Issues: Whether Section 76 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies to a registered supplier that collected GST under valid invoices but did not remit it to the Government, warranting an equivalent penalty.

Analysis: Section 76(1) applies to every person collecting any amount as representing tax and not paying it to the Government. Its language does not distinguish between registered and unregistered persons, nor does it limit its operation to unauthorised collections. GST collected from recipients is held in a fiduciary capacity for the public exchequer; retention of such collections after filing nil or no returns falls within the statutory provision.

Conclusion: A registered supplier that collects GST but fails to remit it to the Government is liable to penalty equivalent to the amount collected under Section 76 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed input tax credit of Rs. 31,115 was admissible; (ii) Whether interest of Rs. 3,80,408 was payable where suppliers were not paid within 180 days; and (iii) Whether the Rs. 20,000 penalty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed input tax credit of Rs. 31,115 was admissible.

Analysis: Section 16(2) requires satisfaction of the prescribed conditions for input tax credit, while Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant. No invoices, proof of payment to the supplier, transport or goods-receipt evidence, or supplier ledger was produced to establish those conditions. The question whether retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration alone could justify denial of credit was not decided.

Conclusion: The input tax credit denial is sustained, with consequential interest to be quantified in accordance with Section 50. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest of Rs. 3,80,408 was payable where suppliers were not paid within 180 days.

Analysis: The unamended second proviso to Section 16(2) required an amount equal to the credit to be added to output tax liability with interest where the supplier was not paid within 180 days; the third proviso permitted re-availment upon subsequent payment. The later amendments to Rule 37 did not govern the disputed period, but the earlier Rule 37 also prescribed reversal or addition of credit with interest. Non-operation of FORM GSTR-2 affected only the reporting mode and did not extinguish the statutory liability, since reversal through FORM GSTR-3B and voluntary payment under Section 73(5) read with Rule 142(2) remained available. The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia was inapplicable because compliance was possible but not attempted. A recipient cannot avoid interest by relying on its own failure to add the amount to output tax liability, and a private arrangement for delayed supplier payment could not extend the statutory period.

Conclusion: Interest of Rs. 3,80,408 on credit relating to supplies unpaid within 180 days is payable. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Rs. 20,000 penalty was sustainable.

Analysis: Under Section 73(9), the statutory minimum penalty was Rs. 10,000. The fourth proviso to Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act required aggregation of the corresponding Central and State GST penalties for integrated tax, resulting in a penalty of Rs. 20,000. No independent challenge to the penalty was established.

Conclusion: The penalty of Rs. 20,000 is sustained. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denied credit, consequential interest, interest for delayed supplier payment, and statutory penalty remain enforceable, subject to quantification of the interest on the denied credit and adjustment of amounts already deposited or paid.

Issues: (i) Whether 22.04.2018 was the relevant date for computing the limitation period for refund of excess tax paid; (ii) Whether the refund application filed on 04.07.2025 was barred by limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (iii) Whether authorities under the GST enactments could sanction a refund filed beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Issue (i): Whether 22.04.2018 was the relevant date for computing the limitation period for refund of excess tax paid.

Analysis: For refund claims not falling within the specific categories in the Explanation to Section 54, the relevant date is the date of payment of tax. The excess GST was reported and paid through the return filed on 22.04.2018. Section 54 contains no provision permitting computation of limitation from the subsequent discovery of an error in applying the tax rate.

Conclusion: 22.04.2018 was the relevant date for computing limitation, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund application filed on 04.07.2025 was barred by limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 54(1) requires a refund application within two years from the relevant date. Since the application was made more than two years after 22.04.2018, it did not satisfy the statutory time limit. The fact that tax had been paid at a rate higher than the applicable rate did not displace the limitation governing a refund application before the statutory authorities.

