Issues: (i) Whether 60% of the vehicle-related expenses claimed against income under section 28(v) was allowable, and the balance 40% was disallowable for want of proof of exclusive business use. (ii) Whether the agricultural income of Rs. 1,75,200 was liable to be treated as income from other sources.

Issue (i): Whether 60% of the vehicle-related expenses claimed against income under section 28(v) was allowable, and the balance 40% was disallowable for want of proof of exclusive business use.

Analysis: The assessee claimed depreciation, interest, and insurance on a car owned in personal capacity against income taxed as business income under section 28(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The claim required proof that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The assessee failed to establish exclusive business use, but the record also did not justify a complete disallowance. On a reasonable estimate, the vehicle was taken to have been used partly for business.

Conclusion: The vehicle-related expenditure was partly allowable, with 60% permitted and 40% disallowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the agricultural income of Rs. 1,75,200 was liable to be treated as income from other sources.

Analysis: The assessee produced material showing ownership of agricultural land, past return of comparable agricultural income in earlier years, and the claim that the land was leased for agricultural operations. In these circumstances, the income returned as agricultural income stood sufficiently supported, and there was no basis to reclassify it as income from other sources.

Conclusion: The addition by treating the agricultural income as income from other sources was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in part, with relief granted on the agricultural income issue and only partial relief on the vehicle expense claim.

Ratio Decidendi: A deduction against income taxed as business income can be allowed only to the extent the assessee substantiates business nexus, while supported agricultural receipts cannot be recharacterised as income from other sources without contrary evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the resolution plan was liable to be rejected for non-submission of earnest money deposit within the stipulated time and for being treated as non-responsive under the request for resolution plan. (ii) Whether the approval of the resolution plan and the scoring process were sustainable in the light of the objective of value maximisation and the treatment of secured and unsecured creditors. (iii) Whether the dissenting financial creditor had locus to challenge the approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether the resolution plan was liable to be rejected for non-submission of earnest money deposit within the stipulated time and for being treated as non-responsive under the request for resolution plan.

Analysis: The request for resolution plan required the earnest money deposit to accompany the resolution plan within the stipulated time, and expressly provided that non-submission would render the plan non-responsive and liable to rejection or non-evaluation. Mere debit from the bidder's bank account on the due date did not amount to compliance when the amount was actually credited to the corporate debtor only after the deadline. The acceptance of the belated deposit was therefore contrary to the stipulated bid conditions.

Conclusion: The plan was non-responsive and ought not to have been accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether the approval of the resolution plan and the scoring process were sustainable in the light of the objective of value maximisation and the treatment of secured and unsecured creditors.

Analysis: The record showed that the majority committee relied heavily on faster recovery for secured creditors and gave inadequate consideration to unsecured and operational creditors. The deliberations did not sufficiently explain why higher-value plans were not preferred or why the evaluation matrix resulted in anomalous scoring that elevated the selected applicant. In the circumstances, the decision-making process did not reflect a proper application of value maximisation consistent with the insolvency framework.

Conclusion: The approval process was unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether the dissenting financial creditor had locus to challenge the approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: A dissenting financial creditor with a stake in the insolvency process is not barred from raising grievances where alleged illegality, non-compliance, and procedural unfairness are asserted. The objections had been raised before the committee and were not mere afterthoughts. The challenge was therefore maintainable.

Conclusion: The appellant had locus to maintain the challenge.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, the approved resolution plan was invalidated, and the matter was directed to proceed afresh in accordance with law with consideration of the remaining resolution plans.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution plan that does not comply with mandatory bid conditions and is accepted in disregard of the prescribed eligibility requirements cannot be sustained merely on the basis of majority approval or commercial wisdom; where the process also fails to properly address creditor treatment and value maximisation, the plan and its approval are liable to be interfered with.

Issues: (i) Whether Service Tax demand confirmed solely on the basis of CBDT data and Form 26AS, without independent verification or corroborative evidence, was sustainable; (ii) whether the extended period of limitation and consequential interest and penalty could be invoked on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether Service Tax demand confirmed solely on the basis of CBDT data and Form 26AS, without independent verification or corroborative evidence, was sustainable.

