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Issues: (i) Whether the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is a standalone and continuing offence, and whether proceedings can survive despite quashing of cognizance in one predicate case where other scheduled offence proceedings remain; (ii) Whether the existence of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) is a condition precedent for invoking the Act and how such proceeds are to be identified through the FIR and ECIR process; (iii) Whether Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 shifts the burden of proof on the accused at the stage of discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iv) Whether absence of a monetary component in the scheduled offence defeats proceedings under the Act and whether a property transfer without cash consideration can still amount to proceeds of crime; (v) Whether the supplementary complaint strengthened the basis for cognizance and continuation of proceedings.
Issue (i): Whether the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is a standalone and continuing offence, and whether proceedings can survive despite quashing of cognizance in one predicate case where other scheduled offence proceedings remain.
Analysis: The statutory scheme treats money laundering as distinct from the predicate offence. The offence under Section 3 covers concealment, possession, acquisition, use, and projection or claiming of proceeds of crime as untainted property, and the activity is continuing so long as the proceeds remain under illicit enjoyment. The existence of a scheduled offence is a jurisdictional foundation, but the fate of one predicate case does not automatically extinguish proceedings where other FIRs or transactions still disclose a prima facie nexus with proceeds of crime. The independence of PMLA proceedings is reinforced by the special statutory scheme and the separate character of the laundering process.
Conclusion: The offence under the Act is standalone and continuing, and the proceedings were not rendered unsustainable merely because cognizance in one predicate matter had been quashed.
Issue (ii): Whether the existence of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) is a condition precedent for invoking the Act and how such proceeds are to be identified through the FIR and ECIR process.
Analysis: Proceeds of crime are the foundation of the Act. The expression is wide and includes property derived or obtained directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, as well as its equivalent value. The FIR may provide the criminal foundation and the ECIR may be recorded on that basis, but the ECIR thereafter operates independently for money-laundering investigation. The existence and identification of proceeds of crime are matters of prima facie material and investigation, and the absence of an immediate cash trail does not by itself negate the jurisdiction if the surrounding material indicates illicit derivation.
Conclusion: The existence of proceeds of crime is a jurisdictional prerequisite, but the materials disclosed a prima facie basis for tracing such proceeds and continuing the proceedings.
Issue (iii): Whether Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 shifts the burden of proof on the accused at the stage of discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 24 creates a rebuttable statutory presumption once material indicates linkage between the property and the scheduled offence. The burden then shifts to the accused to show lawful acquisition and to rebut the presumption. At the discharge stage, the Court is not required to decide rebuttal conclusively, but only to see whether there is sufficient material to proceed. If a prima facie nexus exists, the presumption operates and the matter must ordinarily go to trial.
Conclusion: The statutory burden under Section 24 operates against the accused at the threshold stage, and the petitioners did not establish a ground for discharge.
Issue (iv): Whether absence of a monetary component in the scheduled offence defeats proceedings under the Act and whether a property transfer without cash consideration can still amount to proceeds of crime.
Analysis: Proceeds of crime are not confined to cash. The definition extends to property obtained from criminal activity in any form. A transfer of immovable property, or unlawful gain arising from execution of documents or wrongful title creation, may still constitute proceeds of crime if there is a prima facie nexus with the predicate criminal activity. The absence of direct monetary exchange is therefore not decisive; what matters is whether the property reflects an illicit benefit flowing from the scheduled offence.
Conclusion: The absence of a monetary component did not vitiate the proceedings, and property transactions without cash consideration could still fall within the Act if linked to criminal activity.
Issue (v): Whether the supplementary complaint strengthened the basis for cognizance and continuation of proceedings.
Analysis: A supplementary complaint is a recognised continuation of the investigative process and may place additional material before the Special Court. It does not vitiate the original complaint; rather, it enlarges the material available for assessing a prima facie case. Where such complaint adds further transactions or links to proceeds of crime, it supports continuation of proceedings.
Conclusion: The supplementary complaint reinforced, rather than weakened, the basis for cognizance and continuation of the case.
Final Conclusion: The materials disclosed a prima facie case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the revisional challenge to the refusal of discharge failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Money-laundering proceedings are sustainable where there is a prima facie nexus between the property and a subsisting scheduled offence, because the offence under Section 3 is a continuing and independent offence and the accused must rebut the statutory presumption under Section 24 at trial rather than at the discharge stage.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether purchases supported by E-way bills could be treated as non-genuine/bogus purchases for making an addition.
(ii) Where purchases were not supported by E-way bills, but contract receipts/sales were already subjected to tax and consumption of material could not be ruled out, whether the entire purchase amount could be disallowed or only the profit element embedded in such unproved purchases should be added; and at what rate.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Purchases supported by E-way bills-whether non-genuine
Legal framework: The Court proceeded on factual verification of documentary support evidencing movement/procurement of goods through E-way bills, treating such evidence as materially relevant to the genuineness of purchases.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that where purchases were made through E-way bills, the movement of goods cannot be doubted. Consequently, such purchases could not be characterized as non-genuine merely on the general allegation that certain suppliers were involved in accommodation entries.
Conclusions: Purchases supported by E-way bills were directed to be excluded from the category of non-genuine purchases and could not be disallowed as bogus. The Court specifically accepted that purchases of cement evidenced through E-way bills in the relevant years were to that extent genuine.
Issue (ii): Purchases not supported by E-way bills-scope of addition and rate of profit element
Legal framework: The Court applied the principle that where receipts/sales are already taxed and material consumption cannot be ruled out in executing works, disputed purchases (to the extent not fully proved) may be treated as unproved purchases warranting estimation of profit element, rather than disallowance of the entire purchase value.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted there was "no dispute that the sales were already considered for taxation" and accepted that, given the nature of business involving civil contracts, consumption of materials could not be ruled out. Therefore, for purchases other than those backed by E-way bills, the Court treated them as unproved and considered it appropriate to estimate a percentage as profit embedded in such purchases.
Conclusions: The Court directed the Assessing Officer to estimate the profit element on purchases other than those made through E-way bills at 6%, subject to verification of the E-way bill-supported portion and the balance purchases.
Matters not decided
Since the Court granted relief by restricting the addition to an estimated profit element and excluding E-way bill-supported purchases, it expressly did not adjudicate the additional grounds challenging assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C and other technical grounds, leaving them open.
Issues: Whether the appellant carrying out construction of residential complexes for agreements entered into prior to 01.06.2007 is eligible to avail benefit of the works contract composition scheme and whether denial of such benefit by the Commissioner was sustainable.
Analysis: The question turns on treatment of composite contracts and the scope of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007, particularly Rule 3(1), read in the light of the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (2015) which held that prior to 01.06.2007 only service simplicitor contracts (and not composite contracts involving deemed transfer of goods) were taxable. Subsequent tribunal decisions have applied that ratio to hold that ongoing projects which were composite in nature and began before 01.06.2007 cannot be denied the benefit of the composition scheme introduced for works contracts w.e.f. 01.06.2007. The Tribunal considered precedents including NCC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Tax and Mfar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. C.C.E. & C.S.T., which conclude that denial of the composition scheme to assessees who opted for it for ongoing projects is not justified where the legal position following Larsen & Toubro is that such composite contracts were not taxable under previous service heads and the composition window was intended to facilitate compliance.
Conclusion: The impugned demand and denial of benefit of the composition scheme is set aside; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee and consequential reliefs, if any, are to follow in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether service tax was leviable on construction of residential complex, construction of commercial complex, maintenance/repair services and consulting engineers services as works contract services for the period prior to 01.06.2007.
Analysis: The question turns on the introduction and applicability of the statutory definition of 'works contract' and the date from which the service component of works contracts became taxable. Reliance is placed on the principle that the definition of works contract for service tax purposes was inserted as Section 65(105)(zzzza) and that the amendment making the service element of works contracts taxable operates with effect from 01.06.2007. Earlier authorities applying this principle distinguished service tax liability before and after the statutory amendment and treated maintenance/repair and related activities falling within works contract as not taxable under service tax prior to the amendment. Consistent decisions interpreting these propositions were applied to the facts concerning the nature of the appellant's work orders and the characterisation of activities as works contract.
Conclusion: The service tax demand and penalties confirmed for the period prior to 01.06.2007 are not sustainable; the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any, as per law.
Issues: (i) Whether a refund claim of service tax/CENVAT credit can be rejected solely because figures in ST-3 returns do not tally or on account of procedural or technical lapses; (ii) Whether the Adjudication Authority ought to follow the earlier Commissioner (Appeals) finding and properly examine eligibility under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and Notification No.27/2012-CE in relation to the refund claims for the period AprilJune 2016.
