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Issues: (i) Whether a bail order obtained without disclosure of parallel proceedings and refusals of release may remain final; (ii) Whether a direction to list a petition "two weeks hence" requires vacation to be excluded where the two-week period expires during court vacation.
Issue (i): Whether a bail order obtained without disclosure of parallel proceedings and refusals of release may remain final.
Analysis: While the prosecuting authority was not wholly unrepresented at the bail hearing, its standing counsel could not appear and material facts were not placed before the High Court. The accused pursued successive and parallel remedies for bail or release before the Sessions Court, the High Court and the writ court, without disclosing the rejection of bail and refusal of ad-interim release when seeking urgent listing of the pending bail petition. This conduct amounted to forum shopping, suppression of material facts and abuse of process, defeating the uberrima fides required for discretionary bail.
Conclusion: The final disposal of the bail petition was set aside and the petition was revived for fresh consideration on merits; the accused shall remain on interim bail on the earlier terms pending further orders.
Issue (ii): Whether a direction to list a petition "two weeks hence" requires vacation to be excluded where the two-week period expires during court vacation.
Analysis: A general direction for listing after two weeks does not ordinarily require vacation listing where the expiry falls during a court vacation, unless the matter is made returnable on a specific vacation date or listing before the Vacation Bench is directed.
Conclusion: The two-week period should ordinarily be computed excluding the vacation period, subject to the applicable High Court rules.
Final Conclusion: The bail application requires a fresh and fully informed determination after completion of pleadings, while the stated approach to vacation listing is to be applied ordinarily.
Ratio Decidendi: A litigant seeking discretionary bail must disclose all parallel proceedings and material orders; suppression of such facts constitutes abuse of process warranting reconsideration of the bail determination.
Issues: (i) Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2); (ii) Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit; (iii) Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit; and (iv) Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2).
Analysis: Section 140(2) permits transition of unavailed CENVAT credit on capital goods that was not carried forward under the existing law, provided the credit was admissible under both the existing and GST regimes. Neither the provision nor Rule 117(2)(a) requires that credit must have been partly availed before the appointed day or restricts transition to fifty per cent of the eligible credit. The prescribed TRAN-1 particulars were furnished and the capital-goods credit fulfilled the statutory conditions.
Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 2,90,845 is admissible under Section 140(2), in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit.
Analysis: Table 7(a) concerns credit relating to inputs under specified categories of Section 140 and does not provide a residual route for transitioning central excise duty paid on goods cleared for export before GST. No provision of Section 140 authorises such duty to be converted into GST input tax credit. Section 174(2)(c) does not preserve a right to transitional credit where no such right had accrued under the existing law or the GST transitional framework.
Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 6,99,004 is not admissible, against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit.
Analysis: Interest follows the recoverability of wrongly availed input tax credit. Since the export-related transitional credit was inadmissible, interest is consequentially chargeable on that amount.
Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the inadmissible transitional credit, against the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.
Analysis: Section 73 applies to wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit in cases other than fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression. Upon determination of the inadmissible credit, Section 73(9) requires penalty at ten per cent of the tax determined; disclosure in TRAN-1 does not displace that consequence.
Conclusion: Penalty is sustainable at Rs. 69,900, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The transitional framework preserves eligible unavailed capital-goods credit, but does not authorise conversion of central excise duty paid on pre-GST export clearances into GST credit.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 140(2) permits transition of eligible unavailed capital-goods credit not carried forward under the existing law, but transitional credit cannot be claimed where the statute provides no enabling category for the duty concerned.
Issues: (i) Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions; (ii) Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid; (iii) Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment; (iv) Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal; (v) Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.
Issue (i): Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions.
Analysis: The appellate order rejected extensive submissions concerning tax set-off, credit/debit notes and delayed-return interest through a bare one-line observation. It did not address the material contentions or disclose any reasoned basis for confirming the demand. This failed the speaking-order requirement and breached the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The appellate order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid.
Analysis: The excess output tax payment was undisputed and exceeded the disputed ineligible input tax credit. Section 73 is attracted only where tax remains unpaid or short paid, or credit is wrongly availed or utilised. Requiring payment of the disputed amount followed by a separate refund claim, despite an admitted excess payment, would defeat the permissible set-off of tax liability and produce no revenue loss.
