Issues: Whether attachment of the petitioner's bank accounts should continue while the restored statutory appeal against the assessment remains pending.

Analysis: The statutory appeal had been remitted for fresh decision and remained undecided. In those circumstances, the revenue's interest required protection through a proportionate deposit rather than continued restraint on operation of the bank accounts.

Conclusion: The bank-account attachment shall be lifted upon deposit of 20% of the assessed tax liability within three weeks, and the restored appeal shall be decided on priority within six months.

Issues: Whether Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are unconstitutional.

Analysis: The vires challenge stood rejected by the binding determination that powers to summon, arrest and prosecute for GST levy, collection and evasion-control are ancillary and incidental to the legislative power under Article 246A of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are constitutionally valid; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing Form No. 10AB for regularisation of provisional registration could be rejected without considering the statutory power to condone delay upon reasonable cause.

Analysis: Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) prescribes the time for filing an application by a provisionally registered institution. However, the proviso inserted with effect from 01.10.2024 expressly empowers the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to condone delay where reasonable cause is established. The strict-compliance principles applicable where no condonation power exists do not displace this express statutory discretion. The explanation based on a bona fide misunderstanding of the provisional-registration period was not inherently implausible or demonstrative of deliberate disregard, though the substantial delay requires a specific examination by the competent authority.

Conclusion: The competent authority must determine whether reasonable cause exists under the proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) and cannot reject the application solely on the premise that the statutory time-limit is incapable of condonation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute expressly authorises condonation of delay on reasonable cause, a time-barred application must be considered under that statutory discretion and cannot be rejected merely because the prescribed period has expired.

Issues: Whether a trust holding a valid and subsisting registration under section 12AB could seek renewal under section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) despite an erroneous sub-clause having been selected in its earlier application for regular registration.

Analysis: The trust had first obtained provisional registration under section 12A(1)(ac)(vi), followed by regular registration which remained operative when the renewal application was filed. Section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) applies to an existing registered trust whose registration is due to expire. An incorrect selection of clause (i), instead of clause (iii), in the earlier application did not negate the legal existence of the regular registration granted by the competent authority. Such subsisting statutory registration could not be treated as non-existent through a collateral challenge unless withdrawn or cancelled in accordance with law. The rejection was not founded on the objects, genuineness of activities, or breach of registration conditions.

Conclusion: The renewal application under section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) was valid, and the absence of registration under the erstwhile regime before 01.04.2021 could not justify refusal of renewal.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is ultra vires the Constitution? (ii) If not, whether the provision is liable to be read down so as to protect a bona fide purchaser? (iii) Whether the show cause notice dated 26.09.2025 lacks the jurisdictional foundation for invoking Section 74? (iv) Whether the proceedings are vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, including the rule against bias and the non issuance of Form GST DRC-01A? (v) Whether, in the absence of any of the above, the petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy?

Issue (i): Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is ultra vires the Constitution?

Analysis: Input tax credit under Section 16 is conditional and Section 16(2) imposes cumulative, mandatory conditions. The supplier-tax-payment condition in Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 41(2), requires reversal where the supplier has not paid tax but permits re-availment once payment is made. Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant. The supplier-default risk assigned to the recipient is a legislative-policy choice, while the reversal-and-restoration mechanism prevents the condition from being final or confiscatory. A speaking Supreme Court ruling affirming the validity of the provision and declining its read-down is binding.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is constitutionally valid. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): If not, whether the provision is liable to be read down so as to protect a bona fide purchaser?

Analysis: The request to read down Section 16(2)(c) stands expressly rejected by the binding ruling on the provision. Independently, a bona fide-purchaser exception would not resolve allegations that credit was claimed through fake invoices, bogus supplies and transactions without movement of goods. The genuineness and bona fides of such transactions require factual determination on evidence within the statutory appellate process.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) is not liable to be read down for the assessee. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the show cause notice dated 26.09.2025 lacks the jurisdictional foundation for invoking Section 74?

