Issues: (i) Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons; (ii) Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects; (iii) Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance; and (iv) Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires a meaningful hearing where it is requested in writing or where an adverse decision is contemplated. Section 75(6) requires the order to state relevant facts and the basis of decision. The requested post-reply hearing was not afforded, and the order merely treated the explanation as unsatisfactory without addressing the asserted single supply, duplicate generation, or evidentiary basis for an additional taxable transaction. The statutory audi alteram partem requirement and duty to give reasons were therefore not met.

Conclusion: The original adjudication was vitiated by breach of Sections 75(4) and 75(6), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects.

Analysis: A statutory hearing denied at the original adjudicatory stage is not automatically cured by hearings before appellate forums. The original-stage hearing was material because disputed factual questions required evaluation of the explanation, primary records, and departmental data by the proper officer in the first instance.

Conclusion: The subsequent hearings did not cure the original denial of statutory hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance.

Analysis: The existing notice was founded on duplicate e-way bills against the same invoice and the alleged unpaid tax on an additional transaction. Rule 138(9) was relevant to assess the defence that one e-way bill did not represent actual movement; it did not introduce a new charge. Non-cancellation is a material circumstance, but does not alone establish an additional supply. The issue requires a cumulative assessment of evidence, including the burden of proof and any adverse inference arising from non-production of primary records.

Conclusion: Rule 138(9) does not create a new charge, and non-cancellation is relevant but not conclusive; the issue is partly against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Section 113(1) permits referral for fresh adjudication where necessary. The duplicate e-way bills, the unexplained invoice discrepancy, the asserted technical or clerical causes, and the absence of primary invoice, return, books, and transport records left disputed factual matters unresolved. The demand could neither be annulled solely on unsupported assertions nor sustained through appellate fact-finding in substitution of the denied original hearing.

Conclusion: Fresh adjudication confined to the existing notice, after production of relevant evidence, a meaningful personal hearing, and a reasoned speaking order, is required; this procedural relief is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned determination concerning the surviving transaction cannot stand without compliance with statutory hearing and reasoned-decision requirements; whether any additional taxable supply occurred remains open for determination on the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Denial of a requested statutory personal hearing and failure to give adequate reasons at the original adjudicatory stage are not automatically cured by later appellate hearings where disputed factual evidence requires first-instance determination.

Issues: (i) Whether, for FY 2018-19, ITC could be denied merely because invoices were absent from GSTR-2A and the role of Sections 16 and 155 and Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST; (ii) Whether the appellant established eligibility for ITC on the three supplier invoices and explained the residual IGST difference; (iii) Whether the alleged CGST/SGST credit shortfall could be set off against excess IGST credit; (iv) Whether the alleged non-consideration of evidence required interference or remand; (v) Whether interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether, for FY 2018-19, ITC could be denied merely because invoices were absent from GSTR-2A and the role of Sections 16 and 155 and Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST.

Analysis: Section 16(2)(aa) was not applicable to FY 2018-19. A GSTR-2A mismatch was a trigger for verification and not an independent basis for denial; however, the Substantive Conditions for Input Tax Credit under Section 16 and the Burden of Proof under Section 155 remained applicable. Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied in principle to invoices bearing a registered recipient's GSTIN but wrongly reported as B2C, but a supplier certificate under the Circular was evidentiary material and not conclusive proof.

Conclusion: ITC could not be denied solely because of non-reflection in GSTR-2A, in favour of the assessee on that legal proposition; eligibility nevertheless remained dependent on proof of the statutory conditions.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established eligibility for ITC on the three supplier invoices and explained the residual IGST difference.

Analysis: The invoices, ledger and transport material supported the existence of commercial transactions and movement of goods, but did not sufficiently establish the asserted supplier-side B2C reporting error or payment of tax through the supplier's GSTR-3B. The later supplier certificate lacked objective return-level corroboration, particularly for the high-value invoice capable of invoice-wise B2CL reporting. The three invoices also accounted for only part of the disputed IGST, leaving the balance unsupported by any identified invoice or reconciliation.

Conclusion: The claimed ITC was not established for the three invoices, and the residual IGST difference remained unexplained, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged CGST/SGST credit shortfall could be set off against excess IGST credit.

Analysis: IGST, CGST and SGST are distinct tax heads governed by the statutory utilisation mechanism. No transaction-level reconciliation showed that the apparent short-availment under CGST or SGST arose from the same transactions or constituted a legally permissible Cross-Head Set-Off.