Conclusion: No notice under section 73 lay where the admitted excess output tax payment fully offset the ineligible input tax credit; the related tax, interest and penalty demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment.
Analysis: Excess output tax paid over the tax actually due was found to fall within the exception in section 54(8)(c). Accordingly, the statutory basis asserted for applying the test of unjust enrichment was unavailable.
Conclusion: Refund of excess output tax paid was not subject to the test of unjust enrichment, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal.
Analysis: The show cause notice alleged absence of supporting documents, whereas the adjudication order confirmed the demand because the counterparty had not declared a debit note in its returns. The adjudication thereby travelled beyond the scope of the show cause notice. Further, for the disputed 2017-18 period, GSTR-2A was a reconciliation facility and portal declaration of the credit/debit notes was not mandatory; documents otherwise in order could not be invalidated merely for non-uploading.
Conclusion: The sales-return demand and consequential tax, interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.
Analysis: The show cause notice did not identify the defaulting months, tax amounts, or period for which interest was claimed. Its stated interest amount also materially differed from the amount in the adjudication order without any disclosed basis. The demand lacked the specificity required by the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The interest demand for delayed filing of returns was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The asserted liabilities for tax, interest and penalty lacked legal foundation.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 73 cannot be invoked where an admitted excess output tax payment fully offsets the disputed ineligible input tax credit and no net short payment of tax remains.
Issues: (i) Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls; (ii) Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.
Issue (i): Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls.
Analysis: The reconciliation based on the latest GSTR-2A figures and IGST paid on imports was unrebutted and showed aggregate eligible credit exceeding the credit claimed. Section 49(5)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits surplus IGST credit, after payment of IGST liability, to be utilised towards CGST and SGST liabilities. The Fungibility of Input Tax Credit principle treats the electronic credit ledger as a unified resource for this purpose. Under Judicial Discipline, the applicable jurisdictional ruling on adjustment of IGST surplus against CGST/SGST shortfalls was required to be followed.
Conclusion: The alleged excess input tax credit was not sustainable; surplus IGST credit validly offset the CGST and SGST shortfalls, leaving no short payment of tax warranting proceedings under Section 73.
Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.
Analysis: The original adjudication was passed without affording a Right to Personal Hearing and without considering the taxpayer's contentions. The appellate order mechanically affirmed the demand without analysing the contentions and evidence. Such adjudication breached the Principles of Natural Justice and the requirement of a Speaking Order.
Conclusion: The adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by breach of the Principles of Natural Justice and were null and void.
Final Conclusion: The alleged ITC mismatch had no factual or legal basis after complete reconciliation and permissible cross-utilisation of IGST credit, while the underlying proceedings were independently invalid for procedural unfairness.
Issues: (i) Whether a consolidated show cause notice and order covering multiple financial years is valid under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the disputed input tax credit demands are sustainable; (iii) Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the consequential penalty are sustainable; (iv) Whether interest is payable under Section 50 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on tax determined as payable.
Issue (i): Whether a consolidated show cause notice and order covering multiple financial years is valid under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: Sections 74(1), 74(2) and 74(10) prescribe the conditions and limitation for issuance of a demand notice and order, but do not require separate notices for each financial year. A consolidated notice covering more than one tax period is permissible where each period is within the prescribed limitation and the noticee suffers no prejudice to its right of defence or appeal.
Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice and order for multiple financial years are valid. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the disputed input tax credit demands are sustainable.
Analysis: The prior-year input tax credit reflected in the subsequent year's return was not rejected on legal ineligibility, but for want of proof that the benefit had not already been granted. Verification of that factual position is required. The claims concerning payment under an incorrect tax head and credit availed under incorrect heads also require verification of revenue impact and compliance with Section 49 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 88A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. A fair opportunity to furnish supporting evidence is required.
Conclusion: The three disputed input tax credit components require fresh factual verification and determination in accordance with law; no final tax liability is fixed on these components.
Issue (iii): Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the consequential penalty are sustainable.
Analysis: Section 74 applies only where non-payment, short-payment, erroneous refund, or wrongful availment of input tax credit is attributable to fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. The show cause notice must disclose foundational facts supporting such allegations; mechanical recitation of those expressions is insufficient. The burden of proving mala fides lies on the Department. The relevant input tax credit particulars were disclosed in statutory returns, and the notice did not establish fraud, deliberate suppression, or mens rea to evade tax.