Analysis: Section 74(1) requires prima facie satisfaction that wrongful availment of credit resulted from fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax. A mere reproduction of statutory language would be insufficient; however, detailed allegations of layered dealings, fake invoices, bogus supplies and absence of goods movement furnish the requisite jurisdictional foundation. The challenge concerns the adequacy and correctness of the material, which is an issue on merits rather than an absence of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The show cause notice does not lack jurisdictional foundation under Section 74. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the proceedings are vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, including the rule against bias and the non issuance of Form GST DRC-01A?

Analysis: Following the substitution of "shall" by "may" in Rule 142(1A), pre-notice intimation in Form GST DRC-01A is an enabling facility rather than a condition precedent to action under Section 74. Absence of demonstrable prejudice also defeats this objection. The statutory scheme permits the proper officer to undertake investigation and determination; performance of both functions by that officer, without personal interest, animus, closed mind, or other cogent material creating a real likelihood of bias, does not establish disqualifying bias. Alleged inadequate consideration of the reply is, at most, an error within jurisdiction capable of appellate scrutiny.

Conclusion: The proceedings are not vitiated by breach of natural justice, bias, or non-issuance of Form GST DRC-01A. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether, in the absence of any of the above, the petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy?

Analysis: Once the constitutional and jurisdictional challenges fail, disputed questions concerning the alleged bogus transactions, the sufficiency of evidence, and the assessment of the reply fall within the appellate framework under Section 107. Permitting writ review of those merits would bypass the statutory hierarchy.

Conclusion: The assessee must pursue the statutory appellate remedy. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The supplier-tax-payment condition for input tax credit remains enforceable, and the alleged factual merits of the transactions, including their bona fides, remain open for determination under the statutory appellate framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit is a conditional statutory entitlement, and the mandatory supplier-tax-payment condition under Section 16(2)(c), supported by reversal and re-availment under Section 41, cannot be invalidated or read down; disputes as to transaction genuineness ordinarily require recourse to the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether absence of registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 could justify rejection of applications for registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without first deciding the claimed statutory exclusion under section 77(1) of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

Analysis: Compliance with another law may be examined for purposes of sections 12AB and 80G(5) only where that law applies to the applicant. Section 77(1) excludes from the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 a public trust administered by an agency acting under the control of the State Government or a local authority. The material concerning the memorandum of understanding with a Government medical institution, Government representation in the management committee, prescribed supervision, and no-profit-no-loss operation required examination under that statutory test. Absence of Government grants, private trusteeship, or collection of subsidised user charges was not determinative of governmental control. There was also no finding that the objects were non-charitable or that the activities were non-genuine.

Conclusion: Non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 could not by itself sustain rejection of the applications without first determining the claim under section 77(1); the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, following a search initiated after 01.04.2021, assessment for one of the three immediately preceding assessment years could be completed under section 143(3) without initiating reassessment proceedings under sections 147 and 148.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to section 148 deems the Assessing Officer to possess information suggesting escapement of income for the three assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which a post-01.04.2021 search is initiated. Assessment Year 2021-22 fell within that statutory period following the search conducted on 31.12.2021. The statutory deeming fiction required jurisdiction to be assumed through the reassessment mechanism under sections 147 and 148; no notice under section 148 had been issued.

Conclusion: The assessment under section 143(3) was without jurisdiction and was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether compensation paid to eligible investors of defaulting trading members conferred a prohibited benefit on specified persons so as to attract the denial of exemption; (ii) Whether the notified Investor Protection Fund could claim exemption for eligible contributions and other income, including corpus donations; (iii) Whether the Trust Deed established an irrevocable trust whose funds could not revert to the Stock Exchange or its members; and (iv) Whether interest earned on auction proceeds was taxable as the assessee's income.

