Issues: Whether the delay of 444 days in filing the first appeal ought to have been condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly in a civil dispute concerning property rights.

Analysis: The explanation for the delay was assessed against the settled principle that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 must receive a liberal and justice-oriented construction so that substantive rights are not defeated on the ground of delay alone. In civil litigation, especially where the underlying dispute concerns property and the merits of the challenge have not yet been finally tested, the court should avoid a pedantic approach. The fact that the respondents had not yet acquired an indefeasible right before the final decree and that multiple preliminary decrees are permissible in law reinforced the need to permit the appeal to be heard on merits. The court also noted that any prejudice could have been compensated by costs rather than by shutting out adjudication altogether.

Conclusion: The delay should have been condoned, and the appellants were entitled to have the appeal restored and decided on merits.

1. Whether the fixation of the cut-off date of 01.07.2020 for the grant of pensionary benefits to employees opting for the Pension Scheme from the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) Scheme, and the non-payment of arrears prior to this date, is lawful or amounts to discrimination and arbitrariness.

2. Whether the retired employee who had multiple earlier opportunities to switch to the Pension Scheme but declined, and accepted CPF benefits on retirement, can now claim pension benefits retrospectively from the date of retirement after opting for the Pension Scheme under the 2020 Circular.

3. Whether the principle of approbation and reprobation applies to the employee's acceptance of the Pension Scheme terms and his selective challenge to unfavorable conditions therein.

4. The extent to which financial and administrative considerations justify the cut-off date and the denial of retrospective pension arrears.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

Issue 1: Legality and Validity of the Cut-off Date (01.07.2020) for Grant of Pension Benefits

The legal framework involves the RBI Pension Regulations, 1990, and subsequent administrative circulars issued by RBI, particularly the Administration Circular No. 1 dated 14.09.2020 and detailed instructions dated 18.09.2020. These circulars allowed a last option for employees and retirees to switch from CPF to the Pension Scheme, subject to refund of the RBI's CPF contribution with accrued interest plus simple interest at 3% per annum. Crucially, pension benefits were made payable prospectively from 01.07.2020, with no arrears payable for the period prior.

Precedents cited include this Court's decisions in Mohammad Ali Imam and Others, State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, State of Tripura v. Anjana Bhattacharjee, and others, which establish that fixation of cut-off dates by the executive for pension or pay benefits is a policy decision influenced by financial, economic, and administrative considerations. Such cut-off dates are not arbitrary or discriminatory unless shown to be capricious or whimsical. The Court emphasized judicial restraint in interfering with such policy decisions.

The Court noted that the Government of India had rejected earlier proposals by RBI in 2002, 2018, and 2019 to grant another option for CPF optees to switch to the Pension Scheme, primarily due to financial liability concerns. The 2020 Circular was issued after Government approval, explicitly providing for pension benefits from 01.07.2020 onwards, excluding arrears.

The Court held that the cut-off date was a well-informed policy decision balancing financial sustainability and administrative feasibility. It was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. The financial burden of retrospective pension arrears was substantial (estimated over 900 crores), justifying the prospective-only pension payment.

Issue 2: Entitlement of the Retired Employee to Retrospective Pension Arrears

Respondent No. 1 joined RBI service in 1981 and had four prior opportunities (1990, 1992, 1995, 2000) to opt for the Pension Scheme but chose to retain CPF benefits. On retirement in 2014, he received CPF and gratuity dues. After the 2020 Circular, he opted for the Pension Scheme and started receiving pension from 01.07.2020.

The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that since the Respondent had refunded the CPF contribution with interest as required, he was entitled to pension benefits from the date of retirement, including arrears, and that denial of arrears was discriminatory and arbitrary compared to earlier circulars where arrears were granted.

The RBI challenged this, arguing that each administrative circular constituted a separate scheme with distinct terms, including different cut-off dates and interest rates on refunds. The 2020 Circular was a complete package balancing liabilities and benefits, approved by the Government of India, and the Respondent, having accepted it, could not selectively claim retrospective arrears contrary to its terms.

The Court found that the Respondent's claim for arrears conflicted with his prior decisions and the terms of the 2020 Circular. It emphasized that the Respondent had accepted the scheme as a whole and could not now repudiate unfavorable terms while claiming benefits. The principle of approbation and reprobation was applicable, preventing selective acceptance and rejection of contractual terms.

Issue 3: Applicability of the Principle of Approbation and Reprobation

The Court considered whether the Respondent could accept the pension benefits under the 2020 Circular but challenge the non-payment of arrears, which was a clear and integral part of the scheme's terms. The Court held that such selective acceptance was impermissible. The Respondent had accepted the terms, filled the forms, and refunded the CPF amount with interest as required. Therefore, he could not now repudiate the condition of prospective pension payment only.

This principle was invoked to uphold the integrity of the scheme and prevent abuse of the contractual arrangement.

Issue 4: Financial and Administrative Considerations Justifying the Cut-off Date and Non-Payment of Arrears

The Court recognized that financial constraints and administrative exigencies are valid and relevant considerations for the executive in framing pension schemes and fixing cut-off dates. The Government of India's prior refusals to permit retrospective pension benefits reflected these concerns. The 2020 Circular's terms were a product of detailed financial calculations and policy decisions.

The Court observed that the 3% simple interest charged on refunded CPF contributions was a nominal rate intended to cover administrative costs and inflation, lower than earlier rates (6% or 12%) applicable in prior schemes. The prospective pension payment from 01.07.2020 was a conscious decision to limit financial exposure and ensure scheme viability.

The Court referred extensively to precedents affirming that such policy decisions, especially involving financial implications, warrant judicial deference and should not be interfered with unless arbitrary or discriminatory.

Conclusions on Issues

The Court concluded that:

- The fixation of 01.07.2020 as the cut-off date for pension payment under the 2020 Circular is lawful, rational, and not discriminatory or arbitrary.

- The Respondent, having declined earlier options and accepted the 2020 Scheme's terms, including refunding CPF contributions with interest, is not entitled to pension arrears from the date of retirement.