Conclusion: The confirmation of demand and penalty under Section 74 is set aside in favour of the assessee. Tax, interest and penalty, if any, shall be determined under Section 75(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 as if the notice had been issued under Section 73(1).
Issue (iv): Whether interest is payable under Section 50 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on tax determined as payable.
Analysis: Interest under Section 50 is a statutory consequence of tax validly determined as payable.
Conclusion: Interest is payable on the tax ultimately determined as payable. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Consolidation of tax periods does not invalidate the demand proceedings, but liability must be determined after factual verification under the ordinary demand framework, with statutory interest following the lawful determination of tax.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 74 can be invoked only where the show cause notice discloses foundational facts establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax; a bare allegation founded on disclosed return particulars is insufficient.
Issues: Whether the Appellate Authority could direct the adjudicating authority to verify reconciliation workings and delete input tax credit demand, interest and penalty to the extent of eligible credit.
Analysis: Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 empowers the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry and to confirm, modify or annul the appealed order, while expressly prohibiting it from referring the case back to the adjudicating authority. The conditional direction for verification and consequential deletion of demand required the adjudicating authority to perform the inquiry that the Appellate Authority itself was required to undertake. There was no dispute regarding the need to verify the taxpayer's reconciliation workings.
Conclusion: The referral to the adjudicating authority was impermissible under Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the issue was decided in favour of Revenue.
Issues: Whether input tax credit proposed to be disallowed under Section 16(2)(aa) in the show-cause notice could be denied under Section 16(2)(c) on the ground of non-payment of tax by suppliers, merely because the latter provision was reproduced in the notice.
Analysis: The scope of the show-cause notice was confined to alleged non-compliance with Section 16(2)(aa), which was inapplicable to the relevant period. It contained no allegation or factual basis that tax on the disputed supplies had not actually been paid to the Government, as required for invoking Section 16(2)(c). The adjudication order nevertheless disallowed input tax credit on that distinct ground. Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice. A bare recital of a statutory provision, without identifying its contravention, does not give effective notice of a charge. Such substitution of the basis of demand also violates principles of natural justice. Section 160(1) does not cure a proceeding that is substantively inconsistent with the statutory requirements.
Conclusion: Confirmation of the demand under Section 16(2)(c) was outside the show-cause notice and invalid; mere reproduction of that provision did not constitute a charge or put the taxpayer on notice. The proceedings and demand were set aside.
Issues: Whether an airline is entitled to refund of GST paid on cancelled air tickets where the fare, including GST, was refunded to passengers and the corresponding credit notes could not be adjusted against output tax liability.
Analysis: Section 34(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits adjustment through credit notes, while Circular No. 137/07/2020-GST dated 13.04.2020 permits a refund claim under the category of excess payment of tax where no output liability exists for such adjustment. The ticket number and passenger details consistently linked the air ticket, tax invoice, refund voucher and credit note, and the billing settlement records corroborated the refund mechanism. These records sufficiently established that the fare and GST were returned to the respective passengers and that no incidence of tax was retained or passed on. As the transactions were predominantly business-to-consumer supplies, input tax credit reversal did not arise; the later amendment concerning recipient credit reversal was inapplicable to the relevant period.
Conclusion: The airline is entitled to refund of the GST relating to cancelled tickets, the documentary evidence establishes absence of unjust enrichment, and the refund claim was validly made as excess payment of tax.
Issues: (i) Whether the demand for the period up to 30 September 2016 was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether works-contract supplies to Sintex Prefab and Infra Ltd. and Sintex Industries Ltd. attracted service tax for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017; (iii) Whether commission earned on Vodafone distributorship was exempt from service tax; and (iv) Whether VAT-paid supplies of plastic dustbins, portolet toilets and similar goods to local bodies and State Governments attracted service tax.
Issue (i): Whether the demand for the period up to 30 September 2016 was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The show-cause notice was issued on 22 October 2021. The demand pertaining to the period found to be beyond the five-year extended limitation period could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The demand up to 30 September 2016 is time-barred and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether works-contract supplies to Sintex Prefab and Infra Ltd. and Sintex Industries Ltd. attracted service tax for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017.
