Issues: (i) whether the suspension of mining operations could stand when it was issued without hearing, on an erroneous premise regarding environmental clearance, and without demonstrated jurisdictional facts; (ii) whether the petitioners were entitled to compensatory addition of the suspended period to the lease term; and (iii) whether delay, laches, or Section 8A of the Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 barred the relief.

Issue (i): whether the suspension of mining operations could stand when it was issued without hearing, on an erroneous premise regarding environmental clearance, and without demonstrated jurisdictional facts.

Analysis: The leasehold interest was treated as protected property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The suspension order was found to rest on an incorrect assumption that there was no valid environmental clearance, although the clearance was held to be subsisting. The order was also held to have been passed without notice or opportunity of hearing, and the authority invoking the 2007 Rules was held not to have shown the necessary jurisdictional facts for exercise of power. The action was therefore treated as legally unsustainable and void ab initio.

Conclusion: The suspension order could not be sustained and was liable to be ignored for the purpose of granting consequential relief in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): whether the petitioners were entitled to compensatory addition of the suspended period to the lease term.

Analysis: The lease deed and its force majeure arrangement were construed as permitting addition of the period during which the lessee was prevented from enjoying the leasehold because of wrongful State action. The Court held that the stoppage of mining constituted substantial interference with the right of quiet enjoyment, and that once resumption was permitted, denial of the lost period would defeat the contractual and equitable basis of relief. The distinction between grant or renewal of lease and compensatory restoration of the lost period was emphasised, and Section 8A of the Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 was held not to bar such relief.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to addition of the suspended period of 5 years and 10 months to the mining lease.

Issue (iii): whether delay, laches, or Section 8A of the Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 barred the relief.

Analysis: The Court held that the petition was not defeated by delay and laches because the grievance had been pursued through representations and proceedings culminating in resumption, and because the impugned action affected substantive property rights under Article 300A. It further held that Section 8A did not prevent compensatory addition of the lost period, since the relief was not a fresh extension of lease but restoration of the period lost due to wrongful interdiction.

Conclusion: Neither delay and laches nor Section 8A barred the grant of relief.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded, and the petitioners were granted a mandamus for an additional operating period equal to the time lost during wrongful suspension, subject to ordinary compliances.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory mining lease is wrongfully interrupted by an unsustainable State action passed without jurisdictional basis and without hearing, the lost period may be restored as compensatory relief, and such restoration is not barred merely because the lease is otherwise governed by a statutory outer limit on renewal or extension.

Issues: Whether amounts received by a claimant under a Mediclaim or medical insurance policy are deductible from compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, including under the head of medical expenses.

Analysis: The governing principle in motor accident compensation is to award just compensation without duplication for the same head of loss. Deductions are ordinarily justified only where the receipt has the same source and nature as the loss compensated, or where it is a substitute for the very loss arising from the accident. By contrast, Mediclaim is a contractual benefit purchased by payment of premiums and does not arise from the accident itself. Compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a statutory entitlement triggered by the accident, whereas reimbursement under a Mediclaim policy flows from a separate contractual arrangement. Treating the two as overlapping would ignore the distinct source of the benefit and would unfairly deprive the claimant of the contractual advantage purchased in advance.

Conclusion: Mediclaim or medical insurance amounts are not deductible from compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even when medical expenses are claimed before the Tribunal.

Issues: Whether the appellant, who had remained in custody for more than one year and against whom the charge sheet and supplementary charge sheet had been filed, was entitled to bail pending trial.

Analysis: The Court noted the length of incarceration and the fact that investigation had substantially progressed with filing of the charge sheet and supplementary charge sheet. In these circumstances, the Court found that further custodial detention of the appellant was not required. The order also records that no opinion was being expressed on the merits of the prosecution case and that the grant of bail was for the limited purpose of release pending trial.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to release on bail on such terms and conditions as the trial court may impose.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in extending time for compliance under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the matter required remand for fresh consideration of the tenant's alleged default and the first date of hearing.