- The principle of approbation and reprobation bars the Respondent from selectively accepting benefits and rejecting conditions of the scheme.

- Financial and administrative considerations justify the scheme's terms and the non-payment of retrospective arrears.

- The Division Bench's judgment granting pension from the date of retirement and arrears is unsustainable and is set aside.

Significant Holdings

The Court held:

"Apart from this, there may be other considerations in the mind of the executive authority while fixing a particular date i.e. economic conditions, financial constraints, administrative and other circumstances, and if no reason is forthcoming from the executive for fixation of a particular date, it should not be interfered with by the Court unless the cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result."

"The choice of cut-off date cannot be held to be arbitrary (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical)."

"Financial constraints could be a valid ground for introducing a cut-off date while implementing a pension scheme on a revised basis."

"The Respondent cannot be permitted to choose a particular aspect of the Scheme that makes it unworkable, and that too for his own financial benefit. Approbation and reprobation would not be permissible in such schemes."

"The Scheme in itself had to be given effect to as a whole."

"There being no violation of the Constitutional, Statutory or Common Law principles, interference by the Division Bench... cannot sustain."

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the Division Bench judgment was set aside, and the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition was restored.

Issues: Whether the plaint could be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action, were barred by law, or suffered from jurisdictional and court-fee defects, despite the plaint raising a distinct challenge to sale deeds executed after revocation of authority.

Analysis: Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is confined to the averments in the plaint and can be ordered only when the plaint, on its face, discloses no cause of action, is barred by law, or is otherwise hit by the limited grounds contained in the rule. The pleadings here disclosed a specific and independent challenge to sale deeds executed after the alleged revocation of the board resolution and power of attorney. The documents relied upon were unregistered, and under Sections 17, 23 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, such documents do not by themselves convey title or create an interest in immovable property. An unregistered agreement to sell may at best be used for collateral or specific-performance purposes, not as a completed transfer. The pleadings also raised factual questions on the true nature of the transaction, the effect of revocation, the validity of the sale deeds, and the correctness of the mutation entries, all of which required trial. Revenue entries are not conclusive of title, and title disputes over immovable property fall within civil court adjudication. The plea of insufficient court fee could not justify immediate rejection without an opportunity to make good the deficiency. The High Court, therefore, erred in treating the later cause of action as academic and in rejecting the plaint in its entirety.

Conclusion: The plaint could not be rejected at the threshold, and the civil suit had to be tried on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the application seeking deletion of the appellant's name from the array of parties was barred by res judicata; (ii) Whether the appellant could claim protection under the rent control statute on the basis of an asserted tenancy; (iii) Whether possession of the suit property was implicit in the decree for specific performance.

Issue (i): Whether the application seeking deletion of the appellant's name from the array of parties was barred by res judicata.

Analysis: The appellant had been impleaded as a legal heir after due inquiry and had participated in the proceedings without objecting at the appropriate stage. The attempt to seek deletion later under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was a re-agitation of an issue that had already attained finality. The principle of res judicata applies even at different stages of the same proceeding, and a party cannot repeatedly reopen a concluded question of impleadment.

Conclusion: The application for deletion was barred by res judicata and was rightly rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant could claim protection under the rent control statute on the basis of an asserted tenancy.

Analysis: The appellant failed to establish a subsisting tenancy or exclusive possession over the property. The materials relied on did not show continuous tenancy after the father's death, no timely objection on tenancy was raised in earlier proceedings, and the later municipal licence did not outweigh the concurrent findings of the courts below. The claim was therefore insufficient to invoke the protection of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

Conclusion: The tenancy-based claim and the plea for statutory protection failed.

Issue (iii): Whether possession of the suit property was implicit in the decree for specific performance.

Analysis: In a decree for specific performance, delivery of possession may be implicit where the contracting party was in exclusive possession and the decree would otherwise remain incomplete. On the facts found by the courts below, the suit property was in the possession of the contracting party, and the relief of possession followed as an incident of execution of the sale deed. The decree was therefore not exhausted merely by execution of the conveyance.

Conclusion: Possession was implicit in the decree for specific performance.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings of the courts below were upheld, the appeal was rejected, and the decree-holder was entitled to obtain vacant and peaceful possession in execution.

Ratio Decidendi: A party impleaded as a legal heir after due inquiry cannot later seek deletion of his name at a subsequent stage on the same concluded issue, and in an appropriate case a decree for specific performance may carry with it an implicit entitlement to possession.

Issues: Whether the prosecution could be permitted to place on record the compact discs that had been seized earlier but were omitted from the original and supplementary charge-sheets, and whether the question of their authenticity and the validity of the certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 could be decided at that stage.

Analysis: The CDs had already been seized, sent for forensic analysis, and referred to in the supplementary charge-sheet. The omission was not of a new or undiscovered material but of articles already forming part of the prosecution material. The governing principle is that, where relevant documents or items were inadvertently not filed with the charge-sheet, the court may permit their subsequent production if no serious prejudice is caused to the accused. The earlier view permitting such production remained good law, and the later decisions relied upon by the appellant did not displace that principle. At the same time, the stage at which production is permitted is not the stage for deciding whether the CDs are authentic or whether the Section 65B certificate is ultimately valid.

Conclusion: The prosecution was rightly permitted to produce the CDs, and the challenge to that permission failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, while leaving open the questions relating to identity, authenticity, admissibility, and the Section 65B certificate, which were to be examined at trial.

Ratio Decidendi: A court may permit production of material inadvertently omitted from the charge-sheet, including material already referred to in a supplementary report, provided the accused is not prejudiced and the issue of authenticity or admissibility is left to be decided at the appropriate stage of trial.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 11 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 applies to disputes between two banks concerning competing claims over the same secured asset and priority of charge; (ii) whether a written arbitration agreement is necessary to invoke Section 11; (iii) whether Section 11 is mandatory in nature.

Issue (i): Whether Section 11 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 applies to disputes between two banks concerning competing claims over the same secured asset and priority of charge.

