Issues: (i) Whether reassessment notice issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year was validly approved by the specified authority; (ii) Whether the reassessment notice was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment notice issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year was validly approved by the specified authority.

Analysis: For reassessment initiated beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, approval under Section 151 was required from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, or, in their absence, the Chief Commissioner or Director General. The approval obtained from the Principal Commissioner was not approval by the specified authority.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice lacked valid statutory approval and the reassessment order was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment notice was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Applying the limitation principles governing deemed notices and exclusion of time for responding to the notice under Section 148A(b), the surviving period available to issue the reassessment notice had expired before the notice dated 29.07.2022 was issued.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 was time-barred; it and the consequential reassessment were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings failed for want of approval by the competent authority and because the reassessment notice was issued beyond the permissible limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment initiated beyond three years requires approval of the authority specified for that period, and a notice issued after expiry of the surviving statutory limitation is invalid along with consequential reassessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether continuation of a criminal prosecution for 35 years for minor offences violated the appellant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The right to a speedy trial is an integral component of fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 and extends through every stage of criminal proceedings. Whether delay infringes that right depends on the overall circumstances, including the nature and complexity of the offence, responsibility for delay, prejudice to the accused, and the balancing of individual liberty with societal interests; no universal outer time-limit can be prescribed. Here, the prosecution concerned a trivial altercation involving simple hurt and criminal intimidation, remained pending for 35 years without any attributable cause or explanation, and the co-accused had already been acquitted because the prosecution led no evidence. The prolonged pendency kept the appellant, a public servant, in suspended animation and was oppressive and unfair.

Conclusion: The appellant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 was violated; the criminal trial and prosecution against him shall proceed no further.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the first appeal deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the amount received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was retrenchment compensation exempt under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not taxable as a capital receipt.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the first appeal deserved condonation.

Analysis: The appeals were filed with delay on the basis of professional advice taken at the time of filing the returns. The explanation was found sufficient, and substantial justice was preferred over procedural lapse. The delay was therefore condoned and the matters were taken up for merits.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the first appeal was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was retrenchment compensation exempt under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not taxable as a capital receipt.

Analysis: The Tribunal followed earlier coordinate bench decisions on identical BSNL VRS facts and held that the compensation paid under the revival-linked scheme was in substance retrenchment compensation. It accepted that the payment fell within section 10(10B), not section 10(10C), and treated the receipt as a capital receipt exempt from tax. The assessee was directed to file revised computation before the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for grant of consequential refund after verification.

Conclusion: The amount received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was held exempt under section 10(10B) and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed after condoning the delay, and the compensation received under the BSNL voluntary retirement scheme was held not taxable as income.

Ratio Decidendi: Compensation paid under a BSNL revival-linked voluntary retirement scheme was treated as retrenchment compensation under section 10(10B) where the substance of the payment showed termination-linked compensation rather than taxable retirement benefits.

Issues: Whether the expenditure incurred on shifting the factory from rented premises to owned premises was capital expenditure or revenue expenditure allowable under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The expenditure was incurred for dismantling, transportation, crane charges, supervision and reinstallation of existing machinery and assets while relocating the same line of business. The Court distinguished cases where shifting resulted in a structural improvement or a new profit-making apparatus, and held that the decisive test is not the mere duration of benefit but whether the expenditure is in the capital field. On the facts, no new asset was created, the capital base remained unchanged, and the expenditure only facilitated continuation of the existing business. The Court also noted that the dispute was essentially about timing of deduction and that, in the circumstances, allowing the claim in the year under consideration avoided a prolonged and impractical depreciation exercise.

Conclusion: The expenditure on shifting the factory was held to be revenue in nature and allowable as a deduction; the assessee succeeded on the substantive ground.

Issues: Whether a spouse may obtain the other spouse's income-tax details under the Right to Information Act, 2005 for use in maintenance proceedings, despite the exemption for personal information.

Analysis: Income-tax returns and net taxable-income details constitute personal information. The exemption under Section 8(1)(j) applies where disclosure has no relationship to public activity or interest, or would amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy, unless larger public interest justifies disclosure. A private interest in obtaining financial particulars for a matrimonial maintenance claim does not amount to larger public interest. Maintenance proceedings provide an independent mechanism requiring both parties to disclose their income, assets and liabilities through affidavits.

Conclusion: Disclosure of the spouse's income details under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was not justified, as no larger public interest was established and the maintenance claimant could seek financial disclosure through the applicable maintenance proceedings.