Analysis: The taxable works-contract component was confined to the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017 and quantified at 33% of the gross amount received.
Conclusion: Service tax at 33% of the gross amount received, with interest, is payable for the specified period; no penalty is imposable.
Issue (iii): Whether commission earned on Vodafone distributorship was exempt from service tax.
Analysis: The commission from Vodafone distributorship fell within Serial No. 29(f) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.
Conclusion: The commission is exempt from service tax and the entire demand on that account is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether VAT-paid supplies of plastic dustbins, portolet toilets and similar goods to local bodies and State Governments attracted service tax.
Analysis: The invoices established sale and supply of goods on which VAT had been paid, rather than provision of a taxable service.
Conclusion: The VAT-paid supplies of goods are not liable to service tax and the demand on that account is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Only the non-time-barred works-contract receipts remain chargeable to service tax with interest; the demands relating to Vodafone commission and VAT-paid supplies of goods do not survive, and no penalty is payable.
Ratio Decidendi: Where invoices establish a VAT-paid sale of goods rather than provision of a service, the related receipts are not chargeable to service tax.
Issues: Whether an appellate authority may decide an appeal after departmental additional documents are introduced and objected to by the assessee, without granting a hearing on those objections.
Analysis: Additional documents or inputs, not forming part of the original proceedings, were introduced at the appellate stage. Once the assessee objected to their introduction, the objection required consideration and the assessee was entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the appeal was decided. The appellate authority decided the appeal shortly after the objection was filed without affording such opportunity.
Conclusion: The appellate order was vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice.
Outcome: The interlocutory application for correction of the respondent's name was disposed of.
Issues: Whether a taxpayer who belatedly made good short-paid GST remained liable to interest and penalty under Section 73(9).
Analysis: The short-payment demand was validly created and concurrently confirmed. The principle concerning discretionary penalty for failure to register as a dealer was distinguishable from liability arising from short payment of GST. Payment of the tax after delay did not extinguish liability for interest. The failure to pay tax together with interest within 30 days of the show-cause notice attracted penalty under Section 73(9).
Conclusion: The taxpayer remained liable for interest on the delayed tax payment and for penalty under Section 73(9), against the assessee.
Issues: Whether an appellate order rejecting a GST appeal without deciding the merits because requisite documents were not produced could stand, and whether fresh adjudication was required.
Analysis: The appellate order was virtually non-speaking and did not disclose a merits determination of the disputed computation. Compliance with the condition requiring procurement of 80% of inputs and input services from registered suppliers under Notification No. 3/2019-Central Tax (Rate) dated 29.03.2019 requires consideration of the taxpayer's supporting documents and reconciliations. A reasoned and speaking determination after adequate opportunity of hearing is required.
Conclusion: The appellate rejection cannot stand; the dispute must be determined afresh by the adjudicating authority after considering the requisite documents and granting adequate opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether, for computing IGST on goods imported under a duty-free import authorisation, the assessable value must include basic customs duty at the tariff rate or only the effective basic customs duty after applying the available exemption.
Analysis: Under Section 3(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, the value for IGST includes the imported-goods value and customs duty chargeable under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. Although the goods attracted basic customs duty at the tariff rate, the applicable exemption notification reduced that duty to nil. The authorisation reflected no duty debit, and the exemption benefit could not be disregarded by adding a notional tariff-rate duty through the electronic assessment system. The effective duty after exemption, rather than the tariff duty, is the duty chargeable for this computation.
Conclusion: Only the nil effective basic customs duty available under the exemption is to be included for IGST valuation; tariff-rate basic customs duty cannot be added notionally. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether penalties imposed on Chartered Engineers could survive after the demand, interest, confiscation and penalties in the principal import proceedings had been set aside.
Analysis: The principal proceedings had already been found legally unsustainable: the alleged under-valuation lacked corroborative evidence, the revaluation was arbitrary, and the proceedings were time-barred. As the underlying demand and related penal consequences no longer subsisted, there was no surviving basis for imposing penalties upon the Chartered Engineers.
Conclusion: The penalties imposed on the Chartered Engineers were unsustainable and were set aside.
Issues: Whether penalties under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable where the allegation that the appellants were intended recipients of seized gold rested on third-party statements without independent evidence establishing their involvement or knowledge that the goods were liable to confiscation.