Analysis: Section 11 is confined to disputes arising between the specified classes of parties and relating to securitisation, reconstruction, or non-payment of any amount due including interest. A dispute between two banks over rival claims to the same stock and the priority of their respective charges falls within that statutory field because it is a dispute inter se secured creditors connected with non-payment by the common borrower and the resulting entitlement to the secured asset or sale proceeds. The fact that one charge is described as a pledge and the other as hypothecation does not take the controversy outside Section 11 when the real controversy is priority between the secured creditors.

Conclusion: Section 11 applies to the dispute and the remedy lies under that provision.

Issue (ii): Whether a written arbitration agreement is necessary to invoke Section 11.

Analysis: Section 11 uses the words "as if the parties to the dispute have consented in writing", which creates a statutory deeming fiction of consent to arbitration or conciliation. That fiction operates without the need for an actual written arbitration agreement between the specified parties. The provision itself supplies the consent required for reference to arbitration.

Conclusion: No written arbitration agreement is required for invocation of Section 11.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 11 is mandatory in nature.

Analysis: The use of the word "shall" in Section 11, read with the object of the Act to ensure speedy enforcement of security interests and to prevent inter se disputes among secured creditors from delaying recovery, indicates a mandatory command. Where the statutory conditions are satisfied, the parties cannot bypass the prescribed mechanism by approaching another forum. The DRT therefore has no jurisdiction over such disputes.

Conclusion: Section 11 is mandatory in nature.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the dispute was held to be one that must be resolved by statutory arbitration under Section 11 of the Act, and the High Court's direction to pursue that remedy was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute between specified secured creditors over priority or competing rights in the same secured asset, arising from non-payment by the common borrower, is mandatorily referable to arbitration under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, by a statutory deeming fiction of consent, and not to the DRT.

Issues: (i) Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded after conviction on the basis of a compromise between the parties and the impugned conviction and sentence set aside; (ii) Whether the compounding fee could be reduced having regard to the facts and financial condition of the petitioner.

Issue (i): Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded after conviction on the basis of a compromise between the parties and the impugned conviction and sentence set aside.

Analysis: The parties stated that they had settled the dispute and the entire cheque amount had been deposited. The offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is compoundable under Section 147 of that Act, and compounding is permissible even after conviction. The compromise therefore removed the basis for continuation of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The offence was compounded and the conviction and sentence were quashed and set aside, resulting in acquittal of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the compounding fee could be reduced having regard to the facts and financial condition of the petitioner.

Analysis: The standard graded scheme for compounding costs was noticed, but the Court took into account the petitioner's financial condition and exercised discretion to reduce the fee.

Conclusion: The petitioner was directed to deposit a token compounding fee of Rs. 10,000.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were brought to an end on the basis of a valid compromise, the conviction did not survive, and the petitioner obtained relief through compounding with reduced costs.

Ratio Decidendi: An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 may be compounded even after conviction if the complainant consents, and the court may reduce compounding costs on special facts and reasons.

Issues: Whether the arrest of the detenue was illegal for alleged non-compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in a meaningful manner.

Analysis: Article 22(1) requires that a person arrested without warrant be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of arrest, and Article 21 is infringed if the procedure adopted deprives liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. The corresponding statutory obligation under Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires communication of full particulars of the offence or other grounds for arrest. Applying the principles earlier explained in Vihaan Kumar, the Court held that the communication need not be exhaustive, but must convey sufficient basic facts to enable the arrestee to understand why he has been arrested and to seek legal remedies. On the facts, the written grounds supplied at arrest disclosed the essential accusations, the role attributed to the detenue, and the basis for his arrest, and were therefore not a mere empty formality or eyewash.

Conclusion: The grounds of arrest were held to be meaningful and compliant with Article 22(1) and Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and the arrest was not declared illegal. The appeal was rejected and the connected petition was disposed of by keeping the question of law open.

Ratio Decidendi: Communication of grounds of arrest satisfies Article 22(1) when it conveys sufficient basic facts in a meaningful manner to enable the arrested person to understand the accusation and take legal recourse; failure to do so vitiates the arrest, but a communication that substantially achieves this object is valid.

Issues: (i) Whether a revision was maintainable against the order imposing fine-cum-compensation in a prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. (ii) Whether the appellate court could dismiss the accused's criminal appeal on merits in the absence of the accused and without representation by counsel.

Issue (i): Whether a revision was maintainable against the order imposing fine-cum-compensation in a prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The proviso to section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers a statutory right of appeal on the victim against an order acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, or imposing inadequate compensation. Where such a statutory appeal lies, section 401(4) bars entertainment of a revision at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The Court treated the complainant's grievance against alleged inadequacy of compensation as falling within the appellate route provided by law, and not within revisional jurisdiction under sections 401 and 482 of the Code.

Conclusion: The revision filed to challenge inadequacy of compensation was not maintainable and was dismissed.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate court could dismiss the accused's criminal appeal on merits in the absence of the accused and without representation by counsel.

Analysis: A criminal appeal cannot be disposed of on merits merely because the appellant or counsel is absent. The court is required to ensure fair hearing and, if necessary, appoint amicus curiae before proceeding. Disposition on merits without representation offends the principles of natural justice and denies the accused an effective hearing in appeal.

Conclusion: The appellate judgment dismissing the accused's appeal on merits in the absence of representation was set aside and the appeal was remanded for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the alleged inadequacy of compensation failed for want of maintainability, but the conviction appeal was restored for fresh adjudication on merits after hearing the parties or with assistance of amicus curiae if required.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute provides a specific appellate remedy, revision is barred at the instance of a party who could have appealed; and a criminal appeal cannot be decided on merits without affording a fair hearing, including appointment of amicus curiae if the accused is unrepresented.

Issues: Whether the review petition disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground sufficient to reopen the order dated 30.01.2024.

Analysis: Review jurisdiction under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is narrow and cannot be used as an appellate substitute. An order may be reviewed only on recognised grounds such as discovery of new and important matter, mistake, or error apparent on the face of the record. A mere erroneous view on facts or law, or an attempt to reargue the matter on merits, does not justify review. The grounds urged sought reconsideration of the revisional decision on merits and did not disclose any self-evident or manifest mistake.

