Issues: Whether penalties under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable where the allegation that the appellants were intended recipients of seized gold rested on third-party statements without independent evidence establishing their involvement or knowledge that the goods were liable to confiscation.

Analysis: Statements relied upon in adjudication could not be used against the appellants because the examination-in-chief requirement under Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 was not complied with. Apart from those statements, the record contained no independent corroboration that the appellants received, possessed, controlled, transported, concealed, financed, or otherwise dealt with the seized gold. The knowledge requirement in Section 112(b), namely that the person knew or had reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation, could not be presumed merely from an allegation that the person was to receive the goods.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were unsustainable and were set aside.

Issues: Whether the Revenue proved that the seized non-notified betel nuts were smuggled so as to justify confiscation and penalties.

Analysis: Betel nuts are not notified goods under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962; consequently, the burden lay on the Revenue to establish their foreign origin and illicit importation. The accompanying invoices identified consignors in Mizoram and consignees in West Bengal, and the interception was not at the Indo-Myanmar border. The ARDF report merely stated that the goods "seem" to be from the North-East, including Myanmar, and did not conclusively establish Myanmar origin. Statements alone, without independent cogent evidence of illegal importation, were insufficient to discharge the Revenue's burden.

Conclusion: The seized betel nuts were not proved to be smuggled; the confiscation and penalties were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether service-tax proceedings and the confirmed demand against a practising advocate, founded solely on Form 26AS without examining the nature of receipts or applying the notifications governing legal services, were lawful.

Analysis: The statutory framework under the Finance Act, 1994 and Notification Nos. 25/2012-Service Tax and 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012 governed legal services rendered by an individual advocate. Reliance on Form 26AS alone, without considering that framework or verifying the nature of services corresponding to the receipts, was jurisdictionally defective.

Conclusion: The proceedings and confirmed service-tax demand were without jurisdiction and were liable to be quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty could be imposed on a director under Rule 26(2) where the company was not issued a show-cause notice and the director was not its authorised signatory; (ii) Whether the evidence established that the director issued or abetted invoices without supply of goods so as to attract Rule 26(2).

Issue (i): Whether penalty could be imposed on a director under Rule 26(2) where the company was not issued a show-cause notice and the director was not its authorised signatory.

Analysis: The alleged irregular credit-passing transaction was attributed to the company, but no show-cause notice for penalty was issued to it. The appellant was not its authorised signatory. The alleged corporate transaction alone could not establish personal vicarious liability of the director for the penal consequence.

Conclusion: The proceedings for imposition of penalty upon the director without notice to the company were legally unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the evidence established that the director issued or abetted invoices without supply of goods so as to attract Rule 26(2).

Analysis: Rule 26(2) requires proof that the person issued, or abetted the issue of, invoices without delivery of the underlying goods. No finding established that the appellant issued such invoices or abetted their issue. Reversal of credit by purchasers did not amount to an admission by the appellant or the company. Statements of truck owners lacked evidentiary value because the mandatory procedure for their admission under Section 9D was not followed. Absence of adequate manufacturing infrastructure with the supplier, without proof of the appellant's connivance or abetment, was insufficient to establish the alleged offence.

Conclusion: The statutory ingredients for penalty under Rule 26(2) were not established, and the penalty was unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The individual penal liability lacked a sustainable legal and evidentiary foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Rule 26(2) requires proof that the person issued or abetted the issue of invoices without delivery of goods, and investigation statements cannot establish that liability unless admitted in accordance with the mandatory procedure under Section 9D.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for non-production of copies of all invoices despite entries in the credit register and absence of any allegation that the goods were not received; (ii) Whether the show-cause notice issued after the Department had knowledge of the disputed credit was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for non-production of copies of all invoices despite entries in the credit register and absence of any allegation that the goods were not received.

Analysis: The receipt of goods was recorded in the CENVAT duty register, which was attested by the Superintendent, and in the vendor ledger; some invoices were also produced. There was no allegation that the goods had not reached the factory, were diverted, or were clandestinely removed. The documentary deficiency was therefore merely technical and did not displace the evidence of receipt and accounting of the inputs.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit cannot be denied solely because copies of all invoices were not produced when receipt and accounting of the goods remain undisputed.