Analysis: The demand was founded only on comparison of income-tax data with ST-3 returns. No independent enquiry was undertaken to ascertain the nature of the services rendered or to establish that the receipts represented taxable service turnover under the Finance Act, 1994. Mechanical reliance on Form 26AS and ITR figures, without proof of rendition of taxable service, was held to be impermissible. The Tribunal followed its earlier decisions holding that income-tax data by itself cannot sustain a service tax demand unless supported by corroborative material.

Conclusion: The demand on this basis was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and consequential interest and penalty could be invoked on the facts of the case.

Analysis: Since the demand itself rested only on income-tax data and no independent investigation established suppression with intent to evade tax, the ingredients for invoking the extended period were not satisfied. The Tribunal also accepted that the non-response to departmental letters issued during the peak of the COVID-19 period could not, by itself, justify invocation of the extended period. Once the demand failed, the foundation for interest and penalty also disappeared.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable, and the interest and penalty were also unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand, along with interest and penalty, was annulled and the appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A Service Tax demand cannot be sustained merely on the basis of income-tax data or Form 26AS unless the Revenue independently verifies and establishes rendition of taxable service; in the absence of proved suppression with intent to evade tax, the extended period of limitation is not invokable.

Issues: Whether delay in filing the statement required under Para 4(a) or Para 5(d) of Notification No. 01/2010-CE dated 06.02.2010 was a procedural lapse that could not justify denial of refund or exemption benefit.

Analysis: The filing of the statement within the prescribed time was treated as a procedural requirement under the exemption notification. The substantive conditions of the notification were found to have been complied with, and the delay in filing the statement was not regarded as fatal to the claim. The decision followed earlier Tribunal rulings on the same notification, which had held that delayed compliance with the filing requirement did not defeat the benefit where the underlying entitlement was otherwise established.

Conclusion: The delayed filing did not invalidate the claim, and denial of refund on that ground was unsustainable. The benefit under the notification was held admissible to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the refund denial based solely on belated filing was set aside, with consequential relief as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Delay in complying with a procedural requirement under an exemption notification does not defeat the exemption where the substantive conditions of the notification are satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the supplier derived and retained benefit of additional input tax credit in the post-GST period thereby engaging in profiteering under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether penalty and interest are exigible for such profiteering and, if so, the applicable quantification and temporal scope.

Issue (i): Whether the supplier derived and retained benefit of additional input tax credit in the post-GST period thereby engaging in profiteering under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Comparative computation of ratio of credit availed to purchase value for pre-GST and post-GST periods shows an increase of 4.41 percentage points. Applying that increase to the post-GST purchase value and prorating over the sold area produced a quantified excess realization. Documentary evidence and statutory auditor-certified computations supporting the figures were uncontroverted, and the supplier unqualifiedly accepted the quantified finding and produced evidence of refunds to buyers.

Conclusion: The supplier engaged in profiteering by retaining the benefit of additional input tax credit; the profiteered amount pending to be passed on is quantified as Rs. 6,53,861 (inclusive of GST).

Issue (ii): Whether penalty and interest are exigible for such profiteering and, if so, the applicable quantification and temporal scope.

Analysis: Section 171(3A) prescribes penalty for failure to pass on benefit but contains a proviso exempting penalty where the amount is deposited within thirty days of the determination order; the relevant period of contravention is July 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019. Rule 133(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 prescribes return of the not-passed-on amount with interest at 18% per annum from date of collection until date of refund. The supplier has refunded the amount to eligible buyers; the computations of interest are guided by Rule 133(3)(b) as compensatory restitution for the time value of money.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 171(3A) is not imposable in view of compliance with the proviso (deposit/refund within the statutory period), but interest at 18% per annum is payable from the respective dates of collection until the date of refund in accordance with Rule 133(3)(b).

Final Conclusion: The determination that profiteering occurred and the quantified restitutive obligation, together with the direction to refund the outstanding profiteered amount with interest at 18% per annum to eligible buyers, is confirmed; penalty is not imposed due to compliance with the statutory proviso.

Ratio Decidendi: Where additional input tax credit results in a measurable increase in the credit-to-purchase-value ratio, the supplier must pass on the resultant benefit by commensurate reduction in price; failure to do so gives rise to a restitutive liability quantified by applying the differential credit ratio to the relevant base and, under Rule 133(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, attracts interest at 18% per annum from date of collection until refund, while penalty under Section 171(3A) is avoided if the amount is deposited within thirty days of the order of determination.