Issues: Whether used jute gunny bags without plastic coating, sold after use in packing raw materials, are classifiable as reusable packing bags or as waste and scrap, and the applicable GST rate.

Analysis: Classification under the Customs Tariff is governed by the goods' essential character, commercial identity, condition at supply and functional use. The intact bags retained their form, structure and utility as packing sacks and were sold in identifiable bundles for reuse. Prior use does not convert goods into waste or scrap where they remain usable for their original purpose. Heading 6309 excludes sacks and bags showing signs of wear, while Heading 6310 applies to worn-out, torn, fragmented or otherwise unusable textile material fit only for material recovery. The auction description or bulk mode of sale does not determine classification. The bags consequently fall under Heading 6305 as sacks and bags of a kind used for packing goods.

Conclusion: Used intact and reusable gunny bags are not scrap and are classifiable under Heading 6305 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. They attract GST at 5% where the sale value does not exceed Rs. 2,500 per piece and at 18% where the sale value exceeds Rs. 2,500 per piece.

Issues: Whether dismissal of a tax appeal solely for non-appearance, without considering the written objections and grounds of appeal, violates principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The appellate authority dismissed the appeal solely because neither the assessee nor its authorised representative appeared pursuant to hearing notices. It did not consider the objections, statement of facts, or grounds raised in the appeal. Consideration of an affected person's contentions by the authority making a prejudicial decision is a basic requirement of natural justice; failure to do so constitutes non-application of mind.

Conclusion: Dismissal without considering the assessee's written objections and grounds of appeal was a substantial violation of principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to the purchase of rights in a room or tenement situated in a leasehold building owned by MHADA for consideration lower than the stamp duty value; (ii) whether, on the assessee's alternative plea, the valuation dispute required reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Issue (i): whether section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to the purchase of rights in a room or tenement situated in a leasehold building owned by MHADA for consideration lower than the stamp duty value.

Analysis: The assessee purchased rights in a room or tenement in a leasehold building for consideration lower than the stamp duty value. The reliance placed on authorities dealing with section 50C was held to be inapposite because that provision operates in the limited field of capital gains computation, whereas section 56(2)(x) taxes receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration and operates more broadly. The transaction was therefore not taken outside the scope of section 56(2)(x) merely because the property rights arose in a leasehold MHADA structure.

Conclusion: The applicability of section 56(2)(x) was upheld and the assessee failed on this issue.

Issue (ii): whether, on the assessee's alternative plea, the valuation dispute required reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Analysis: The assessee specifically sought a valuation reference in case the primary objection failed. The valuation aspect was treated as a limited issue requiring fresh examination. The matter was therefore restored for obtaining a DVO report and recomputing the addition, if any, in accordance with law after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The valuation issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication and reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer was directed in substance.

Final Conclusion: The addition was sustained on the question of statutory applicability, but the valuation aspect was remanded for fresh determination, resulting in only partial relief to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeals deserved condonation on the basis of sufficient cause; (ii) whether the amortization of cost of development of the highway project had to be computed with reference to the actual end date of the concession period and whether the excess depreciation disallowance made in earlier years could be sustained; (iii) whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive after deletion of the underlying addition.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeals deserved condonation on the basis of sufficient cause.

Analysis: The explanation for delay was supported by the record and showed that the assessee was a special purpose vehicle with the project having ended and with delayed communication and professional advice. The governing approach to limitation required a liberal and pragmatic construction of sufficient cause where the explanation was bona fide and did not indicate mala fides or dilatory intent.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the amortization of cost of development of the highway project had to be computed with reference to the actual end date of the concession period and whether the excess depreciation disallowance made in earlier years could be sustained.

Analysis: The concession agreement originally expired on 28.04.2013 and the proposed extension till 10.07.2024 was never effectively granted. The toll notification extended the operating period only up to 26.10.2013, and the assessee had terminated the agreement with effect from 28.04.2013. The CBDT circular on BOT road projects required amortization over the remaining period of the toll concessionaire agreement after reducing earlier deductions from the initial cost. On that basis, the end date used by the Assessing Officer was incorrect, and the earlier-year excess depreciation adjustment could not be sustained in the manner made by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The amortization was to be recomputed with reference to 26.10.2013, and the addition relating to excess depreciation was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive after deletion of the underlying addition.