Analysis: Statements relied upon in adjudication could not be used against the appellants because the examination-in-chief requirement under Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 was not complied with. Apart from those statements, the record contained no independent corroboration that the appellants received, possessed, controlled, transported, concealed, financed, or otherwise dealt with the seized gold. The knowledge requirement in Section 112(b), namely that the person knew or had reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation, could not be presumed merely from an allegation that the person was to receive the goods.
Conclusion: The penalties under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were unsustainable and were set aside.
Issues: Whether the Revenue proved that the seized non-notified betel nuts were smuggled so as to justify confiscation and penalties.
Analysis: Betel nuts are not notified goods under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962; consequently, the burden lay on the Revenue to establish their foreign origin and illicit importation. The accompanying invoices identified consignors in Mizoram and consignees in West Bengal, and the interception was not at the Indo-Myanmar border. The ARDF report merely stated that the goods "seem" to be from the North-East, including Myanmar, and did not conclusively establish Myanmar origin. Statements alone, without independent cogent evidence of illegal importation, were insufficient to discharge the Revenue's burden.
Conclusion: The seized betel nuts were not proved to be smuggled; the confiscation and penalties were unsustainable.
Issues: Whether service-tax proceedings and the confirmed demand against a practising advocate, founded solely on Form 26AS without examining the nature of receipts or applying the notifications governing legal services, were lawful.
Analysis: The statutory framework under the Finance Act, 1994 and Notification Nos. 25/2012-Service Tax and 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012 governed legal services rendered by an individual advocate. Reliance on Form 26AS alone, without considering that framework or verifying the nature of services corresponding to the receipts, was jurisdictionally defective.
Conclusion: The proceedings and confirmed service-tax demand were without jurisdiction and were liable to be quashed.
Issues: (i) Whether penalty could be imposed on a director under Rule 26(2) where the company was not issued a show-cause notice and the director was not its authorised signatory; (ii) Whether the evidence established that the director issued or abetted invoices without supply of goods so as to attract Rule 26(2).
Issue (i): Whether penalty could be imposed on a director under Rule 26(2) where the company was not issued a show-cause notice and the director was not its authorised signatory.
Analysis: The alleged irregular credit-passing transaction was attributed to the company, but no show-cause notice for penalty was issued to it. The appellant was not its authorised signatory. The alleged corporate transaction alone could not establish personal vicarious liability of the director for the penal consequence.
Conclusion: The proceedings for imposition of penalty upon the director without notice to the company were legally unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the evidence established that the director issued or abetted invoices without supply of goods so as to attract Rule 26(2).
Analysis: Rule 26(2) requires proof that the person issued, or abetted the issue of, invoices without delivery of the underlying goods. No finding established that the appellant issued such invoices or abetted their issue. Reversal of credit by purchasers did not amount to an admission by the appellant or the company. Statements of truck owners lacked evidentiary value because the mandatory procedure for their admission under Section 9D was not followed. Absence of adequate manufacturing infrastructure with the supplier, without proof of the appellant's connivance or abetment, was insufficient to establish the alleged offence.
Conclusion: The statutory ingredients for penalty under Rule 26(2) were not established, and the penalty was unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The individual penal liability lacked a sustainable legal and evidentiary foundation.
Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Rule 26(2) requires proof that the person issued or abetted the issue of invoices without delivery of goods, and investigation statements cannot establish that liability unless admitted in accordance with the mandatory procedure under Section 9D.
Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for non-production of copies of all invoices despite entries in the credit register and absence of any allegation that the goods were not received; (ii) Whether the show-cause notice issued after the Department had knowledge of the disputed credit was barred by limitation.
Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for non-production of copies of all invoices despite entries in the credit register and absence of any allegation that the goods were not received.
Analysis: The receipt of goods was recorded in the CENVAT duty register, which was attested by the Superintendent, and in the vendor ledger; some invoices were also produced. There was no allegation that the goods had not reached the factory, were diverted, or were clandestinely removed. The documentary deficiency was therefore merely technical and did not displace the evidence of receipt and accounting of the inputs.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit cannot be denied solely because copies of all invoices were not produced when receipt and accounting of the goods remain undisputed.