Analysis: Order XV Rule 5 is intended to secure deposit of admitted rent during the pendency of a suit, but the power to strike off the defence is not to be exercised mechanically. The Court reiterated that the consequence is penal in nature and must be applied only after examining the relevant facts, including whether there has been compliance or substantial compliance, whether the default is wilful or bona fide, and what constitutes the first date of hearing. The Court also noted that procedural rules are meant to advance justice and not defeat it. On the record, the foundational aspects for invoking the rule had not been adequately examined by the courts below, while the High Court's later indulgence did not properly reconcile with its earlier conditional order.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial court for a fresh decision on the application under Order XV Rule 5 CPC after determining the first date of hearing and considering compliance, substantial compliance, and the nature of any default.

Issues: (i) whether the amounts advanced by the appellants to the respondents answered the definition of "deposit" under the MPID Act; (ii) whether the respondents fell within the expression "financial establishment" under the MPID Act and were liable to proceedings under Section 3; (iii) whether failure to establish offences under the Indian Penal Code or the civil nature of the dispute barred recourse to the MPID Act.

Issue (i): whether the amounts advanced by the appellants to the respondents answered the definition of "deposit" under the MPID Act.

Analysis: The definition of "deposit" under Section 2(c) is of wide amplitude and includes any receipt of money by a financial establishment to be returned after a specified period, with or without interest or other benefit. The real character of the transaction depends on its ingredients and not on the label attached to it. On the admitted facts, money was advanced for return with quarterly interest, which satisfied the statutory ingredients.

Conclusion: The amounts advanced constituted "deposit" within Section 2(c) of the MPID Act.

Issue (ii): whether the respondents fell within the expression "financial establishment" under the MPID Act and were liable to proceedings under Section 3.

Analysis: Section 2(d) defines "financial establishment" broadly to include any person accepting deposits under any scheme, arrangement, or in any other manner. Once the respondents accepted the amounts as deposits, their status was brought within the statutory definition. Section 3 then applied to fraudulent default in repayment of the deposit with promised benefit.

Conclusion: The respondents were "financial establishment[s]" within Section 2(d) and were amenable to proceedings under Section 3 of the MPID Act.

Issue (iii): whether failure to establish offences under the Indian Penal Code or the civil nature of the dispute barred recourse to the MPID Act.

Analysis: Proceedings under the IPC and proceedings under the MPID Act operate in distinct statutory fields. Non-establishment of IPC offences does not create any embargo against invoking the MPID Act. Likewise, the civil complexion of a money dispute does not exclude the operation of a special enactment where the statutory ingredients are otherwise satisfied.

Conclusion: Recourse to the MPID Act was not barred by the earlier IPC proceedings or by the civil nature of the dispute.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside and the appellants were held entitled to proceed under the MPID Act for redress of their grievance.

Ratio Decidendi: A money transaction repayable after a specified period with promised benefit may constitute a "deposit" under the MPID Act irrespective of nomenclature, and acceptance of such deposit by private persons can bring them within "financial establishment"; the special remedy under the MPID Act remains available even if parallel IPC allegations fail.

Issues: Whether a dispute regarding deduction and refund of BOCW cess, arising from a construction contract and turning on the applicability of the BOCW enactments and related rules, is arbitrable and fit for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The controversy was held to be governed substantially by the statutory framework under the Building and Other Construction Workers enactments, including the question whether the work fell within the exclusion in the definition of building or other construction work. The deduction was made pursuant to statutory provisions, government notifications, and the contractual stipulation incorporated in the agreement, and the amount had already been deposited with the competent State authority. The Court held that disputes centred on statutory liability, levy, collection, and applicability of the cess are matters for the competent statutory mechanism and not a pure contractual dispute amenable to arbitration at the referral stage.

Conclusion: The request for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator was rejected, as the dispute was held not fit for reference under Section 11(6) and was required to be pursued before the statutory authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff proved its monetary claim and entitlement to recover amounts against the defendants in the civil suit. (ii) Whether the acquittal in the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the cheque was issued towards an admitted liability and the defence was not proved.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff proved its monetary claim and entitlement to recover amounts against the defendants in the civil suit.

Analysis: The suit was founded on alleged joint business dealings, supply of yarn, job-work charges, and damages for non-delivery of garments. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to prove any joint business association among the defendants or any reliable entrustment of work and delivery of materials. The agreement relied on was found to be suspicious because the stamp paper post-dated the alleged execution. The documents said to connect the fifth defendant were held unreliable, and the evidence showed that the plaintiff had not established the claim by acceptable proof.