Issue (i): Whether mismatch in ST-3 returns or procedural/technical non-compliance can justify rejection of a refund claim for export of services.
Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed precedent and the record, noting that refund claims are based on substantive documents establishing credit taken, nature and nexus of services, and utilisation for output services rather than on ST-3 return figures alone. Prior Tribunal authorities have held that non-observance of procedural conditions or errors in ST-3 returns are technical in nature and cannot be the sole basis to deny substantive refund rights. The impugned orders rejected claims primarily on ST-3 mismatches or procedural lapses without addressing substantive eligibility, which the earlier Commissioner (Appeals) had found unsustainable.
Conclusion: The rejection of refund claims solely for mismatch in ST-3 returns or procedural lapses is not sustainable; such grounds do not justify denial of substantive refund entitlement. Conclusion is in favour of the assessee on this issue.
Issue (ii): Whether the Adjudication Authority erred in not following the Commissioner (Appeals) finding and in failing to examine eligibility conditions under Rule 6A and Notification No.27/2012-CE for the AprilJune 2016 period.
Analysis: The Tribunal found that for the AprilJune 2016 claim the Original Authority did not consider several substantive conditions including compliance with Rule 6A, the requirements of Notification No.27/2012-CE, and verification of export turnover before rejecting the claim. The matter required de novo consideration of these eligibility conditions and an opportunity for personal hearing, rather than outright rejection on procedural grounds.
Conclusion: The impugned order for AprilJune 2016 is set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication on merits including examination of Rule 6A compliance, Notification No.27/2012-CE conditions and verification of export turnover; conclusion provides relief to the assessee by directing reconsideration.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal partially allows the consolidated proceedings: it upholds the refund entitlement except for an admitted ineligible amount of Rs.11,802, and directs remand for de novo adjudication of the AprilJune 2016 claim so that substantive eligibility requirements are examined and a personal hearing is afforded.
Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim for export of services cannot be denied solely due to discrepancies in ST-3 returns or procedural/technical lapses; authorities must examine substantive eligibility using supporting documents, Rule 6A and relevant notification requirements, and afford an opportunity of hearing before rejecting a refund.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether interest was payable on the refunded amount under section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 when the refund sanctioned under section 11B was granted within three months from the date of receipt of the refund application.
2. Whether a claim for interest on refunded pre-deposit under section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be examined in an appeal arising from a refund application made only under section 11B, where the application did not seek refund/interest of pre-deposit and the dispute before the authorities related to section 11BB interest on the section 11B refund.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Interest on section 11B refund under section 11BB
Legal framework: The Court considered section 11B (refund application for duty and interest paid) and section 11BB (interest on delayed refunds), which makes interest payable only if the refund ordered under section 11B is not refunded within three months from the date of receipt of the section 11B(1) application.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the refund as one pursued and processed strictly under section 11B, as the refund application itself expressly stated it was filed under section 11B pursuant to the Tribunal's earlier directions. On the statutory scheme, section 11BB interest is attracted only upon delay beyond the three-month period computed from the date of receipt of the refund application. Since the refund application was filed on 26.09.2019 and the refund was sanctioned on 18.10.2019, the refund was granted within three months. Consequently, the statutory condition for section 11BB interest was not met. The Court also found no error in the reasoning of the authorities who denied interest on this basis.
Conclusions: Interest under section 11BB was held not payable because the refund was sanctioned within three months of the section 11B application; the rejection of the interest claim by the authorities was upheld.
Issue 2: Entertaining section 35FF interest claim on pre-deposit within section 11B refund appeal
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the appeal before it arose from a refund application under section 11B for a specified refunded amount and that the application did not refer to refund of pre-deposit or interest on pre-deposit under section 35FF. It further recorded that the pre-deposit itself had already been refunded and only interest was said to remain unpaid. The Court held that if interest on pre-deposit was not paid, the appellant was required to pursue separate appropriate proceedings, because the claim could not be examined within the present proceedings emanating solely from the section 11B refund application and the section 11BB interest dispute.
Conclusions: The Court held that the section 35FF pre-deposit interest contention was not examinable in the present appeal and must be pursued separately, as it did not arise from the section 11B refund application under consideration.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether an Investigating Agency has power under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to attach or debit freeze a bank account merely because amounts suspected to be linked to a cyber fraud are credited to that account.
(ii) Whether, and in what manner, debit-freezing/attachment of a bank account suspected to contain "proceeds of crime" is required to be undertaken under the BNSS, including the role of Section 107 and the Magistrate's authority.
(iii) Whether banks may debit freeze accounts on their own or upon investigative communications not amounting to a competent freezing/attachment order, and what is the permissible course indicated by the Court.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Power of Investigating Agency to debit freeze/attach under Section 106 BNSS
Legal framework: The Court examined Section 106 of the BNSS (treated as akin to the earlier seizure provision) and contrasted it with Section 107 BNSS (dealing with attachment/forfeiture/restoration). The Court relied on, and applied, the reasoning adopted in an identical context that Section 106 concerns "seizure" during investigation and does not confer authority to attach/debit freeze an account as proceeds of crime.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the distinction that seizure under Section 106 is meant to secure evidence and can be done by the police with an ex post facto report to the Magistrate, whereas attachment (including measures aimed at securing "proceeds of crime" by preventing disposal) falls within Section 107 and requires Magistrate's order. The Court treated debit freezing of a bank account as an attachment-type measure rather than a mere investigative seizure.
Conclusion: The Court conclusively held that debit freezing/attachment of a bank account is not permissible under Section 106 BNSS; therefore, the Investigating Agency has no power under Section 106 to attach or debit freeze accounts.
Issue (ii): Proper route under BNSS for debit freezing/attachment of accounts suspected to contain proceeds of crime
Legal framework: The Court examined Section 107 BNSS as the provision enabling attachment of property believed to be derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity or commission of an offence, upon approaching the jurisdictional Magistrate.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court endorsed the mechanism that the investigating officer must move the jurisdictional Magistrate for attachment; the Magistrate may order attachment after hearing parties or may issue an interim attachment order where notice would defeat the purpose. The Court accepted that subsequent steps concerning confirmation of proceeds of crime and distribution/restoration are to follow the Magistrate's process contemplated under Section 107.
Conclusion: The Court held that the Investigating Agency may proceed under Section 107 BNSS to debit freeze or attach a bank account, i.e., only through Magistrate-authorised attachment, not by unilateral action under Section 106.
Issue (iii): Legality of banks debit freezing accounts without a competent freezing/attachment order; permissible course
Legal framework: The Court took note of the "Citizen Financial Cyber Frauds Reporting and Management System" and its guidance indicating that banks/intermediaries may place the disputed amount on lien on the basis of acknowledgement details, enabling later refund after investigation, but this does not equate to debit freezing the entire account. The Court also considered the factual position that in several matters there was no clear investigative communication placed showing an instruction to debit freeze, making it unclear how the banks debit froze the accounts.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that banks should not proceed to debit freeze accounts merely upon communications that do not specifically require debit freezing by a competent authority, particularly when the lawful framework differentiates between lien on disputed amounts and account-wide debit freeze/attachment requiring appropriate authority. The Court recognized that wrongful debit freezing can cause day-to-day losses and expressly permitted affected persons to seek compensation through appropriate proceedings, to be decided on merits.
Conclusion: The Court directed that banks should act in terms of the stated management system unless there is a specific debit-freezing order by a competent authority; and it left open compensation claims to be pursued separately on merits.
Final operative determination (material to outcome): Since the impugned debit freezes were imposed under Section 106 BNSS, the Court held them unlawful and quashed and set aside the Investigating Agency's orders debit freezing the concerned accounts, allowing the petitions to that extent.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether exemption for accumulation of income under section 11(2) could be denied solely because the purpose stated in Form No. 10 was allegedly "general/vague" and not "specific or concrete", despite otherwise admitted compliance with statutory conditions.
(ii) Whether, on the facts, the purpose stated for accumulation (read with material furnished during assessment) was sufficiently connected to the trust's stated charitable objects so as to satisfy the "purpose" requirement under section 11(2).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Denial of section 11(2) accumulation for want of "specific purpose" in Form No. 10
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined section 11(2) as requiring: (a) furnishing a statement in the prescribed form/manner stating the purpose and period of accumulation (not exceeding five years); (b) investment/deposit in specified modes; and (c) furnishing the statement on or before the due date for filing the return. The Court treated the statutory text as requiring a statement of "the purpose", without reading into it an additional mandatory requirement that the purpose must be expressed as an itemised, project-specific plan in Form No. 10 in every case.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that both lower authorities did not doubt compliance with the other statutory conditions, and the denial rested mainly on the view that the purpose mentioned was not "specific or concrete". The Court held that, on a plain reading of the provision, what is required is that the assessee furnish the prescribed statement stating the purpose for which income is accumulated. The Court accepted that, given the limited space in the relevant column of Form No. 10, stating a purpose aligned with the trust's objects could not, by itself, be treated as non-compliance, particularly when the Department did not allege that the stated purpose was outside the trust's objects or that other statutory conditions were violated.