Conclusion: The review petition was not maintainable on the grounds urged and was liable to be dismissed.

Specifically, the issues presented and considered include:

• Whether the averments in the complaint satisfy the statutory requirement under Section 141(1) of the NI Act that the accused person was "in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company" at the time the offence was committed.
• Whether the complaint must reproduce the exact words of Section 141 verbatim or whether the substance of the averments read as a whole is sufficient to invoke vicarious liability.
• The scope of vicarious liability of directors under Section 141, particularly whether mere directorship or omnibus averments of managing the company suffice to attract liability.
• The extent of pleading required in the complaint regarding the specific role or administrative functions of the director alleged to be liable.
• The applicability of precedents, especially the judgments in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (I & II), Sabitha Ramamurthy, Ashok Shewakramani, Ashutosh Parasrampuriya, Siby Thomas, and others, in determining the sufficiency of averments.

Issue-wise detailed analysis:

1. Sufficiency of Averments under Section 141(1) NI Act

The relevant legal framework is Section 141(1) of the NI Act, which imposes vicarious liability on every person who, at the time the offence under Section 138 is committed, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The provisos provide defenses if the person proves lack of knowledge or due diligence.

Precedents emphasize that this provision creates criminal liability and must be strictly complied with. The phrase "in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company" is a sine qua non for liability.

The Court referred to the definition of "in charge of" as a person in overall control of the day-to-day business of the company. The complaint in this case averred that the accused director was responsible for the day-to-day affairs, management, and working of the company, which by dictionary meaning and substance corresponds to the statutory phrase.

The Court rejected the argument that the exact words of Section 141 must be mechanically reproduced. Instead, the substance of the allegations read as a whole must fulfill the statutory requirements. This approach aligns with the principle in Monaben Ketanbhai Shah, which cautions against hypertechnical scrutiny and advocates looking at the complaint in its entirety.

The complaint also showed that the accused director participated in negotiations, was authorized by board resolutions to sign key loan documents, execute promissory notes, mortgages, guarantees, and file charges with the Registrar of Companies. These facts demonstrate control and responsibility for the company's business.

Thus, the Court found that the averments satisfy the requirement of Section 141(1) and are sufficient to proceed against the accused director.

2. Requirement of Specific Role Attribution in Complaint

Learned counsel for the respondent contended that beyond the basic averment of being "in charge of and responsible," the complaint must specify the precise role or administrative functions of the director. The Court disagreed, relying on S.P. Mani and K.K. Ahuja, which held that the complainant is only expected to know generally who was in charge of the affairs of the company. Detailed administrative particulars are within the special knowledge of the company and its officers and need not be pleaded by the complainant.

The burden to prove non-liability or absence of control lies on the accused at trial. This principle ensures that the complaint stage is not burdened with intricate details beyond the complainant's knowledge.

3. Precedents on Pleading Requirements and Vicarious Liability

The Court extensively analyzed the three-Judge Bench judgment in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (I), which clarified that:

• Section 141 conditions must be strictly complied with as they create criminal liability.
• Being a director alone does not make one liable; the person must be in charge and responsible for the conduct of business.
• The complaint must specifically aver that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the company's business at the relevant time.
• However, the exact words need not be verbatim if the substance of the complaint satisfies the statutory requirement.

The Court also noted that S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals (II), Sabitha Ramamurthy, and Ashok Shewakramani emphasize the need for clear, unambiguous averments to attract liability. Omnibus or vague averments lumping directors together without specific facts are insufficient.

In the present case, the complaint's averments were clear and specific, distinguishing it from cases like Siby Thomas and Ashok Shewakramani where the averments were vague or omnibus and the courts quashed proceedings.

4. Application of Law to Facts

The complaint and annexed documents clearly showed that the accused director was actively involved in the company's business, authorized to negotiate loan terms, sign critical documents, and provide guarantees. This demonstrated that she was in charge of and responsible for the company's business at the relevant time.

The High Court's quashing of proceedings on the ground of insufficient averments was therefore found to be erroneous. The Court held that the complaint disclosed a prima facie case against the accused director under Section 141 and the trial should proceed.

5. Treatment of Competing Arguments

The Court carefully considered the respondent's reliance on Siby Thomas and other authorities requiring strict adherence to the language of Section 141 and specific role attribution. It distinguished those cases on facts, noting that in the present case the complaint contained clear and specific averments satisfying the statutory requirements.

The Court also rejected the argument that the complainant must plead administrative details within the company's special knowledge, holding that such matters are for the accused to prove at trial.

Conclusions

The Court concluded that the averments in the complaint fulfill the requirements of Section 141(1) of the NI Act and that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings against the accused director. The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment set aside, and the trial court's order issuing process restored.

Significant holdings and core principles established include:

"Section 141 contains conditions which have to be satisfied before the liability can be extended to officers of a company. Since the provision creates criminal liability, the conditions have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the company, had a role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable."

"Mere use of a particular designation of an officer without more, may not be enough by way of an averment in a complaint. When the requirement in Section 141, which extends the liability to officers of the company, is that such a person should be in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of business of the company, how can a person be subjected to liability of criminal prosecution without it being averred in the complaint that satisfies those requirements."

"It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint."

"The complainant is supposed to know only generally as to who were in charge of the affairs of the company or firm, as the case may be. The other administrative matters would be within the special knowledge of the company or the firm and those who are in charge of it. In such circumstances, the complainant is expected to allege that the persons named in the complaint are in charge of the affairs of the company/firm."

"The repetition of the exact words of the Section in the same order, like a mantra or a magic incantation is not the mandate of the law. What is mandated is that the complaint should spell out that the accused sought to be arrayed falls within the parameters of Section 141(1) of the NI Act. Only then could vicarious liability be inferred against the said accused, so as to proceed to trial. Substance will prevail over form."