Issue (i): Whether compensation paid to eligible investors of defaulting trading members conferred a prohibited benefit on specified persons so as to attract the denial of exemption.

Analysis: Sections 13(1)(c)(i), 13(1)(c)(ii) and 13(3)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deny exemption where trust income or property directly or indirectly benefits specified persons. The Fund compensated investors only for the shortfall after realization of the defaulting member's assets. Compensation to brokers or associate brokers was prohibited, the defaulting member's liability was not extinguished, and the Fund retained its recovery rights. No material established any direct or indirect benefit to the Stock Exchange or its members.

Conclusion: No violation of Section 13(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was established; exemption was available in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the notified Investor Protection Fund could claim exemption for eligible contributions and other income, including corpus donations.

Analysis: The Fund was notified for the purposes of Section 10(23EA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and registered under Section 12A. The restriction under Section 11(7) on simultaneous claims was prospective from assessment year 2025-26 and did not govern the assessment years in question. In the absence of a violation of Section 13, corpus donations received with a specific direction formed exempt capital receipts under Section 11(1)(d).

Conclusion: Eligible contributions remained exempt under Section 10(23EA), and corpus donations were exempt under Section 11(1)(d), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Trust Deed established an irrevocable trust whose funds could not revert to the Stock Exchange or its members.

Analysis: The Trust Deed expressly declared the trust irrevocable and prohibited recovery of Fund money by the Stock Exchange. Upon winding up, dissolution or liquidation of the Stock Exchange, the remaining balance after pending claims was required to be transferred to SEBI for investor education, awareness and research. The dissolution arrangement therefore did not permit reversion of the Fund to the settlor or its members.

Conclusion: The trust satisfied the requirement of irrevocability, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether interest earned on auction proceeds was taxable as the assessee's income.

Analysis: Auction proceeds and accrued interest were required to be maintained in a separate account pending adjudication. The assessee held the amounts only in a fiduciary capacity and lacked beneficial ownership. Claiming TDS credit and redepositing the related refund into the dedicated account did not change that character. Under the real-income principle, the interest did not accrue as income of the assessee.

Conclusion: Interest on auction proceeds was not taxable in the hands of the assessee, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemptions and treatment of auction-proceeds interest accepted in the appellate orders were sustained for all the assessment years covered by the consolidated decision.

Issues: (i) Whether healthcare services through mobile medical units under a Government tender constitute medical relief and charitable purpose despite contractual receipts, tax deduction at source and surplus generation; (ii) Whether alleged non-genuineness of activities and payments to specified persons justified rejection of regular registration; (iii) Whether provisional registration could be cancelled without a separate specific notice and opportunity.

Issue (i): Whether healthcare services through mobile medical units under a Government tender constitute medical relief and charitable purpose despite contractual receipts, tax deduction at source and surplus generation.

Analysis: The stated objects were exclusively directed to hospitals, healthcare facilities, mobile health units, diagnostics and medical assistance, with an express bar on commercial operation. Medical relief is an independent charitable limb under section 2(15). The tender mechanism and Government funding were merely the means of delivering healthcare in rural and remote areas. Contractual consideration, deduction of tax at source under section 194C and generation of surplus did not alter the essential nature of medical services where no independent profit-making activity or distribution of profits was established.

Conclusion: Mobile medical unit services provided under the Government contract constituted medical relief and charitable purpose, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged non-genuineness of activities and payments to specified persons justified rejection of regular registration.

Analysis: Financial statements, constitutional documents, Government tender and agreement records, ledger accounts, tax records and supporting camp material substantiated the medical activities. Beneficiary and camp records were maintained through the Government health machinery, from which further verification could have been undertaken. Payments to persons specified under section 13(3) were supported as remuneration for medical, managerial and administrative services; no finding established that the payments were excessive or unreasonable. Mere specified-person relationship could not establish diversion of funds or render the activities non-genuine.

