Cheque dishonour complaint timing u/s138: how to count the one-month filing limit after 15-day notice; appeals dismissed.

The dominant issue was whether a complaint under s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was barred by limitation, i.e., not filed within one month from the date the cause of action arose under proviso (c). The SC held that the computation must follow the settled rule in s. 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and s. 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, requiring exclusion of the first day and inclusion of the last. Accordingly, the one-month period runs from the day immediately after expiry of the 15-day notice period, and the day on which the cause of action arises is excluded. As the complaint filed on the last day so computed was within time, the appeals were dismissed.

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Issues:
- Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is within the prescribed time limit.

Analysis:
The case involved appeals questioning the timeliness of complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant's cheques bounced, leading to notices being served on the accused. The accused failed to make payment within the stipulated 15 days, causing the complainant to file complaints beyond the alleged time limit. The accused petitioned the High Court for quashing the process, which was rejected, leading to the appeals. The issue revolved around the interpretation of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act.

The court examined Section 138, which deems the dishonoring of a cheque as an offense under certain conditions. Section 142 mandates that the court can only take cognizance of such offenses upon a written complaint made within one month of the cause of action. The court deliberated on whether the period of one month should exclude the day on which the cause of action arose, citing a precedent where the first day was excluded in similar calculations. The court referred to the Limitation Act and the General Clauses Act, which support the exclusion of the initial day in computing time periods.

Applying the established rule of excluding the first day and including the last, the court calculated the period for filing the complaint. In this case, the 15-day period expired on 14th October, 1995, making the cause of action arise on 15th October, 1995. By excluding this day, the complaint filed on 15th November, 1995, was deemed to be within the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the appeals challenging the timeliness of the complaints were dismissed, upholding the validity of the complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

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