Final determinations:

• The complaint's averments that the accused director was responsible for the day-to-day affairs, management, and working of the company satisfy the statutory requirement of being "in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business" under Section 141(1).
• The High Court erred in quashing the complaint on the ground of insufficient averments.
• The trial court's order issuing process against the accused director is restored, and the proceedings shall continue in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether, at the stage of discharge under Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the accused can rely on defence documents and correspondence not forming part of the police report and accompanying material, and whether discharge could be sustained on that basis.

Analysis: Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 confines the Magistrate's consideration to the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, together with such examination of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary. The settled position is that the accused has no right to adduce defence material at the stage of framing of charge or discharge, and a roving or fishing inquiry is impermissible. The court at that stage may sift the prosecution material only to see whether the charge is groundless or whether the material discloses a triable case, but it cannot conduct a mini-trial or rely upon documents summoned at the instance of the defence to conclude that no loss or offence is made out.

Conclusion: The discharge orders were unsustainable because they were founded on defence material outside the permissible scope of Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and the accused were not entitled to discharge on that basis.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge under Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the court must confine itself to the police report and accompanying documents under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and cannot rely on defence material to decide the existence of a triable case.

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this judgment include:

• The constitutional and statutory validity of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of President and Members of State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020 ("2020 Rules"), specifically Rules 3(2)(b), 4(2)(c), 6(1), 6(9), and 10(2).
• The appropriate qualifications, recruitment procedures, and tenure for appointment of Presidents and Members of State and District Consumer Commissions under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 ("2019 Act").
• The extent and manner of judicial involvement and dominance in the Selection Committee constituted for appointments to Consumer fora, vis-`a-vis the doctrine of separation of powers.
• The validity and applicability of directions issued in the earlier judgment in The Secretary Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye ("Limaye - I") regarding written examinations and viva voce for appointments.
• The legality and effect of appointments made by the State of Maharashtra and Telangana to Consumer Commissions pursuant to selection processes conducted under the impugned rules and notifications.
• The permissibility of reappointments to the Consumer Commissions, and the applicable procedures and qualifications for such reappointments.
• The adequacy and structure of the consumer grievance redressal mechanism, including the need for permanent tenure and staff for Consumer fora.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

A. Constitutional and Statutory Validity of the 2020 Rules (Rules 3(2)(b), 4(2)(c), 6(1), 6(9), and 10(2))

Legal Framework and Precedents: The 2019 Act empowers the Central Government to frame rules regarding qualifications, recruitment, appointment procedures, tenure, resignation, and removal of Presidents and Members of the State and District Consumer Commissions (Sections 29, 43, and 101). Earlier, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and corresponding rules governed these appointments. The Court's earlier decisions in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (MBA - III and MBA - IV), and State of Uttar Pradesh v. All Uttar Pradesh Consumer Protection Bar Association (UPCPBA) laid down principles on judicial dominance in appointments, tenure of office, and procedural safeguards.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that Rules 3(2)(b) and 4(2)(c) of the 2020 Rules, which fixed experience requirements for Non-Judicial members at 20 and 15 years respectively, were arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held 10 years' experience sufficient, aligning with prior judgments.

Rule 6(1), which prescribed the composition of the Selection Committee as including only one judicial member (the Chief Justice or nominee) alongside two executive members, was struck down for diluting judicial involvement, violating the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial independence. The Court emphasized that the judiciary must have a dominant role in appointments to quasi-judicial Consumer fora, as established in Rojer Mathew and MBA judgments.

Rule 6(9), which gave the Selection Committee unfettered power to determine its own procedure for appointments without a mandated written examination and viva voce, was also declared unconstitutional in Limaye - I. The Court mandated a written examination and viva voce for Non-Judicial members to ensure transparency and meritocracy.

Rule 10(2), reducing the tenure of office from five years (under the 2019 Rules) to four years, was found inconsistent with the Court's earlier rulings that a minimum tenure of five years is necessary to attract competent members and ensure judicial independence.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court relied on the constitutional mandate for judicial independence, separation of powers, and prior Supreme Court precedents. The arbitrary experience requirements were inconsistent with statutory provisions and constitutional guarantees. The executive dominance in the Selection Committee was found to be detrimental to the independence and impartiality of Consumer fora.

Application of Law to Facts: The impugned 2020 Rules were inconsistent with constitutional principles and earlier judicial pronouncements. The Court directed the Union of India to amend the Rules to ensure judicial majority in the Selection Committee, appropriate qualifications, and a minimum tenure of five years.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The State contended that the executive's role was necessary and that the tenure and experience requirements were policy decisions. The Court rejected these, holding that judicial independence and constitutional mandates override such policy considerations. The Court also rejected the argument that Rule 6(3) saved Rule 6(1) from invalidity.

Conclusions: The Court struck down Rules 3(2)(b), 4(2)(c), 6(1), 6(9), and 10(2) to the extent inconsistent with constitutional mandates and prior judgments, directing fresh rules to be framed accordingly.

B. Requirement of Written Examination and Viva Voce for Judicial and Non-Judicial Appointments

Legal Framework and Precedents: Limaye - I mandated a written examination and viva voce for appointments to Consumer fora to ensure merit and transparency, particularly for Non-Judicial members.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court recognized practical difficulties in requiring judicial members and Presidents of State Commissions (who must be or have been High Court Judges) to undergo written exams and viva voce. Consequently, it relaxed this requirement for these posts, clarifying appointments shall be made in consultation with and subject to concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court took note of difficulties faced by States and the nature of judicial appointments. It distinguished between judicial and non-judicial posts, permitting examination requirements only for Non-Judicial members.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court allowed review petitions seeking clarification of Limaye - I to exempt judicial appointments from examination requirements.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Union Government and States argued impracticality of exams for judicial posts; the Court accepted this on a concession basis.

Conclusions: Written examination and viva voce are mandatory only for Non-Judicial members; judicial members and Presidents of State and District Commissions are exempt, subject to judicial consultation.

C. Validity of Appointments Made by States of Maharashtra and Telangana

Legal Framework and Precedents: The appointments were made pursuant to the impugned 2020 Rules and subsequent amendments, with some conducted before Limaye - I and others after.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that appointments made by Maharashtra on 05.10.2023, pursuant to written exams and viva voce, were valid and the appointees are entitled to complete their tenure. The Court emphasized principles of natural justice, noting that these appointees were not parties before the High Court and must be heard before any adverse order.