Conclusion: The alleged CGST/SGST shortfall could not be netted against excess IGST credit, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether the alleged non-consideration of evidence required interference or remand.

Analysis: The material relied upon had not been tendered before the adjudicating authority, while the first appellate forum afforded two hearing opportunities that were not used. The available material was assessed on merits, and Rule 45 restricted the Admission of Additional Evidence before the Tribunal. The statutory bar on remand by the first appellate authority and the discretionary remand power of the Tribunal did not warrant another factual inquiry after repeated opportunities had been provided.

Conclusion: No breach of Natural Justice or basis for Discretionary Remand was established, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (v): Whether interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Utilisation of the disputed credit was undisputed, and no specific challenge to the interest period or computation was made. Interest on Wrongly Availed and Utilised Input Tax Credit followed under Section 50(3) read with Rule 88B(3). The penalty represented the statutory minimum under Section 73(9) after the principal tax demand was sustained.

Conclusion: The interest and penalty were sustainable, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The historical Input Tax Credit Mismatch was tested against substantive proof requirements rather than resolved mechanically from return reflection; the record supplied no basis for the claimed credit, cross-head adjustment, or further fact-finding.

Ratio Decidendi: For FY 2018-19, non-reflection of ITC in GSTR-2A cannot alone justify denial, but the claimant must prove eligibility under Section 16 and discharge the burden under Section 155; a supplier certificate under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST is not conclusive where the asserted reporting error and tax-payment explanation remain inadequately substantiated.

Issues: Whether an interlocutory application seeking stay and priority listing could be substantively considered before the appeal completed scrutiny and was registered.

Analysis: Rule 29 permits interlocutory relief in a pending matter. As the appeal remained under scrutiny and had not been registered, consideration of the substantive relief was deferred until registration. The urgency shown warranted expeditious completion of scrutiny.

Outcome: The Registry was directed to expedite scrutiny, register the appeal if no deficiency was found, and place the interlocutory application before the Bench after registration.

Issues: Whether additional court fee under Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is payable on a first GST appeal filed before the Kerala State GST appellate authority under Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Acts.

Analysis: Section 107(6) of the CGST/KGST Acts prescribes the payments required for maintaining a GST appeal. However, the State court-fee levy separately applies to appeals filed before the Kerala State GST appellate authority. The settled position recognising the validity and applicability of the levy under Section 76 binds the State GST authorities and appellants filing appeals before them. The later notification relied upon by the appellant did not negate the existing liability to pay the applicable additional court fee.

Conclusion: Additional court fee under Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is payable for the first GST appeal; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether limited input tax credit relief based on amended GST records could be sustained despite retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, in the absence of transaction-specific evidence establishing ineligibility.

Analysis: Sections 16(2), 16(2)(c) and 155 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require ITC eligibility and the claimant's burden to be assessed with reference to the facts and evidence relating to particular transactions. Retrospective cancellation of a supplier's registration, without specific material showing that the invoices were fictitious, supplies were not received, or the limited credit was otherwise inadmissible, was insufficient to displace relief granted after examination of identified GST-record amendments. Discrepancies in return figures likewise did not establish inadmissibility of the specific credit. Section 75(7) of the respective Acts also confined the demand to the grounds forming the basis of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The limited ITC relief of Rs. 76,750.20 was sustained.

Issues: Whether rejection of the application for keeping tax-recovery proceedings in abeyance solely because an appeal was pending and 20% of the disputed demand had not been paid was sustainable.

Analysis: The CBDT stay-demand guidelines require the assessing authority to apply its discretion after considering the relevant facts and merits of the request. Payment of 20% of the disputed demand cannot be imposed as a per se precondition for considering a stay application. The impugned order relied only on pendency of the appeal and non-payment of 20%, without recording any assessment of the merits or other relevant circumstances.

Conclusion: The impugned refusal to keep recovery proceedings in abeyance was unsustainable and was set aside for fresh determination.

Issues: (i) Whether the Rs. 10 crore bank credit was properly treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (ii) whether the documents claimed to be newly discovered justified review of the earlier judgment.

Issue (i): Whether the Rs. 10 crore bank credit was properly treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 68 places the burden of proof on the assessee to establish the identity of the creditor, the creditor's creditworthiness, and the genuineness of the transaction. The receipt of Rs. 10 crore in the assessee's personal bank account was undisputed. The accommodation-entry explanation and the alleged onward transfer of Rs. 9.97 crore were unsupported and did not discharge that burden.

