Issues: Whether delay in implementing an approved resolution plan warranted adverse findings and regulatory referral where the plan permitted payment to be deferred pending an appeal.

Analysis: The approved plan contained a 46-day implementation schedule and an unconditionality clause, but also provided for payment after finality where litigation concerning the plan was pending. The plan had been approved without modification. The interim direction permitting implementation did not mandate it. The parties acted on the payment clause in a bona fide belief and implemented the plan after the adjudicating authority raised its concern. Adverse observations were also made against the successful resolution applicant without it being a party or being heard.

Conclusion: The delay did not warrant adverse findings against the successful resolution applicant or monitoring committee members, or referral of their conduct to the insolvency regulator. The specified adverse observation and referral were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Stakeholders cannot be faulted for deferring implementation during a pending appeal in reliance on an unmodified approved plan that makes payment contingent on finality, even where no stay has been granted.

Issues: Whether cancellation of a provisional attachment could rest solely on the quashing of one predicate-offence FIR without considering another FIR and the independent effect of quashing.

Analysis: The attachment was based on two FIRs, but the appellate decision addressed only the quashing of one. The effect of quashing on an attachment requires independent assessment; quashing a predicate-offence FIR on compromise does not itself obliterate proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The cancellation of the attachment could not be sustained on the basis adopted. Its validity and the parties' contentions remain open for fresh determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Quashing a predicate-offence FIR on compromise does not itself eliminate proceeds of crime; its effect on a provisional attachment requires independent assessment, including consideration of any other FIR underlying the attachment.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail pending trial for alleged GST offences.

Analysis: Article 21 protects personal liberty through just, fair and reasonable procedure. Pre-trial detention is not punitive, and its necessity must be assessed alongside the presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy trial. The investigation was complete, the complaint had been filed, the applicant had no criminal history, and the trial was unlikely to conclude soon. No material indicated a risk of absconding, interference with evidence or witnesses, or other exceptional circumstances warranting continued custody. The Court also noted the circular concerning GST arrest powers.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to release on bail. The criminal trial remains pending, and the merits of the allegations were not determined.

Ratio Decidendi: Pre-trial detention must not be punitive; bail ordinarily follows unless continued custody is justified by circumstances affecting the trial or administration of justice.

Issues: Whether failure to provide an opportunity of personal hearing vitiated the orders.

Analysis: The show cause notice and reminders stated "N.A." against the date, time and venue of personal hearing. A date, time and venue were required to enable the assessee to present its case.

Conclusion: The orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: An order is vitiated for breach of natural justice where the assessee is denied an opportunity of personal hearing through failure to specify its date, time and venue.

Issues: Whether an appeal is maintainable without filing Form APL-05 when the defect remains uncorrected despite opportunities to cure it.

Analysis: Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Rule 110 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, provides for an appeal in Form APL-05. Rule 18 of the GST Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025, requires online filing in the prescribed form with the relevant documents. Final acknowledgment follows filing and removal of defects. Form APL-05 had not been filed despite notices and opportunities to correct the defect.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable without Form APL-05.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal to the Tribunal is not maintainable where the mandatory statutory appeal form has not been filed and the defect remains uncorrected despite opportunities to cure it.

Issues: Whether CGST authorities had jurisdiction under Section 73 of the CGST Act to recover allegedly inadmissible CENVAT credit transitioned to GST.

Analysis: The proceedings concerned CENVAT credit transitioned under Section 140 of the CGST Act. The applicable precedents distinguish the admissibility of credit under the earlier law from input tax credit under the CGST Act and recognise the preservation of proceedings under the earlier law through Section 174.

Conclusion: The CGST authorities lacked jurisdiction to conduct the recovery proceedings under Section 73. The impugned appellate order was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 73 of the CGST Act cannot be used to determine the admissibility under the earlier law of CENVAT credit transitioned to GST; proceedings under the earlier law remain subject to the statutory saving.