Appointments in Telangana, made before Limaye - I, were upheld as the directions in Limaye - I are prospective and do not affect concluded selections.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court examined the timelines of selection processes, adherence to examination requirements, and procedural fairness.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court allowed continuation of service for appointed candidates and reinstatement in Telangana, overruling High Court orders setting aside appointments.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: Some petitioners challenged appointments on procedural grounds; the Court rejected such challenges where selection was bona fide and substantially compliant with directions.

Conclusions: Valid appointments stand; appointees may complete tenure; selection processes must adhere to constitutional and judicially mandated procedures.

D. Reappointment and Procedure Therefor

Legal Framework and Precedents: Rule 10(2) of the 2020 Rules provided for reappointment on the basis of Selection Committee recommendation. Earlier 2019 Rules contained provisions for reappointment without repeating selection process if qualifications were met.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the High Court's suggestion to apply Rule 8(18) of 2019 Rules (under the repealed 1986 Act) for reappointments was untenable, as those Rules stand repealed. There cannot be revival of repealed Rules by implication. The 2020 Rules, though partially struck down, remain the operative law, and reappointments must be governed by the new Rules to be framed.

The Court clarified that no vested right to reappointment exists; it is subject to Selection Committee satisfaction under the prevailing Rules.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court analyzed statutory provisions, rule-making powers, and principles of administrative law regarding repealed legislation.

Application of Law to Facts: Pending reappointments must await new Rules. Those seeking reappointment must comply with examination requirements if applicable, except judicial posts exempted as above.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: Petitioners claimed entitlement to reappointment without examination; the Court rejected such claims.

Conclusions: Reappointments are discretionary, governed by new Rules; no automatic right to reappointment exists; examination requirements apply as per new Rules.

E. Adequacy and Structure of Consumer Fora and Need for Permanent Tenure

Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court referred to constitutional provisions (Articles 14, 38, 39, 47), Directive Principles, and earlier judgments emphasizing socio-economic justice and consumer protection as constitutional imperatives.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court emphasized that consumerism is integral to constitutional values, encompassing social, economic, political, and environmental justice. It highlighted the need for permanent structures for Consumer fora, with permanent staff and members, to ensure efficiency, independence, and quality of justice.

The Court urged the Union of India to consider establishing permanent Consumer Tribunals or Courts with adequate strength and judicial leadership.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court drew upon constitutional philosophy, historical evolution of consumerism, and practical challenges faced by Consumer fora under tenure-based appointments.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court directed the Union to file affidavits and take steps towards permanent adjudicatory structures.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Court noted the absence of a clear mechanism for tenure security and administrative control in Consumer fora and called for reforms.

Conclusions: Consumer fora should have permanent members and staff; tenure security is essential to judicial independence and quality justice; the Union of India must revamp the structure accordingly.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules, which provides for the composition of the Selection Committee, has been rightly struck down, placing reliance upon the doctrine of separation of powers and earlier decisions of this Court in Rojer Mathew (supra), MBA - III (supra) and MBA - IV (supra), as the composition of the Selection Committee as per the said Rule indicates executive dominance."

"The tenure of office of the President and Members of the State Commission and the President and Members of the District Commission fixed at four years under Rule 10(2) of the 2020 Rules is not legally sustainable, especially in view of the dictum in Madras Bar Association III."

"Written examination and viva voce shall be mandatory only for Non-Judicial Members of the State Commission and Members of the District Commission. No such examination shall be required for appointment or reappointment of the President of the State Commission, Judicial Members of the State Commission, and President of the District Commission, who shall be appointed in consultation with and subject to the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court."

"Appointments made pursuant to a bona fide selection process substantially complying with the directions issued by this Court shall be upheld and the appointees shall be allowed to complete their tenure."

"There cannot be revival of repealed Rules by implication; reappointments must be governed by the prevailing Rules, and no vested right to reappointment exists."

"Consumer fora must be restructured to have permanent members and staff with secure tenure to ensure independence, efficiency, and quality of adjudication, in consonance with the constitutional mandate."

"The Selection Committee for appointments to Consumer fora shall have judicial majority, with two judicial members including the Chairperson, and one executive member with voting rights; the Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs may be an ex-officio member without voting rights."

"The Union of India is directed to notify new Rules within four months incorporating the above principles and States shall complete recruitment processes accordingly."

Issues: (i) Whether the arbitral award could be sustained insofar as it allowed compensation and interest on the basis of chartered accountant certificates that were not proved by supporting evidence. (ii) Whether the remaining components of the award, including the claim for interest on delayed payment and arbitration costs, called for interference in appeal under Section 37.

Issue (i): Whether the arbitral award could be sustained insofar as it allowed compensation and interest on the basis of chartered accountant certificates that were not proved by supporting evidence.

Analysis: The claim for idling compensation was founded on certificates that only referred to audited books, contract ledgers and related documents, but the authors of the underlying material were not examined and no meaningful supporting proof of the figures was produced. The certificates were accepted by the arbitral tribunal without examining their foundation, rendering the basis of the award unsupported by evidence. An award resting on such material is vulnerable as being perverse and contrary to public policy when the claimed amounts are allowed without proof of the underlying facts.

Conclusion: This issue was decided in favour of the appellant. The compensation awarded on the basis of the chartered accountant certificates and the consequential interest on that component were disallowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the remaining components of the award, including the claim for interest on delayed payment and arbitration costs, called for interference in appeal under Section 37.

Analysis: The challenge to the separate claim for interest on profit and loss on delayed payment did not persuade the Court to interfere, and the arbitration costs were also found to be unexceptionable in appellate review. The Court therefore confined interference to the award components that depended on the unproved certificates and declined to disturb the rest.

Conclusion: This issue was decided against the appellant. The remaining portions of the award were left undisturbed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent of removing the award components founded on unproved chartered accountant certificates, while the balance of the award was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral award that allows a claim on the basis of unproved certificates, without reliable evidence of the underlying figures and documents, is perverse and liable to be interfered with as being unsupported by evidence.