Issue (ii): Whether the show-cause notice issued after the Department had knowledge of the disputed credit was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The audit memo of 31 July 2015 evidenced departmental knowledge of the disputed credit, whereas the show-cause notice was issued on 6 September 2017. The material did not establish suppression or misstatement warranting invocation of the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was time-barred, and the demand could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The demand of disputed credit, together with consequential interest and penalty, is unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A delayed demand for CENVAT credit cannot be sustained through the extended limitation period where the Department already had knowledge of the credit and suppression or misstatement is not established.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on countervailing duty paid at the concessional rate under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012 on imported coal.

Analysis: Rule 3(1)(vii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 independently permits credit of additional customs duty. The restriction associated with Rule 3(1)(i) is confined to goods availing the specified Central Excise exemption and does not extend to countervailing duty paid under the Customs notification on imported coal. The restriction applicable to domestically manufactured coal cannot be read into the Customs notification governing imports.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit of the countervailing duty paid on imported coal under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012 is admissible, and its disallowance is unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether 99% VAT remission retained under the Assam industrial incentive scheme formed part of transaction value under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. (ii) Whether the extended limitation period and equal penalty were invocable.

Issue (i): Whether 99% VAT remission retained under the Assam industrial incentive scheme formed part of transaction value under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The incentive was conditional upon capital investment and commencement of commercial production, was available for a defined entitlement period and subject to a ceiling linked to fixed capital investment. VAT liability was first determined for each return period, after which 99% was remitted under the statutory incentive, with 1% deposited. The retained amount was a State industrial subsidy and not an additional amount paid by buyers in connection with the sale of goods.

Conclusion: The 99% VAT remission was not includible in transaction value; the central excise duty and consequential interest demand were unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period and equal penalty were invocable.

Analysis: The VAT retention was known to the Department during audit, particulars were sought and supplied before issuance of the show-cause notice, and no suppression of facts with intent to evade duty was established. The applicable departmental circular also recognised that the extended period was unavailable for this valuation controversy.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period was not invocable, and the equal penalty was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: Investment-linked VAT remission under the applicable State incentive scheme is treated as a subsidy rather than sale consideration, and neither duty liability nor the related limitation-based penalty could be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A State-granted, investment-linked VAT remission is not additional consideration from the buyer and cannot be included in excise transaction value.

Issues: (i) Whether amounts paid during investigation before adjudication constituted excise duty or deposits and were liable to be treated as pre-deposit; (ii) Whether interest was payable on the refunded amount, and if so, under which provision, from what date and at what rate.

Issue (i): Whether amounts paid during investigation before adjudication constituted excise duty or deposits and were liable to be treated as pre-deposit.

Analysis: Excise duty becomes payable only against an assessment or an adjudication modifying the assessment under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and upon becoming due. Amounts paid during investigation, before any assessed or adjudicated liability, are deposits notwithstanding their credit under an excise-duty accounting head. The Central Excise Act, 1944 does not authorise compulsory collection of amounts in anticipation of a liability that may arise from investigation. As the sums were accepted towards the appeal and no excess over the mandatory pre-deposit was released, the entire amount was required to be regarded as pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Conclusion: The amounts were deposits and, in the facts, must be treated as pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable on the refunded amount, and if so, under which provision, from what date and at what rate.

Analysis: Interest is recoverable or payable only as statutorily prescribed, not on equitable considerations or at a non-statutory rate. Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applies to delayed refunds of duty after an application, whereas the amount here was not duty and the form of the refund request did not alter its character. Refund of the amount treated as pre-deposit is governed by Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Conclusion: Interest is payable to the assessee under Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 at the applicable statutory rate from the date of deposit until the date of refund; the claim for interest at 12% per annum is rejected.

Final Conclusion: The refunded investigative deposits carry statutory interest applicable to pre-deposits for the period commencing from their payment.

Ratio Decidendi: An amount paid during investigation before assessment or adjudication is a deposit rather than duty; where it is treated as pre-deposit in appeal, interest on its refund is governed by the statutory pre-deposit provision from the date of deposit.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit on services received at centrally registered service stations and marketing or branch offices was admissible and could be utilised for payment of excise duty without an input service distributor registration; (ii) Whether ISD credit distributed wholly to Tiruvottiyur was recoverable; (iii) Whether credit of services exclusively used by the Oragadam and Manjambakkam units was recoverable from Tiruvottiyur; (iv) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for the first show cause notice; and (v) Whether interest and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit on services received at centrally registered service stations and marketing or branch offices was admissible and could be utilised for payment of excise duty without an input service distributor registration.