Issue (ii): Whether the show-cause notice issued after the Department had knowledge of the disputed credit was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The audit memo of 31 July 2015 evidenced departmental knowledge of the disputed credit, whereas the show-cause notice was issued on 6 September 2017. The material did not establish suppression or misstatement warranting invocation of the extended limitation period.
Conclusion: The show-cause notice was time-barred, and the demand could not be sustained.
Final Conclusion: The demand of disputed credit, together with consequential interest and penalty, is unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A delayed demand for CENVAT credit cannot be sustained through the extended limitation period where the Department already had knowledge of the credit and suppression or misstatement is not established.
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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in view of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and the approved Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the High Court could interfere under Article 226 with the State Government's consent and the decision of the Empowered Committee relating to the project and the SPV.
1.2 Whether the decision of the Empowered Committee dated 22.09.2025, granting consent and "No Objection Certificate" to the successful Resolution Applicant, was arbitrary, violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution, or contrary to the petitioner's alleged accrued contractual and proprietary rights.
1.3 Whether the selection/continuation of the technical member/operator and the substitution of the petitioner as lead developer pursuant to the Resolution Plan amounted to hostile discrimination or arbitrary treatment under Article 14.
1.4 Whether alleged non-compliance with, or violation of, the Consolidated FDI Policy of India concerning 100% FDI in an already developed hotel project could be a ground, in writ jurisdiction, to invalidate the Empowered Committee's decision.
1.5 Whether the writ petition was an impermissible attempt to re-litigate issues already decided in earlier proceedings before the NCLT, NCLAT, this Court and the Supreme Court, warranting dismissal with costs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Interference with State consent and Empowered Committee decision in the backdrop of IBC proceedings
Legal framework discussed
2.1 The Court noted that: (i) a Resolution Plan in respect of the project company was approved by the NCLT under Sections 29, 30 and 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) under Section 31(1) of the IBC, an approved Resolution Plan is binding on all stakeholders including shareholders; (iii) under Section 60(5)(c), the NCLT has jurisdiction over questions of law and fact arising out of, or in relation to, the insolvency resolution process; and (iv) under Section 238, the IBC has overriding effect over any inconsistent law or instrument.
2.2 The Court also recorded that in earlier litigation it had already been conclusively held that provisions of the IBC override the Telangana Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 2001 to the extent of inconsistency, and that only the NCLT/NCLAT had jurisdiction over challenges to the CIRP and Resolution Plan.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court found that the project company (SPV) was the corporate debtor under IBC and entered CIRP, and that the State Government's consent, now impugned, was a condition expressly required in the approved Resolution Plan to enable change of shareholding in the SPV.
2.4 Once the Resolution Plan had been approved under the IBC and sustained in appeal up to the Supreme Court, its terms, including the mechanism for transfer of shareholding and substitution, were binding on all parties, including the petitioner as shareholder/lead developer. Any dispute arising from or relating to the Plan and its implementation fell within the statutory jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT.
2.5 The Court viewed the State's consent and the Empowered Committee's decision as an act in furtherance of, and in conformity with, the approved Resolution Plan and the insolvency framework, and not as an independent, free-standing executive allocation of the project.
2.6 The Court held that in the face of the comprehensive and overriding IBC scheme, and the binding nature of the approved Resolution Plan, the High Court's interference under Article 226 would be contrary to the statutory design and the settled position laid down in prior decisions, including those upholding the lack of writ jurisdiction in this very dispute post-CIRP.
Conclusions
2.7 The Court concluded that the decision of the Empowered Committee and the State's consent were integrally connected with, and governed by, the approved Resolution Plan under the IBC. Interference under Article 226 was not warranted, as the proper forum for any challenge related to the Plan or its implementation lay before the NCLT/NCLAT, in view of Sections 31, 60(5)(c) and 238 of the IBC and prior binding decisions.
Issue 2 - Alleged arbitrariness, violation of Articles 14 and 300A, and extinguishment of petitioner's rights without notice or compensation
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Court accepted that petitioner's claimed rights were rooted in its position as lead member/shareholder in the SPV and in the project agreements. However, it held that such contractual and derivative proprietary interests were necessarily subject to consequences flowing from insolvency of the SPV and the approved Resolution Plan.
