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Issues: (i) Whether the proviso inserted in Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by the 2002 amendment operated retrospectively so as to validate a complaint filed beyond limitation; (ii) whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and whether amendment of the complaint to add that charge was permissible.
Issue (i): Whether the proviso inserted in Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by the 2002 amendment operated retrospectively so as to validate a complaint filed beyond limitation.
Analysis: The complaint was filed after the expiry of the period computed from the presumed service of notice and expiry of the statutory waiting period. The subsequent proviso to Section 142(b) conferred power on the court to condone delay and was treated as a substantive provision, not merely procedural. In the absence of express language making it retrospective, such a provision could not be applied to a complaint already barred when filed. As no application for condonation was made, cognizance under Section 138 could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The proviso to Section 142(b) did not operate retrospectively, and the complaint under Section 138 was barred by limitation; the order taking cognizance was without jurisdiction.
Issue (ii): Whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and whether amendment of the complaint to add that charge was permissible.
Analysis: Cheating requires deception and fraudulent or dishonest inducement at the inception. The cheques in question were post-dated and were issued when the account was operative. On the complaint averments, even if accepted as true, there was no material showing dishonest intention at the time of issuance. The attempted addition of Section 420 could not cure the fundamental absence of ingredients, and the court lacked jurisdiction to permit the amendment in the circumstances.
Conclusion: No offence under Section 420 was made out, and the amendment permitting that charge was invalid.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand because the prosecution under Section 138 was time-barred and the added charge under Section 420 was unsustainable, resulting in complete relief to the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory amendment conferring power to condone delay is substantive and, unless expressly made retrospective, cannot revive a complaint already barred by limitation; a charge of cheating also requires dishonest inducement at the inception, which a mere post-dated cheque transaction does not establish.