Analysis: Under the first limb of Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, services used by a provider for rendering taxable output services qualify as input services. The services received at the service stations were used for taxable repair and maintenance services rendered from premises covered by the centralised registration. Receipt of input services in the factory is not a condition for credit under the provider-of-output-service limb. Rule 4(2) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 treats the centrally registered person, and not each declared premise, as the provider of taxable output services.

Analysis: Rule 3(4) permits CENVAT credit validly earned by a person acting as a provider of output service to be used for payment of excise duty, without a one-to-one correlation or separate credit pools. An input service distributor mechanism applies where credit is distributed from one office to another; it does not require a centrally registered provider to distribute credit to itself. The marketing and branch office services were independently eligible as services used up to the place of removal and for advertisement or sales promotion, since the offices were premises of the manufacturer from which goods were sold. A denial founded on Rule 7 where that ground was not alleged in the notices could not sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the service-station and marketing or branch-office credits were admissible, and their utilisation for payment of excise duty was permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether ISD credit distributed wholly to Tiruvottiyur was recoverable.

Analysis: Rule 7(d) could apply only upon proof that the underlying services were used in more than one unit. The notices assumed common use without establishing that foundational fact. For the relevant period before 01.04.2016, Rule 7 enabled, rather than compelled, distribution of credit among units. Where the eligibility and quantum of the ISD credit and the distribution at the ISD end were not disputed, recovery from the recipient unit was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the ISD credit distributed to Tiruvottiyur was not recoverable on merits.

Issue (iii): Whether credit of services exclusively used by the Oragadam and Manjambakkam units was recoverable from Tiruvottiyur.

Analysis: The assessee accepted that this credit had been taken in error and did not contest its substantive eligibility. However, the recovery notice for this amount invoked only the extended period, whose statutory requirements were not met.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee on limitation: the credit pertaining to the other units was not recoverable.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for the first show cause notice.

Analysis: Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. Detection during audit, absence of invoice-wise particulars in returns that did not require them, and voluntary reversal with written intimation did not establish wilful suppression or intent to evade. The relevant records and ISD documentation were available to the Department, and transfer of credit among units of the same assessee was revenue neutral. The interpretative dispute concerning Rule 7 also negatived any inference of deliberate evasion.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the extended period was not invocable, rendering the first notice time-barred to the extent it depended on that period.

Issue (v): Whether interest and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: No interest could arise on credit validly availed, and interest on the remaining disputed credits could not survive once the recovery notice was barred by limitation. The foundation for penalty based on fraud, suppression, or wilful misstatement failed. The penalty imposed under Rule 15(1) also exceeded the statutory ceiling applicable through Section 11AC(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: all interest demands and penalties were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: Credit validly earned by the centrally registered provider of taxable output services could be maintained in a common CENVAT pool and used for excise-duty payment. The reversals already availed as credit by the other units cannot be taken afresh at Tiruvottiyur or refunded, as that would result in double availment of the same credit.

Ratio Decidendi: A centrally registered person providing taxable output services through its declared premises may avail input-service credit in its own account and cross-utilise it for excise duty; an input service distributor registration is unnecessary where no inter-office distribution of credit occurs.

Issues: (i) Whether subsequent developments after the write-down rendered a merits determination unwarranted; (ii) Whether the Administrator could write down the AT-1 Bonds in the absence of a specific provision in the Reconstruction Scheme; (iii) Whether the act of writing down the AT-1 Bonds conformed to the Master Circular and the terms of the Information Memoranda.

Issue (i): Whether subsequent developments after the write-down rendered a merits determination unwarranted.

Analysis: The validity of an administrative action must be assessed on the facts and law prevailing when the action occurred. Subsequent changes in financial position or circumstances cannot determine the validity of the impugned administrative decision.

Conclusion: Subsequent developments did not render a merits determination unwarranted.

