Issues: Whether interest is payable on the refund of IGST collected on ocean freight from the date of its original payment.

Analysis: The claim was accepted as identical to the precedent governing refund of IGST levied on ocean freight. That precedent treats the declaration invalidating the levy as operative from inception, absent an express prospective limitation, and recognises that interest compensates the taxpayer for being deprived of the refunded amount during its retention by the authorities.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest on the refunded IGST in the manner specified in the governing precedent.

Issues: Whether rejection of condonation of an 18-day delay in furnishing Form 10B for claiming exemption was sustainable.

Analysis: The audit report was delayed by only 18 days during the continuing Covid-19 pandemic. The requirement of furnishing the audit report is procedural, and the report may be produced before the assessment or appellate authority upon sufficient cause. The pandemic-related inability to file the report was accepted as genuine, establishing genuine hardship. The delegated discretion under Section 119(2)(b) required a pragmatic application favouring substantial justice over technicality; the refusal did not reflect proper application of that discretion.

Conclusion: The rejection of condonation was invalid. The delayed Form 10B must be treated as having been filed within the prescribed period and taken into account for the exemption claim.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to regular bail in a prosecution alleging GST evasion through transportation of goods without invoices and e-way bills.

Analysis: The application was considered under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The record indicated that the accused was a transporter rather than a manufacturer or supplier, no computation or determination of GST liability attributable to him had been made, the charge sheet had been filed, he had remained in custody since 12.04.2026, and the trial was likely to take time. The assessment was made without commenting on the merits of the prosecution.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to regular bail.

Issues: Whether the Revenue established sufficient cause for condonation of 156 days' delay in filing an appeal.

Analysis: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits condonation where sufficient cause is shown. The explanation disclosed the departmental process of scrutiny, obtaining opinions and approvals, collection of documents, settlement of the appeal memorandum and final approval for filing. A justice-oriented and pragmatic approach applies to bona fide administrative delays, and the decisive consideration is the sufficiency of the cause rather than the length of delay. The explanation was not shown to be mala fide or factually incorrect. Handwritten insertion of dates in the application did not, by itself, establish that it was mechanical or stereotyped.

Conclusion: The delay was sufficiently and bona fide explained and was condoned in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether consideration received on sale of transferable development rights obtained in exchange for surrendered land is chargeable to capital gains tax and the cost of acquisition deductible therefrom; (ii) Whether the scrutiny assessment was confined to verification of the refund claim and excluded examination of the transferable development rights receipt; (iii) Whether acceptance of exemption for similar transferable development rights receipts in the assessment of the assessee's brother required identical treatment.

Issue (i): Whether consideration received on sale of transferable development rights obtained in exchange for surrendered land is chargeable to capital gains tax and the cost of acquisition deductible therefrom.

Analysis: Transferable development rights are property and therefore capital assets. The surrender of land for transferable development rights constituted an exchange, followed by a separate transfer of the rights for cash. Unlike self-generated transferable development rights arising solely from regulatory entitlement, the rights in question were acquired by giving up an identifiable capital asset. Their cost of acquisition was consequently ascertainable as the cost attributable to the land surrendered. The computation mechanism did not fail, and the principle applicable where an asset has no conceivable cost of acquisition was inapplicable. The subsequent amendment concerning intangible assets for which no consideration is paid did not displace the actual cost incurred through surrender of land.

Conclusion: The sale consideration of the transferable development rights is chargeable to capital gains tax, against the assessee; however, the capital gains must be recomputed after deduction of the cost of acquisition attributable to the land exchanged.

Issue (ii): Whether the scrutiny assessment was confined to verification of the refund claim and excluded examination of the transferable development rights receipt.

Analysis: The notice merely identified the refund claim as an initial matter for verification and did not state that the case had been selected for limited scrutiny. It did not restrict examination of the chargeability of the receipt claimed as exempt.

Conclusion: The assessment was not confined to limited scrutiny, and examination of the transferable development rights receipt was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether acceptance of exemption for similar transferable development rights receipts in the assessment of the assessee's brother required identical treatment.

Analysis: An assessment order in another taxpayer's case, without a conscious and binding acceptance of the same legal position on identical facts, does not establish a legal right to identical treatment. An erroneous or unexamined assessment does not bind the Revenue in a separate assessment, and estoppel does not operate against the correct application of statute.

Conclusion: The assessment of the assessee's brother did not require exemption of the receipt in the present case, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The receipt remains taxable as capital gains, with the allowable cost of land surrendered required to be deducted in computing the taxable gain.