Conclusion: The refund application was time-barred under Section 54(1), against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether authorities under the GST enactments could sanction a refund filed beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Analysis: The two-year period under Section 54 is mandatory, and the statutory authorities have no express power to condone delay or entertain a belated refund claim. Section 54(8), including the requirement that the tax incidence has not been passed on, regulates the manner of disbursal only after a refund is otherwise admissible; it neither creates an independent refund entitlement nor overrides limitation. Relief against retention of tax allegedly collected without authority of law may be sought through writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not through a belated statutory refund claim.

Conclusion: The statutory authorities could not sanction the belated refund, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory refund mechanism remained unavailable because the claim was lodged after the mandatory limitation period, notwithstanding the asserted excess payment and absence of unjust enrichment.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 must be made within two years from the applicable relevant date, and statutory authorities lack power to condone delay absent an express enabling provision.

Issues: (i) Whether delayed filing of returns, despite subsequent full payment of tax and interest, justified invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the appellate authority could modify the penalty by applying Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether delayed filing of returns, despite subsequent full payment of tax and interest, justified invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires monthly return filing and provides a separate process for action against return defaulters. Section 74(1) applies only where tax remains unpaid or short paid by reason of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. The returns filed by the taxpayer disclosed the turnover, rate and liability correctly, and the admitted tax liability and interest had been discharged before initiation of proceedings under Section 74. No specific fraud, false declaration, non-declaration in a furnished return, or withholding of information on requisition was established. Mere delayed filing of returns, without proof of the statutory ingredients, did not amount to suppression or wilful misstatement under Explanation 2 to Section 74.

Conclusion: Section 74 was not legally invocable on the stated facts. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate authority could modify the penalty by applying Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Where proceedings initiated under Section 74 are found unsustainable, Section 75(2) requires determination, if warranted, under Section 73 by the proper officer within the applicable statutory limits. The appellate authority's direct modification of the penalty under Section 73 was therefore not sustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty modification under Section 73 was set aside, and any liability under that provision must be determined by the original adjudicating authority. This finding is in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The taxpayer cannot be proceeded against under the fraud-or-suppression framework of Section 74, while any liability under the ordinary demand provision remains subject to a lawful determination by the proper officer.

Ratio Decidendi: Delayed filing of returns alone does not establish fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade tax under Section 74 where the subsequently filed returns correctly disclose the tax liability and the liability has been discharged before initiation of proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether an appellate authority may dismiss an appeal ex parte without deciding the appellant's core ground through a reasoned order under Section 107(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether CBIC Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied to the disputed input tax credit and justified requiring CA or supplier certificates; and (iii) Whether input tax credit of Rs. 1,92,949.93 claimed in FY 2019-20 was validly availed as omitted FY 2018-19 credit within the statutory time limit.

Issue (i): Whether an appellate authority may dismiss an appeal ex parte without deciding the appellant's core ground through a reasoned order under Section 107(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 107(11) and 107(12) require the appellate authority to pass a written order stating the points for determination, its decision on those points, and reasons. Although the order recorded non-appearance and noted the portal comparison, it did not address the specific explanation that FY 2018-19 credit had been claimed in FY 2019-20 within the permissible period. Absence of the appellant does not dispense with the requirement of adjudication on the grounds raised.

Conclusion: The ex parte non-speaking appellate order was legally unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether CBIC Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied to the disputed input tax credit and justified requiring CA or supplier certificates.

Analysis: The Circular is confined to specified mismatches for FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19 arising from supplier-side reporting failures. The disputed difference resulted from comparing FY 2019-20 GSTR-3B with FY 2019-20 GSTR-2A while excluding credit already reflected in FY 2018-19 GSTR-2A and claimed later by the recipient. No supplier reporting default was alleged. Further, the aggregate disputed amount was below Rs. 2 lakh, making a CA certificate unwarranted even on the Circular's monetary thresholds.

Conclusion: The Circular was inapplicable, and the certificate requirement could not sustain the input tax credit demand.

Issue (iii): Whether input tax credit of Rs. 1,92,949.93 claimed in FY 2019-20 was validly availed as omitted FY 2018-19 credit within the statutory time limit.