Conclusion: Exemption under section 11(2) could not be denied merely because the purpose written in Form No. 10 was described as general, where statutory conditions were otherwise met and there was no case that the stated purpose fell outside the trust's objects or that other requirements of section 11(2) were breached.
Issue (ii): Sufficiency of the stated purpose when tested against the trust's objects and record material
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court proceeded on the principle that the purpose of accumulation must be within the objects of the trust and that plurality of purposes is not prohibited, provided the purpose remains within the trust's charitable objects. It also considered that the purpose stated in Form No. 10 may be read in the overall factual context, including explanations/material furnished during assessment.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded that the trust had multiple main objects, while Form No. 10 mentioned one stated purpose: working towards communities without discrimination with emphasis on social justice. The Court also considered the resolution furnished during assessment expanding/elaborating the scope of intended application (including communal harmony and relief-oriented activities and hosting an award). Although the assessing authority had doubted the resolution due to absence of minutes, the Court ultimately assessed the record by focusing on whether the trust's activities during the relevant year were within the parameters of its objects. On the material before it, the Court found that the trust carried out activities consistent with its objects and thus satisfied the applicable conditions. The Court further relied on the admitted position that in earlier years similar accumulation had been allowed and not doubted, supporting the view that the accumulation was not for an impermissible or extraneous purpose.
Conclusion: The purpose stated for accumulation, even if broadly worded, was held to be in consonance with the trust's major objects and supported by the trust's activities on record; since the Department did not contend that the accumulation was for purposes outside the objects or that accumulated income was diverted beyond the trust's permissible scope, the claim for accumulation under section 11(2) was allowed and the denial was set aside.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether "Power Recliner", a structural component used in motor vehicle seats, is classifiable as a part of motor vehicles under Heading 8708 or as a part of seats under Heading 9401 of the Customs Tariff.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Correct tariff classification of "Power Recliner"
Legal framework
2.1 The Court examined: (i) General Rules for the Interpretation of the Tariff, particularly GRI 1 and the principle that a specific heading prevails over a general one; (ii) Heading 8708 (parts and accessories of motor vehicles of headings 87.01 to 87.05); (iii) Heading 9401 (seats and parts thereof, including seats of a kind used for motor vehicles); (iv) Note 2 to Section XVII and the General Explanatory Notes to Section XVII, especially Part (C) excluding "vehicle seats of heading 94.01"; (v) HSN Explanatory Notes to heading 8708 and heading 9401; (vi) judicial precedent in the decision affirming the classification of recliner components under heading 9401; and (vii) persuasive international practice reflected in US Customs rulings classifying recliner assemblies under heading 9401.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The product "Power Recliner" was found to be a metal structural component designed specifically to be integrated inside the backrest structure of a motor vehicle seat, enabling adjustment of the backrest angle. It is an internal, integral, non-standalone part, capable of functioning only when incorporated into the seat assembly and not adaptable for use with any other motor vehicle part.
2.3 The Court noted that Heading 8708 covers parts and accessories of motor vehicles subject to two cumulative conditions from the HSN Explanatory Notes: (i) suitability for use solely or principally with the vehicles; and (ii) not being excluded by the Notes to Section XVII. Under Note 2 to Section XVII and its General Explanatory Notes (Part (C)), parts and accessories that are more specifically covered elsewhere in the Nomenclature are excluded from Section XVII, and "vehicle seats of heading 94.01" are expressly listed as excluded. Once vehicle seats are classified under Heading 9401, their parts are thereby excluded from Heading 8708.
2.4 Applying GRI 1 and the principle of specific over general, the Court held that Heading 9401 is a specific heading for seats (including seats of a kind used for motor vehicles) and explicitly covers "parts" of such seats, whereas Heading 8708 is a general heading for motor vehicle parts. As there is no provision in the Tariff or HSN Explanatory Notes excluding recliner mechanisms from Heading 9401 or reallocating them to any other heading, the more specific description under Heading 9401 must prevail over the general description under Heading 8708.
2.5 Referring to the HSN Explanatory Notes for Heading 9401, the Court noted that even cushions and mattresses used in seats, though having their own separate heading (9404), are treated as parts of seats when presented with or as components of seats. This was taken as clarifying the principle that components integral to seat functionality and identifiable as such are to be classified as parts of seats under Heading 9401. Since the power recliner is structurally engineered solely for seat integration and performs the essential function of adjusting the backrest angle, it satisfies the criteria of a "part" of a seat under Heading 9401.
2.6 The Court relied on the precedent in which child parts used to assemble recliner mechanisms for motor vehicle seats were held classifiable under Heading 9401 90 00, with Heading 8708 excluded in view of Section XVII Note 2 and the specific nature of Heading 9401. That decision, having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, was treated as conclusively settling that recliner mechanisms and their components are parts of seats under Heading 9401 and not parts of motor vehicles under Heading 8708. The ratio was held to be directly applicable to the present goods.
2.7 The Court also considered US Customs Cross Rulings wherein recliner assemblies and metal recliner mechanisms designed for automobile seats were classified under Heading 9401 as parts of seats. While not binding, these rulings were viewed as persuasive and indicative of a harmonised international approach under the HS, reinforcing the conclusion that recliner mechanisms are more appropriately regarded as parts of seats rather than general automotive parts under headings analogous to 8708.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that the "Power Recliner" is an internal, integral and specifically designed structural component of motor vehicle seats, used solely and principally with such seats, and functionally and structurally identifiable only as a part of a seat. By operation of Note 2 to Section XVII and the specific-heading principle under GRI 1, classification under Heading 8708 is legally excluded. The goods are correctly classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 9401 99 00 as "Seats (other than those of heading 9402), whether or not convertible into beds, and parts thereof - Parts - Other."
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether construction services provided for individual residential houses for economically weaker section (EWS) and low-income group (LIG) under work orders of a housing board are exempt from service tax under the relevant exemption notification.
1.2 Whether refund of service tax, including both the portion paid by the contractors and the portion paid by the housing board under reverse charge mechanism but deducted from contractors' bills, is barred by the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
1.3 Whether the limitation prescribed under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applies to refund of service tax paid by mistake on exempt construction services, and whether the amounts so paid constitute "tax" or "revenue deposit."
1.4 Whether the assessees are entitled to interest on the refunded amount and, if so, at what rate.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Taxability / Exemption of Construction of Individual Residential Houses
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal referred to prior decisions interpreting section 65(105)(zzzh), section 65(30a) and section 65(91a) of the Finance Act, 1994 relating to "construction of complex" and "residential complex," as well as the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 exempting services by way of construction of a single residential unit otherwise than as a part of a residential complex.
2.2 Earlier decisions, including those cited from the order in S.P. Builders and related cases, held that:
(a) "Residential complex" means a complex comprising a building or buildings having more than 12 residential units (prior to 01.07.2012); and
(b) Independent residential houses/blocks having 12 or fewer units in a building are outside the scope of "residential complex" and hence not liable under "construction of complex" service; and post 01.07.2012, exemption applies for a single residential unit otherwise than as part of a residential complex.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal relied on its earlier final order in S.P. Builders, which had examined the same statutory definitions and held that construction of individual/independent residential houses, each being a separate residential unit and not constituting a "residential complex" as defined, is not exigible to service tax. That view was also supported by multiple precedents (Macro Marvel Projects, Lakhlan & Qureshi, Beriwal Constructions, Quality Builders, A.S. Sikarwar) and affirmed by higher courts.
2.4 It was noted that, post 01.07.2012, though "construction of complex" became a declared service, the exemption notification exempted construction of a single residential unit otherwise than as part of a residential complex. On identical facts in S.P. Builders, benefit of Notification No. 25/2012-ST had been extended.
2.5 In the present matters, the appellants had constructed individual residential houses for EWS/LIG for the housing board, and such activity matched the factual and legal scenario considered in S.P. Builders.
Conclusions
2.6 The services in question, being construction of individual/independent residential houses for EWS/LIG and not forming part of a taxable "residential complex," were exempt from service tax under Notification No. 25/2012-ST; hence, the tax collected on such services was not legally payable.
