UAPA bail bar and prima facie truth test: SC upholds bail where prosecution material showed only association and meetings.

The SC held that the High Court was not bound to remand the bail matter after the second supplementary charge-sheet and transfer of investigation to the NIA, because it could examine the later material in appeal. On merits, the prosecution material did not make the UAPA accusations prima facie true: association, meetings, correspondence and presence were insufficient without credible evidence of intent to further terrorist activity, so the statutory bail bar did not apply. Given nearly six years of pre-trial custody, the absence of framed charges, and the appellant's age and health, continued detention was held unjustified. Bail was therefore directed subject to conditions.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was bound to remand the bail matter to the Special Court after filing of the second supplementary charge-sheet and transfer of investigation to the NIA. (ii) Whether, on the materials in the charge-sheets and witness statements, the accusations under the bail-restricting provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 were prima facie true. (iii) Whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration, age and health justified grant of bail despite the statutory restriction.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was bound to remand the bail matter to the Special Court after filing of the second supplementary charge-sheet and transfer of investigation to the NIA.

Analysis: The appellate forum had jurisdiction to examine the later charge-sheet while deciding the bail challenge. The course of sending the matter back to the Special Court was permissible, but it was not the only lawful course. The change of investigating agency did not divest the High Court of power to consider the matter in appeal under the NIA Act.

Conclusion: The High Court was not bound to remand the matter, and the objection to maintainability failed.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the materials in the charge-sheets and witness statements, the accusations under the bail-restricting provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 were prima facie true.

Analysis: The materials relied upon did not show a prima facie terrorist act, raising or collecting funds for terrorism, recruitment, membership, support, or funding of a terrorist organisation in the sense required by the statute. The allegations mainly showed association, meetings, correspondence and presence, which were insufficient without credible evidence of intent to further terrorist activities. The threshold under the bail-restricting provision was not crossed.

Conclusion: The accusations under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 were not prima facie true against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration, age and health justified grant of bail despite the statutory restriction.

Analysis: The appellant had remained in custody for nearly six years, charges had not been framed, and the Court balanced the seriousness of allegations with the constitutional protection of personal liberty. Once the statutory bar was found inapplicable on the materials, continued detention was held unjustified in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: Bail was warranted on the facts, and the appellant was entitled to be released on conditions.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge succeeded, the refusal of bail was set aside, and release on bail was directed subject to conditions imposed by the Special Court.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Court must assess whether the prosecution material makes the accusations prima facie true; mere association, meetings or correspondence, without credible evidence of intent to further terrorist activity, does not satisfy the statutory bar, and constitutional liberty may prevail where continued detention becomes unjustified on the facts.

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