Analysis: The invoice-wise reconciliation, GSTR-2A reports, tax-comparison records, and GSTR-3B returns established that FY 2018-19 credit reflected in GSTR-2A was claimed in April and July 2019. Those returns were filed before the due date for the September 2019 return, satisfying the time limits under Sections 16(4) and 39(9). The condition requiring invoice reflection in the recipient's statement under Section 16(2)(aa) became effective only from 01.01.2022 and did not govern the period in dispute. A GSTR-2A/GSTR-3B mismatch, without verification of the reconciliation, could not by itself justify denial of credit.

Conclusion: The disputed input tax credit was validly availed within the prescribed time, and the related tax, interest, and penalty demand was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The input tax credit component of the impugned demand was removed, while the accepted output-tax liability and its consequential components remained unaffected.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit validly availed within the statutory time limit cannot be denied solely by comparing GSTR-3B of a subsequent year with that year's GSTR-2A where reconciliation establishes that the credit relates to invoices reflected in an earlier year.

Issues: (i) Whether the seized gold could be treated as smuggled goods so as to invoke the statutory presumption and sustain confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the penalty for dealing with allegedly smuggled gold was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the seized gold could be treated as smuggled goods so as to invoke the statutory presumption and sustain confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 shifts the burden of proving lawful acquisition only where the seizure is founded on a reasonable belief of smuggling, based on relevant material rationally connected with that belief. Domestic courier transport and absence of accompanying documents could justify suspicion and investigation, but did not by themselves establish illegal importation. The absence of foreign markings, the inconclusive assayer report, the disclosed jewellery business and melting explanation, and the failure to independently verify the identified recipient or melting laboratory were material circumstances not adequately addressed.

Analysis: The requirements of Section 111(i) and Section 111(j) of the Customs Act, 1962 were not met merely because the gold was recovered from an airport cargo complex; no concealment in imported packages or unauthorised removal from a customs area was identified. Liability under Section 111(d) likewise required illegal importation to be established through evidence or a lawfully raised statutory presumption.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the gold could not be treated as smuggled on the available material, and the absolute confiscation was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty for dealing with allegedly smuggled gold was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 required identification of the appellant's act or omission rendering the goods liable to confiscation and material demonstrating the requisite knowledge or reason to believe. Jewellery business and transportation without accompanying documents, without more, did not establish those statutory ingredients.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the penalty was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The adverse customs determinations concerning confiscation and personal penalty were set aside, with consequential relief to follow in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: The burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 arises only upon a reasonable belief of smuggling founded on relevant material; suspicion from domestic transportation and missing documents cannot alone establish illegal importation or sustain confiscation.

Issues: Whether an appeal against confiscation of gold carried by an international passenger is maintainable before the Tribunal when the gold was recovered from the passenger's person.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. Gold brought into India during international travel retains its character as passenger baggage even when recovered from the passenger's trouser pocket rather than from luggage. Allegations of non-declaration or concealment concern the merits of confiscation and penalty and cannot override the statutory exclusion of jurisdiction. The nature of the goods and transaction, rather than the relief sought, determines maintainability. Section 129DD provides the applicable revisional remedy.

Conclusion: No. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the baggage-related order; the appropriate remedy lies before the competent Revisional Authority.

Issues: (i) Whether commission-based marketing and order-procurement services supplied to foreign principals constituted export of services and were taxable in India; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of the proposed service tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether commission-based marketing and order-procurement services supplied to foreign principals constituted export of services and were taxable in India.

Analysis: Rule 6A(d) required the place of provision of service to be outside India. Under Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, the place of provision is ordinarily the location of the service recipient. The service recipient is the person whose instructions are acted upon, whose business need is satisfied, and who bears the consideration; a third party affected by performance is not thereby the recipient. The foreign principals engaged the assessee to procure orders and promote their products, paid the commission in convertible foreign exchange, and used the services for their business. There was no evidence that Indian customers received any service from the assessee after their order details were passed to the foreign principals. The destination of the service was therefore outside India, determined by its consumption rather than its place of performance.