Analysis: Once the quantum addition was deleted, the foundation for the penalty disappeared. The issue giving rise to the claim was also debatable, and the CBDT clarification post-dated the return filing. In identical facts for the related year, no penalty had been levied, which further supported deletion.

Conclusion: The penalty was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeals was condoned, the quantum appeals were allowed to the extent of recomputation and deletion of the impugned addition, and the penalty appeal succeeded with deletion of the penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: In BOT road project cases, amortization must be computed with reference to the actual remaining concession period as established on the record, and penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot survive once the substantive addition is deleted and the issue is debatable.

Issues: (i) Whether section 50C of the Income-tax Act applied to the transfer of leasehold land and building. (ii) Whether the additional ground challenging reopening under section 147 required remand for adjudication by the first appellate authority.

Issue (i): Whether section 50C of the Income-tax Act applied to the transfer of leasehold land and building.

Analysis: The transfer was not confined to a bare leasehold right. The asset had been held for business use, a building had been constructed, and the sale deed reflected transfer of land and building. In view of the broader construction of the expression relating to capital assets and the scope of section 50C, leasehold holding did not exclude application of the deeming fiction where land and building were transferred.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the additional ground challenging reopening under section 147 required remand for adjudication by the first appellate authority.

Analysis: The challenge to reopening raised questions about the completeness of disclosure and the availability of the relevant assessment records. As the first appellate authority had not adjudicated this ground and the record required verification, the matter was sent back for examination of the assessment records and, if necessary, a report from the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The additional ground was remanded for fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent of remitting the reassessment challenge for fresh consideration, while the substantive challenge to the application of section 50C failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 50C can apply to a transfer of immovable property held on lease where the transaction in substance involves land and building, and a reopening challenge requiring factual verification may be remanded when the first appellate authority has not examined it.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment orders passed under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 should be set aside and the matter relegated to the Lodha Committee in view of the Supreme Court's scheme under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The Court held that the statutory scheme of provisional attachment and confiscation under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 operates differently from the Supreme Court's special mechanism for the PACL assets under Article 142 of the Constitution. It found that restoration under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 is a limited route controlled by the Special Court, and that the Enforcement Directorate had earlier acted in aid of the Lodha Committee mechanism. The Court also noted that the attachment orders had served their purpose, the petitioners had given an undertaking against alienation, and the matter had remained pending for years without meaningful adjudication.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment orders were set aside and the matter was relegated to the Lodha Committee for decision in accordance with the Supreme Court's scheme.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of after granting the respondent's applications, with the attached properties directed to remain protected from alienation or encumbrance until final determination by the Lodha Committee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special restitution mechanism has been devised by the Supreme Court for a defined class of assets under Article 142, provisional attachment under the money-laundering statute may be displaced in favour of that mechanism when the statutory process has served its purpose and the matter is appropriately remitted to the designated committee.

Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private asset reconstruction company in respect of measures taken under the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: Relying on the principles stated by the Supreme Court, the Court held that a private financial institution or asset reconstruction company does not, by itself, perform a public function so as to attract writ jurisdiction. The existence of a statutory framework under the SARFAESI Act and the availability of remedies under that Act do not convert the private creditor into a writ-amenable authority. The Court also held that the petitioner could not seek interim protection in writ proceedings when the writ itself was not maintainable.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be not maintainable against the private respondent and the petitioner was left to pursue the appropriate remedy before the proper forum.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order passed under section 143(3) read with section 144C(3) and section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without giving effect to the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel, was valid in law.

Analysis: The assessment proceeded through a draft order, objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel, and directions requiring verification and inclusion of additional comparables. The Transfer Pricing Officer later gave effect to those directions and reduced the transfer pricing adjustment, but the Assessing Officer passed the final assessment order before that compliance and retained the original adjustment. Under section 144C(10) and section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel are binding and the assessment has to be completed in conformity with them. The order passed in disregard of those directions was therefore contrary to the statutory scheme and amounted to a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was held to be invalid, without jurisdiction, and null and void; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A final assessment order passed under section 144C must conform to the binding directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel, and any departure from those directions vitiates the order as being without jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) whether the arm's length price of management, testing and validation services could be determined at nil by rejecting the assessee's aggregated benchmarking under TNMM; (ii) whether notional interest could be imputed on outstanding receivables from associated enterprises; and (iii) whether the disallowance claimed under section 43B on payment basis could be entertained in these proceedings.