Issues: (i) Whether absence of a written loan agreement prevents a financial creditor (NBFC) from proving existence of a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether withdrawal of a prior Section 7 petition without express liberty to file afresh bars the financial creditor from instituting a subsequent Section 7 petition on breach of the settlement; (iii) Whether the Section 7 petition should be admitted where records and acknowledgements establish debt and default.

Issue (i): Whether a written financial contract is a mandatory prerequisite to establish financial debt for the purposes of initiation of CIRP under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The legal framework under the Code and allied Rules and Regulations permits proving financial debt by reference to relevant documents and records evidencing disbursement and accrual of interest; the IBC has overriding effect over other instruments. Precedents of this Tribunal establish that written contract is not an indispensable pre-condition where the nature of the transaction is otherwise demonstrated by bank statements, acknowledgements, promissory notes, TDS on interest, post-dated cheques and ledger entries.

Conclusion: A written loan agreement is not mandatory; absence of a formal written contract does not preclude a financial creditor from proving financial debt where other evidentiary material establishes disbursement and time value of money.

Issue (ii): Whether withdrawal of an earlier Section 7 petition without express leave bars filing a fresh Section 7 petition on subsequent breach of the settlement giving rise to renewed cause of action.

Analysis: Withdrawal of the earlier petition wiped out the proceedings in that petition; where the corporate debtor breaches the settlement terms, such breach gives rise to a new cause of action. Principles invoked from suits and public-policy extensions are not automatically applicable to IBC proceedings to deny remedy where a bona fide breach occurs. Tribunal precedents recognize that permitting barring of fresh petitions on such technical grounds would incentivize sham settlements and defeat creditor rights.

Conclusion: Withdrawal of the earlier petition without liberty does not bar a fresh Section 7 petition founded on breach of the settlement; res judicata and related principles are inapplicable to prevent a new petition where a fresh cause of action has arisen.

Issue (iii): Whether the Section 7 petition should be admitted where records on file establish debt and default above the statutory threshold.

Analysis: Under the Code the Adjudicating Authority's limited task is to be satisfied on the existence of debt and default from records or evidence produced; where bank statements, acknowledgements, promissory notes, TDS entries and dishonoured post-dated cheques reflect disbursement, accrual of interest and acknowledgement by the corporate debtor, the prerequisites for admission are satisfied and the application cannot be rejected on technical grounds.

Conclusion: The material on record established debt and default and the Section 7 petition should be admitted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted for admission of the Section 7 petition and further action in accordance with the Code.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purposes of admission under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a financial debt may be proved by admissible records and acknowledgements evidencing disbursement and time value of money; a formal written loan agreement is not an absolute prerequisite, and a fresh Section 7 petition is maintainable upon breach of a settlement giving rise to a new cause of action despite prior withdrawal of a petition.

Issues: Whether the petitioners, accused of mobilising a violent mob, attacking investigating officials and obstructing investigation, are entitled to grant of bail pending further investigation and trial.

Analysis: The impugned order examines the material collected during investigation including call detail records indicating multiple calls in the relevant period, witness statements prima facie placing the petitioners at their premises and indicating they called persons to assemble, video footage suggesting presence of a mob, recovery of firearms kept by an associate, and complaints of threats and influence over witnesses. Investigation and charge-sheeting are in progress with further evidence and supplementary charges contemplated. While prolonged custody is recognised as a factor favouring bail, the assessment balances that factor against the incriminating material, the petitioners' alleged leadership role in mobilising a large violent crowd, the gravity of injuries to officials and damage to government property, and the real risk of tampering with evidence or intimidating witnesses if released. The co-accused released on bail were found not similarly circumstanced. The analysis treats delayed recording of some witness statements as an issue for trial, but finds the collected material sufficient for a prima facie case to refuse bail at this stage.

Conclusion: Bail applications of the petitioners are rejected; petitioners are not entitled to bail at this stage and the proceedings shall continue.

Issues: (i) Whether properties acquired before the alleged scheduled offence could still be attached as the value of proceeds of crime under the Act. (ii) Whether the absence of the appellants' names in the predicate FIR and the claim of ordinary commercial receipts defeated the attachment and confirmation order.

Issue (i): Whether properties acquired before the alleged scheduled offence could still be attached as the value of proceeds of crime under the Act.

Analysis: The statutory definition of proceeds of crime is not confined only to property directly derived from the scheduled offence. It also covers the value of such property. The attachment was upheld on the footing that, even if the attached assets were acquired earlier, they could still be proceeded against as equivalent value where the tainted assets were not available. The distinction drawn by the appellants on the basis of chronology was therefore rejected.