Conclusion: The Rs. 10 crore credit was validly treated as unexplained cash credit; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the documents claimed to be newly discovered justified review of the earlier judgment.

Analysis: Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires proof that new and important evidence could not, despite due diligence, have been produced earlier. The sale deeds of 2007 and tribunal order of 2015 were available in public records during the original proceedings, and due diligence was not established. Reconsideration of the factual explanation on those materials would amount to an impermissible rehearing in review jurisdiction. No error apparent on the face of the record was shown.

Conclusion: The asserted new material did not establish a valid ground for review; decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unexplained-credit addition remains legally sustainable, and review jurisdiction cannot be used to reopen settled factual findings on material that was available with due diligence.

Ratio Decidendi: A review based on newly discovered evidence is unavailable where the evidence was obtainable with due diligence in the original proceedings, and review cannot be used to rehear factual findings.

Issues: (i) Whether drawback could be denied and recovered where export proceeds were remitted by RBI under the rupee trade scheme and the goods allegedly did not reach the intended destination; (ii) Whether goods already exported were liable to confiscation under Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed.

Issue (i): Whether drawback could be denied and recovered where export proceeds were remitted by RBI under the rupee trade scheme and the goods allegedly did not reach the intended destination

Analysis: Rule 16 of the Customs and Central Excise Duties Drawback Rules, 1995 concerns erroneous or excess drawback, whereas Rule 16A provides for recovery where export sale proceeds remain unrealised within the stipulated foreign-exchange period. The export proceeds were remitted through the RBI mechanism applicable to rupee exports to Russia, and no material showed that RBI had treated the remittances as unrelated to the exports or reversed them. Customs authorities could not disregard remittances made under that mechanism without an RBI determination.

Analysis: Drawback under Section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962 is linked to completion of export. Export stands completed when the goods leave Indian territorial waters and title passes to the buyer; subsequent non-arrival at the intended foreign destination does not, by itself, negate drawback entitlement. The destination of the goods does not determine the drawback rate or eligibility.

Conclusion: Drawback was admissible and its denial and recovery were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether goods already exported were liable to confiscation under Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed

Analysis: Section 2(19) of the Customs Act, 1962 defines export goods as goods which are to be taken out of India. Section 113 applies to such export goods and not to goods that have already been exported. During the relevant period, the Customs Act did not have extra-territorial jurisdiction over goods outside India. Since the goods could not be treated as liable to confiscation under Section 113, the foundational requirement for penalties under Section 114 was absent.

Conclusion: The exported goods were not liable to confiscation, and the related penalties were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery, confiscation basis, interest demand, and associated personal penalties lacked legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Duty drawback accrues upon completion of export when goods leave Indian territorial waters and title passes to the buyer, and is not defeated by subsequent non-arrival at the intended destination where export proceeds stand realised through the applicable RBI mechanism.

Issues: Whether continued detention of the seized machines and spare parts was lawful where no notice was issued within the period prescribed for seizure and no provisional-release order covered those goods.

Analysis: Section 110(2) mandates return of seized goods where notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within six months, subject only to a valid extension for a further period not exceeding six months. The statutory consequence remains operative notwithstanding provisional release under Section 110A. The machines and spare parts were not covered by the provisional-release order, and the notice issued on 21.02.2025 was beyond one year from their seizure on 15.09.2022.

Conclusion: Detention of the 14 machines and spare parts beyond 15.09.2023 was illegal and unsustainable. Their release was directed upon execution of a bond equivalent to their value.

Issues: Whether the penalty for alleged abetment of gold smuggling was sustainable on the statements, electronic communications, and the alleged failure to act at airport screening.

Analysis: A statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon in adjudication only after compliance with the procedure under Section 138B, including examination of the maker, a determination of admissibility, and an effective opportunity of cross-examination, unless a statutory exception applied. Those safeguards were not followed for the appellant's statement or the material witness statements. The call records and WhatsApp chats also lacked the certification required for electronic evidence. The DFMD was faulty, the appellant was not assigned screening duties as a proper officer, and no independent corroborative evidence connected the appellant with possession, handling, or dealing with the smuggled gold.