Issue 2: Unjust Enrichment and Eligibility to Refund of Both Portions of Tax
Legal framework
2.7 The Tribunal examined the principle that refund is barred where the incidence of tax has been passed on to another person (unjust enrichment). It referred to the decision of a High Court (Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd.) which held that refund can be claimed by a person who has borne the incidence of tax.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 As per the work orders, service tax liability was contractually to be borne by the contractors. Under the reverse charge mechanism, the housing board paid its portion of service tax but deducted that amount from the contractors' running bills.
2.9 The Tribunal found, on facts, that the entire service tax - both the portion directly deposited by the contractors and the portion deposited by the housing board under reverse charge - had in substance been borne by the appellants, because the housing board's share was recovered from the amounts payable to the contractors. A Chartered Accountant's certificate to this effect was placed on record.
2.10 The Tribunal distinguished the decision relied on by Revenue (Nahar Singh Contractor) on factual grounds: in that case, the refund claim was filed 5½ years after the Tribunal's order, the appellant failed to establish that the houses were not part of any apartment/township, and there was no evidence of non-passing on of the tax, leading to application of limitation and unjust enrichment. In the present appeals, refund claims were filed within five years, and sufficient evidence showed that the incidence of tax was borne by the appellants.
2.11 Relying on S.P. Builders and similar cases, the Tribunal reiterated that where the contract stipulates that service tax is to be borne by the contractor and the service recipient recovers even the reverse charge portion from the contractor, the incidence of the entire tax is on the contractor who is then entitled to refund.
Conclusions
2.12 The incidence of the entire service tax (both directly paid and reverse-charge portion) was borne by the appellants. The bar of unjust enrichment does not apply.
2.13 The appellants are entitled to refund of both portions of service tax - that paid directly by them and that paid by the housing board but deducted from their bills.
Issue 3: Applicability of Section 11B Limitation to Tax Paid by Mistake on Exempt Services
Legal framework
2.14 The Tribunal considered section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which prescribes a limitation period and procedure for refund of "duty of excise" (made applicable to service tax), and the judicial position as laid down by the Karnataka High Court in KVR Constructions, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and followed by another High Court (Tripura Cricket Association).
2.15 The Tribunal also relied on its own decisions, including Credible Engineering Construction, S.P. Builders, Meenu Builders, and Gajendra Singh Sankhla, where it had been held that payments made under a mistaken notion for amounts not legally exigible as tax are to be regarded as deposits, not as "duty/tax," and hence outside the purview of section 11B.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 Following KVR Constructions, the Tribunal noted that section 11B governs refund of "duty of excise" and not other amounts collected without authority of law. Where, due to exemption, the department had no authority to levy or collect service tax on the transaction, any amount paid under a mistaken belief cannot be treated as tax/duty for the purpose of section 11B.
2.17 The Tribunal reiterated that:
(a) If the services in question were exempt and not legally taxable, any amount paid as "service tax" thereon was not a duty/tax but a deposit.
(b) Mere payment by the assessee and acceptance by the department does not convert an otherwise non-exigible amount into lawful "tax."
(c) Consequently, the statutory limitation and procedural requirements under section 11B for refund of duty do not apply to such deposits.
2.18 In Meenu Builders and Gajendra Singh Sankhla, after analyzing KVR Constructions and distinguishing Mafatlal Industries and other authorities cited by Revenue, the Tribunal had held that where service tax was paid purely under mistake of law on exempt services, the payments are to be treated as revenue deposits, and limitation under section 11B and interest regime under section 11BB are inapplicable.
2.19 Applying the above reasoning, the Tribunal held in the present matters that the service tax had been paid by mistake on exempt construction services; thus, the payments were deposits and not service tax, and section 11B could not be invoked to reject the refund as time-barred.
Conclusions
2.20 The amounts paid as "service tax" on the exempt construction of individual EWS/LIG houses were not legally exigible and constitute deposits with the government, not tax.
2.21 The limitation provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 do not apply to such deposits; accordingly, the refund claims are not barred by limitation on the basis of section 11B.
Issue 4: Entitlement to Interest on Refund and Applicable Rate
Legal framework
2.22 The Tribunal considered its prior decisions, including Meenu Builders, Gajendra Singh Sankhla, and Indus Towers Limited, which addressed interest on refunds in cases where tax was paid by mistake and section 11B/11BB was held inapplicable.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.23 In Meenu Builders and Gajendra Singh Sankhla, after holding that payments of service tax made under mistake of law on exempt services are outside section 11B, the Tribunal concluded that section 11BB (which governs interest on delayed refund of "duty") and Notification No. 67/2003-CE (NT) concerning the rate of interest under that regime do not apply.
2.24 In those cases, relying inter alia on Indus Towers Limited, the Tribunal granted interest at 12% per annum on delayed refunds where the department had retained amounts which were only deposits and not legally payable tax.
2.25 Applying the same reasoning, the Tribunal held in the present matters that, as section 11B and 11BB are inapplicable, interest must nevertheless be paid on delayed refund of deposits, and following the established precedent, the appropriate rate is 12% per annum.
Conclusions
2.26 The appellants are entitled to interest on the refunded amounts, as the sums were revenue deposits wrongly retained by the department.
2.27 Consistent with prior decisions (including Indus Towers Limited, Meenu Builders, and Gajendra Singh Sankhla), interest is payable at the rate of 12% per annum on the refunded amounts.
Overall Dispositive Conclusions
2.28 The construction of individual EWS/LIG residential houses under the housing board's work orders was exempt from service tax under the applicable notification; tax paid thereon was not legally due.
2.29 The entire incidence of the purported service tax, including the reverse-charge portion deposited by the housing board after deduction from the contractors' bills, was borne by the appellants; thus, refund is not hit by unjust enrichment.
2.30 The payments made were in the nature of deposits consequent to mistake of law, not "tax/duty," and section 11B limitation does not apply; the refund claims are therefore not time-barred under section 11B.
2.31 The appellants are entitled to refund of the full amount paid by them and by the service recipient (recovered from their bills), together with interest at 12% per annum; the impugned orders rejecting the refund claims are set aside with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether the restriction of the addition on account of bogus purchases by estimating the net profit rate at 2.5% was justified.
Analysis: The assessment had treated the purchases as bogus and made a full addition, but the first appellate authority found that the assessee had already suffered tax on the profit element embedded in the corresponding sales. The appellate authority therefore estimated the profit element by considering the past net profit trend and enhanced the net profit rate on the impugned purchases to 2.5% from 1.89%. On scrutiny of the record, no infirmity was found in that approach.
Conclusion: The restriction of the addition was upheld and the Revenue's challenge failed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the addition under section 68 in respect of unsecured loan received from a corporate lender was justified on the ground that the assessee failed to establish the identity and creditworthiness of the lender and genuineness of the loan transaction.
1.2 Whether, for assessment years prior to 01.04.2023, section 68 required the assessee to explain the "source of the source" in respect of unsecured loans.
1.3 Whether the disallowance of interest paid on the said unsecured loan could survive once the principal addition under section 68 was deleted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Addition under section 68 on unsecured loan and requirement to prove "source of source"
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal proceeded on section 68 as applicable prior to the amendment by the Finance Act, 2022. It noted, with reference to a High Court decision, that the pre-amendment provision did not require the assessee to explain the "source of the source" of sums credited, except in cases of share capital, share premium and amounts of like nature.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee, during assessment, had furnished: return of income, computation of income, audit report, details of unsecured loans, confirmations, PAN, copies of income-tax returns, bank statements, and evidence of repayment of the loan with interest and TDS thereon. This factual position was noted as admitted by the Assessing Officer.
2.3 The Tribunal noted that summons under section 131 were issued to the lender company's director, who personally appeared before the Assessing Officer. In his statement, he:
(i) Confirmed having advanced a loan of Rs. 1,15,00,000/- to the assessee-company.
(ii) Explained that the source was collections from sundry debtors, reflected as credits in the lender's bank account.
(iii) Stated that the assessee-company was one in which his father-in-law was a director, explaining the business relationship.
(iv) Confirmed that the loan had been fully repaid by 08.06.2017.
2.4 The addition was made by the Assessing Officer on the reasoning that mere production of PAN, ITRs, confirmations, bank statements, repayment details and TDS deductions did not discharge the assessee's onus under section 68, and that the lender was allegedly a "paper company" used for accommodation entries, based on search material in a related group.
2.5 The Tribunal held that, in light of the documentary evidence and sworn confirmation by the lender's director, the assessee had discharged its onus under section 68 to establish:
(i) Identity of the lender - established through corporate details, PAN, return of income, audited accounts and personal attendance of the director in response to summons.
(ii) Creditworthiness of the lender - established through audited financials, bank statement showing receipt from sundry debtors, and availability of funds to advance the loan.
(iii) Genuineness of the transaction - established through banking channels, confirmations, recording in books, and subsequent repayment with interest.