Conclusion: The contention that pre-offence acquisition by itself barred attachment was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of the appellants' names in the predicate FIR and the claim of ordinary commercial receipts defeated the attachment and confirmation order.

Analysis: The absence of the appellants from the FIR was held to be immaterial because action under the Act can extend to any person in possession of proceeds of crime. On the facts accepted from the material on record, the receipts claimed to be commercial were found to be linked to funds routed through the foreign entity connected with the scheduled offence, and the appellant company was treated as a shell company through which funds were invested in properties and other assets. The burden cast on the appellants to show that the assets were not proceeds of crime was not discharged.

Conclusion: The attachment and its confirmation were sustained against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found sufficient material to connect the attached assets with proceeds of crime or their equivalent value and held that the confirmation of provisional attachment did not call for interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Act, attachment is maintainable not only against property directly derived from the scheduled offence but also against property of equivalent value, and the remedy is not confined to persons named in the predicate FIR if the material shows possession or use of proceeds of crime.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of service tax for the period April 2014 to March 2015, as confirmed by the lower authorities by invoking the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, is sustainable; (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. and whether interest and penalties imposed under Sections 78(1) and 77(1)(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 survive if the demand is unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is invokable to confirm the disputed demand.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the facts that the appellant was registered, filed ST-3 returns regularly, and the demand was computed by comparing Income Tax Returns/Form 26AS data with ST-3 returns without independent verification. The Department issued letters seeking information in January-February 2020 and issued the Show Cause Notice on 31.12.2020; no material established suppression with intent to evade tax. The Tribunal relied on precedent where demands based solely on income-tax portal data and information disclosed in returns were held not to attract the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is not invokable; the demand is barred by limitation and is unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. and whether interest and penalties under Sections 78(1) and 77(1)(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 can be sustained.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the appellant's entitlement to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. for consulting engineer services related to road construction and noted that when the principal activity (road construction) is exempt, ancillary activities including consulting services are also exempt. Because the primary demand was held time-barred, the legal basis for levying interest and penalties was examined and found to fall with the demand; penalties and interest cannot survive independently where the tax demand is set aside for being barred by limitation.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. as applied, and the interest and penalties under Sections 78(1) and 77(1)(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 are dropped since the tax demand is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order confirming the service tax demand, interest and penalties is set aside as the demand is barred by limitation and the appellant is entitled to consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a demand is founded solely on data from Income Tax Returns/Form 26AS and the assessee has been regularly registered and filing statutory returns without evidence of suppression with intent to evade, the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is not available to the Revenue and such demand is time-barred.

Issues: (i) Whether works contract services rendered to government authorities (including Gorkhaland Territorial Administration and Executive Engineer, Special Department) are exempt under Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012; (ii) Whether Service Tax liability for Goods Transport Agency services rendered to a body corporate (Gorkhaland Territorial Administration) is on the appellant or on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994; (iii) Whether the demand confirmed invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable in absence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether works contract services rendered to government authorities are exempt under Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 provides exemption for works contract services rendered to the Government, a local authority or a governmental authority for civil structures or original works meant predominantly for use other than for commerce, industry or business; the entry was examined with reference to the nature of the recipients (Gorkhaland Territorial Administration and Executive Engineer, Special Department Engineering Division, Darjeeling) and the nature of the works (construction, erection, beautification, development of local haat). The recipients were found to qualify as government or governmental authorities under the notification and the works fall within the activities covered by the exemption entry.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The works contract service demands of Rs.18,75,422 and Rs.1,25,873 confirmed under the impugned order are set aside as exempt under Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012.

Issue (ii): Whether Service Tax liability for Goods Transport Agency services rendered to a body corporate is on the appellant or on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 places liability on the service recipient where the consignor or consignee falls within specified categories such as a body corporate. The recipient in this case, Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, qualifies as a body corporate; accordingly the liability to discharge Service Tax for GTA services received rests on the recipient and not on the service provider.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The Goods Transport Agency demand of Rs.19,273 confirmed against the appellant is set aside since liability is on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand confirmed invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable in absence of suppression or wilful misstatement by the appellant.