Conclusion: The civil claim was not proved and the decree of the trial court was set aside in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquittal in the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the cheque was issued towards an admitted liability and the defence was not proved.

Analysis: The Court held that the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt, that the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption, and that the defence based on alleged transactions and a purported agreement was unsupported and unreliable. The reversal of conviction by the appellate criminal court had been founded mainly on the civil decree, which no longer survived. The evidence also showed that the defence version did not displace the complainant's case of cheque dishonour.

Conclusion: The acquittal was unsustainable and the conviction and sentence were restored in favour of the complainant.

Final Conclusion: Both connected matters were allowed, with the civil decree set aside and the criminal acquittal reversed, resulting in restoration of the trial court's conviction and dismissal of the civil suit.

Ratio Decidendi: A cheque issued for an admitted liability attracts the statutory presumption under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the presumption is displaced only by credible rebuttal evidence; unsupported allegations and unreliable fabricated documents do not suffice. A civil monetary claim must also be proved by cogent evidence of the underlying transaction and liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the dishonoured cheque issued in the course of a loan transaction attracted criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139. (ii) Whether the High Court should interfere in revision with the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence.

Issue (i): Whether the dishonoured cheque issued in the course of a loan transaction attracted criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139.

Analysis: The loan transaction and issuance of the cheque were admitted, as were the signatures on the cheque. The accused also admitted borrowing the amount, but failed to establish a probable defence showing absence of legally enforceable liability. The cheque, even if asserted to be a security cheque, did not cease to attract Section 138 where the underlying debt subsisted and the cheque matured for presentation. In the absence of a successful rebuttal, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operated in favour of the complainant.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 was upheld, and the finding was against the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court should interfere in revision with the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence.

Analysis: Revisional power is limited to correcting jurisdictional error, illegality, or gross miscarriage of justice, and does not permit routine reappreciation of evidence where the trial court and appellate court have recorded concurrent findings based on proper appreciation of the record. No material irregularity or failure of justice was shown to justify interference.

Conclusion: No revisional interference was warranted, and the concurrent findings were sustained.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed on merits, the conviction and sentence were affirmed, and the petitioner remained liable to undergo the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: A dishonoured cheque issued in a loan transaction attracts Section 138 where the drawer fails to rebut the statutory presumptions by raising a probable defence, and a revisional court will not interfere with concurrent findings absent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice.

Issues: Whether the disputed receipt, whose handwriting and signatures were denied by the complainant, ought to have been ed to the Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison, and whether the order rejecting the request was sustainable.

Analysis: The petition arose from proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the accused relied on a receipt marked as Exhibit D01A. The complainant denied both the signatures and handwriting on that document. In such a situation, expert examination of the disputed document was relevant for a just adjudication of the matter, and the trial court's rejection of the request on conjectural grounds failed to account for its evidentiary value.

Conclusion: The request for FSL examination was allowed, and the order rejecting it was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The disputed document is to be examined by the handwriting expert, and the trial proceedings remain stayed until the FSL report is received.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the signatures and handwriting on a material document are specifically denied, the court may direct forensic comparison if the document can bear on the just adjudication of the case.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order, passed by a successor Additional Commissioner without the petitioner's personal hearing and without available hearing notes of the predecessor officer, was vitiated by breach of natural justice and constitutional fairness; (ii) Whether the availability of an alternate statutory remedy barred exercise of writ jurisdiction despite such violation.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned order, passed by a successor Additional Commissioner without the petitioner's personal hearing and without available hearing notes of the predecessor officer, was vitiated by breach of natural justice and constitutional fairness.

Analysis: The order had been made by an officer who had not heard the petitioner, while the hearing had been conducted by a different officer of the same rank who had earlier occupied the post. The record did not establish that the successor had before him the notes of final hearing prepared by the predecessor. In such circumstances, the decision-making process was found to offend the basic requirement of a fair hearing and constitutional fairness under Article 14.