Issues: (i) Whether transitional credit could be denied because it was entered in the wrong table of Form GST TRAN-1. (ii) Whether Revenue could challenge substantive eligibility for the credit on appeal when that ground was omitted from the notice and adjudication. (iii) Whether the appellate authority was obliged to conduct a further inquiry into eligibility.

Issue (i): Whether transitional credit could be denied because it was entered in the wrong table of Form GST TRAN-1.

Analysis: Section 140 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides for transitional credit for different categories of registered persons, and Rule 117 requires a declaration in Form GST TRAN-1. A dealer claiming credit under Section 140(3) must use Table 7(a), rather than Table 5(a). Adopted precedents distinguish inadvertent procedural lapses from substantive eligibility. The later circular provided an opportunity to revise declarations.

Conclusion: The credit could not be denied solely because it was entered in the wrong table. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Revenue could challenge substantive eligibility for the credit on appeal when that ground was omitted from the notice and adjudication.

Analysis: The notice and adjudication confined the proposed recovery to use of the wrong table, although invoices had been produced and verification was available under Rule 121. The reasoning applied principles analogous to constructive res judicata and approbation and reprobation to the eligibility objection available but omitted during adjudication.

Conclusion: Revenue could not raise the omitted eligibility objection on appeal. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellate authority was obliged to conduct a further inquiry into eligibility.

Analysis: Section 107(11) provides for further inquiry as may be necessary, conferring discretion to be exercised according to the facts. The appellate authority addressed the ground on which recovery had been adjudicated.

Conclusion: A further inquiry was not obligatory in this case. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional credit remains undisturbed without a fresh adjudication of substantive eligibility.

Ratio Decidendi: An inadvertent procedural error in a transitional credit declaration cannot by itself defeat a claim to credit where the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Issues: (i) Whether input tax credit of Rs. 4,176 each under CGST and SGST was liable to reversal for exceeding the prescribed time limit. (ii) Whether credit inadvertently reported under CGST and SGST instead of IGST was liable to reversal with interest and penalty.

Issue (i): Whether input tax credit of Rs. 4,176 each under CGST and SGST was liable to reversal for exceeding the prescribed time limit.

Analysis: Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 operates notwithstanding the earlier time limit in Section 16(4).

Conclusion: The taxpayer was absolved of liability to reverse the credit of Rs. 4,176 under each head.

Issue (ii): Whether credit inadvertently reported under CGST and SGST instead of IGST was liable to reversal with interest and penalty.

Analysis: Section 73 addresses, among other matters, wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit. The Tribunal applied the cited High Court rulings treating the electronic credit ledger as a unified pool and recognising inadvertent allocation of eligible IGST credit to CGST and SGST as a technical error.

Conclusion: The reversal and associated interest and penalty require fresh consideration in light of those rulings.

Final Conclusion: The time-barred credit reversal is removed; liability arising from the allocation of credit under the wrong tax heads remains for fresh determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Inadvertent allocation of otherwise eligible IGST credit to CGST and SGST heads does not by itself establish wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the customs house agent for involvement in the import of misdeclared goods was sustainable.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority found that the agent's role in importing the seized consignment was not proved, but inferred knowledge of misdeclaration from third-party statements and the use of the agent's telephone number in the trader's contact details. No independent documentary evidence directly linked the agent to the import. Penalties against other implicated persons had been set aside, eroding the foundation of the allegations. Cross-examination is not an absolute right, but forms part of natural justice and is consistent with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962. The agent's request to cross-examine persons whose statements were relied upon was denied on grounds including delay; the Tribunal incorrectly proceeded on the basis that no such request had been made.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs penalty based on third-party statements cannot be sustained where cross-examination has been denied, independent evidence of the alleged role is absent, and the foundation of the allegations has been eroded.

Issues: Whether the request to convert free shipping bills into advance authorisation shipping bills was rightly rejected.