Analysis: The record shows demands were raised based on ST-3 returns and Form 26AS without evidence of suppression or wilful mis-statement by the appellant. Conditions required for invocation of the extended period of limitation were not established by the Revenue.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The invocation of the extended period of limitation is not sustainable and demands raised on that ground are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming demands, interest and penalty is set aside in full and the appeal is allowed with consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Works contract services to government or governmental authorities falling within Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 are exempt from Service Tax; Goods Transport Agency services received by a body corporate attract liability on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994; invocation of extended limitation requires proof of suppression or wilful misstatement which was absent.

Issues: Whether a notice of demand issued along with a draft assessment order under the procedure of Section 144C can be enforced where no final assessment order has been passed by the Assessing Officer within the time prescribed under Section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The petition raises a single substantive question concerning the operation of Section 144C(13) which mandates completion of the assessment in conformity with the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions within one month from the end of the month in which the directions are received. The factual matrix shows that directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel were received in September 2021 and therefore the Assessing Officer was statutorily required to pass the final assessment on or before October 31, 2021. No final assessment was passed within that period. The statutory prescription in Section 144C(13) operates notwithstanding Sections 153 and 153B, and is intended to be mandatory to ensure expeditious completion of assessments following DRP directions. Authoritative precedents have held that failure to complete assessment within the period under Section 144C(13) results in lapse of jurisdiction and that internal administrative difficulties or technical glitches in departmental systems cannot extend a statutory limitation. The respondents' explanation that ITBA technical errors prevented passing the final order does not furnish a statutory basis for extending the period prescribed by Section 144C(13). As the final assessment was not completed within the prescribed time, the draft order did not crystallize any enforceable tax liability and the notice of demand issued with the draft order lacked legal foundation.

Conclusion: The demand notice dated March 16, 2021 issued along with the draft assessment order and the penalty notice under Section 274 read with Section 270A are quashed and set aside; the petition is allowed and the decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amendment by Finance Act, 2020 increasing the tolerance band to 10% for differences between actual consideration and stamp duty value is curative and retrospective such that no addition under Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is required where the difference is less than 10% of the consideration in Assessment Year 2017-18.

Analysis: Finance Act, 2020 raised the tolerance band for variations between stated consideration and stamp duty valuation to 10% for immovable property and that amendment addresses unintended hardships arising from deeming provisions concerning undervaluation. Prior tribunal decisions have treated the enhancement of the tolerance band as curative in nature and applicable retrospectively to the date when the related deeming provision took effect. On the facts of the appeal the difference between the actual consideration paid and the stamp duty value falls below the 10% tolerance band; accordingly, the anti-avoidance deeming provision under Section 56(2)(x) does not apply in these circumstances.

Conclusion: The amendment increasing the tolerance band to 10% is to be treated as curative and retrospective; since the difference is less than 10% of the consideration, the addition under Section 56(2)(x) is not sustainable and is deleted. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of Rs. 71,59,544 being proportionate power and fuel expenses relating to rented portion is sustainable; (ii) Whether the disallowance of Rs. 1,71,25,129 being proportionate repair and maintenance expenses relating to rented portion is sustainable.

Issue (i): Disallowance of Rs. 71,59,544 as proportionate power and fuel expenses.

Analysis: The recurring nature of the claim and evidence showing power charges recovered from tenants and recorded as income were examined; reliance was placed on co-ordinate bench decisions and on assessment proceedings in subsequent years where similar disallowance proposals were not sustained. The unit-wise statements and challans demonstrating recovery from tenants and accounting as business income were taken into account.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 71,59,544 is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Disallowance of Rs. 1,71,25,129 as proportionate repair and maintenance expenses.

Analysis: The facts showed that repair and maintenance expenditure for the rented portions was met from maintenance/Common Area Maintenance (CAM) charges received from tenants and accounted as business income; the matter is a recurring issue and co-ordinate bench decisions for related assessment years favoured deletion of similar disallowances. The unit-wise repair expenditure and corresponding CAM receipts were considered to determine that expenses were matched by business income.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 1,71,25,129 is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both issues were decided in favour of the assessee and the appeals are allowed, following the reasoning that expenses incurred for rented portions which are met from and reflected against CAM or tenant recoveries accounted as business income cannot be proportionately disallowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where expenditure for common facilities or rented portions is met from and accounted against maintenance/common area charges or tenant recoveries treated as business income, proportionate disallowance of such expenses against rental income is not warranted and earlier co-ordinate bench decisions on identical recurring issues shall be followed.