Issue (ii): Whether the Administrator could write down the AT-1 Bonds in the absence of a specific provision in the Reconstruction Scheme.

Analysis: The Draft Scheme contained an express clause for permanent write-down of the AT-1 Bonds, whereas the notified Reconstruction Scheme omitted that clause. Clause 6(1) preserved subsisting instruments generally but did not confer a specific power to write down the bonds after reconstruction. A general savings clause cannot implicitly vest a power for which the governing framework prescribes a distinct mechanism.

Conclusion: The Administrator lacked authority to write down the AT-1 Bonds after the Reconstruction Scheme came into force. The issue is determined against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the act of writing down the AT-1 Bonds conformed to the Master Circular and the terms of the Information Memoranda.

Analysis: Annex 16 of the Master Circular distinguishes the pre-specified trigger from the Point of Non-Viability. On the Point of Non-Viability trigger, conversion or permanent write-down had to occur before the Reconstruction Scheme took effect, and the regulatory decision and determination of the amount were reserved to the RBI. The Administrator, appointed under Section 36ACA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, exercised the powers of the board of directors and could not assume the RBI's independent regulatory authority.

Conclusion: The write-down did not conform to the Master Circular or the Information Memoranda and was ultra vires. The issue is determined against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The extinguishment of the AT-1 Bonds remains invalid, and annual coupon payments continue in accordance with the Information Memoranda.

Ratio Decidendi: An AT-1 write-down upon a Point of Non-Viability trigger must be effected before a reconstruction scheme takes force and by the RBI exercising its regulatory power; a general savings clause cannot vest that power in an administrator.

Issues: (i) Whether the tax demand of Rs.4,58,289/- could be sustained after its payment before the order-in-original; (ii) Whether interest under Section 50(1) is payable until credit of tax to the Government's account or until subsequent debit from the Electronic Cash Ledger on return filing; (iii) Whether the interest liability for FY 2017-18 and the balance payable required alteration or a further credit; (iv) Whether the penalty of Rs.45,829/- was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the tax demand of Rs.4,58,289/- could be sustained after its payment before the order-in-original.

Analysis: Section 73(1) authorises determination and recovery of tax that remains unpaid. The tax shortfall and interest thereon had been deposited through DRC-03 before the order-in-original was made, but the payment was not considered. Section 73(1) does not permit double recovery of an amount already received by the Government.

Conclusion: The tax demand of Rs.4,58,289/- was rightly set aside. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest under Section 50(1) is payable until credit of tax to the Government's account or until subsequent debit from the Electronic Cash Ledger on return filing.

Analysis: Section 50(1) imposes interest only for the period during which tax remains unpaid. Under Section 49, a payment made through Form GST PMT-06 is credited to the Government's account and reflected in the Electronic Cash Ledger upon realisation of the challan. The later debit from that ledger while filing the return is an accounting appropriation and does not prolong the period for which tax remains unpaid.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 50(1) runs only up to the date of credit of the tax amount to the Government's account, not up to the later Electronic Cash Ledger debit date. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the interest liability for FY 2017-18 and the balance payable required alteration or a further credit.

Analysis: For September 2017, interest was correctly computed only up to the respective challan-payment dates, resulting in interest of Rs.5,22,204/-. For the remaining months, the record did not establish any earlier credit of cash to the Government's account than the return-filing dates. The due date for December 2017 was correctly taken as 22.01.2018 under Notification No. 02/2018-Central Tax dated 20.01.2018. The interest of Rs.4,58,289/- paid with the tax shortfall discharged interest attributable to that separate shortfall and could not also be adjusted against interest on delayed monthly tax payments.

Conclusion: The total interest liability of Rs.40,47,151/- and the balance of Rs.25,47,151/- after credit of Rs.15,00,000/- were confirmed; no further credit was allowable. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee and partly against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the penalty of Rs.45,829/- was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 73(8) grants penalty immunity only where tax and applicable interest are paid within thirty days of the show-cause notice. Since payment was made after that period, the immunity was unavailable. Sections 73(9) and 122(2)(a) prescribe the applicable statutory penalty upon confirmation of the demand, without requiring proof of fraud, deliberate default, or contumacious conduct.