Conclusion: The statements and electronic material could not validly sustain the allegation, and the penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a successful liquidation-auction bidder who failed to pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated period was entitled to refund of the deposited amount despite an express forfeiture clause in the auction notice and the ceiling on earnest money deposit under Schedule I.

Analysis: Schedule I of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 limited the earnest money deposit to 10% of the reserve price but did not displace an express auction condition permitting forfeiture of the entire amount deposited upon a successful bidder's failure to pay the balance consideration. The bidder accepted the sale on an as-is-where-is basis, with prior disclosure of the title-related issue, and voluntarily deposited the stipulated amount comprising the earnest money deposit and part of the sale consideration. The asserted need for prior title deeds arose only near the payment deadline and could not justify non-payment. The triple test did not assist the bidder: repeated assurances did not establish financial capacity, and the proceedings initiated by another entity did not constitute an extraneous impediment preventing payment. The allegation of unequal treatment was raised belatedly and without supporting material.

Conclusion: The forfeiture of the entire deposited amount, including the earnest money deposit and part sale consideration, was valid, and no refund was due.

Issues: (i) Whether an OTS between a personal guarantor and the sole financial creditor can bring the corporate debtor out of liquidation; (ii) Whether forfeited earnest money deposit previously received by the financial creditor must revert to the liquidation estate after its debt is settled; (iii) Whether payment of remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate is valid; and (iv) Whether the admitted operational creditor is entitled to distribution and the personal guarantor can claim priority as a financial creditor.

Issue (i): Whether an OTS between a personal guarantor and the sole financial creditor can bring the corporate debtor out of liquidation.

Analysis: A bilateral settlement with a financial creditor does not displace the statutory liquidation process. Exit from liquidation is available only through the legally recognised routes, including a scheme under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, or sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern. The separately ratified transfer of assets, treated as a private sale after unsuccessful auctions and on value-maximisation considerations, was left undisturbed.

Conclusion: The OTS did not terminate or alter the liquidation process, and no interference was warranted with the ratified asset transfer.

Issue (ii): Whether forfeited earnest money deposit previously received by the financial creditor must revert to the liquidation estate after its debt is settled.

Analysis: The forfeited earnest money deposit constituted an asset of the liquidation estate. Once the financial creditor accepted the OTS amount and issued an account-closure certificate, its claim stood satisfied and it retained no entitlement to the forfeited amount. The amount was consequently required to be restored to the liquidation estate for distribution under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The forfeited earnest money deposit was required to be returned to the liquidation estate and could not be retained by the financial creditor.

Issue (iii): Whether payment of remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate is valid.

Analysis: The erstwhile liquidator had undertaken claim processing, conducted auctions, pursued applications, and represented the corporate debtor in connected proceedings. The monthly remuneration had been fixed during the insolvency process and continued during liquidation; the reduced amount allowed was supported by the unchallenged computation and work performed.

Conclusion: Payment of the approved remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate was valid.

Issue (iv): Whether the admitted operational creditor is entitled to distribution and the personal guarantor can claim priority as a financial creditor.

Analysis: The operational creditor's claim had been lodged during the insolvency process, updated after liquidation commenced, admitted by the liquidator, and reported to the relevant authorities. Payment by the personal guarantor to settle the financial creditor's dues did not effect an assignment of debt or substitute the guarantor as a financial creditor. As purchaser of assets or promoter, the guarantor had no priority claim over the liquidation estate and could receive any surplus only after statutory claims were satisfied under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The admitted operational creditor was entitled to distribution under the statutory waterfall, and the personal guarantor had no priority entitlement as a financial creditor.

Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate, including forfeited earnest money deposit, remains available for settlement of liquidation costs and admitted stakeholder claims in accordance with the statutory waterfall.

Ratio Decidendi: A personal guarantor who settles the corporate debtor's financial debt under an OTS does not, absent assignment or substitution, become a financial creditor entitled to liquidation-estate proceeds, which must be distributed under the statutory waterfall after the financial creditor's claim is satisfied.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax could be invoked for the period 2015-16.

Analysis: Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 permits invocation of the extended limitation period only where suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud or like conduct is established. The relevant receipts and taxable transactions had been disclosed through VAT returns and ST-3 returns, and the original adjudicating authority had evaluated those records while dropping the proposed demand. The material did not establish suppression of facts, wilful misstatement or fraud. Therefore, any demand could only fall within the normal limitation period. The show cause notice dated 24.12.2020 for the period 2015-16 was wholly time-barred.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the service tax demand was barred by limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions; (ii) Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit; and (iii) Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Issue (i): Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions.