Conclusion: The commission services constituted export of services and were not liable to service tax; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of the proposed service tax demand.

Analysis: The assessee regularly filed service-tax returns and disclosed the activity as export of service. Mere non-payment or failure to declare tax liability does not establish wilful suppression; a positive act showing intent to evade payment is required. No evidence established deliberate concealment or intent to evade service tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was invalid and the demand was time-barred; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned service-tax confirmation was unsustainable both because the services qualified as exports and because the extended period was unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a foreign principal engages and pays an Indian service provider for order procurement and marketing, the foreign principal is the service recipient, and the service qualifies as export when its place of provision is outside India notwithstanding that prospective customers are located in India.

Issues: (i) Whether waste and scrap arising from manufacture of goods of headings 8601 to 8606 cleared at a concessional rate under Notification No. 1/2011-CE was exempt under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE; (ii) Whether the extended period under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was validly invoked; (iii) Whether interest and penalty under Sections 11AA and 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether waste and scrap arising from manufacture of goods of headings 8601 to 8606 cleared at a concessional rate under Notification No. 1/2011-CE was exempt under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE.

Analysis: Section 5A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits exemption from the whole or any part of duty. Notification No. 1/2011-CE exempted the specified coaches from duty in excess of 1%; therefore, the coaches remained exempted goods for purposes of the unqualified expression used in Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE. Sl. No. 17 does not restrict its benefit to goods wholly exempted or chargeable to nil duty. A restriction found in another notification could not be added by interpretation. Rule 2(d) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was not transplanted into the notification, but its express inclusion of goods availing Notification No. 1/2011-CE corroborated the statutory character of the concession as an exemption. The proviso to Notification No. 27/2011-CE was attracted because goods of heading 8607 remained excisable despite their exemption; however, an incorrect initial claim under that notification did not defeat the independently applicable exemption under Sl. No. 17.

Conclusion: Waste and scrap arising from goods of headings 8601 to 8606 was exempt under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE; the duty paid was not payable and was refundable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was validly invoked.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. Departmental audit had already ascertained and quantified the relevant facts, collected the amounts, and those facts were subsequently the subject of refund adjudication before issuance of the notice. The notice contained no particularised allegation of a deliberate act or intent to evade. Mere alleged non-disclosure of exempt clearances could not constitute wilful suppression, particularly where the dispute concerned a tenable construction of exemption notifications and the material facts were within departmental knowledge.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invokable and the demand was barred by limitation in its entirety, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest and penalty under Sections 11AA and 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were sustainable.

Analysis: Interest was consequential to the duty demand, which failed both on merits and limitation. Penalty under Section 11AC required the ingredients of fraud, suppression, or intent to evade, none of which were established.

Conclusion: No interest or penalty was sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption under Sl. No. 17 governed the entire disputed waste and scrap, rendering the amount paid refundable only once and leaving no legally sustainable duty demand, interest, or penalty.

Issues: Whether the bail conditions requiring two local sureties and deposit of the passport should be modified.

Analysis: One local surety had been furnished, but the inability to obtain a second had prevented the appellant from benefiting from bail. The passport had already been deposited with the tax authorities.

Conclusion: One local surety and another surety satisfactory to the Magistrate shall suffice. Proof of the existing passport deposit and an undertaking not to seek its release without the trial court's permission shall replace the requirement to deposit it.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in protesting the inspection-stage payments justified rejecting the assessee's claim; (ii) whether the orders concluding the tax proceedings were sustainable despite non-issuance of a payment acknowledgement and non-consideration of the protest.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in protesting the inspection-stage payments justified rejecting the assessee's claim.

Analysis: The protest was submitted 17 days after payment. The inspection coincided with a family wedding, and the associated customary formalities continued afterwards.