Conclusion: The penalty of Rs.45,829/- was sustainable. This issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The discharged tax shortfall cannot be recovered afresh; the recomputed interest liability and residual balance remain payable without further set-off, and the statutory penalty remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of Section 50(1), tax deposited through a PMT-06 challan ceases to remain unpaid when it is credited to the Government's account, and interest cannot be levied for the subsequent period merely because the Electronic Cash Ledger is debited later upon filing of the return.

Issues: Whether penalty for alleged facilitation of undervalued imports through use of another person's importer-exporter code was sustainable where the appellant's role was confined to introducing a freight forwarder and providing a contact for arranging an importer-exporter code.

Analysis: Penalty under the Customs Act, 1962 requires material establishing blameworthy conduct, knowledge of illegality, or participation in the alleged unlawful arrangement. Merely informing an importer about a freight forwarder or a person who could allegedly arrange an importer-exporter code does not itself contravene the Customs Act. The record contained no evidence that the appellant procured the importer-exporter code, participated in an illegal act, or knew of the alleged undervaluation or other illegal activity. The allegations therefore did not establish criminal conspiracy or culpable involvement.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was not sustainable against the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court could interfere under Section 62 with concurrent findings of debt and default; (ii) Whether the assignee was entitled to maintain the Section 7 applications as a financial creditor; (iii) What evidentiary threshold governs proof of default for Section 7 admission and whether accounting disputes or profitability preclude admission; (iv) What legal weight an authenticated Information Utility record and other documentary material carry in establishing default.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court could interfere under Section 62 with concurrent findings of debt and default.

Analysis: Section 62(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 confines an appeal to questions of law. Concurrent factual findings of the specialised insolvency fora cannot be reopened through a reassessment of accounts or documentary evidence unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, ignore material evidence, or apply an erroneous legal standard.

Conclusion: No basis existed to disturb the concurrent findings of financial debt and default.

Issue (ii): Whether the assignee was entitled to maintain the Section 7 applications as a financial creditor.

Analysis: Section 5(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 includes a person to whom a financial debt has been legally assigned or transferred. The validity of the assignment had been finally determined, and the identity of issue, finality of that determination, and identity of parties or privies attracted issue estoppel. The Adjudicating Authority's Section 7 jurisdiction does not extend to a collateral re-examination of a concluded assignment dispute.

Conclusion: The assignee was a financial creditor competent to initiate proceedings under Section 7, and the assignment challenge was barred by issue estoppel.

Issue (iii): What evidentiary threshold governs proof of default for Section 7 admission and whether accounting disputes or profitability preclude admission.

Analysis: Sections 3(12), 4 and 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 require proof that a financial debt, in whole or in part, became due and remained unpaid above the statutory threshold. Default is a historical event, whereas the outstanding quantum remains variable due to interest, charges, adjustments and repayments. The admission-stage enquiry is summary and is determined on a preponderance of probabilities from documentary material; it does not require a forensic reconciliation of accounts or a final calculation of every component of the claim. Detailed verification and quantification are addressed during the CIRP claims process under Section 18(b). Positive EBITDA or profitability does not establish debt-serviceability and is not a legal bar to admission once default is shown.

Conclusion: A documented default exceeding the statutory threshold was sufficient for admission; disputes on quantification, appropriation, and profitability did not negate or cure the default.

Issue (iv): What legal weight an authenticated Information Utility record and other documentary material carry in establishing default.

Analysis: Sections 7(3)(a) and 7(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 establish a hierarchy of proof. An authenticated Record of Default issued by an Information Utility is independently sufficient at the first tier and carries a strong evidentiary presumption, rebuttable only by clear, cogent, credible and compelling material rather than bare denial or bookkeeping disagreement. At the second tier, loan agreements, statements of account, acknowledgements, settlement communications and the materials identified in Part V of Form 1 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 may collectively establish default on the summary standard. A debtor's failure to dispute the Information Utility record during authentication may operate as an admission and estoppel.

Conclusion: The authenticated Information Utility records, read with the collective documentary record, sufficiently established default for Section 7 purposes.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for commencing the corporate insolvency resolution process were satisfied, and the resolution process in respect of both corporate debtors may continue in accordance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Ratio Decidendi: In a Section 7 proceeding under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, admission depends on prima facie documentary proof of an unpaid due financial debt above the statutory threshold, not on final quantification of the claim or the corporate debtor's commercial solvency; an authenticated Information Utility Record of Default is sufficient unless displaced by compelling contrary material.