Analysis: The governing methodology for real-estate projects rejects a comparison of input tax credit with turnover because construction expenditure, credit accrual and buyer collections do not have a direct correlation throughout a project. It requires the total GST-related saving for the project to be determined and allocated over the total project area to derive a uniform per square foot benefit. The revised computation quantified the additional input tax credit against project purchase value, determined the project-level saving, divided it by total area, and applied the resulting per square foot figure to the sold area. Purchase value was used to measure credit against project expenditure, not as a substitute for turnover or for allocating benefit according to buyer collections. Judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 does not permit replacement of a fair and reasonable factual computation accepted by the specialised Tribunal absent jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or non-compliance with the binding remand directions.

Conclusion: The methodology was consistent with the remand directions and was validly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerns the benefit of input tax credit actually accruing to the supplier and its passing on to recipients. The pre-GST returns recorded nil CENVAT credit actually availed, while substantial GST input tax credit was availed after GST. A credit that was only legally available but remained unclaimed cannot be treated as having reduced the pre-GST tax incidence, since that would compare actual post-GST benefit with a hypothetical pre-GST benefit. The benefit was not restricted to credit on goods, as the post-GST credit on input services was also actually availed.

Conclusion: Unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit could not be notionally set off against the post-GST input tax credit; the determination based on actual availment was upheld, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Analysis: GST collected on the enhanced consideration resulting from non-passing of the tax benefit forms part of the profiteered amount because it represents tax collected on the additional realisation. The direction to pay interest at 18% was part of the statutory anti-profiteering consequence, and no independent jurisdictional infirmity was established.

Conclusion: Addition of GST at 12% to the profiteered amount and the direction for interest at 18% were valid, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The project-specific calculation founded on actually availed incremental input tax credit, allocated on a per square foot basis and inclusive of GST collected on the excess realisation, remains enforceable with interest payable to the affected recipients.

Ratio Decidendi: In real-estate anti-profiteering proceedings, incremental input tax credit actually availed after GST must be determined as project-level savings and allocated by area; unavailed pre-GST credit cannot be imputed as a notional offset.

Issues: Whether imposition of tax and penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was justified where the e-way bills had expired and their validity was not extended under Rule 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Section 129 permits demand of tax and penalty for contraventions during transportation, while Rule 138(10) prescribes the validity period of an e-way bill. Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST distinguishes serious and substantive contraventions from minor or procedural lapses. The consignment was accompanied by invoices, lorry receipt, e-way bills and a test certificate; the invoices charged integrated tax and physical verification disclosed no discrepancy in the goods. Expiry of the e-way bills was the sole defect, and no tax evasion or intention to evade tax was established. The explanation for the incorrect destination entry and consequential validity period was relevant while deciding whether Section 129 could be invoked.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the expired e-way bills was invalid and unjustified; the levy of integrated tax and penalty was set aside.

Issues: Whether statutory interest consequential to confiscation and redemption of imported goods may be computed from the original assessment of the Bill of Entry when the liability arising from the confiscation proceedings was determined only by a subsequent adjudication order.

Analysis: Under Section 125(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, the obligation to pay duty and charges consequent upon redemption arises in the context of exercise and acceptance of the redemption option. The resulting duty liability is required to be assessed and determined through the machinery of Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, after which statutory interest may apply in accordance with law. The original assessment was based on the declared description of the goods, whereas the goods were seized and the description, classification, confiscation consequences, redemption fine, penalties and duty consequences were determined only through the adjudication order dated 28.02.2023. Delay in adjudication does not by itself extinguish statutory interest; however, a liability that had not yet been determined cannot be treated as an amount in delayed payment for the preceding period.

Conclusion: Interest could not be computed for the period from the original assessment in May 2015 until 28.02.2023. The interest liability must be recomputed from the date of determination under the adjudication order, after accounting for the subsequent reassessment and payments or appropriations already made; interest for the subsequent period remains payable if attracted under the applicable law.

Issues: Whether penalty upon a director under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable where the imported goods were not available for confiscation or imposition of redemption fine, and the duty demand against the importer arising from the same order had already been set aside.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 111. Although the adjudication order recorded that the goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111(m), no redemption fine under Section 125 was imposed because the goods were not physically available. The duty demand and penalties against the importer, founded on the same reclassification, had also been set aside in the importer's appeal. These circumstances left no legal basis for fastening penal liability upon the director.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed upon the appellant under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); (ii) Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Issue (i): Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI).