Conclusion: The delay did not justify rejecting the claim, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the orders concluding the tax proceedings were sustainable despite non-issuance of a payment acknowledgement and non-consideration of the protest.

Analysis: Rule 142 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules provides for acknowledgement in Form GST DRC-04 of a payment reported through Form GST DRC-03. Although a notice and hearing followed, the acknowledgement was not issued and the protest concerning the inspection-stage payments was not considered. The adopted precedent addressed the effect of non-issuance of that acknowledgement.

Conclusion: The orders were unsustainable, and the inspection-stage payments must be refunded, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to a refund of the inspection-stage payments; the underlying tax liability was not determined on its merits.

Issues: Whether the omission of the restriction under Rule 96(10) affects pending proceedings and the processing of the export refund.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted without a saving or sunset clause. Binding Supreme Court precedent addresses the effect of such an omission on pending proceedings. A Central Board of Indirect Tax and Customs clarification states that the omission takes effect retrospectively from 23 October 2017.

Conclusion: Proceedings under the omitted restriction cannot continue, and the refund is to be processed.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings under an omitted subordinate rule cannot continue where its omission is not accompanied by a saving or sunset clause.

Issues: (i) Whether functionally dissimilar companies were correctly excluded as transfer-pricing comparables. (ii) Whether a company with abnormal profits attributable to extraordinary circumstances was correctly excluded as a comparable.

Issue (i): Whether functionally dissimilar companies were correctly excluded as transfer-pricing comparables.

Analysis: The software-services exclusions were covered by an existing decision involving the same assessee. For IT-enabled services, functional profiles and business models were material to comparability. The factual findings included extensive outsourcing and differences between higher-end and routine services; the outsourcing findings were not contested. The inquiry under Section 260A concerns substantial questions of law.

Conclusion: The exclusions for functional dissimilarity were upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a company with abnormal profits attributable to extraordinary circumstances was correctly excluded as a comparable.

Analysis: Transfer-pricing analysis seeks to determine an arm's length price. The company's exceptionally high margin was attributed to extraordinary circumstances, including a merger and consolidated results; its inclusion would distort the mean profit level indicator.

Conclusion: The company was correctly excluded, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing benchmark cannot be based on the excluded comparables.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer-pricing comparables must be functionally comparable, and an entity with abnormal results attributable to extraordinary circumstances must be excluded to avoid distorting the arm's length benchmark.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction may be exercised despite an alternative appellate remedy; (ii) Whether an appellate order passed before the deadline for written submissions violates natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction may be exercised despite an alternative appellate remedy.

Analysis: An appeal to the Tribunal is ordinarily the appropriate remedy against an order under section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The challenge concerned an apparent procedural error and sought an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was available despite the alternative appellate remedy.

Issue (ii): Whether an appellate order passed before the deadline for written submissions violates natural justice.

Analysis: The notice allowed written submissions by a specified date, but the appellate authority decided the appeal ex parte before that date, denying the opportunity to make those submissions.

Conclusion: The premature appellate order violated natural justice and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to a fresh hearing and a fresh decision on the appeal; the assessment merits remain open.

Ratio Decidendi: Deciding an appeal before the deadline allowed for submissions violates natural justice and may justify writ intervention notwithstanding an alternative appellate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether Diwali expenditure incurred at business premises was allowable as business expenditure; (ii) Whether disallowance of general, office and sales-promotion expenses was sustainable beyond expenditure admitted to be personal.

Issue (i): Whether Diwali expenditure incurred at business premises was allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: Under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, expenditure incurred for business purposes is allowable. The Diwali expenditure was nominal, incurred at the business premises with staff members, and was capable of creating goodwill among employees and customers. There was no finding that the expenditure had not been incurred at the business premises.

Conclusion: The Diwali expenditure of Rs. 24,340 was allowable and its disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance of general, office and sales-promotion expenses was sustainable beyond expenditure admitted to be personal.