Issues: (i) Whether the construction demands relating to the landowners' and developer's shares were taxable and correctly classified and valued; (ii) Whether reverse-charge liability for GTA, security, legal and manpower services was established; and (iii) Whether extended limitation and consequential penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the construction demands relating to the landowners' and developer's shares were taxable and correctly classified and valued.

Analysis: The legal character of a joint development arrangement depends on its contractual terms, the parties' rights and obligations, and the consideration flowing between them; its nomenclature is not determinative. Transfer of land or development rights in return for constructed flats is capable of being non-monetary consideration under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, but taxability must first be established for the relevant period. The pre-01.07.2010 position requires examination under the applicable Board circulars and the relevant statutory exclusion; subsequent periods require independent application of the governing provisions.

Analysis: Valuation of a taxable landowners' share under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 and Rule 3(a) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 arises only after taxability is established. Comparable flats must be genuinely similar in material particulars and at the relevant time, and the record must be verified to avoid duplication of value already subjected to service tax. Whether the developer's construction was a service simpliciter or a composite works contract depends upon the actual agreements, transfer of property in goods, and contemporaneous records. The works-contract provisions and the correct taxable classification remain material after 01.07.2012; an incorrect statutory citation in a notice alone does not invalidate an otherwise sustainable demand.

Conclusion: The construction demands were not sustainable on the existing record and can be determined only after examination of the agreements, period-wise taxability, correct classification, valuation, and possible duplication of taxable value.

Issue (ii): Whether reverse-charge liability for GTA, security, legal and manpower services was established.

Analysis: GTA liability requires proof that the transporter satisfied the statutory definition, including issuance of a consignment note or a document meeting that requirement. Ledger entries and freight expenditure alone cannot replace that jurisdictional fact. For security services, the identity and status of the provider, applicability of Notification No. 30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, and any prior discharge of tax on the same service require verification.

Analysis: Direct engagement, payment, supervision and control of workers by the recipient do not, without proof of supply by an independent provider, constitute manpower-supply service. Similarly, an entry described as legal fees does not by itself establish that the provider was an advocate or that the service was a legal service covered by reverse charge. Revenue retains the initial burden to establish these foundational facts, subject to the assessee disclosing material within its special knowledge.

Conclusion: Reverse-charge liability can arise only upon proof of the statutory prerequisites for each alleged service and after reconciliation of the relevant records and payments.

Issue (iii): Whether extended limitation and consequential penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 requires a positive act of fraud, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax; mere non-payment, non-registration, or an omission does not suffice. For the first notice, collection of service tax from purchasers, coupled with non-deposit and non-disclosure in statutory returns, was treated as material to the allegation of suppression. Availability of information in private books or subsequent departmental access during investigation does not by itself negate suppression. An incomplete voluntary disclosure and unsupported financial hardship do not establish reasonable cause for retaining tax collected from purchasers.

Analysis: A subsequent notice is not barred merely because an earlier notice concerned the same assessee or service category. The decisive inquiry is whether the notices rest on the same material facts and transactions. For a subsequent invocation of the extended period, Revenue must independently establish the statutory ingredients from evidence relating to the distinct project and transactions. Penalties under Sections 77, 78 and 78A of the Finance Act, 1994 depend upon the liability and limitation findings ultimately reached.

Conclusion: Limitation for both notices and the consequential penalties require fresh determination by applying the stated statutory tests to the relevant evidence.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax liability remains dependent on a fresh, evidence-based determination of the contractual arrangements, taxable character of the construction and alleged reverse-charge services, valuation, limitation, and consequential interest and penalties.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm tax, interest and penalty beyond the demand proposed in the show-cause notice under Section 75(7).

Analysis: The show-cause notice proposed tax alone and specified no interest or penalty, whereas the adjudication order additionally confirmed substantial interest and penalty. Section 75(7) imposes a mandatory limitation that the confirmed demand cannot exceed the demand proposed in the notice. Confirmation of amounts beyond that scope constitutes a jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: An adjudicating authority cannot confirm interest or penalty not proposed in the show-cause notice; an order confirming demand beyond the notice is without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether proceedings for demand under Section 74 could validly be initiated and concluded in the name of a deceased sole proprietor despite the revenue authority having knowledge of the death and of the legal heir.