2.6 Referring to the judicial view on the Finance Act, 2022 amendment, the Tribunal held that, for the relevant assessment year, section 68 did not mandate the assessee to explain the "source of the source" of unsecured loans, since such requirement was then confined to share capital, share premium and similar sums. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer could not sustain the addition merely by insisting on the source of the lender's funds once the lender's identity, creditworthiness and the genuineness of the loan transaction were satisfactorily established.
Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had fully discharged the onus under section 68 in respect of the unsecured loan from the lender. The allegation of the lender being a mere "paper company" and provider of accommodation entries was held insufficient in the face of the direct evidence on record. The addition of Rs. 1,15,00,000/- under section 68 was directed to be deleted, and the order of the first appellate authority on this point was set aside.
Issue 3: Disallowance of interest on unsecured loan
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Tribunal noted that the assessee had paid interest on the impugned unsecured loan, deducted tax at source, and transacted entirely through banking channels. It treated the interest claim as intrinsically linked to the genuineness of the loan itself.
2.9 Having held the unsecured loan to be genuine and deleted the principal addition under section 68, the Tribunal implicitly accepted that the corresponding interest payment was also genuine and allowable.
Conclusions
2.10 The disallowance of interest of Rs. 2,56,500/- was held to be unsustainable as it was consequential to, and dependent upon, the addition under section 68. With the loan accepted as genuine, the interest disallowance was also deleted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in view of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and the approved Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the High Court could interfere under Article 226 with the State Government's consent and the decision of the Empowered Committee relating to the project and the SPV.
1.2 Whether the decision of the Empowered Committee dated 22.09.2025, granting consent and "No Objection Certificate" to the successful Resolution Applicant, was arbitrary, violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution, or contrary to the petitioner's alleged accrued contractual and proprietary rights.
1.3 Whether the selection/continuation of the technical member/operator and the substitution of the petitioner as lead developer pursuant to the Resolution Plan amounted to hostile discrimination or arbitrary treatment under Article 14.
1.4 Whether alleged non-compliance with, or violation of, the Consolidated FDI Policy of India concerning 100% FDI in an already developed hotel project could be a ground, in writ jurisdiction, to invalidate the Empowered Committee's decision.
1.5 Whether the writ petition was an impermissible attempt to re-litigate issues already decided in earlier proceedings before the NCLT, NCLAT, this Court and the Supreme Court, warranting dismissal with costs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Interference with State consent and Empowered Committee decision in the backdrop of IBC proceedings
Legal framework discussed
2.1 The Court noted that: (i) a Resolution Plan in respect of the project company was approved by the NCLT under Sections 29, 30 and 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) under Section 31(1) of the IBC, an approved Resolution Plan is binding on all stakeholders including shareholders; (iii) under Section 60(5)(c), the NCLT has jurisdiction over questions of law and fact arising out of, or in relation to, the insolvency resolution process; and (iv) under Section 238, the IBC has overriding effect over any inconsistent law or instrument.
2.2 The Court also recorded that in earlier litigation it had already been conclusively held that provisions of the IBC override the Telangana Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 2001 to the extent of inconsistency, and that only the NCLT/NCLAT had jurisdiction over challenges to the CIRP and Resolution Plan.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court found that the project company (SPV) was the corporate debtor under IBC and entered CIRP, and that the State Government's consent, now impugned, was a condition expressly required in the approved Resolution Plan to enable change of shareholding in the SPV.
2.4 Once the Resolution Plan had been approved under the IBC and sustained in appeal up to the Supreme Court, its terms, including the mechanism for transfer of shareholding and substitution, were binding on all parties, including the petitioner as shareholder/lead developer. Any dispute arising from or relating to the Plan and its implementation fell within the statutory jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT.
2.5 The Court viewed the State's consent and the Empowered Committee's decision as an act in furtherance of, and in conformity with, the approved Resolution Plan and the insolvency framework, and not as an independent, free-standing executive allocation of the project.
2.6 The Court held that in the face of the comprehensive and overriding IBC scheme, and the binding nature of the approved Resolution Plan, the High Court's interference under Article 226 would be contrary to the statutory design and the settled position laid down in prior decisions, including those upholding the lack of writ jurisdiction in this very dispute post-CIRP.
Conclusions
2.7 The Court concluded that the decision of the Empowered Committee and the State's consent were integrally connected with, and governed by, the approved Resolution Plan under the IBC. Interference under Article 226 was not warranted, as the proper forum for any challenge related to the Plan or its implementation lay before the NCLT/NCLAT, in view of Sections 31, 60(5)(c) and 238 of the IBC and prior binding decisions.
Issue 2 - Alleged arbitrariness, violation of Articles 14 and 300A, and extinguishment of petitioner's rights without notice or compensation
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Court accepted that petitioner's claimed rights were rooted in its position as lead member/shareholder in the SPV and in the project agreements. However, it held that such contractual and derivative proprietary interests were necessarily subject to consequences flowing from insolvency of the SPV and the approved Resolution Plan.
2.9 The Court observed that the supervening operation of the IBC and the Resolution Plan lawfully altered the corporate and contractual landscape, including shareholding and project control. Any alleged extinguishment or modification of petitioner's rights occurred within the statutory insolvency framework and pursuant to judicial orders, not by arbitrary State action.
2.10 The argument that the State could not give consent/No Objection without issuing notice or paying compensation to the petitioner was rejected on the basis that the petitioner was already heard, and its objections to the Resolution Plan had been considered and rejected by the NCLT/NCLAT and the Supreme Court. The impugned act was an implementation step under a binding Plan, not an independent deprivation invoking Article 300A in isolation.
2.11 The Court emphasized that disputes regarding contractual breaches, valuation, or compensation, including any claim that the petitioner should be compensated for loss of its interests, are within the specialized domain of the NCLT and related fora under the IBC, where relevant proceedings are pending.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court held that no independent constitutional infirmity under Articles 14 or 300A was made out against the Empowered Committee's decision. The State's consent was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional, but a necessary and lawful step in implementing the approved Resolution Plan; any residual grievances must be agitated within the IBC forum, not in writ proceedings.
Issue 3 - Alleged discrimination and arbitrariness in favour of the technical member/operator
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The petitioner alleged that retention of the technical member/operator (EIH Ltd.) in the project, while petitioner's role as lead member was effectively extinguished, amounted to discrimination under Article 14.
2.14 The Court held that post-CIRP, the legal and commercial position of the technical member/operator and the lead member/shareholder were not similarly situated. The continuation of the operator and the structuring of operating arrangements were part of the commercial and operational choices recognized and embedded in the Resolution Plan.
2.15 As the differentiation arose from the statutory insolvency process and the commercial wisdom reflected in the Plan, and because the roles and obligations of the technical member and the petitioner were materially distinct, the Court found no element of "hostile discrimination" or unequal treatment in a constitutional sense.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court concluded that the alleged preferential treatment to the technical member/operator did not violate Article 14, as the differentiation was founded on distinct legal and factual positions under the Resolution Plan and the insolvency framework, and not on arbitrary or invidious classification.
Issue 4 - Alleged violation of the Consolidated FDI Policy and challenge to 100% FDI in the project
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The petitioner contended that allowing 100% FDI in an already developed infrastructure/hotel project was impermissible under the Consolidated FDI Policy and contrary to fundamental public policy of India, and therefore the impugned decision should be invalidated.
2.18 The Court held that questions of FDI compliance and grant of approvals fall within the remit of competent central authorities such as the Reserve Bank of India and the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Writ interference is justified only where clear and gross illegality in such regulatory sphere is demonstrated.
2.19 On the materials placed, the Court found no such clear illegality or violation of the FDI Policy attributable to the Empowered Committee's decision. The challenge was characterized as speculative and not supported by any concrete regulatory finding of breach.
Conclusions
2.20 The Court concluded that alleged violations of FDI Policy, in the absence of demonstrable illegality and in view of the jurisdiction of central regulatory authorities, could not be a valid ground in writ jurisdiction to set aside the Empowered Committee's decision.
Issue 5 - Re-litigation, finality of prior adjudications and imposition of costs
Interpretation and reasoning
2.21 The Court recorded that earlier writ proceedings challenging substitution of the petitioner and related decisions (W.P. No. 17129 of 2020 and Writ Appeal No. 1135 of 2023) had been dismissed, and the Supreme Court had declined to interfere. Likewise, objections to the Resolution Plan had failed before the NCLT, NCLAT and Supreme Court.
2.22 The present writ petition, challenging the Empowered Committee's consent which was merely a step towards implementation of the same Resolution Plan, was viewed as an indirect attempt to reopen and reargue issues already adjudicated or necessarily concluded by those earlier decisions.