Issues: Whether the appellant could claim the benefit of Notification No. 99/2011-CUS dated 09.11.2011 at a later stage despite not having claimed it at the time of self-assessment, and whether the matter should be remanded for consideration of such exemption at the stage of finalization of the Bills of Entry.

Analysis: The relevant exemption was held to be claimable even after assessment, if the importer remains otherwise eligible. The absence of an initial claim at the time of clearance did not create any estoppel against seeking the benefit later. It was also noted that the country-of-origin certificates were already on record and that reassessment is legally permissible where supporting evidence was available at the time of initial documentation. As the assessments were provisional and finalization was still pending, the proper course was to direct the original authority to examine the admissibility of the exemption while finalizing the Bills of Entry.

Conclusion: The exemption claim was held to be open for consideration at the later stage, and the matter was remanded to the original authority for examination of eligibility under Notification No. 99/2011-CUS dated 09.11.2011 during finalization of the imports.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(d), 10(m) and 10(n) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 so as to warrant revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit and imposition of penalty; (ii) Whether the disciplinary enquiry and the timeline/procedure adopted by the authorities vitiated the impugned order of revocation, forfeiture and penalty.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(d), 10(m) and 10(n) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 thereby justifying revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit and imposition of penalty.

Analysis: The record shows the appellant produced KYC and client identification documents, and the exporter held operative IEC and GSTIN and had undertaken numerous shipments through other brokers. The authorities relied substantially on discreet market enquiries, an email from a private body and the inability to trace the exporter as the basis for concluding undervaluation and that the broker was the exporter. The evidence relied upon by the authorities is hearsay or collected without involving the exporter and does not establish intent to defraud or that the broker acted in deliberate breach of obligations. Precedent and applicable regulatory standard require reasonable verification and do not mandate physical inspection by the broker; prima facie bonafide documents satisfy Regulation 10(n).

Conclusion: Regulation 10(d), 10(m) and 10(n) violations are not established; findings adverse to the appellant on these Regulations are set aside and are in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the enquiry, timeline and procedural course adopted by the authorities vitiated the impugned disciplinary action.

Analysis: The disciplinary process suffered undue delay contrary to the timeline directed by the High Court and the Inquiry Officer's report and the Adjudicating Authority's treatment of replies and timelines show lack of application of mind. The authorities failed to properly consider the appellant's submissions and relied on a flawed inquiry report. The suspension and subsequent revocation proceeded on infirm bases including disregard of mandatory procedural considerations and reliance on evidence that does not meet the required standard.

Conclusion: The disciplinary enquiry and impugned order are procedurally flawed and vitiate the action; this conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order revoking the Customs Broker's licence, forfeiting the security deposit and imposing penalty is set aside; licence to be restored and monetary amounts returned, reflecting that the regulatory and procedural deficiencies render the disciplinary action unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs broker who obtains prima facie bonafide KYC and client identity documents (including operative IEC and GSTIN) need not perform physical verification, and disciplinary action based on hearsay or discreet market enquiries without involving the client, or taken after failure to comply with prescribed enquiry timelines and without proper application of mind, cannot sustain revocation of licence, forfeiture or penalty under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Tribunal should admit and entertain appeals against orders imposing penalty where the amount of penalty involved in each appeal is less than Rs. two lakhs under the second proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, and whether the appeals are maintainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the second proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 which vests discretion in the Appellate Tribunal to refuse admission of appeals where, inter alia, the amount of fine or penalty determined by the order does not exceed two lakh rupees. The material shows penalties of Rs.25,000 and Rs.75,000 were imposed in the respective original orders. The Tribunal also examined the dispatch and delivery presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and found certified copies of the orders were dispatched to the appellant by speed post and not returned undelivered; the presumption of delivery was not rebutted. The Tribunal noted that neither the Commissioner (Appeal) nor the Tribunal had examined the merits of the penalties and limited its determination to admissibility and maintainability under the statutory proviso.

Conclusion: The Tribunal exercised its discretion under the second proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and declined to admit the appeals because the penalty involved in each appeal is less than Rs. two lakhs; the appeals are not maintainable and are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the penalty or fine determined by the order does not exceed Rs. two lakhs, the Appellate Tribunal may, in its discretion, refuse to admit an appeal under the second proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962; absence of rebuttal to the presumption of service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act supports maintenance of dispatch and delivery for limitation and admissibility purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order of the NCLT restoring certain directors and appointing an Administrator should be interfered with; (ii) Whether disputed payment receipts may be sent for forensic examination in the course of administration.