Conclusion: The impugned order was held to be vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice and was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of an alternate statutory remedy barred exercise of writ jurisdiction despite such violation.

Analysis: The existence of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar where the complaint is of breach of natural justice. The exception to the alternate remedy rule applies where the impugned action is taken in violation of fair hearing requirements, and the writ court may entertain the petition in such a case.

Conclusion: The alternate remedy objection was rejected and writ jurisdiction was exercised.

Final Conclusion: The petitions were allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration with an opportunity to the petitioner to place written submissions and seek supply of documents.

Ratio Decidendi: An order passed without a fair personal hearing by the authority deciding the matter is vitiated by natural justice, and the existence of an alternate remedy does not bar writ intervention in such cases.

Issues: (i) Whether a miscellaneous application in a disposed of civil appeal seeking to treat the oral dictation as final and the digitally signed order as having no force of law was maintainable. (ii) Whether the differences between the oral dictation and the signed order amounted to a material change requiring re-hearing or rendered the signed order invalid.

Issue (i): Whether a miscellaneous application in a disposed of civil appeal seeking to treat the oral dictation as final and the digitally signed order as having no force of law was maintainable.

Analysis: The application was held to be in the nature of a review and not a permissible post-disposal request for correction of a clerical or arithmetical mistake. The governing procedural framework permits only limited correction of accidental slips or omissions in a concluded matter, and a miscellaneous application cannot be used to rewrite the final order or to challenge its legal efficacy in the absence of a proper review or other legally recognised basis. The absence of the required affidavit and the attempt to question the force of the signed order reinforced the conclusion that the filing was misconceived.

Conclusion: The application was not maintainable and was liable to be rejected as against the applicants.

Issue (ii): Whether the differences between the oral dictation and the signed order amounted to a material change requiring re-hearing or rendered the signed order invalid.

Analysis: The distinction was drawn between a rough dictation given in open court and the final judicial order signed after correction and enhancement. The signed order was treated as the final operative expression of the Court's decision, while corrections made before signing were held permissible so long as they did not introduce a material alteration affecting the result. On the facts, the omission of a status quo direction and the treatment of the writ petition as disposed of were held not to be material changes warranting re-hearing. The Court further held that the signed order reflected correction and refinement rather than a substantive departure from the decision pronounced in court.

Conclusion: The signed order was valid and binding, and no re-hearing was required.

Final Conclusion: The miscellaneous application failed both on maintainability and on merits, and the signed order remained the controlling and enforceable disposition of the earlier appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: In a disposed matter, only clerical or accidental errors may be corrected through a miscellaneous application, and pre-signature alterations that do not amount to a material change do not invalidate the signed order; the signed order is the final operative order of the Court.

Issues: Whether a post-conviction settlement permits compounding of a dishonour-of-cheque offence through inherent jurisdiction after the revision affirming conviction and sentence has attained finality.

Analysis: The conviction and sentence had already been affirmed in a revision decided on merits. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 cannot be used to review, alter, or nullify a final judgment of a co-ordinate Bench. Upon final disposal, the Court becomes functus officio except for correction of clerical or arithmetical errors; a subsequent settlement does not revive a concluded proceeding for reconsideration.

Conclusion: The request to compound the offence on the basis of the subsequent settlement was not maintainable, and the final conviction and sentence remained unaffected.

Issues: Whether the insurer was liable to satisfy the award when the premium was received before the accident but the policy period shown in the document commenced after the accident.

Analysis: The accident occurred on 19/04/2015, while the policy document showed coverage from 21/04/2015. However, the record reflected fund transfer/payment of premium on 16/04/2015. The insurer did not examine the agent said to have handled the transaction, though he was the best witness to explain whether the amount was an advance deposit or premium received for the vehicle. In these circumstances, adverse inference was drawn against the insurer. Applying Section 64-VB(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938, the relevant date for assumption of risk was the date of receipt of premium, and the insurer could not rely only on the later commencement date printed in the policy.

Conclusion: The insurer was held liable to pay compensation, and the challenge to the award failed.

Final Conclusion: The award fastening liability on the insurer was upheld because premium receipt preceded the accident, making the insurer responsible under the governing insurance law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where premium is proved to have been received before the accident, the insurer assumes risk from that date and cannot avoid liability merely because the policy document states a later commencement date.