2.23 The Court held that such re-litigation of settled issues, under the guise of a fresh challenge to the Empowered Committee's minutes, was impermissible and contrary to the principles of finality and judicial discipline, especially within the structured IBC regime.
2.24 To deter such conduct and to discourage frivolous or obstructive litigation aimed at derailing implementation of an approved Resolution Plan, the Court deemed it appropriate to impose exemplary costs.
Conclusions
2.25 The Court dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit and as an impermissible attempt to re-agitate settled issues, and directed the petitioner to pay costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without specifying whether the case was selected for limited scrutiny, complete scrutiny, or compulsory manual scrutiny, and not being in any of the prescribed formats under CBDT Instruction F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017, is legally valid.
1.2 Whether non-compliance with the binding CBDT Instruction regarding the format and content of notices under section 143(2) vitiates the entire assessment framed under section 143(3) as void and without jurisdiction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of notice under section 143(2) not conforming to CBDT Instruction and effect on consequent assessment
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal considered the requirement of issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for framing an assessment under section 143(3).
2.2 The Tribunal referred to CBDT Instruction F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017, which mandates that notices under section 143(2) be issued only in one of the specifically prescribed formats, clearly indicating whether the case is under limited scrutiny, complete scrutiny, or compulsory manual scrutiny.
2.3 Through reliance on a coordinate bench decision, the Tribunal took note of judicial recognition that CBDT circulars/instructions issued under section 119 are binding on income-tax authorities, with reference to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in UCO Bank that such circulars are mandatory and meant for just, proper and efficient administration of the Act.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal found as an undisputed fact that the notice issued under section 143(2) dated 27.08.2018 mentioned only "Computer Aided Scrutiny Selection" and did not specify whether it was a case of limited scrutiny, complete scrutiny or compulsory manual scrutiny.
2.5 The Tribunal held that the impugned notice was not in any of the prescribed formats contemplated in CBDT Instruction F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017 and therefore was in violation of the said Instruction.
2.6 The Tribunal rejected the contention of the Revenue that being a computer-generated notice, non-mention of the category of scrutiny would not invalidate the notice, holding instead that revenue authorities are required to follow CBDT Instructions, and violation of such Instructions renders the notice invalid.
2.7 The Tribunal relied on the decisions of coordinate benches in similar fact situations, where notices under section 143(2) not issued in the prescribed CBDT formats were held to be invalid and all consequential proceedings were quashed.
2.8 By adopting the reasoning of the coordinate benches, the Tribunal reiterated that CBDT Instructions issued under section 119 are mandatory and binding on the assessing authorities, and non-compliance with the prescribed format and contents of notice under section 143(2) strikes at the root of the validity of the assessment proceedings.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal concluded that the notice dated 27.08.2018 issued under section 143(2) was invalid as it was not in conformity with CBDT Instruction F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017, particularly for not indicating the nature of scrutiny and not being in any prescribed format.
2.10 Consequently, the assessment order passed under section 143(3) on 24.12.2019, being founded on an invalid notice under section 143(2), was held to be invalid, void ab initio and without jurisdiction, and was therefore quashed.
2.11 The appeal was allowed on this preliminary legal ground, and no further issues on merits were adjudicated.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether omission of Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 by Notification No. 20/2024 dated 8 October 2024, without any saving clause, renders those provisions inapplicable to all pending proceedings and cases.
1.2 Whether show cause notices, orders-in-original, and orders-in-appeal issued or passed under the erstwhile Rules 89(4B) and 96(10), in matters not yet attaining finality, stand lapsed in view of such omission.
1.3 Whether proceedings where orders-in-appeal have been passed, but further statutory appeal is unavailable due to non-constitution of the Appellate Tribunal, can be treated as "transactions past and closed" or as pending proceedings to which the omission applies.
1.4 Consequential entitlement of the petitioners to refund of IGST and related reliefs upon the omission of Rules 89(4B) and 96(10).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Applicability of omission of Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) to pending proceedings
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Court referred to Notification No. 20/2024 dated 8 October 2024 by which Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017 were omitted without any saving clause.
2.2 The Court relied on the reasoning of a Coordinate Bench holding that, though the omission is prospective, it applies to "pending proceedings/cases", and on the Bombay High Court's exposition of common law principles on repeal/omission without savings, including the concept of "transactions past and closed".
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.3 The Coordinate Bench had held that omission of Rule 96(10) by Notification No. 20/2024, being prospective, nonetheless applies to all pending proceedings/cases where final adjudication had not taken place as on 8 October 2024, and that writ petitions challenging show cause notices and orders-in-original invoking Rule 96(10) constitute pending proceedings.
2.4 The Bombay High Court, applying common law principles of repeal/omission in the absence of a saving clause or recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, held that all pending proceedings (including undisposed show cause notices, orders passed after 8 October 2024, and orders passed before that date but under challenge in appeal or writ proceedings so as not to be "transactions past and closed") stand lapsed and are not preserved.
2.5 The Court, on a combined reading of the above judgments, held that omission of Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) without a saving clause renders those provisions redundant from inception for all matters that are not "transactions past and closed", and that such omission applies to all proceedings/cases/petitions pending adjudication before the Court or before adjudicating authorities, as well as to orders made before 8 October 2024 but not yet finalised due to appeals or challenges.
Conclusions:
2.6 The omission of Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) by Notification No. 20/2024 applies to all pending proceedings/cases as on 8 October 2024, including those pending before adjudicating authorities and courts, and to non-final orders under challenge; such proceedings and actions based on the omitted rules stand lapsed.
Issue 2: Survival of departmental actions (show cause notices, orders-in-original, orders-in-appeal)
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.7 The respondent departments argued that the omission of the Rules is only prospective, and that show cause notices and orders already issued, especially where appeals had been concluded and orders-in-appeal passed prior to the omission, stand saved and cannot be set aside.
2.8 The Court, following the Coordinate Bench and Bombay High Court, treated all such matters, where final adjudication had not taken place or where orders were under challenge, as pending proceedings, not as "transactions past and closed".
2.9 It was held that, in the absence of any saving clause, and applying the principles that a repealed/omitted provision (except for transactions past and closed) is to be treated as if it never existed, actions founded on Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) that had not attained finality could not be carried forward and would lapse.
Conclusions:
2.10 All impugned departmental actions, including show cause notices, orders-in-original and orders-in-appeal based on Rules 89(4B) and 96(10), in matters pending as on 8 October 2024, stand quashed and set aside, and no further proceedings based thereon are to be carried forward.
Issue 3: Effect of non-constitution of the Appellate Tribunal and characterization of "transactions past and closed"
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.11 The Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal is not yet constituted, rendering the statutory appellate remedy against orders-in-appeal unavailable and thereby constraining the petitioners to approach the High Court under writ jurisdiction.
2.12 In that context, the Court held that, since the petitioners lack an effective appellate remedy solely due to non-constitution of the Tribunal, the orders-in-appeal cannot be treated as having attained finality and, therefore, do not fall within the category of "transactions past and closed".
2.13 Accordingly, such orders-in-appeal, being under challenge in writ petitions and lacking finality, are to be treated as pending proceedings to which the omission of Rules 89(4B) and 96(10) applies.
Conclusions:
2.14 Orders-in-appeal challenged before the Court, in the absence of an available Tribunal remedy, are pending proceedings and not "transactions past and closed"; such orders, being founded on the omitted rules, stand lapsed.
Issue 4: Consequential reliefs and entitlement to refund
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.15 Following the Coordinate Bench's ruling that, upon omission of Rule 96(10), petitioners are entitled to maintain refund claims of IGST paid on export of goods, and adopting the Bombay High Court's conclusion that pending proceedings lapse, the Court held that the basis for rejection or curtailment of refunds no longer survives.
2.16 It was directed that all pending applications for refund must be processed, and where applications had been rejected and refunds refused on the basis of the omitted rules, such applications stand restored for further processing in accordance with law.
Conclusions:
2.17 All writ petitions are allowed; the impugned departmental actions are quashed and set aside.
2.18 The petitioners are entitled to refund; all pending refund applications shall be processed, and previously rejected applications shall stand restored and be further processed.
2.19 The necessary steps, including processing of refunds, shall be completed within twelve weeks from receipt of the writ of the order; there is no order as to costs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should direct provisional release of seized imported goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of the case, the insistence of the customs authority on continued detention of the goods despite personal bond and bank guarantee already furnished was legally sustainable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Direction for provisional release of seized imported goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction to the customs authorities to provisionally release seized goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 without insisting on any further security or payment.
2.2 The respondents relied on Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 to justify seizure and contended that provisional release is within the absolute discretion of the customs authority.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the fact of seizure of goods under the Customs Act was not in dispute.