Analysis: The record shows allegations of an oral family settlement dated 04.02.2008, partial payments admitted by parties, disputed claims of cash payments, non-production of key documents and counter-allegations of forgery and non-compliance with the settlement terms. The NCLT appointed an Administrator to manage the company after finding circumstances warranting intervention, and also dismissed an application for forensic examination of documents at that stage. The appellate review examined admitted payments, pleadings and contemporaneous filings, and found that full compliance with the alleged settlement was not established and that disputes over payments and forgery allegations remain live. Given the possibility of a future buyout and the appellants' assertion of possession of receipts, limited scope for forensic examination was considered appropriate if the Administrator, in the course of administration, encounters disputed receipts and refers the matter back to the NCLT.

Conclusion: (i) The appeal is not allowed to the extent of displacing the NCLT's core directions; the impugned order restoring directors and appointing an Administrator is not interfered with. (ii) The impugned order is modified to permit the Administrator, if presented with disputed receipts during administration or a buyout process, to apply to the NCLT for forensic examination of those receipts. No other relief is granted in favour of the appellants.

Issues: Whether the liquidator and Stakeholders' Consultation Committee were bound to consider the appellant's enhanced offer submitted after the stipulated bid timeline and after the successful bidder had been identified in the NRRA process.

Analysis: The assignment of a not readily realisable asset under Regulation 37A of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 must be transparent and aimed at value maximisation, but those objectives operate within a fair process and cannot override duly fixed timelines or the legitimate interests of other participants. The appellant's revised offer was made after the cut-off date and after the bid process had substantially progressed, while the successful bidder had already been selected and acted upon. Entertaining a belated higher offer at that stage would unsettle the completed process, prejudice other bidders, and undermine the finality required in liquidation sales. The conduct of the appellant, including seeking refund of the EMD and approaching the Tribunal after considerable delay, also supported the conclusion that the process had been accepted when it concluded.

Conclusion: The enhanced offer was not required to be considered, and the challenge to the completed NRRA assignment failed.

Issues: Whether Rishisol S-1, Rishisol S-2, Rishisol S-3 and Rishisol B-1 were correctly classifiable under CTH 2710.13 as motor spirit.

Analysis: The applicable classification entry required the goods to be hydrocarbon oil excluding crude mineral oil, to have a flash point below 25 C, and to be suitable for use, by themselves or in admixture with any other substance, as fuel in spark ignition engines. The Tribunal found that although the products satisfied the flash point criterion, the material on record, including the technical opinion relied upon by the parties, did not establish that the goods were actually suitable for use as fuel in spark ignition engines. The record did not provide reliable evidence to satisfy the third statutory condition, and the department failed to discharge the burden for reclassification.

Conclusion: The products could not be classified under CTH 2710.13.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge to the classification failed, and the order in favour of the assessee was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: For classification as motor spirit under CTH 2710.13, all statutory conditions must be cumulatively satisfied, including proof that the product is suitable for use as fuel in spark ignition engines.

Issues: Whether, in an application for appointment of an arbitrator arising out of a partnership deed, the dispute could be referred to arbitration by impleading a non-signatory company on a prima facie case of alter ego, commonality of subject matter, and use of the corporate form to carry on competing business.

Analysis: The partnership deed contained a broad arbitration clause governing disputes relating to the partnership affairs. The subsequent memorandum of understanding indicated that the partnership business continued and that the parties' rights under the deed remained relevant. On the pleadings and materials placed, there were specific allegations that the non-signatory company was operating from the same premises, using the same resources, user identification, customers, workers, and purchase orders, and was allegedly functioning as the alter ego of a signatory partner. The referral court noted that it must confine itself to a prima facie examination at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator and should not conduct a mini-trial on joinder or corporate separateness. It further held that objections as to misjoinder, non-signatory status, and the applicability of estoppel or piercing the corporate veil could be raised before the arbitral tribunal, which is competent to decide its own jurisdiction and the party status of those before it.

Conclusion: The non-signatory company could be brought within the arbitration at the referral stage on a prima facie basis, and the application for appointment of an arbitrator was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of appointment under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the referral court should ordinarily restrict itself to a prima facie view on the existence of the arbitration agreement and leave contested questions about binding non-signatories, including alter ego and veil-piercing objections, to the arbitral tribunal under its jurisdictional competence.