Analysis: A coordinate bench had allowed conversion on substantially similar facts involving the same advance authorisation. The time limit prescribed by the circular relied upon by the authorities had been held ultra vires the statute.

Conclusion: The rejection of the conversion request was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A time limit prescribed by a circular held ultra vires the statute cannot bar conversion of shipping bills.

Issues: (i) Whether the application against the personal guarantor was barred by limitation; (ii) whether the personal guarantee was validly invoked.

Issue (i): Whether the application against the personal guarantor was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The continuing guarantee expressly treated a written acknowledgment by the borrower as made on the guarantor's behalf for limitation purposes. The borrower's balance-sheet acknowledgment was made during the subsisting limitation period. Applying that acknowledgment and the exclusion of the pandemic period, limitation extended to 28 February 2025; the application was filed on 8 May 2024.

Conclusion: The application was within limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the personal guarantee was validly invoked.

Analysis: The guarantee made the guarantor's obligation payable on written demand and permitted enforcement without first proceeding against the borrower. A copy of the default notice was addressed to the guarantor, and the subsequent recall notice was also addressed to the guarantor.

Conclusion: The guarantee was validly invoked.

Final Conclusion: The guarantor remains subject to the initiated insolvency resolution process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a guarantee expressly deems the borrower's written acknowledgment to bind the guarantor for limitation purposes, a timely acknowledgment extends limitation against the guarantor even after invocation of the guarantee.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the insolvency appeal could be condoned when the order was uploaded after its pronouncement.

Analysis: The order recorded counsel's presence, and no material showed that it had not been pronounced on its stated date. Under the insolvency appeal framework, limitation runs from pronouncement rather than subsequent uploading, with the day of pronouncement excluded from computation. The prescribed period is 30 days, extendable by no more than 15 days for sufficient cause. Exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy requires an application within the prescribed limitation period; the copy was sought after that period.

Conclusion: The delay was beyond the Tribunal's condonable jurisdiction and could not be condoned.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an insolvency order is pronounced in counsel's presence, subsequent uploading does not defer limitation. The Tribunal cannot condone delay beyond the statutory maximum, and exclusion of time for obtaining a certified copy requires a timely application for it.

Issues: Whether rejection of the refund claim for unutilised input tax credit on supplies to a special economic zone should be sustained where return disclosures and supporting documents require verification.

Analysis: Supplies to a special economic zone for authorised operations are zero-rated under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Rule 89 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 prescribes the refund formula and documentation requirements. Correct reporting of zero-rated turnover and its breakup is material to applying the formula. The returns did not disclose the claimed SEZ supplies, turnover figures required reconciliation, and there were conflicting accounts concerning the submission of supporting documents. Invoice-wise reconciliation, invoices, endorsements and the letter of undertaking required verification, with an opportunity of hearing and a speaking order.

Conclusion: The rejection could not be sustained without re-examination of the claim. Refund entitlement remains undecided.

Issues: (i) Whether the GST refund limitation applies to a service-tax appeal pre-deposit mistakenly paid through the GST portal. (ii) Whether unjust enrichment applies to the refund of that pre-deposit.

Issue (i): Whether the GST refund limitation applies to a service-tax appeal pre-deposit mistakenly paid through the GST portal.

Analysis: Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act concerns refunds of amounts paid under GST law. The disputed payment was identified as a service-tax appeal pre-deposit and was subsequently paid through the accepted channel. The adopted precedents distinguish amounts paid under mistake of law from tax collected under GST law and apply general limitation principles.

Conclusion: Section 54's limitation does not bar the claim; general limitation provisions apply. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether unjust enrichment applies to the refund of that pre-deposit.

Analysis: A statutory appeal pre-deposit secures the right of appeal rather than discharging duty. The adopted precedent and departmental circular distinguish its return from a refund of duty.

Conclusion: Unjust enrichment does not apply to the pre-deposit refund. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The erroneous GST-portal payment is recoverable as a service-tax appeal pre-deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal pre-deposit mistakenly paid through the GST mechanism is outside the GST refund limitation and its refund is not subject to unjust enrichment; general limitation provisions apply.