Conclusion: The alleged non-genuineness and related-party payments did not justify refusal of regular registration, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether provisional registration could be cancelled without a separate specific notice and opportunity.

Analysis: Rejection of regular registration and cancellation of an existing provisional registration carry distinct consequences. No separate notice identifying statutory grounds for cancellation or effective opportunity to answer those grounds was demonstrated.

Conclusion: Cancellation of the provisional registration without separate specific notice and opportunity was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Regular registration was required to be granted, and the provisional registration remained unaffected by the invalid cancellation.

Ratio Decidendi: An activity falling within medical relief retains its charitable character notwithstanding Government contractual funding, tax deduction at source or surplus, unless material establishes a departure from charitable objects or impermissible application of income; cancellation of registration also requires specific notice and opportunity.

Issues: (i) Whether suspended directors whose rights are affected by a challenged forensic audit report may be impleaded as petitioners after the company enters corporate insolvency resolution process; (ii) Whether amendments bringing the subsequent insolvency proceedings on record may be permitted; and (iii) Whether the company may be transposed from petitioner to respondent where the resolution professional declines to prosecute the writ petition.

Issue (i): Whether suspended directors whose rights are affected by a challenged forensic audit report may be impleaded as petitioners after the company enters corporate insolvency resolution process.

Analysis: Under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a person whose presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication may be added as a party. Upon commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process, the company's management vests in the resolution professional and the directors' powers stand suspended. Since the resolution professional did not wish to continue the challenge and the forensic audit report affected the suspended directors' rights, their presence was necessary to enable adjudication of the challenge and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

Conclusion: The suspended directors may be impleaded as petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether amendments bringing the subsequent insolvency proceedings on record may be permitted.

Analysis: The proposed amendments only placed subsequent events concerning the company's admission to corporate insolvency resolution process and appointment of the resolution professional on record. They were formal and did not alter the nature or character of the writ petition.

Conclusion: The amendments may be carried out.

Issue (iii): Whether the company may be transposed from petitioner to respondent where the resolution professional declines to prosecute the writ petition.

Analysis: As management of the company vested in the resolution professional, and the resolution professional was unwilling to pursue the writ proceedings, the company could not continue as a petitioner. Its presence as a respondent permits notice through the resolution professional while allowing the challenge to proceed through the added petitioners.

Conclusion: The company may be transposed as a respondent.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the forensic audit report may proceed through the added petitioners, with the company represented in the proceedings through its resolution professional as a respondent.

Issues: (i) Whether the loan of Rs. 3,20,499 received from the assessee's sister constituted unexplained investment under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 14,60,000 based on stamp duty value under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the loan of Rs. 3,20,499 received from the assessee's sister constituted unexplained investment under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee furnished the lender's PAN, loan confirmation and bank statement evidencing receipt through banking channels. No defect or discrepancy in those documents was identified, although the addition proceeded on the premise that confirmation had not been furnished.

Conclusion: The loan was satisfactorily explained and the addition under Section 69 was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs. 14,60,000 based on stamp duty value under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The factual position concerning the March 2014 MOU, payment of Rs. 1,50,000, delivery of possession, part performance, property condition and valuation had not been correctly appreciated. The observation that two apartments had been purchased also required factual verification. Examination of the applicability of Section 56(2)(vii)(b), Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was directed after affording effective opportunity of hearing and independently evaluating the material rather than merely relying on the remand report.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was restored for fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The unexplained-investment addition is unsustainable on the evidence produced, while the stamp-duty-value addition remains to be determined afresh upon proper verification of the transaction and relevant material.

Issues: Whether penalty for misreporting of income at 200% could be imposed when penalty proceedings and the statutory notice were initiated only for under-reporting of income.

