Limitation and summoning in cheque dishonour complaints: marginal delay may be condoned and prima facie liability suffices at outset.

A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is maintainable where limitation is computed by excluding the starting day and the filing is within time or involves only a marginal delay capable of condonation on sufficient cause; a separate condonation application is not invariably required, and the Magistrate may take cognizance where the statutory conditions are satisfied. At the summoning stage, the court need only see whether the complaint and supporting affidavit disclose a prima facie case, including specific averments as to the company official's role, without deciding disputed questions of liability. The quashing challenge therefore failed and the complaint was allowed to proceed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was barred by limitation and whether delay in filing could be condoned; (ii) Whether the summoning order was liable to be quashed for want of material showing liability of the company officials and for alleged insufficiency in the summoning process.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was barred by limitation and whether delay in filing could be condoned.

Analysis: The limitation for filing a complaint under Section 142(b) is computed after excluding the relevant starting day, and the complaint is maintainable if filed within the prescribed period or if a short delay is capable of being condoned on sufficient grounds. On the facts, the Court treated the complaint as being within time on the basis of the filing/verification material, and alternatively held that even the marginal delay shown was only of a few days. It further held that filing of a separate application for condonation of delay is not a statutory mandate in the circumstances considered, and the Magistrate had power to take cognizance where sufficient cause existed.

Conclusion: The limitation objection was rejected and the complaint was not liable to be quashed on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the summoning order was liable to be quashed for want of material showing liability of the company officials and for alleged insufficiency in the summoning process.

Analysis: At the summoning stage, the Court is required only to see whether a prima facie case is made out on the complaint and supporting affidavit material, without entering into disputed questions of fact. The complaint contained specific averments regarding the role of the company official, and the evidence by affidavit was capable of being considered under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In these circumstances, the Court found no illegality in the summoning order and held that the challenge to vicarious liability and role attribution could be raised at the appropriate stage before the trial court.

Conclusion: The summoning order was upheld and the quashing plea failed.

Final Conclusion: The petition did not disclose any ground warranting interference in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, and the complaint proceedings were allowed to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a marginal delay in filing the complaint may be condoned within the Magistrate's statutory power, and at the summoning stage the Court need only ascertain whether the complaint and supporting affidavit disclose a prima facie case, without adjudicating disputed questions of role or liability.

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