Issues: Whether proceedings under Section 74 for financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20 could be sustained on the basis of audit-detected discrepancies.

Analysis: Section 74 requires the adjudicating officer's satisfaction that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression caused the short payment, with the foundational facts stated in the show-cause notice. The discrepancies arose from records produced by the taxpayer, and no incriminating material was identified. The taxpayer's stated exemption from filing the reconciliation statement and accounts was not disputed. Failure to discharge the liability voluntarily before audit did not necessarily establish wilful suppression.

Conclusion: The Section 74 proceedings are unsustainable. Liability for financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20 is to be determined on the footing of a notice under Section 73.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings for short payment under Section 74 require foundational facts supporting the adjudicating officer's satisfaction that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression caused the short payment; an audit-detected discrepancy and failure to pay voluntarily do not by themselves establish that requirement.

Issues: Whether the claim for refund of special additional duty was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The refund notification, as amended with effect from 1 August 2008, required a claim to be filed within one year of payment of the additional duty. Its conditions required strict interpretation. The goods were imported and the duty paid after the amendment, while the claim was filed more than one year after payment. Decisions concerning imports before the amendment were distinguished.

Conclusion: The refund claim was barred by limitation and was correctly rejected. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For imports after the amendment, a claim under the conditional special additional duty refund notification must be filed within one year of payment of the duty.

Issues: (i) Whether admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application was justified; (ii) whether the lenders could be compelled to accept the proposed settlement; (iii) whether the admitted insolvency application could be withdrawn outside the statutory procedure.

Issue (i): Whether admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application was justified.

Analysis: Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 requires ascertainment of default in a financial debt that is due and payable. The debt and default were undisputed, and evidence of default had been supplied. The objections concerned the applicant's minority share, settlement and assignment.

Conclusion: Admission was justified, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the lenders could be compelled to accept the proposed settlement.

Analysis: The initial settlement proposal required an upfront deposit before the lenders could obtain internal approvals. That deposit was not made, and subsequent commitments to deposit settlement amounts were also not honoured.

Conclusion: The lenders could not be compelled to accept the proposed settlement, against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the admitted insolvency application could be withdrawn outside the statutory procedure.

Analysis: Amended Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prescribes the procedure for withdrawal, including committee approval and restrictions on the stage at which withdrawal is available.

Conclusion: Withdrawal could occur only in accordance with the statutory procedure, against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The established default supports continuation of the insolvency process; unfulfilled settlement offers do not displace the statutory withdrawal mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: A complete insolvency application by a financial creditor must be admitted when a due financial debt and default are established.

Issues: Whether the assessment proceedings complied with the requirement of a personal hearing.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of in terms of an earlier judgment. The order does not independently adjudicate the issue or specify the relief granted.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST orders should be entertained despite the statutory appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The questions concerning payment to the supplier, the supplier's returns and entitlement to input tax credit involve facts capable of adjudication by the Tribunal; no jurisdictional question arises. The writ petition was filed within the statutory appeal period.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not to be entertained. A statutory appeal filed within one month of the judgment must be entertained without objection as to limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appellate tribunal can determine disputed facts and no jurisdictional question arises, the writ court may decline to exercise jurisdiction in view of the appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether confiscation for failure to account for taxable goods requires proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 130(1) distinguishes non-accounting for taxable goods under clause (ii) from contraventions expressly qualified by an intent to evade tax. The first appellate authority applied an intent requirement across the clauses without verifying the alleged account books or reconciling its findings on non-production of records with clause (ii). The applicability of confiscation requires assessment of the relevant statutory ingredients against verified evidence.

Conclusion: Proof of intent to evade tax is not required under Section 130(1)(ii). The confiscation and penalty require fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-accounting for taxable goods under Section 130(1)(ii) is a distinct ground for confiscation and does not require proof of intent to evade tax.