2.4 The Court confined itself to the prayer for provisional release, since the other substantive relief earlier sought was not pressed.
2.5 It was undisputed that the petitioner had already furnished: (i) an unconditional bank guarantee of 100% of the alleged differential duty liability, and (ii) a personal bond of 100% of the value of the goods.
2.6 The petitioner also expressed readiness and willingness to furnish an additional 25% personal bond over and above the 100% already furnished, and to give an undertaking regarding possible redemption fine and penalty in case of failure in adjudication.
2.7 The Court took into account an earlier decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in a set of matters involving an identical issue of provisional release, wherein provisional release was ordered on furnishing: (i) a personal bond of 125% of the value of the goods, and (ii) a bank guarantee of 35% of the differential duty.
2.8 Having regard to the safeguards already in place (bank guarantee and personal bond) and the additional security offered by the petitioner, the Court considered that adequate protection of the revenue and interests of the department would be achieved by imposing further conditions rather than continuing detention of the goods.
2.9 The contention of the respondents that it was within their absolute discretion to detain the goods and that provisional release would be detrimental to their interests was not accepted as sufficient to deny provisional release when adequate financial safeguards were available and comparable terms had been approved in the earlier precedent.
Conclusions
2.10 The Court held that the goods should be provisionally released subject to additional security conditions, balancing the interests of the importer and the revenue.
2.11 The Court directed that:
(a) The petitioner shall furnish an additional personal bond of 25% of the value of the goods over and above the 100% personal bond already furnished.
(b) Upon furnishing the aforesaid additional personal bond of 25% of the value of the goods, the respondents shall release the goods provisionally.
(c) The petitioner shall also file an undertaking to the satisfaction of the customs authority.
2.12 The writ petition was disposed of in these terms, with rule made absolute to the extent of the directions for provisional release, and with no order as to costs.
Issues: Whether Rule 86A of the Punjab Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits the Commissioner or an authorised officer to block a taxpayer's electronic credit ledger by an amount exceeding the credit available at the time of the order.
Analysis: The rule was construed on its plain language as a preventive and provisional measure. Its invocation is conditioned on the existence of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger and on recorded reasons to believe that such credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible. Once credit is not available in the ledger, or has already been utilised, the power under Rule 86A cannot be exercised to create a negative balance or to effect a debit beyond the available credit. The availability of credit is therefore a condition precedent to the exercise of the power, and the authority must resort to the ordinary statutory recovery mechanisms where warranted.
Conclusion: Rule 86A does not authorise negative blocking of the electronic credit ledger beyond the credit available at the relevant time, and the impugned blocking was unsustainable.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether any substantial question of law arises in an appeal against the Tribunal's order deleting transfer pricing adjustment where the Transfer Pricing Officer failed to apply any of the statutorily prescribed methods for determining the arm's length price and this failure was not disputed by the Revenue.
(2) How "tax effect" is to be computed under the CBDT Circular dated 15 March 2024 for purposes of filing or prosecuting appeals, and whether an appeal is maintainable where the tax effect relatable to the disputed issues in that appeal is below the monetary limit, notwithstanding a higher aggregate tax effect for the assessment year.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Substantial question of law in transfer pricing appeal where no prescribed method applied
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Tribunal recorded a categorical finding that, in determining the arm's length price for the impugned international transaction, the Transfer Pricing Officer had not followed any of the methods prescribed under the Income-tax Act.
(b) The Tribunal further recorded that this factual position was not controverted by the Departmental Representative before it.
(c) Relying on prior decisions, the Tribunal held that it is incumbent upon the Transfer Pricing Officer to follow one of the methods prescribed in law for benchmarking; failure to do so renders the transfer pricing adjustment vulnerable and unsustainable.
(d) It was also noted that precedent holds that where the prescribed method is not followed, the Transfer Pricing Officer cannot be afforded a "second innings" to cure the defect by redoing the exercise.
(e) Before the Court, the Revenue sought to argue that, in the peculiar facts, there was no question of following any other method than what the Transfer Pricing Officer had adopted; however, this contention had not been raised before the Tribunal, and the Revenue had, in fact, effectively conceded that the prescribed methods were not followed and only sought a fresh opportunity.
(f) The Court observed that the new argument was neither raised nor involved before the Tribunal and did not even find reflection in the questions formulated in the appeal memo.
Conclusions
(g) In view of the undisputed factual finding that no prescribed transfer pricing method was followed, and the application of binding precedent by the Tribunal, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
(h) The appeal was dismissed at the admission stage, with the clarification that questions on the broader legal position are left open for determination in an appropriate future case where they properly arise.
Issue 2: Computation of "tax effect" under CBDT Circular dated 15 March 2024 and maintainability of appeal
Legal framework
(a) The Court referred to paragraph 5.1 of the CBDT Circular dated 15 March 2024 defining "tax effect" as the difference between the tax on the total income assessed and the tax that would have been chargeable had such total income been reduced by the amount of income in respect of the issues against which the appeal is intended to be filed ("disputed issues"), inclusive of surcharge and cess, with specific rules for loss cases and penalty orders.
Interpretation and reasoning
(b) The Revenue contended that for the relevant assessment year, since there were multiple appeals and the aggregate tax effect exceeded Rs. 2 crores, the monetary limit in the CBDT Circular would not bar the present appeal.
(c) The assessee contended, by placing reliance on paragraph 5.1, that "tax effect" must be confined to the income pertaining to the specific disputed issues forming the subject matter of the particular appeal, and on that basis, the tax effect in the instant appeal was only Rs. 10,18,145/-, well below the Rs. 2 crores threshold.
(d) The Court noted that the connected appeal for the same assessment year, in which the larger tax effect had been computed, stood dismissed. Consequently, the outstanding tax effect relatable to the present appeal alone was Rs. 10,18,145/-.
(e) The Court emphasised that paragraph 5.1 lays stress on the phrase "the issues against which the Appeal is intended to be filed", and this expression cannot be ignored while determining the tax effect. Even if the concept of "aggregate tax effect" for the year is invoked, it must still be read in the context of this definition.
(f) The Court observed that, even assuming the substantial questions of law regarding disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D were to be answered in favour of the Revenue, the recoverable amount in this appeal would remain restricted to Rs. 10,18,145/- plus interest; effectively, therefore, the tax effect for the purposes of the Circular was only Rs. 10,18,145/-.
(g) The Court was referred to decisions suggesting that where no exempt income is earned, disallowance under Section 14A is not warranted, and also to a decision indicating that disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income. The Court found that these decisions prima facie supported the assessee's case but, given the low tax effect, chose not to adjudicate these substantive issues.
Conclusions
(h) The Court held that the tax effect, as understood under paragraph 5.1 of the CBDT Circular dated 15 March 2024, in relation to the disputed issues in the present appeal, was far below the monetary ceiling of Rs. 2 crores.
(i) The appeal was disposed of on the ground of low tax effect, with all questions of law raised in the appeal kept open for consideration in an appropriate future case.
(j) It was clarified that, in any such future proceedings, the assessee would be entitled to rely on the cited decisions in its favour, and the Revenue would be at liberty to contend that those decisions do not govern the issue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
- Whether cash deposits in specified bank notes during the demonetization period, recorded in the audited books and claimed as business receipts, could be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68 and brought to tax under section 115BBE.
- Whether the appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating the merits when evidences and submissions were already on record.
- Whether, upon deletion of the addition under section 68, the consequential tax at the enhanced rate under section 115BBE survives.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Treatment of cash deposits in specified bank notes as unexplained cash credit under section 68
Interpretation and reasoning
- The assessee was a wholesale trader with total turnover of Rs. 5,01,70,254/-, regularly depositing monthly cash collections of about Rs. 40-45 lakhs into its bank account and making RTGS payments to suppliers out of such deposits.
- During the demonetization period, total cash deposits were Rs. 34,43,760/-, out of which Rs. 12,29,000/- comprised specified bank notes. Only this SBN component was added under section 68 by the Assessing Officer.
- The books of account were regularly maintained, supported by vouchers and records, and duly audited under section 44AB. The Assessing Officer did not invoke section 145(3) to reject the books, nor did he dispute the turnover or general pattern of cash deposits.
- The Court held that once the turnover and cash deposits for the whole year as recorded in the books are accepted, it is not permissible to bifurcate cash deposits into regular currency and specified bank notes and treat only the latter as unexplained without any positive material indicating a source other than regular business.
- Specified bank notes were legal tender prior to demonetization, and the assessee's case was that the SBN deposits represented cash sales realized prior to demonetization and held in cash balance; this explanation was supported by the regularity and quantum of monthly sales and past cash deposits (including a higher cash deposit in November of the preceding year).