Issues: Whether the High Court's directions regulating the sequence and expeditious consideration of pending applications warranted interference.

Analysis: No error of fact or law was found in the impugned directions. The High Court had expressly left the merits of all pending applications open; the Single Judge was directed to determine them independently, without being influenced by the High Court's observations.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with directions for independent disposal of the pending applications within three months.

Issues: (i) Whether deemed service and the complainant's non-appearance permitted adjudication on merits; (ii) Whether a non-signatory spouse could be prosecuted as drawer of a dishonoured cheque; (iii) Whether vicarious liability could be invoked against the spouse of a sole proprietor; (iv) Whether a demand notice seeking an amount materially different from the cheque amount was valid; (v) Whether process against an accused residing outside the Magistrate's jurisdiction could issue without the mandatory inquiry; and (vi) Whether misdescription of the business entity and the defective claim constituted abuse of process.

Issue (i): Whether deemed service and the complainant's non-appearance permitted adjudication on merits.

Analysis: Notice sent to the complainant's registered address was returned with the endorsement "Addressee Left." The presumption of service under the applicable statutory framework operated where the addressee had left without providing a forwarding address. The record contained materials of sterling quality sufficient to determine the legal sustainability of the prosecution notwithstanding the complainant's absence.

Conclusion: The complainant was validly served and its absence did not prevent adjudication of the revision on merits, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether a non-signatory spouse could be prosecuted as drawer of a dishonoured cheque.

Analysis: The cheque was drawn on an account maintained by the sole proprietorship of the petitioner's husband, and the petitioner was neither the account holder nor the signatory. Section 138 imposes liability upon the drawer of a cheque drawn on an account maintained by that person; alleged dominion or control cannot substitute the statutory identity between drawer, signatory and account holder.

Conclusion: The petitioner could not be prosecuted as the drawer under Section 138, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether vicarious liability could be invoked against the spouse of a sole proprietor.

Analysis: A sole proprietorship has no legal identity distinct from its proprietor. The statutory vicarious-liability fiction applies to a company, including a firm or association of individuals, and cannot be extended by implication to a sole proprietorship. Marriage and bald assertions of control do not establish a legal basis to arraign the proprietor's spouse.

Conclusion: Section 141 could not be invoked to impose vicarious liability on the petitioner, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether a demand notice seeking an amount materially different from the cheque amount was valid.

Analysis: The dishonoured cheque was for Rs.36,07,687, whereas the statutory notice demanded Rs.7,607. Proviso (b) requires a demand for the cheque amount, so that the drawer receives a clear opportunity to make payment and avoid prosecution. The substantial mismatch failed that requirement and prevented accrual of a valid cause of action.

Conclusion: The demand notice was void ab initio and could not sustain the prosecution, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (v): Whether process against an accused residing outside the Magistrate's jurisdiction could issue without the mandatory inquiry.

Analysis: As the petitioner resided in Karnataka while process issued from Kolkata, the Magistrate was required to postpone process and conduct an inquiry or direct investigation. This mandatory gatekeeping safeguard was bypassed, despite the materials disclosing the petitioner's lack of connection with the cheque and account.

Conclusion: The failure to conduct the mandatory inquiry vitiated the summoning order against the petitioner, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (vi): Whether misdescription of the business entity and the defective claim constituted abuse of process.

Analysis: The complaint ambiguously described the concern as a proprietorship/partnership despite documents identifying it as a sole proprietorship, and relied on a materially mismatched demand notice. These defects were used to implead a non-signatory spouse who had no statutory connection with the dishonoured cheque, rendering the criminal process coercive and legally untenable.

Conclusion: The prosecution against the petitioner was an abuse of process and was liable to be quashed, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was discharged from criminal liability arising from the dishonoured cheque; the trial against the remaining accused may proceed independently.

Ratio Decidendi: A non-signatory spouse of a sole proprietor cannot be prosecuted for cheque dishonour where she neither maintains nor signs the account, Section 141 is inapplicable to the proprietorship, and the statutory notice and mandatory pre-summoning safeguards are fundamentally deficient.

