Special tax-law prosecution and general penal law can both apply; repeal did not extinguish pending proceedings or violate equality.

Section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was treated as operating alongside section 177 of the Indian Penal Code, because the two provisions occupied different fields and were not irreconcilably inconsistent; prosecution under both remained legally maintainable, though double punishment was barred. Repeal of the 1922 Act did not extinguish liability or pending prosecutions, since section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not exclude the saving effect of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. A complaint need not be personally filed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner if it was taken on his authority, and the statutory prosecution scheme was held not to offend article 14 because discretion was structured by statutory safeguards.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 excluded prosecution under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code by implication; (ii) whether prosecutions in respect of pending proceedings under the repealed 1922 Act were saved after repeal by section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; (iii) whether the appellant could be prosecuted under both enactments for the same act or omission; (iv) whether a complaint had to be filed personally by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 53 of the Income-tax Act, 1922; and (v) whether the choice of prosecution offended article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 excluded prosecution under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code by implication.

Analysis: The two provisions were held to operate in different fields without repugnancy. Section 52 created a special procedure for conduct that was already punishable under the general penal law, but it did not alter the nature of the offence under the Indian Penal Code. Mere differences in compoundability, mode of institution, forum, or the presence of an additional bar under the tax law did not make the provisions inconsistent. A later special provision does not repeal an earlier general provision unless the inconsistency is unavoidable.

Conclusion: Section 52 did not impliedly repeal section 177 of the Indian Penal Code, and prosecution under both provisions was legally maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether prosecutions in respect of pending proceedings under the repealed 1922 Act were saved after repeal by section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Analysis: Repeal does not, by itself, destroy accrued liabilities, penalties, or pending proceedings unless the repealing statute manifests a contrary intention. The saving clauses in section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were not exhaustive so as to exclude the operation of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In the absence of a clear intention to extinguish prosecutions already attracted by the repealed Act, the legal proceeding could continue or be instituted as if the repeal had not occurred.

Conclusion: The prosecution under section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was saved and remained legally valid.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant could be prosecuted under both enactments for the same act or omission.

Analysis: Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permits prosecution and punishment under either or any of the enactments where the same act constitutes offences under more than one law, subject only to the prohibition against double punishment. The provision bars punishment twice for the same offence, not prosecution or conviction under both laws where the legal ingredients overlap.

Conclusion: The appellant could be prosecuted under both provisions, though he could not be punished twice for the same offence.

Issue (iv): Whether a complaint had to be filed personally by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 53 of the Income-tax Act, 1922.

Analysis: The statutory requirement was only that proceedings be taken at the instance of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. That expression was treated as meaning on his authority. The complaint filed by another officer under such authority satisfied the condition precedent, and personal filing by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was not mandatory.

Conclusion: The prosecution was not invalid for want of a complaint personally filed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.

Issue (v): Whether the choice of prosecution offended article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The prosecution scheme under the tax law was controlled by statutory safeguards, including the requirement of initiation at the instance of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the restriction arising from penalty proceedings. The discretion was therefore not arbitrary or unguided in the constitutional sense.

Conclusion: There was no violation of article 14.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on all substantial questions that were decided, and the prosecution was held to be legally maintainable under the relevant tax law and the general criminal law.

Ratio Decidendi: A special penal provision in a taxing statute does not impliedly repeal a general penal provision unless the two are irreconcilably inconsistent, and on repeal of a taxing enactment pending or accrued prosecutions survive unless the repealing statute clearly evinces a contrary intention.

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