2.9 The Court observed that the supervening operation of the IBC and the Resolution Plan lawfully altered the corporate and contractual landscape, including shareholding and project control. Any alleged extinguishment or modification of petitioner's rights occurred within the statutory insolvency framework and pursuant to judicial orders, not by arbitrary State action.
2.10 The argument that the State could not give consent/No Objection without issuing notice or paying compensation to the petitioner was rejected on the basis that the petitioner was already heard, and its objections to the Resolution Plan had been considered and rejected by the NCLT/NCLAT and the Supreme Court. The impugned act was an implementation step under a binding Plan, not an independent deprivation invoking Article 300A in isolation.
2.11 The Court emphasized that disputes regarding contractual breaches, valuation, or compensation, including any claim that the petitioner should be compensated for loss of its interests, are within the specialized domain of the NCLT and related fora under the IBC, where relevant proceedings are pending.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court held that no independent constitutional infirmity under Articles 14 or 300A was made out against the Empowered Committee's decision. The State's consent was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional, but a necessary and lawful step in implementing the approved Resolution Plan; any residual grievances must be agitated within the IBC forum, not in writ proceedings.
Issue 3 - Alleged discrimination and arbitrariness in favour of the technical member/operator
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The petitioner alleged that retention of the technical member/operator (EIH Ltd.) in the project, while petitioner's role as lead member was effectively extinguished, amounted to discrimination under Article 14.
2.14 The Court held that post-CIRP, the legal and commercial position of the technical member/operator and the lead member/shareholder were not similarly situated. The continuation of the operator and the structuring of operating arrangements were part of the commercial and operational choices recognized and embedded in the Resolution Plan.
2.15 As the differentiation arose from the statutory insolvency process and the commercial wisdom reflected in the Plan, and because the roles and obligations of the technical member and the petitioner were materially distinct, the Court found no element of "hostile discrimination" or unequal treatment in a constitutional sense.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court concluded that the alleged preferential treatment to the technical member/operator did not violate Article 14, as the differentiation was founded on distinct legal and factual positions under the Resolution Plan and the insolvency framework, and not on arbitrary or invidious classification.
Issue 4 - Alleged violation of the Consolidated FDI Policy and challenge to 100% FDI in the project
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The petitioner contended that allowing 100% FDI in an already developed infrastructure/hotel project was impermissible under the Consolidated FDI Policy and contrary to fundamental public policy of India, and therefore the impugned decision should be invalidated.
2.18 The Court held that questions of FDI compliance and grant of approvals fall within the remit of competent central authorities such as the Reserve Bank of India and the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Writ interference is justified only where clear and gross illegality in such regulatory sphere is demonstrated.
2.19 On the materials placed, the Court found no such clear illegality or violation of the FDI Policy attributable to the Empowered Committee's decision. The challenge was characterized as speculative and not supported by any concrete regulatory finding of breach.
Conclusions
2.20 The Court concluded that alleged violations of FDI Policy, in the absence of demonstrable illegality and in view of the jurisdiction of central regulatory authorities, could not be a valid ground in writ jurisdiction to set aside the Empowered Committee's decision.
Issue 5 - Re-litigation, finality of prior adjudications and imposition of costs
Interpretation and reasoning
2.21 The Court recorded that earlier writ proceedings challenging substitution of the petitioner and related decisions (W.P. No. 17129 of 2020 and Writ Appeal No. 1135 of 2023) had been dismissed, and the Supreme Court had declined to interfere. Likewise, objections to the Resolution Plan had failed before the NCLT, NCLAT and Supreme Court.
2.22 The present writ petition, challenging the Empowered Committee's consent which was merely a step towards implementation of the same Resolution Plan, was viewed as an indirect attempt to reopen and reargue issues already adjudicated or necessarily concluded by those earlier decisions.
2.23 The Court held that such re-litigation of settled issues, under the guise of a fresh challenge to the Empowered Committee's minutes, was impermissible and contrary to the principles of finality and judicial discipline, especially within the structured IBC regime.
2.24 To deter such conduct and to discourage frivolous or obstructive litigation aimed at derailing implementation of an approved Resolution Plan, the Court deemed it appropriate to impose exemplary costs.
Conclusions
2.25 The Court dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit and as an impermissible attempt to re-agitate settled issues, and directed the petitioner to pay costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.
TaxTMI