Issues: Whether the pleadings and reliefs challenged by the petitioner were liable to be struck out under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the relief concerning residue sale proceeds after auction was barred by Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

Analysis: The plaint was found to disclose a substantive dispute regarding whether the properties were acquired from HUF nucleus and whether the plaintiff could claim entitlement to the residue amount after auction. At the stage of striking out pleadings, the Court held that the averments could not be treated as unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The relief relating to residue amount was also held not to be a challenge to the bank proceedings themselves, and the Court held that the dispute over entitlement to the residue amount and the HUF character of the property was not shown to be one that the Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal was empowered to determine. The petitioner's reliance on the cited Supreme Court decision was distinguished on facts.

Conclusion: The application for striking out pleadings was not liable to be allowed, and the relief in question was not held to be barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

Issues: Whether the observations made in the High Court's bail orders should be set aside while retaining the operative bail orders.

Analysis: The appeals arose from orders granting bail, but the impugned orders also contained observations considered unnecessary and capable of affecting the pending trial. The respondents had remained on bail for a sufficiently long period, and the Court confined interference to the observations alone, leaving the grant of bail undisturbed.

Conclusion: The observations in the impugned orders were set aside and declared irrelevant for the ongoing trial, while the operative portion granting bail was preserved.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only to the extent of removing the impugned observations from consideration in the trial, and the bail granted to the respondents continued to operate.

Issues: (i) Whether the order of acquittal suffered from perversity warranting appellate interference; (ii) Whether issuance of a signed blank cheque, authorisation of the complainant, and the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act negatived the acquittal.

Issue (i): Whether the order of acquittal suffered from perversity warranting appellate interference.

Analysis: The evidence showed dishonour of the cheque, admission of signature by the accused, and the cheque being issued in the course of business dealings. The trial court's reliance on a supposed final settlement and absence of proof of debt was found unsustainable because the defence did not dispute the transaction in the manner assumed by the acquittal. In an appeal against acquittal, interference is justified where the view taken is perverse or unsupported by the record.

Conclusion: The acquittal was perverse and liable to be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether issuance of a signed blank cheque, authorisation of the complainant, and the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act negatived the acquittal.

Analysis: A voluntarily signed blank cheque, once handed over, does not by itself defeat liability; the drawer must rebut the presumption that it was issued towards a debt or liability. The accused admitted issuance and signature, and the materials showed the cheque was connected with the supply of medicines. The challenge to the complainant's authorisation also did not defeat maintainability, since the complaint was filed by an authorised representative and the earlier objection on competence had already been rejected. The statutory presumptions under the Act therefore operated in favour of the complainant.

Conclusion: The presumptions were not rebutted and the complaint remained maintainable, against the respondents.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court interfered with the acquittal, convicted the respondents under the Negotiable Instruments Act, and imposed fine as compensation with a default sentence.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, a signed cheque voluntarily handed over attracts the statutory presumption of liability, and an acquittal based on an unsupported assumption of no enforceable debt is liable to be reversed in appeal where the trial court's view is perverse.

Issues: Whether the bank could refuse to issue the sale certificate and deliver physical possession of the secured asset to the successful auction-purchaser merely because a securitisation application was pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and an interim order stated that the auction would be subject to its final outcome.

Analysis: The sale had been confirmed and the auction-purchaser had deposited the entire consideration. In such a situation, the purchaser acquired a vested right to obtain the sale certificate, and the bank was duty-bound to complete the sale and deliver possession in the absence of any stay order restraining it from doing so. The pendency of proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, by itself, did not justify withholding the certificate or possession. The statutory scheme under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, as explained in the cited Supreme Court decision, requires the bank to act in accordance with the confirmed sale and the mandatory consequences flowing from it.

Conclusion: The objection based on pendency of the securitisation application was rejected. The bank was bound to issue the sale certificate and take steps to deliver physical possession to the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded and the petitioner obtained a direction for issuance of the sale certificate and delivery of physical possession, while the relief remained subject to the final outcome of the pending securitisation application.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an auction sale is confirmed and the full sale price is paid, the secured creditor cannot withhold the sale certificate or possession merely because related proceedings are pending, unless there is a competent stay order preventing such action.