Issues: (i) whether the material in the charge-sheet disclosed a prima facie case to justify framing of charges for offences under Sections 409 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; (ii) whether the material disclosed the ingredients of criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Issue (i): whether the material in the charge-sheet disclosed a prima facie case to justify framing of charges for offences under Sections 409 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Analysis: At the stage of discharge or framing of charge, the court is confined to the material in the charge-sheet and cannot conduct a roving enquiry or weigh evidence as in trial. The material alleged that the accused inserted handwritten words above the minister's signature so as to project the endorsement as if it had been made by the minister, and the forensic opinion indicated that the handwriting matched the accused. On these allegations, the ingredients of forgery and dishonest dealing with entrusted documents were sufficiently disclosed for trial.

Conclusion: Yes. The charges under Sections 409 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 were properly sustained.

Issue (ii): whether the material disclosed the ingredients of criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: Criminal misconduct under the unamended provision required an allegation that the public servant obtained for himself or for another person a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or otherwise satisfied one of the statutory modes. The charge-sheet contained no allegation that the accused obtained any such advantage, accepted gratification, misappropriated property, or derived pecuniary gain within the meaning of the provision. The alleged irregularity in tender processing, by itself, did not satisfy the statutory ingredients.

Conclusion: No. The charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The order framing charge was sustained for the IPC offences, but the charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act was set aside, resulting in partial relief to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge, charges can be framed if the charge-sheet material discloses a prima facie case or grave suspicion, but a corruption charge cannot stand unless the statutory ingredients of obtaining a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or other expressly defined modes of criminal misconduct, are specifically alleged.

Issues: (i) Whether an acquittal in a prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could rest solely on the non-examination of the complainant company's initial authorised representative and the absence of a fresh affidavit by the substituted representative. (ii) Whether the impugned acquittal required interference and the matter had to be sent back for a denovo trial.

Issue (i): Whether an acquittal in a prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could rest solely on the non-examination of the complainant company's initial authorised representative and the absence of a fresh affidavit by the substituted representative.

Analysis: A company may prosecute through different human representatives, and substitution of the authorised representative is permissible. The initial affidavit and supporting documents do not become unusable merely because the original deponent is not later produced for cross-examination, particularly where the complaint is supported by documentary material showing the transaction, dishonour, notice, and service. If the trial court felt that examination of the earlier representative was necessary, the proper course was to use its power to summon the witness rather than dispose of the complaint on that technical ground. The statutory presumption under section 139 remains relevant once the foundational facts are shown, and the accused must be afforded an opportunity to rebut it on the merits.

Conclusion: The acquittal could not lawfully be founded only on the non-examination of the initial authorised representative, and that reasoning was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned acquittal required interference and the matter had to be sent back for a denovo trial.

Analysis: Because the trial court declined to examine the other issues and rejected the complaint on a narrow procedural premise, the decision did not reflect a proper adjudication on the available evidence. The appropriate course was to set aside the acquittal, erase the evidence already recorded, and restore the matter for a fresh trial from the plea stage, with liberty to the complainant to seek substitution if needed and with opportunity to both sides to adduce and test evidence.

Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded for denovo trial.

Final Conclusion: The complainant's appeal succeeded to the extent of obtaining reversal of the acquittal, and the complaint was restored for fresh adjudication on merits without being influenced by the earlier observations.

Ratio Decidendi: In a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a prosecution by a company cannot be rejected solely because the original authorised representative who filed the affidavit is not later cross-examined, where substitution of representatives is permissible and the court can resort to its procedural powers to secure the witness for a decision on merits.

The core legal questions considered in the judgment are:

• Whether the suit for partition, possession, declaration, injunction, and accounting in respect of properties allegedly belonging to a Joint Hindu Family is maintainable or barred under the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (hereinafter 'the Benami Act'), specifically under Section 4 and Section 14 thereof.
• Whether an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground of bar by the Benami Act is sustainable at the threshold, i.e., on the basis of plaint averments alone without evidence.
• Whether subsequent purchasers of some of the suit properties are entitled to invoke the provisions of the Benami Act to challenge the maintainability of the suit.
• Whether the properties described in the plaint can be held to be benami properties on the face of the plaint.
• Whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Benami Act, which confer full ownership rights to a female Hindu in respect of property possessed by her, bar the suit.
• Whether the plea under Section 4 read with Section 14 of the Benami Act can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when not raised or argued before the courts below.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Maintainability of Suit vis-`a-vis Bar under the Benami Act

Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 4(1) of the Benami Act bars any suit, claim, or action to enforce any right in respect of benami property by or on behalf of the real owner against the person in whose name the property is held. The Act defines 'benami property' and 'benami transaction' under Sections 2(8) and 2(9), with certain exceptions, including properties held in fiduciary capacity or those falling under specified categories.

The Court relied on the precedent in Pawan Kumar vs. Babu Lal (2019) 4 SCC 367, which held that for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of statutory bar, the bar must be apparent on the face of the plaint without doubt or dispute. If the suit is saved by exceptions under the Benami Act, it raises a disputed question of fact requiring evidence, and thus the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted that the plaint consistently describes the suit properties as Joint Hindu Family properties purchased from joint family funds or income derived from the joint family business. There is no averment that the properties are benami in the hands of any party. Hence, the suit cannot be held barred by the Benami Act merely on the basis of the plaint.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court observed that the issue of whether the properties are benami is a factual issue to be adjudicated upon after evidence is led. The subsequent purchasers (defendant Nos.5 and 6) who moved the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC cannot claim personal knowledge about the nature of the properties in the hands of original owners and are not the appropriate parties to invoke the Benami Act at the threshold.

