Pending recovery proceedings under old law remain valid, and accrued appeal rights survive absent clear legislative intention.

Pending recovery proceedings initiated under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 in aid of arrears under the repealed Income-tax Act, 1922 were not converted into proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 merely because the new Act came into force or because the Tax Recovery Officer later dealt with the claim petition. Section 297(2)(j) was treated as an enabling recovery provision, not as a clear indication that existing proceedings under the old recovery machinery were extinguished. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act continued to apply, so the proceedings remained governed by the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act and the accrued statutory right of appeal to the Presidency Divisional Commissioner survived.

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Issues: Whether recovery proceedings initiated under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, by virtue of section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, stood transformed into proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 after the new Act came into force, and whether the respondents retained a maintainable right of appeal to the Presidency Divisional Commissioner.

Analysis: The proceeding had been validly initiated under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act in aid of recovery of arrears under the repealed 1922 Act. Section 297(2)(j) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was held to be an enabling provision permitting recovery under the new Act, but not evincing any intention to destroy proceedings already commenced under the old law. The repeal clause did not exclude the operation of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, and nothing in the new Act showed that pending proceedings under the old recovery machinery were transformed into proceedings under the new Act merely because the Tax Recovery Officer later dealt with the claim petition. Since the proceedings remained under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, the statutory right of appeal under that Act, which had accrued when the claim petitions were filed, continued to subsist.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not transformed into proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the respondents' appeals to the Presidency Divisional Commissioner were maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A repealing fiscal statute does not extinguish or transform pending recovery proceedings commenced under the repealed law unless the new enactment clearly manifests a contrary intention; an enabling recovery clause does not, by itself, take away an accrued statutory right of appeal under the old procedure.

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