Ratio Decidendi: Where transferable development rights are acquired in exchange for surrender of land, the land surrendered supplies an ascertainable cost of acquisition, so the capital gains computation mechanism remains operative on their subsequent sale.

Issues: Whether the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee equivalent to approximately 80% of the value of imported goods for their provisional release was excessive, and the appropriate conditions for release pending adjudication.

Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits release of seized goods on conditions that safeguard Revenue during pending adjudication while enabling the importer to deal with the goods. A bank guarantee fixed at approximately 80% of the goods' value was onerous. Since the anti-dumping duty liability remained under investigation and no merits determination was made, a balanced security condition was required.

Conclusion: The provisional-release condition was modified to require a bank guarantee of 30% of the differential duty together with a bond for the full value of the seized goods; the goods were directed to be released in a time-bound manner.

Issues: Whether interim relief should be granted against the securities-market debarment to enable completion of the approved preferential issue of fully convertible warrants and limited mutual-fund transactions.

Analysis: The preferential issue had been approved by 76.64% of the public shareholders, who comprised about 96% of the shareholding, and was expected to raise substantial capital. No charge concerning dealing in securities had been made against the company. The regulatory position that the investment could proceed after expiry of the debarment, without identifying any other legal bar, supported limited interim protection. The merits of the underlying proceedings were expressly kept open.

Outcome: Limited interim stay granted to permit completion of the preferential warrant issue upon deposit of the penalties, with the debarment otherwise continuing; the time for issuance was extended by one week and ordinary-course mutual-fund transactions were permitted.

Issues: Whether admission of the corporate insolvency resolution process application was liable to be set aside because the financial creditor relied on photocopies of documents.

Analysis: Section 7 permits ascertainment of default from information-utility records or other evidence furnished by the financial creditor. The undisputed record of default from NeSL, the corporate debtor's acknowledged loan liabilities and deposit pursuant to the DRAT order, and the absence of a specific challenge to the pleaded date of default established default. A claimed factual error in the NCLT's recording of a concession could not be raised in the writ petition without first seeking correction of the NCLT order through an application for speaking to the minutes.

Conclusion: The admission of the application under Section 7 was valid, and no ground for writ interference was made out.

Issues: Whether Cenvat credit on input services could be denied because the service-provider invoices were issued in the name of the head office, which was not registered as an Input Service Distributor.

Analysis: Rule 9 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 permits verification of receipt and accounting of input services notwithstanding defects in invoice particulars. During the relevant period, there was no requirement that credit relating to head-office invoices be distributed proportionately through an Input Service Distributor. The absence of Input Service Distributor registration was a procedural irregularity where no unintended credit benefit or revenue loss resulted.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit was admissible to the assessee; denial solely for want of Input Service Distributor registration of the head office was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice and consequential cancellation of GST registration, which do not disclose the particulars of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression and contain no reasons, are valid; and whether availability of an alternate remedy bars writ jurisdiction in the presence of apparent illegality.

Analysis: The show-cause notice merely reproduced the statutory grounds without stating the factual particulars required to enable an effective response. It fixed the date of appearance on the very date of issuance, affording no sufficient opportunity to reply. The cancellation order did not disclose the ground for cancellation and revealed non-application of mind. Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be invoked despite an alternate remedy where the impugned action disclosed glaring illegality affecting the rights of a registered trader.

Conclusion: The deficient show-cause notice and the unreasoned cancellation order were invalid and liable to be set aside.

Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation and the underlying adjudication order could stand where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation, preventing the petitioner from responding.

Analysis: Uploading the show-cause notice only under the specified portal tab, without separate intimation, prevented the petitioner from filing a response. This amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. Since the appellate authority dismissed the appeal solely on limitation without examining the merits, interference was warranted on the peculiar facts.

Conclusion: The impugned appellate and adjudication orders cannot be sustained for breach of natural justice; the petitioner is entitled to respond to the show-cause notice and to a fresh reasoned determination after an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the assessment order should be set aside for fresh adjudication upon the petitioner's undertaking to make a deposit of the disputed tax.

Analysis: The statutory period for appeal had expired, and the petitioner had not availed the opportunity of personal hearing. The petitioner nevertheless undertook to deposit 50% of the disputed tax in cash and to submit a reply with supporting documents.

Outcome: The assessment order was quashed and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication upon compliance with the stipulated deposit and reply requirements.

Outcome: Appeals disposed of and matters remitted to the jurisdictional High Courts.