Analysis: Under-reporting under section 270A attracts penalty at 50% of the tax payable, whereas under-reporting resulting from misreporting attracts penalty at 200%. Misreporting is confined to the specified circumstances under section 270A(9). These are distinct statutory defaults with different ingredients, penal consequences, available defences and consequences concerning immunity. The assessment order and notice identified only under-reporting and did not allege misreporting or specify any circumstance under section 270A(9). The subsequently imposed penalty proceeded on the aggravated charge of misreporting without prior notice to the assessee.

Conclusion: Penalty imposed for misreporting of income on a charge different from the initiated and notified charge of under-reporting of income is unsustainable; the penalty was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment based on investigation information concerning an alleged accommodation-entry loan was valid; (ii) Whether the unsecured loan addition and consequential interest disallowance were sustainable; (iii) Whether the claim for current-year and brought-forward business losses could be entertained without supporting material.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment based on investigation information concerning an alleged accommodation-entry loan was valid.

Analysis: The information was specific to the assessee and directly concerned the unsecured loan alleged to have resulted in escaped income. At the stage of recording reasons, a prima facie belief was sufficient. The material disclosed a live nexus between the investigation information and the belief of income escaping assessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment was valid. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the unsecured loan addition and consequential interest disallowance were sustainable.

Analysis: Confirmation and banking details did not, by themselves, establish the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the loan where the creditor neither responded to the statutory notice nor appeared for examination, and adverse investigation material remained unrebutted. The primary onus under the unexplained cash credit provision was not discharged. The interest claim was consequential to the unsupported loan transaction.

Conclusion: The unsecured loan addition and consequential interest disallowance were sustained. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the claim for current-year and brought-forward business losses could be entertained without supporting material.

Analysis: No material established fulfilment of the statutory requirements for determination and carry-forward of the claimed losses. The necessary factual foundation for the claim was absent.

Conclusion: The business-loss claim was rightly declined. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment, the unexplained cash-credit treatment of the loan, the related interest disallowance, and the refusal of the loss claim remain operative for all assessment years covered by the common order.

Ratio Decidendi: Banking-channel payments and loan confirmations alone do not discharge the assessee's burden to prove the creditworthiness of the creditor and genuineness of a transaction where adverse material remains unrebutted.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the advance ruling required adjudication when no assessment proceedings were pending.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of as nothing survived for consideration, with liberty to reopen it if any assessment proceedings concerning the respondent were found pending.

Issues: Whether the company claim instituted by the Official Liquidator was barred by limitation.

Analysis: A claim under Section 446(2) is governed by Article 137, and the right to apply accrues when the winding-up order is made, provided the claim was legally enforceable when the winding-up proceedings commenced. Section 458A excludes the period from commencement of winding-up proceedings until the winding-up order, and also excludes one year immediately following that order. The Official Liquidator consequently has three years under Article 137 together with the additional one-year exclusion following the winding-up order.

Conclusion: The claim filed within four years from the winding-up order was within limitation; the respondent's preliminary objection was rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether dissemination of the ethical and philosophical teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, alongside wider public-welfare objects, rendered the institution ineligible for approval under section 80G(5); (ii) Whether the expenditure reported in Form 10AB constituted religious expenditure exceeding the statutory limit under section 80G(5B).

Issue (i): Whether dissemination of the ethical and philosophical teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, alongside wider public-welfare objects, rendered the institution ineligible for approval under section 80G(5).

Analysis: Section 80G(5)(iii) requires that an institution not be expressed to benefit a particular religious community or caste, while Explanation 3 to section 80G excludes purposes wholly or substantially religious from charitable purpose. The relevant inquiry is the institution's dominant character, assessed from its objects as a whole, its beneficiaries and its actual activities. Its objects included relief to indigent persons, medical relief, public libraries, public welfare and moral advancement, with services available without distinction of class, caste or community. Dissemination of spiritual and philosophical teachings without denominational restriction did not, by itself, establish a purpose of advancing a particular religion.

Conclusion: The institution was not one existing wholly or substantially for religious purposes and was eligible for approval under section 80G(5), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the expenditure reported in Form 10AB constituted religious expenditure exceeding the statutory limit under section 80G(5B).