Application of Law to Facts: Given that the properties are alleged to be joint family properties and fall within exceptions under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) of the Benami Act, the suit is not barred. The application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was rightly rejected by the courts below.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The defendants argued that properties standing exclusively in the name of defendant No.2 are her personal properties and not amenable to partition, invoking Section 4 read with Section 14 of the Benami Act. The plaintiffs countered that this plea was never raised before the courts below and that the properties fall within exceptions under the Benami Act. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that these are factual issues not suitable for rejection of plaint at the threshold.

Conclusions: The suit is maintainable and not barred by the Benami Act on the face of the plaint. The question of benami character of the properties is a disputed factual issue to be decided after evidence.

Issue 2: Applicability of Section 14 of the Benami Act and Raising New Pleas Before Supreme Court

Legal Framework: Section 14 of the Benami Act provides that property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that Section 14 does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such property. Moreover, no specific plea under Section 14 was taken or argued before the courts below. The Court emphasized that a party cannot raise a new plea for the first time before the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition without foundation in the lower courts.

Application of Law to Facts: Since the defendants did not raise Section 14 as a ground for rejection of plaint before the trial court or the High Court, they are precluded from doing so at this stage.

Conclusions: The suit is not barred by Section 14 of the Benami Act, and the defendants cannot raise this plea for the first time before the Supreme Court.

Issue 3: Competency of Subsequent Purchasers to Challenge Suit Maintainability Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

Court's Reasoning: The Court noted that subsequent purchasers (defendant Nos.5 and 6) cannot claim knowledge of the true nature of the properties in the hands of original owners. They are not the appropriate parties to move an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint on the ground of bar by the Benami Act.

Application of Law to Facts: The subsequent purchasers' application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was rightly rejected as they lack locus standi to raise such a preliminary bar without evidence.

Conclusions: Subsequent purchasers cannot challenge the maintainability of the suit on the ground of bar by the Benami Act at the threshold.

Issue 4: Scope and Test for Rejection of Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

Legal Framework and Precedents: Order VII Rule 11 CPC permits rejection of plaint if the suit appears from the plaint to be barred by any law. The test is strict and requires that the bar must be apparent without doubt or dispute.

Court's Interpretation: The Court reiterated that if the bar is dependent on disputed facts or evidence, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. The factual disputes must be resolved at trial.

Application: Since the issue of benami character and joint family nature of the properties are disputed questions of fact, rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was not justified.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"Section 4(1) of the Benami Act bars a suit in respect of benami property, but whether the property is benami or not is a question of fact to be decided on evidence and not on the basis of mere averments in the plaint."

"The provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC do not permit rejection of the plaint where the question of bar by statute depends upon disputed facts or is subject to exceptions."

"Subsequent purchasers of properties cannot claim personal knowledge about the nature of the properties in the hands of original owners and therefore cannot maintain an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint on the ground of bar by the Benami Act."

"Section 14 of the Benami Act, which provides that property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as full owner, does not bar a suit in respect of such property."

"A plea not raised before the courts below cannot be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition."

"The suit for partition and other reliefs in respect of properties alleged to be joint Hindu family properties purchased from joint family funds is maintainable and not barred by the Benami Act at the threshold."

Issues: Whether the disciplinary proceedings and charge sheet were liable to be quashed for being issued before receipt and consideration of the Central Vigilance Commission's first-stage advice in a case having a vigilance angle, and whether retiral benefits were admissible without back wages.

Analysis: The Bank itself treated the matter as one involving a vigilance angle and sought the Commission's first-stage advice, which under the applicable vigilance framework is obtained before issuance of the charge sheet. The affidavits filed before the High Court also recorded that the charge sheet would be issued after receipt of the advice. Notwithstanding that position, the charge sheet was served before the advice was received and considered. In these facts, the Court held that the Bank could not depart from its own stand and proceed unilaterally. The long delay, the proximity to superannuation, and the absence of any material showing receipt of the advice supported interference with the disciplinary action.

Conclusion: The disciplinary proceedings, including the charge sheet, were quashed and set aside. The appellant was held entitled to retiral benefits, but not to back wages or allowances.

Issues: Whether the assignment of the borrower's loan account to the asset reconstruction company was liable to be interfered with on the grounds of absence of prior notice, want of NPA or stressed-asset classification, and alleged non-compliance with the RBI framework and the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme.

Analysis: The loan account was treated as a stressed account under the applicable RBI framework governing resolution and transfer of stressed loans. The Court noted that the governing circulars permitted transfer of loan exposures classified as NPA or SMA, and that the borrower's consent was not a precondition for assignment of the lender's asset. It further held that the borrower had been intimated about the transfer, so the plea of violation of natural justice was untenable. The Court also applied the settled principle that lending decisions and assignment of debt are commercial matters, and writ interference is confined to cases of statutory breach, unfairness, or mala fides, none of which was established. The claim relating to the ECLGS was also rejected, as the scheme did not create an enforceable right to compel disbursal in the manner sought.

Conclusion: The challenge to the assignment failed and the writ appeal was held against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order dismissing the writ petition was upheld, and the appellate challenge to the transfer of the loan account was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A lender may assign a stressed loan asset in accordance with the applicable regulatory framework without obtaining the borrower's consent, and such commercial assignment is not amenable to writ interference absent a clear statutory infraction or other recognised ground for judicial review.

Issues: Whether directions were warranted for expeditious disposal of a long-pending complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and for ensuring the accused's appearance during trial.

Analysis: The complaint had remained pending since 2014. The statutory scheme under Sections 138 and 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 contemplates prompt and efficient trial, and the Court relied on the Supreme Court's directions emphasising day-to-day progress and expeditious disposal of cheque dishonour cases. The Court also noted that the trial court must proceed in accordance with the statutory framework and may take coercive steps where necessary to secure the presence of the accused during trial.

Conclusion: Directions were issued to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within six months of receipt of the certified copy of the order, and to use lawful coercive measures to secure the accused's presence if required.

Final Conclusion: The application succeeded to the extent of obtaining a time-bound direction for speedy disposal of the pending complaint and effective trial management.

Ratio Decidendi: Complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must be prosecuted with procedural expedition in accordance with the statutory mandate and binding Supreme Court directions, and trial courts may adopt coercive measures permitted by law to secure the accused's attendance.