Issues: (i) Whether a draft assessment order could be treated as a final assessment order to sustain a demand and penalty proceedings; (ii) Whether the draft-assessment procedure applied where the Transfer Pricing Officer had proposed no variation in the assessee's returned income.

Issue (i): Whether a draft assessment order could be treated as a final assessment order to sustain a demand and penalty proceedings.

Analysis: The assessment order expressly described itself as a draft order under Section 144C(1), characterised the disallowance as a proposed addition, withheld issuance of demand and penalty notices, and granted the assessee an option under Section 144C(2) to accept the proposed variation or file objections. A final assessment determining the sum payable, as required by Section 143(3), was never passed. A demand under Section 156 could not rest on this draft order. The asserted error in selecting an incorrect portal tab was inconsistent with the contents of the order and was not corrected through any subsequent order; Section 292B could not cure the defect.

Conclusion: The draft assessment order could not be deemed a final assessment order; the consequential demand and penalty initiation were invalid. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the draft-assessment procedure applied where the Transfer Pricing Officer had proposed no variation in the assessee's returned income.

Analysis: The Transfer Pricing Officer made no variation to the international transactions because the applicable advance pricing agreement covered the relevant assessment year. Consequently, the assessee was not an eligible assessee under Section 144C(15)(b), and the Assessing Officer had no occasion to invoke the draft-assessment procedure under Section 144C(1).

Conclusion: The draft assessment order was without authority under Section 144C because the assessee was not an eligible assessee. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The invalid draft assessment order and all consequential fiscal and penalty actions lack legal foundation and stand annulled.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand can arise only from a final assessment determining the sum payable, and a draft order issued under Section 144C cannot be converted into a final assessment through Section 292B, particularly where the assessee is not eligible for the draft-assessment procedure.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee had a service permanent establishment in India through activities undertaken by its personnel for its Indian subsidiary; (ii) Whether the Indian subsidiary constituted a dependent agent permanent establishment and, if so, whether any further profit was attributable to it.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee had a service permanent establishment in India through activities undertaken by its personnel for its Indian subsidiary.

Analysis: Article 5(2)(l) requires furnishing of services in India through employees or other personnel, while excluding services falling within Article 12. The established activities comprised oversight of the subsidiary, employee training, administrative support, news-gathering assistance and product-sales support. Oversight was stewardship or auxiliary activity; moreover, the Revenue did not establish that the remaining activities were beyond auxiliary functions or did not constitute technical or consultancy services excluded from the service-PE clause.

Conclusion: The assessee had no service permanent establishment in India. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Indian subsidiary constituted a dependent agent permanent establishment and, if so, whether any further profit was attributable to it.

Analysis: Article 5(4) requires authority habitually exercised to conclude contracts, maintenance of stock for regular delivery on behalf of the enterprise, or habitual securing of orders wholly or almost wholly for it. The subsidiary independently contracted with Indian customers, raised its own invoices, bore contractual responsibilities and indemnified the assessee. The assessee's product-related controls and exclusive distribution arrangement did not displace the principal-to-principal character of sales. Independently, the transfer-pricing order had accepted the transactions between the assessee and subsidiary as arm's length.

Conclusion: The Indian subsidiary was not a dependent agent permanent establishment; consequently, no profit was attributable to it. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No taxable profit could be assessed on the basis of a permanent establishment in India, and the income returned by the assessee was required to be accepted.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsidiary dealing independently with customers on a principal-to-principal basis is not a dependent agent merely because of parental control or exclusive distribution, and a service permanent establishment cannot arise without proof of qualifying services beyond auxiliary activities or services excluded under the treaty.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129 for transportation without an e-way bill is leviable where the movement is a stock transfer between premises of the same registered person.

Analysis: The movement under a delivery challan was between premises bearing the same GSTIN, involved no distinct counterparty and lacked consideration. It consequently did not constitute a supply under the statutory definition and could not be an intra-State taxable supply attracting the charging provision. Since no tax was payable on the goods, the tax-linked penalty formula under Section 129 could not be invoked. Although the e-way bill requirement applies to movement for reasons other than supply, its breach did not justify recourse to Section 129 in the circumstances; the applicable consequence for such a document-related contravention lay under the specific penal provision. The record also contained no allegation or material establishing fraud, suppression, or non-genuineness beyond the absence of an e-way bill.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 129 is not leviable for transport of goods without an e-way bill where the transport is a stock transfer between premises of the same registered person.