Analysis: Section 80G(5B) permits religious expenditure not exceeding 5% of total income. The amount entered as religious expenditure in Form 10AB exactly matched total expenditure in the audited accounts, notwithstanding the negative answer to the preceding query on religious expenditure. This supported the explanation of a clerical data-entry error. The expenditure capable of being treated as religious, recorded as Mandir Pooja expenditure, ranged from 1.46% to 2.92% of gross receipts and remained below the statutory ceiling.

Conclusion: The reported figures could not be treated as religious expenditure, and any religious expenditure was within the statutory limit, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory conditions for recognition of donations were satisfied, and the refusal based on religious character and excessive religious expenditure lacked legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Approval under section 80G cannot be denied merely because an institution disseminates spiritual or philosophical teachings or incurs incidental religious expenditure; its dominant objects, unrestricted beneficiaries and compliance with the statutory expenditure ceiling determine eligibility.

Issues: Whether an exporter of software services is entitled to refund of unutilised CENVAT credit for the relevant period even where the exported software service is not a taxable service.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 governs refund of accumulated credit attributable to exported output services. The binding position applied was that the non-taxability of exported software services does not disentitle an eligible exporter from claiming refund of CENVAT credit. The substantial questions concerning Rule 5, the definition of taxable service, and Notification No. 18/2008-ST were already governed by that position.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to refund of CENVAT credit notwithstanding that the exported software service was not taxable.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate proceedings could be adjudicated after the assessee opted under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and Form 3 had been issued; (ii) Whether exemption under Section 10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was available in respect of long-term capital gains from sale of shares of Sunrise Asian Ltd.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate proceedings could be adjudicated after the assessee opted under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and Form 3 had been issued.

Analysis: The assessee had filed Forms 1 and 2 under the settlement scheme, and Form 3 was issued by the designated authority. The lower appellate authority treated the appeal as incapable of adjudication under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. That finding was confirmed.

Conclusion: The appeal could not be adjudicated after issuance of Form 3 under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether exemption under Section 10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was available in respect of long-term capital gains from sale of shares of Sunrise Asian Ltd.

Analysis: The investigation report and the SEBI adjudication report established manipulation and rigging of the scrip's share price. Although those materials were furnished to the assessee, no supporting documents were produced before either the lower appellate authority or the Tribunal, despite the second round of proceedings and adjournments. The findings disallowing the claimed exemption were therefore sustained.

Conclusion: The claimed exemption for the long-term capital gains was not allowable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The settlement-scheme position and the merits independently sustain the Revenue's treatment of the disputed share-sale gains.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication order and the appellate order dismissing the statutory appeal as time-barred should be set aside and the matter restored for fresh adjudication where the assessee could not respond to the show-cause notice due to health grounds and hospitalization of its accountant.

Analysis: The adjudication was made ex parte because no reply was filed to the show-cause notice. The statutory appeal was dismissed solely on limitation and was not examined on merits. Health issues, including the hospitalization of the assessee's accountant, were accepted as sufficient circumstances for the failure to participate. A justice-oriented approach required a fresh opportunity to file a reply, produce supporting material and be heard, consistent with Natural Justice and Opportunity of Hearing.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication and the limitation-based appellate dismissal were set aside, and the matter was restored to the adjudicating authority for fresh consideration from the stage of filing a reply to the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether the marketing and promotional services rendered by the assessee qualified as export of service under the Export of Service Rules, 2005.

Analysis: The Revenue's grounds substantially reiterated the contentions raised before the authorities below. The Tribunal's finding that the services fell within Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, read with the applicable Board circular, remained unassailed by any ground warranting interference. The precedent relied upon by the Revenue did not support its challenge, as the comparable issue had been resolved in favour of the assessee.

Conclusion: The services were correctly treated as export of service; the finding is in favour of the assessee.