Issue (i): whether the arm's length price of management, testing and validation services could be determined at nil by rejecting the assessee's aggregated benchmarking under TNMM.

Analysis: The assessee had benchmarked the international transactions on an aggregated basis under TNMM and had shown a higher operating margin than comparables. The TPO rejected the analysis without establishing the statutory conditions for rejection and adopted the other method without bringing any comparable uncontrolled transaction on record. The material showed receipt of services and business need, and the services were closely linked to the assessee's manufacturing and operational activities. The aggregation approach was therefore accepted.

Conclusion: The determination of arm's length price at nil was unsustainable and the transfer pricing adjustment was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether notional interest could be imputed on outstanding receivables from associated enterprises.

Analysis: The receivables were held to be closely linked to the main service transaction. The international transaction had already been benchmarked under TNMM and working capital adjustment had been granted. In such circumstances, a separate adjustment on notional interest would amount to impermissible duplication. The assessee was also treated as debt-free, reinforcing the absence of a basis for imputing borrowing cost.

Conclusion: No separate transfer pricing adjustment on account of notional interest on receivables was warranted and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether the disallowance claimed under section 43B on payment basis could be entertained in these proceedings.

Analysis: The impugned disallowance was not made in the draft or final assessment order and arose only from the intimation under section 143(1). The issue was not raised before the Assessing Officer or the Dispute Resolution Panel and did not arise in the present appeal proceedings.

Conclusion: The ground was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the transfer pricing issues, while the section 43B ground was rejected, resulting in partial relief overall.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner's services constituted export of services and the refund claim relating to export turnover was admissible; (ii) whether refund of input tax credit on royalty expenses and on other claimed ineligible input tax credit was liable to be rejected; (iii) whether the rejection of refund on duty drawback, invoices and credit notes, adjusted total turnover, and allied issues required interference and remand.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner's services constituted export of services and the refund claim relating to export turnover was admissible.

Analysis: The services rendered under the commercial arrangement were held to be provided to foreign recipients, with the place of supply lying outside India on the facts found. The services included research and development, engineering, repair and related services performed for overseas customers, and the petitioner was treated as an independent contractor rather than an establishment of the same distinct person as the foreign entity. The Court accepted that the composite nature of the services and the governing place-of-supply provisions supported export treatment.

Conclusion: The refund rejection on the ground that the supplies were not export of services was quashed and the claim was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of input tax credit on royalty expenses and on other claimed ineligible input tax credit was liable to be rejected.

Analysis: The royalty payments were found to be made for the right to manufacture and sell rotor blades and for licensed technology and trademark rights, and were treated as business-related inputs. The Court also held that the inputs and input services such as manpower, production-related expenses, material handling, housekeeping and similar outlays were used in the course or furtherance of business and were not shown to be blocked credits. The Court further observed that the question of valuation or credit eligibility could not be conclusively denied in refund proceedings on the reasoning adopted by the authorities.

Conclusion: The refund rejection on royalty-related credit and on the alleged ineligible input tax credit was quashed and the claim was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the rejection of refund on duty drawback, invoices and credit notes, adjusted total turnover, and allied issues required interference and remand.

Analysis: The remaining issues were held to be affected by factual and computational controversy, including duty drawback, treatment of credit notes, and computation of adjusted total turnover. The Court found that these matters required fresh examination by the appellate authority in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside on these issues and the matters were remitted for reconsideration.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded in part, with refund claims allowed on export of services, royalty credit, and ineligible credit issues, while the remaining refund disputes were sent back for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Services rendered to overseas recipients under an independent commercial arrangement, where the place of supply is outside India, qualify as export of services; business-related input tax credit not falling within the blocked-credit provisions cannot be denied in refund proceedings merely on the basis adopted by the authorities, while fact-intensive residual refund issues may be remanded for fresh consideration.

Issues: Whether an order passed under Section 73(9) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be sustained when the show cause notice was uploaded on the GST portal after cancellation of the petitioner's registration and no alternative mode of service was adopted.

Analysis: Once registration stood cancelled, the petitioner was not required to keep checking the GST portal. Service of notice in such a situation had to be effected by an alternative and proper mode. As the notice was not so served, the petitioner was deprived of an effective opportunity of participation, amounting to breach of natural justice.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and set aside for violation of natural justice, and the department was left free to issue a proper notice and proceed in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy in view of the alleged violation of natural justice and jurisdictional objections; (ii) Whether the impugned penalty order under Section 114AA of the Customs Act was vitiated for non-consideration of the objections raised by the petitioner.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy in view of the alleged violation of natural justice and jurisdictional objections.