Analysis: Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was invoked against a sole proprietor who had died before the impugned intimation, show-cause notice and demand order. The death and the legal heir's status had been disclosed to the revenue authority in earlier registration-cancellation proceedings and in prior demand proceedings. Initiating fresh proceedings in the deceased person's name, despite that knowledge, constituted a jurisdictional defect. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the alleged input-tax-credit liability.

Conclusion: The proceedings initiated and concluded against the deceased proprietor were without jurisdiction. Fresh proceedings may be initiated against the legal heir if permissible in law.

Issues: (i) Whether the State may withhold the income-tax and VAT components of the auction deposit after the auction transaction failed; and (ii) Whether interest is payable on the refundable deposit and, if so, at what rate and for what periods.

Issue (i): Whether the State may withhold the income-tax and VAT components of the auction deposit after the auction transaction failed.

Analysis: The auction purchaser neither received the iron ore nor obtained permission to lift it, and the entitlement to refund the entire deposit was accepted. Amounts paid towards income tax and VAT formed part of the demand arising from the auction and their remittance to tax departments could not prejudice the payer. As no taxable event occurred and the auction consideration was never supplied, continued retention of those amounts lacked justification and attracted the principles of restitution and unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: The withholding of Rs.15,41,436 towards income tax and VAT is invalid. The balance amount must be refunded, with the State left free to obtain reimbursement or adjustment from the concerned tax departments in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether interest is payable on the refundable deposit and, if so, at what rate and for what periods.

Analysis: Interest is compensatory, being the normal accretion on money whose use has been wrongfully withheld. The absence of a contractual or express statutory interest provision does not defeat compensation where the State retains money that ought to have been refunded after the transaction failed.

Conclusion: Interest is payable at 8% per annum on Rs.2,89,05,436 from 31.07.2023 to 31.03.2025, with credit only for amounts actually paid on 31.03.2025. From 01.04.2025, interest at 8% per annum is payable on Rs.8,00,000 and Rs.15,41,436 until actual payment.

Final Conclusion: The failed auction requires complete restitution of the amounts demanded and paid, together with compensatory interest for their undue retention.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an auction transaction fails and the purchaser receives no consideration, the State must make complete restitution of all amounts paid pursuant to its demand; inter-departmental remittance cannot defeat that obligation, and compensatory interest follows undue retention.

Issues: (i) Whether a criminal appeal against conviction could be adjudicated ex parte without direct notice to the unrepresented appellant or provision of legal assistance; (ii) Whether the conviction was vitiated because recalled documentary evidence was not subjected to verifiable cross-examination; (iii) Whether the complainant established a legally enforceable debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without primary accounts and authenticated vouchers; (iv) Whether the petitioner rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on a preponderance of probabilities; (v) Whether duplicate proceedings asserting the same liability against another person affected the credibility of the complaint; and (vi) What relief followed from those determinations.

Issue (i): Whether a criminal appeal against conviction could be adjudicated ex parte without direct notice to the unrepresented appellant or provision of legal assistance.

Analysis: Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with the fair-hearing guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, requires that an appeal against conviction not be determined without securing effective representation where the appellant and counsel are absent. The appellate forum was required either to give direct administrative notice to the appellant or arrange legal assistance through legal aid or an amicus curiae before deciding the appeal on merits.

Conclusion: The ex parte appellate adjudication was procedurally illegal and denied the petitioner a fair hearing.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction was vitiated because recalled documentary evidence was not subjected to verifiable cross-examination.

Analysis: Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 treats cross-examination as an essential safeguard for testing adverse evidence. The complainant introduced the trade licence and bill vouchers after recall, but the record did not reliably establish that she was made available for cross-examination on those documents; the order-sheet entry recording its closure was illegible. Treating the recalled material as unchallenged in those circumstances was impermissible.

Conclusion: The conviction was vitiated by material irregularity arising from the unreadable order-sheet entry and incomplete cross-examination of the recalled evidence.

Issue (iii): Whether the complainant established a legally enforceable debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without primary accounts and authenticated vouchers.

