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Issues: (i) Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in the PMLA case in view of prolonged custody, absence of charge-sheet in the predicate offence, and the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial; (ii) Whether counsel for an accused could directly communicate with the investigating officer in a pending matter by email outside court proceedings.
Issue (i): Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in the PMLA case in view of prolonged custody, absence of charge-sheet in the predicate offence, and the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial.
Analysis: The applicant had been in custody since 07.02.2024, while the predicate offence had not yet progressed to charge-sheet stage. The case rested on alleged proceeds of crime under the PMLA, but the Court treated the possibility of a timely joint adjudication of the predicate and PMLA proceedings as remote. Relying on the settled principle that statutory restrictions on bail do not eclipse constitutional protection under Article 21, the Court held that prolonged incarceration without realistic prospect of early trial completion justified relaxation of the PMLA bail rigour. The Court also noted that the applicant was already on bail in the predicate offence, custodial interrogation was not required, and the risk of absconding was not shown.
Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to bail and release was directed on conditions.
Issue (ii): Whether counsel for an accused could directly communicate with the investigating officer in a pending matter by email outside court proceedings.
Analysis: The Court found that, once the matter was sub judice and the Enforcement Directorate was represented through counsel, any grievance about non-filing of reply ought to have been raised before the Court rather than by direct communication with the investigating officer. The Court relied on the professional standard that an advocate shall not communicate on the subject matter of controversy with a party represented by an advocate except through that advocate. It held that such direct email communication by the applicant's counsel was not proper.
Conclusion: The objection was upheld and the conduct of the applicant's counsel was disapproved.
Final Conclusion: Bail was granted to the applicant, but the Court also recorded that direct communication by counsel with the investigating officer in the pending proceeding was impermissible and contrary to professional propriety.
Ratio Decidendi: In bail matters under stringent special statutes, constitutional protection of personal liberty and the right to speedy trial may justify release where prolonged incarceration continues without a realistic prospect of timely trial completion, and advocates must channel all communications in a contested matter through the court and opposing counsel rather than directly with the represented investigating agency.