Analysis: The rule of alternative remedy was noted to admit well-settled exceptions, including violation of natural justice and lack of jurisdiction. The challenge raised by the petitioner was founded on both grounds, namely that the objections were not dealt with and that the very invocation of penalty under Section 114AA was questioned on jurisdictional footing.

Conclusion: The writ petition was entertained and not rejected on the ground of alternate remedy.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned penalty order under Section 114AA of the Customs Act was vitiated for non-consideration of the objections raised by the petitioner.

Analysis: The objections raised by the petitioner, including the challenge to the jurisdiction to invoke Section 114AA and the plea that the opportunity granted was only an empty formality, were not dealt with in the impugned order. The adjudicating authority was required to consider and answer those objections, particularly when they had a bearing on the validity of the proposed penalty. The omission showed non-application of mind and denial of a meaningful opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent that the penalty order was annulled and the proceedings were sent back for reconsideration in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where objections raising natural justice and jurisdictional challenges are specifically filed, the adjudicating authority must deal with them in a reasoned manner; failure to do so renders the order vulnerable to judicial interference and remand.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order confirming tax, interest and penalty can sustain when interest was not quantified in the show cause notice, and whether the interest-saving provision applies where the omission is in the notice rather than in the order.

Analysis: The notice had not quantified the interest for the relevant period, though the liability was later fastened in the adjudication order. The statutory bar prevents confirmation of demand on grounds not specified in the notice, and the demand in the order cannot exceed the notice. The provision making interest payable whether or not specified in the order applies to non-quantification in the adjudication order, not to omission in the show cause notice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order and the show cause notice, insofar as they sustained the impugned demand beyond the notice, were unsustainable and were quashed. The issue is answered in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to a hearing before further action could proceed on the basis of summons issued under Section 74 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and whether the departmental preliminary inquiry report was required to be taken into account.

Analysis: The summons had been issued under Section 74 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the petitioner had already filed a reply or objection. In these circumstances, the authorities were directed to grant a proper hearing and to intimate the date to the petitioner. The preliminary inquiry report dated 18.02.2026 was also directed to be considered while hearing the petitioner.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of with directions for hearing and consideration of the preliminary inquiry report.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 can be filed and registered by the appellate authority without insisting on prior pre-deposit of 7.5% of the disputed duty or penalty and proof thereof at the filing stage; (ii) whether the writ Court could direct acceptance and registration of the appeal as within limitation if filed within the time granted.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal under Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 can be filed and registered by the appellate authority without insisting on prior pre-deposit of 7.5% of the disputed duty or penalty and proof thereof at the filing stage.

Analysis: The statutory bar is only against entertaining the appeal unless the prescribed pre-deposit is made. The Court relied on the settled meaning of "entertain" as admitting the matter to consideration on merits, and held that this expression is distinct from mere filing or registration. Registration of a proceeding is a ministerial act, while the question whether the appeal is to be entertained arises only when the appellate authority applies its mind on the quasi-judicial side. The Court further held that, although the appellate authority itself has no power to waive the statutory deposit, the High Court may, in an appropriate case, exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct filing and registration without insisting on proof of deposit at that initial stage.

Conclusion: The appeal must be allowed to be filed, numbered and registered without insisting on prior pre-deposit or proof of pre-deposit at the filing stage; the question of entertainment on merits may be considered later by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Issue (ii): Whether the writ Court could direct acceptance and registration of the appeal as within limitation if filed within the time granted.

Analysis: Since the petitioners had lost time for no fault on their part, the Court granted a further period for presentation of the appeal and directed that, if filed within that period, it should be accepted and registered without objection on limitation at that stage.

Conclusion: The appeal may be filed within four weeks and shall then be accepted and registered without raising a limitation objection at the filing stage.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were allowed in part to the extent of directing filing and registration of the proposed appeals without insisting on pre-deposit at the threshold, while leaving the merits of entertainment under Section 129E to be considered by the appellate authority at the appropriate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory expression "entertain" in a pre-deposit provision refers to admission of the appeal for judicial consideration on merits and not to the mere act of filing or registration, and the High Court may, in an appropriate case, protect the right to approach the appellate forum by directing such filing without insisting on pre-deposit proof at the threshold.