Analysis: The explanation to Section 138 requires the cheque to have been issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability. The vouchers did not contain a receiving signature, seal, or acknowledgement by the petitioner, and their provenance was uncertain. Primary commercial records, including cash books, ledgers, stock registers, financial statements, and debtor records, were not produced to substantiate the alleged credit transaction.

Conclusion: The complainant failed to establish the legally enforceable debt alleged in the complaint.

Issue (iv): Whether the petitioner rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on a preponderance of probabilities.

Analysis: The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, may be rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities through a plausible defence and the inherent deficiencies in the complainant's evidence. The asserted absence of a garments business, the cheque bearing the stamp of a travel concern, the explanation that the blank signed cheque was supplied to a loan intermediary, and the absence of acknowledged commercial records together raised a probable defence. The principle concerning voluntarily delivered blank cheques did not apply where the alleged delivery was to an intermediary rather than the claimant in discharge of a debt.

Conclusion: The petitioner successfully rebutted the statutory presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.

Issue (v): Whether duplicate proceedings asserting the same liability against another person affected the credibility of the complaint.

Analysis: Parallel complaints sought recovery of the identical aggregate liability from another person through cheques bearing the same date, without any pleaded joint arrangement or guarantee. Such overlapping and mutually destructive claims undermined the asserted underlying transaction and corroborated the defence of misuse of blank cheques. Failure to address this material ground was an error.

Conclusion: The duplicate proceedings discredited the complaint and constituted an abuse of process of court.

Issue (vi): What relief followed from those determinations.

Analysis: The denial of legal representation in the appellate proceedings, coupled with the identified evidentiary and procedural defects requiring appellate consideration, made the ex parte appellate decision unsustainable. A merits determination was required after due notice and effective representation for the appellant.

Conclusion: The ex parte appellate decision was set aside, and the criminal appeal was required to be reheard and decided afresh in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The conviction appeal must receive a fresh merits adjudication after the appellant is afforded due notice and effective legal representation, with the identified evidentiary issues and duplicate claims addressed.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate court deciding an appeal against conviction must ensure that an unrepresented appellant receives direct notice or legal representation before a merits decision is rendered.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand adjudication dated 14 January 2026 was valid when a filed DRC-06 reply was treated as absent; and (ii) Whether the Electronic Credit Ledger could be negatively blocked for alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit.

Issue (i): Whether the demand adjudication dated 14 January 2026 was valid when a filed DRC-06 reply was treated as absent.

Analysis: The record established that the reply dated 16 February 2025 had been uploaded in Form GST DRC-06, but the adjudication proceeded ex parte on the erroneous premise that no reply had been filed. Confirmation of demand without considering the uploaded response and without an effective hearing was inconsistent with fair adjudication and the requirement of a reasoned decision.

Conclusion: The demand order was quashed, and the matter requires fresh adjudication after consideration of the reply and an opportunity of personal hearing. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Electronic Credit Ledger could be negatively blocked for alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit.

Analysis: Negative blocking under Rule 86A(1) cannot operate as a recovery mechanism for allegedly fraudulent or ineligible input tax credit. The issues concerning non-filing of returns, cancellation of registration, and ledger operability require determination in accordance with the applicable statutory formalities.

Conclusion: Negative blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger for alleged wrongful input tax credit was held impermissible. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand requires fresh adjudication on the filed reply, while the registration and Electronic Credit Ledger consequences must be addressed within the stated legal limits.

Issues: Whether a faceless best-judgment assessment could be sustained where the assessee's reply, though filed after the stipulated deadline, had been viewed before the assessment was made but was not considered, and no video-conference hearing was afforded.

Analysis: An assessment under Sections 144 and 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must conform to the principles of natural justice. Although the assessee did not seek adjournment within the stipulated time and the Assessing Officer could not be faulted merely for proceeding after expiry of that time, the right to file a reply had not been formally closed. Only a short period had been given for responding to an extensive questionnaire, and the reply was available and viewed before completion of the assessment. As a quasi-judicial authority, the Assessing Officer was required to objectively consider material available on record and provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The assessment could not be sustained; it must be redetermined after considering the reply and providing a video-conference hearing, without any opinion on the merits of the assessee's claims.