- Relying on the principle recognized by the jurisdictional High Court that once sales realization forming part of declared turnover has been offered and accepted as income, the same amount cannot again be brought to tax under section 68, as that would result in double taxation of the same income, the Court found the separate addition on SBN deposits unsustainable.
- The Mumbai Tribunal decision was also noted for the proposition that where cash deposits during demonetization are out of cash balance as per books, such deposits cannot be treated as unexplained cash credit.
Conclusions
- The assessee satisfactorily explained the source of the cash deposit of Rs. 12,29,000/- in specified bank notes as arising from recorded business receipts and cash balance.
- The separate addition under section 68 in respect of these deposits, while accepting the books and turnover, amounted to impermissible double taxation and was deleted.
- The order of the appellate authority upholding the addition was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the impugned addition.
Issue 2: Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution by the appellate authority
Interpretation and reasoning
- The appellate authority had dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution, observing non-compliance with notices and absence of ground-wise submissions with supporting evidence.
- Before the Tribunal, the assessee explained that earlier compliance had been made, that change of consultant led to non-receipt of subsequent notices, and that relevant documents (including audited books and supporting records) were already on the assessment record and produced in the paper book.
- The Court considered the material placed on record and proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the addition, implicitly disapproving the disposal of the appeal merely for non-prosecution when evidence was available and the matter could be decided substantively.
Conclusions
- The dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority for non-prosecution, without effective adjudication on merits in the presence of available records, was not sustained.
- The appellate order was set aside and replaced by the Tribunal's decision on merits deleting the addition.
Issue 3: Applicability of section 115BBE after deletion of the addition under section 68
Legal framework
- The Court noted that section 115BBE applies where the total income includes income referred to in sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B, 69C, or 69D.
Interpretation and reasoning
- Since the foundational addition under section 68 on account of alleged unexplained cash credit was deleted, there remained no income of the nature contemplated by section 68 or the connected provisions to attract section 115BBE.
Conclusions
- With the deletion of the section 68 addition, the consequential levy of tax at the enhanced rate under section 115BBE did not survive.
- The ground challenging the application of section 115BBE was allowed as a consequence of the deletion of the underlying addition.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the twin conditions under Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 apply to an application for pre-arrest bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in respect of an offence under the PMLA.
1.2 Whether, on the materials placed on record, a prima facie case of "money-laundering" under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PMLA, based on the alleged "proceeds of crime" from scheduled predicate offences, is made out against the applicant.
1.3 Whether, in the facts and circumstances, the applicant satisfies the statutory conditions, including those under Section 45 of the PMLA, so as to be entitled to pre-arrest bail.
---2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Applicability of Section 45 PMLA twin conditions to pre-arrest bail under BNSS
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 45 of the PMLA (as amended in 2018), which prescribes that when the Public Prosecutor opposes a bail application, bail can be granted only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence under the Act and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It also considered Sections 65 and 71 of the PMLA, which respectively provide for the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and correspondingly BNSS) insofar as not inconsistent with the PMLA, and for the overriding effect of the PMLA.
2.2 The Court relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India and Directorate of Enforcement v. M. Gopal Reddy, which held that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA apply equally to applications for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. (now Section 482 BNSS).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court held that, by virtue of Sections 65 and 71 of the PMLA, the provisions of the Cr.P.C./BNSS apply only to the extent they are not inconsistent with the PMLA. The specific restrictions on bail under Section 45(1) PMLA, being special provisions, override the general provisions relating to bail under Cr.P.C./BNSS.
2.4 The Court further observed that Section 45(2) PMLA expressly declares that the limitations on granting bail under Section 45(1) are in addition to the limitations under Cr.P.C. or any other law. Hence, the power to grant bail, whether under Sections 438/439 Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Sections 482/483 BNSS), is subject not only to the usual considerations for bail but also to the stricter twin conditions specified in Section 45(1).
Conclusions
2.5 The Court concluded that the twin conditions under Section 45(1) of the PMLA are mandatory, have overriding effect, and apply fully to an application for pre-arrest bail under Section 482 BNSS in respect of offences under the PMLA.
---Issue 2 - Existence of prima facie case of money-laundering under Section 3 PMLA
Legal framework
2.6 The Court examined Chapter II of the PMLA and specifically Section 3, which stipulates that "money-laundering" is an offence when a person directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly is a party to, or is actually involved in, any process or activity connected with the "proceeds of crime," including its concealment, possession, acquisition, use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property.
2.7 The Court referred to Section 2(1)(p) which defines "money-laundering" as having the meaning assigned in Section 3, and Section 2(u) which defines "proceeds of crime" as any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, or the value of such property.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Court explained that money-laundering has two components: (i) the predicate offence, being the underlying criminal activity generating the proceeds, and (ii) the "surface offence" of money-laundering, which is the activity connected with the proceeds of crime. The predicate offences in this case were the scheduled offences alleged in the five police crimes involving cheating, criminal breach of trust and forgery, some of which are scheduled offences under the PMLA.
2.9 The Court held that "money-laundering" encompasses any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, including their concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projecting/claiming them as untainted. Participation in any one of these processes or activities is sufficient to attract Section 3. The offence under Section 3 is distinct from, and does not otherwise depend on, the underlying scheduled offence except to the extent that the proceeds of crime must originate from such scheduled offence.
2.10 On the factual allegations, the Court noted that the applicant and co-accused allegedly cheated multiple persons under the guise of importing and supplying cashews and by offering job opportunities, thereby obtaining a total of Rs. 25,52,79,015/-, a substantial part of which was transacted through bank transfers. Since the predicate offences involve scheduled offences, the above amount obtained was held to prima facie fall within the definition of "proceeds of crime."
2.11 The Court highlighted that investigation had revealed that Rs. 2.03 crores were credited to the applicant's bank account by the complainants, which were not transferred overseas for imports as claimed. It observed that even mere possession of "proceeds of crime" would attract the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court concluded that, on the materials presently available and the nature of transactions disclosed, a prima facie case of money-laundering under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PMLA is made out against the applicant.
---Issue 3 - Entitlement of the applicant to pre-arrest bail under Section 482 BNSS in light of Section 45 PMLA and the facts
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The Court considered the applicant's contention that he was falsely implicated, including allegations that the case was a counterblast to a complaint made by him against an Enforcement Directorate officer, and that even if the prosecution case is accepted in toto, no offence under the PMLA is made out. It contrasted this with the respondent's submission regarding the sufficiency of materials, the high magnitude of the alleged economic offence, and the strict constraints of Section 45(1) PMLA.
2.14 Applying Section 45(1) PMLA, the Court examined whether it could at this stage record satisfaction that there are "reasonable grounds for believing" that the applicant is not guilty of the offences alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Court held that "reasonable grounds" in Section 45(1)(ii) connote substantial probable cause for such belief, and that such satisfaction cannot be recorded on the present materials.
2.15 The Court noted that investigation in all five predicate crimes and in the money-laundering case is ongoing and at a crucial stage, and that further time would be required by the investigating agency to gather all materials, particularly to establish the nexus between the applicant and the alleged crimes.
2.16 The Court took into account the respondent's assertion, borne out by the counter-affidavit, that although the applicant appeared pursuant to summons on some occasions, he was not cooperating with the investigation. The Court also noted the huge amount involved and found that custodial interrogation of the applicant appears necessary.
2.17 The Court accepted the submission that, if pre-arrest bail were granted, there would be a real possibility of the applicant influencing witnesses and interfering with the investigation, especially given the nature of allegations and scale of transactions.
Conclusions
2.18 The Court held that the applicant had failed to satisfy the mandatory twin conditions of Section 45(1) PMLA and that, on the facts and at the current stage of investigation, it was not possible to form reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty or would not commit any offence while on bail. Consequently, the Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 BNSS to grant pre-arrest bail and dismissed the bail application.
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Issues: Whether Rule 86A of the Punjab Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits the Commissioner or an authorised officer to block a taxpayer's electronic credit ledger by an amount exceeding the credit available at the time of the order.
Analysis: The rule was construed on its plain language as a preventive and provisional measure. Its invocation is conditioned on the existence of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger and on recorded reasons to believe that such credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible. Once credit is not available in the ledger, or has already been utilised, the power under Rule 86A cannot be exercised to create a negative balance or to effect a debit beyond the available credit. The availability of credit is therefore a condition precedent to the exercise of the power, and the authority must resort to the ordinary statutory recovery mechanisms where warranted.
Conclusion: Rule 86A does not authorise negative blocking of the electronic credit ledger beyond the credit available at the relevant time, and the impugned blocking was unsustainable.
TaxTMI