Analysis: Rule 57C of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 denied credit on inputs used in manufacture of exempt or nil-rated final products. The second proviso to Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994 confined AED (GSI) credit to payment of excise duty leviable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, on final products. TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI), while tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); consequently, no dutiable final product under that enactment existed against which the credit could be utilised. The subsequent CENVAT amendment and circular could not apply to the 1998-99 period. The retrospective amendment under Section 88 of the Finance Act, 2004 applied only to AED (GSI) paid on or after 1 April 2000.

Conclusion: The assessee was not eligible to avail or utilise AED (GSI) credit towards basic excise duty. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Analysis: Refund under Rule 57F(13) depended upon valid entitlement to the underlying AED (GSI) credit. Since the credit itself was unavailable under Rule 57C and Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994, export of the tyres did not create entitlement to refund of that credit.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to refund of the disputed AED (GSI) credit. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: AED (GSI) credit under the MODVAT regime could be used only against liability under the same additional-excise-duty enactment; later CENVAT provisions did not alter the position for the earlier disputed period.

Ratio Decidendi: Credit of a specified additional excise duty is unavailable where no final product is liable to that duty, and cannot be diverted towards payment of a different excise duty unless the governing credit scheme expressly permits it.

Issues: Whether the writ petition could be maintained despite the appellant's failure to challenge the portal-uploaded notice and final tax order through the available statutory remedy.

Analysis: The appellant acknowledged receipt of the notice through the portal but asserted, without corroboration, that it had not seen the notice or the consequential order until recovery proceedings commenced. Any objection that the notice was only an electronic summary or lacked required particulars ought to have been raised by a timely reply before the final order was made. The appellant's continued inaction, particularly when it had accessed the portal for input tax credit purposes, did not justify invoking writ jurisdiction after the final order.

Conclusion: The rejection of the writ petition for non-availment of the alternative statutory remedy was upheld; the appellant could not challenge the notice and final order on the asserted ground after remaining silent during the proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged cash returned by builders or paid to builders in purported builder-financing transactions was taxable as unexplained money or unexplained investment under sections 69A and 69B; (ii) Whether alleged interest from purported builder-financing transactions was taxable; and (iii) Whether the stamp-duty-value differential on acquisition of property was taxable under section 56(2)(x)(b) without determination of fair market value by the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Issue (i): Whether alleged cash returned by builders or paid to builders in purported builder-financing transactions was taxable as unexplained money or unexplained investment under sections 69A and 69B.

Analysis: Section 69A requires unexplained money, while section 69B concerns investment exceeding the amount recorded in the books. The alleged cash returned by builders was traced to advances initially made through accounted banking channels. No independent unexplained source, asset, income, or accretion corresponding to the alleged return was established. The alleged cash payment by the assessee to builders was likewise not sustainable on the materially identical search material and transaction pattern.

Conclusion: The additions for alleged cash received from, or paid to, builders under sections 69A and 69B were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged interest from purported builder-financing transactions was taxable.

Analysis: The addition was founded on the inferred builder-financing arrangement and electronic material. The property transactions were also consistent with acquisition for capital appreciation and rental income, with the related rental income and capital gains having been offered to tax and accepted. The material did not justify sustaining a separate addition for alleged interest income.

Conclusion: The alleged interest-income additions were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the stamp-duty-value differential on acquisition of property was taxable under section 56(2)(x)(b) without determination of fair market value by the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(x)(b) applies where immovable property is acquired for consideration below the stamp duty value beyond the statutory threshold, irrespective of the characterisation of the transaction as builder financing. Where the stamp duty value is disputed, the valuation mechanism under section 50C requires determination of fair market value through the Departmental Valuation Officer before finalising the addition.

Conclusion: The exclusion of section 56(2)(x)(b) merely because the transactions were characterised as builder financing was rejected against the assessee; the issue of valuation, quantum, and ultimate taxability was remitted for fresh determination after Departmental Valuation Officer valuation.

Final Conclusion: The alleged cash-flow and interest additions were unsustainable, while the stamp-duty-value differentials require valuation-based reconsideration under the statutory mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: An alleged return of an assessee's own accounted advance cannot be separately assessed as unexplained money or investment without evidence of an independent unexplained source or accretion.