Analysis: The assessee did not contest the finding that expenditure of Rs. 76,118, reflected in five vouchers, was personal in nature. However, no specific finding established that the remaining expenditure was personal or was not incurred for business purposes. The absence of verifiable bills could not sustain a blanket disallowance of the balance amount without such a finding.

Conclusion: The disallowance was sustained to the extent of Rs. 76,118 of admitted personal expenditure, while the balance disallowance of Rs. 5,08,410 was deleted; the issue was partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Business expenditure incurred for Diwali celebrations at the business premises remained deductible, and only the admitted personal outlay was excluded from deduction.

Ratio Decidendi: A disallowance of business expenditure may be sustained to the extent shown or admitted to be personal, but cannot be retained for the remaining expenditure merely because supporting bills are unverifiable without a specific finding that it is personal or non-business expenditure.

Issues: Whether long-term capital gain arising on conversion of land into stock-in-trade could be assessed in full in the year of conversion and execution of the development agreement, instead of proportionately as the stock-in-trade was sold.

Analysis: Section 45(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 postpones chargeability of capital gain arising on conversion of a capital asset into stock-in-trade until the previous year in which such stock-in-trade is sold or otherwise transferred. The consideration under the development agreement was receivable over time, and the converted stock-in-trade was sold in stages. The corresponding capital gains had been offered in the relevant assessment years in proportion to the sale consideration received. Assessment of the aggregate consideration in the impugned year would result in double addition of capital gain.

Conclusion: Long-term capital gain was chargeable proportionately in the years in which the converted stock-in-trade was sold; the addition of the entire capital gain in the impugned assessment year was deleted.

Issues: Whether exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad) for assessment year 2020-21 could be denied for non-filing of a return under Section 139(4C), despite satisfaction of the substantive eligibility conditions.

Analysis: For assessment year 2020-21, Section 139(4C) prescribed the requirement to furnish a return but did not make such filing a condition precedent to exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad). The condition linking entitlement to exemption with timely return filing was introduced through the twentieth proviso to Section 10(23C) with effect from 01.04.2023 and had prospective operation. Registration under Section 12A was also not a prerequisite for the claimed exemption. The institution's receipts were within the then applicable threshold and the substantive conditions for exemption were satisfied.

Conclusion: Exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad) could not be denied for assessment year 2020-21 merely because no return was filed under Section 139(4C); the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order could stand when it relied on cited decisions that could not be traced and were disclaimed by the respondents.

Analysis: The order relied on those citations for its view that the fifteen-day period for a speaking order under Section 17(5) of the Customs Act was directory. The respondents acknowledged that the citations could not be traced in the form given and disclaimed reliance on them. The Court drew support from the Supreme Court's rule against reliance on fake or hallucinated precedents in adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory decision based on cited precedents that cannot be traced and are disclaimed by the authority cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether GST registration could be cancelled for alleged non-deposit of input tax credit despite regular filing of returns, instead of pursuing statutory recovery.

Analysis: Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provide the statutory mechanism for recovery relating to input tax credit. The alleged non-deposit of input tax credit was required to be addressed through that recovery procedure. Regular filing of returns provided no justification for cancelling the registration, and cancellation in these circumstances was not in accordance with the procedure established by law.

Conclusion: The cancellation of GST registration was unjustified, and its revocation must be allowed in accordance with law. The authorities remain free to initiate proceedings by show-cause notice for any other violation in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Issues: Whether rejection of a delayed statutory appeal through a single-line cyclostyled order, without considering the grounds for condonation of delay, was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides the statutory appellate framework. Grounds advanced in support of condonation of delay require fair and meaningful consideration. A rejection cannot rest on a bare assertion that the grounds are insufficient; reasons must disclose deliberation on those grounds and support the conclusion reached.

Conclusion: The appellate order rejecting the appeal was unsustainable for want of reasons and consideration of the delay-condonation grounds. It was set aside and the matter was remitted for a fresh speaking order in accordance with law.