Issues: Whether GST could be recovered for a period preceding its commencement on 08.07.2017.

Analysis: GST became operative on 08.07.2017. The respondents accepted that it was chargeable only from that date; consequently, a demand for the prior period lacked basis.

Conclusion: GST cannot be charged from the petitioner for any period before 08.07.2017.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to the GST demand order should be entertained despite an available statutory appeal, on the grounds of alleged breach of natural justice and delayed recourse to the appellate remedy.

Analysis: The record disclosed service of the show-cause notice, filing of replies by the petitioner, and grant of an opportunity of personal hearing before the demand order. The writ petition was instituted nearly one year and six months after the impugned order. The contention that the hearing was scheduled before expiry of the reply period was considered appropriate for examination in the statutory appeal.

Conclusion: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction was not warranted where an effective statutory appellate remedy was available; any application for condonation of delay may be considered by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the substituted refund formula in Rule 89(5) applies to refund applications filed after 05.07.2022 where the accumulated ITC relates to earlier periods; and (ii) whether a supplementary refund claim for a period for which an earlier NIL claim was filed may be rejected merely because no separate mechanism exists or the GST portal restricts refiling.

Issue (i): Whether the substituted refund formula in Rule 89(5) applies to refund applications filed after 05.07.2022 where the accumulated ITC relates to earlier periods.

Analysis: Notification No. 14/2022-Central Tax substituted the refund formula to permit consideration of input-service ITC. The applicable date for the substituted formula is the date of filing of the refund application, rather than the period in which the ITC accumulated. The substituted provision was treated as curative and clarificatory, and the contrary understanding in Circular No. 181/13/2022-GST could not restrict the statutory refund entitlement.

Conclusion: The amended Rule 89(5) formula applies to the refund applications filed after 05.07.2022 notwithstanding that the ITC accumulated during earlier periods; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a supplementary refund claim for a period for which an earlier NIL claim was filed may be rejected merely because no separate mechanism exists or the GST portal restricts refiling.

Analysis: Section 54 confers a substantive refund benefit, while the method of filing is procedural. Neither the show-cause notices nor the adjudication orders identified a statutory prohibition against a supplementary claim. A portal limitation or absence of a distinct supplementary-claim category cannot defeat a claim satisfying the substantive refund conditions, which must be assessed on merits.

Conclusion: A supplementary refund claim cannot be rejected solely because an earlier claim for the same period was filed or because of procedural or technological restrictions; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substituted formula and the availability of a supplementary claim preserve the entitlement to differential inverted-duty refunds where the statutory conditions and limitation requirements are met.

Ratio Decidendi: A substituted curative refund formula applies to a claim filed after its notification even where the ITC arose earlier, and absence of a filing mechanism or portal functionality cannot defeat a substantively valid refund claim.

Issues: (i) Whether recovery of the demand pending the first appeal warranted a stay because the assessment was prima facie affected by breach of the principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether the Office Memoranda stipulating payment of 20% of the demand constrained the grant of stay.

Issue (i): Whether recovery of the demand pending the first appeal warranted a stay because the assessment was prima facie affected by breach of the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The import information furnished during assessment contained only aggregated monthly particulars, with apparent repetitions, and did not provide invoice-wise or bill-of-entry-wise details despite repeated requests. The assessee supplied complete import particulars recorded in its accounts, whose aggregate exceeded the import figure relied upon for the addition. Meaningful reconciliation was therefore not possible, giving rise to a strong prima facie case of breach of the principles of natural justice. The assessment was also high-pitched, and recovery during pendency of the appeal would cause undue hardship.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, recovery of the demand was stayed until disposal of the first appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the Office Memoranda stipulating payment of 20% of the demand constrained the grant of stay.

Analysis: Administrative circulars cannot bind or curtail the Court's power to grant appropriate protection. The stipulated 20% deposit is not an inflexible requirement where the facts justify a stay.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, payment of 20% of the demand was not required as a condition for staying recovery.

Final Conclusion: The appellate authority is to decide the pending appeal expeditiously and independently on its merits, without being influenced by the prima facie observations.

Issues: Whether the assessment and consequential penalty notices were issued without an effective opportunity of hearing under the faceless assessment procedure.

Analysis: The record showed that only four working days were available for responding to the show-cause notice; the request for additional time was not communicated as accepted or rejected; and the subsequently uploaded material was not addressed. The Revenue accepted that a fresh assessment should be undertaken after affording an effective hearing.

Outcome: The assessment order and consequential penalty notices were set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh assessment.

Issues: Whether discretionary writ jurisdiction should be exercised against an assessment order when a statutory appeal is already pending.

Analysis: The pendency of the statutory appeal was treated as a ground for declining discretionary jurisdiction. No opinion was expressed on the merits, including the jurisdictional contention.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of, with a request to the appellate authority to decide the pending appeal expeditiously.

Issues: Whether the petitioner satisfied the statutory requirements for regular bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, having regard to the prima facie material, period of custody and claim of parity.

Analysis: The statutory bail threshold under Section 45 required satisfaction, inter alia, that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was not guilty. The material disclosed a specific and central role in the alleged investment scheme, including mobilisation of investments, management of connected entities and movement or use of alleged proceeds of crime. The financial and documentary material, statements recorded during investigation and the alleged disparity between represented and available cloud-storage capacity constituted prima facie material that could not be discarded at the bail stage. The evidentiary worth of that material was for trial, particularly when material witnesses remained to be examined. The custody period of about one year and seven months was insufficient, in view of the grave and structured economic-offence allegations and the stage of trial, to justify release. Parity with a woman co-accused was unavailable because her bail was granted in circumstances in which the Section 45 conditions did not apply.

Conclusion: The statutory requirements for regular bail were not satisfied; the prima facie material, pending examination of key witnesses, and the nature of the allegations did not warrant release at this stage.

Issues: (i) Taxability of construction for charitable educational trusts before and after 1 July 2012; (ii) Exemption for construction of an SEZ unit despite non-compliance with notification procedure; (iii) Taxability of construction of a public community hall under the MPLAD Scheme.

Issue (i): Taxability of construction for charitable educational trusts before and after 1 July 2012.

Analysis: For the period before 1 July 2012, construction of school buildings, college buildings and a vocational-training centre for charitable educational institutions was not construction of buildings or civil structures primarily used for commerce or industry. The applicable circular treated non-profit educational construction as non-commercial. From 1 July 2012, the claimed exemption was confined to construction services provided to Government, local authorities or government authorities; construction for charitable societies did not qualify. Registration under Section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not extend the religious-use exemption to the educational buildings.

Conclusion: The demand relating to pre-1 July 2012 educational construction is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee; the demand for post-1 July 2012 construction is sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Exemption for construction of an SEZ unit despite non-compliance with notification procedure.

Analysis: Construction of the building for the SEZ unit was covered by the statutory SEZ exemption under Section 26 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 read with Rule 30 of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006. The overriding effect of the special law meant that procedural non-compliance with Notification No. 17/2011-ST could not defeat the statutory exemption.

Conclusion: Service-tax exemption for SEZ-unit construction is available, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Taxability of construction of a public community hall under the MPLAD Scheme.

Analysis: The Nirmithi Kendra structure was a community hall constructed for the District Collector under the centrally funded MPLAD Scheme. It created a durable public-purpose asset for unrestricted public use and was not construction in furtherance of business or commercial purposes.

Conclusion: Demand for construction of the Nirmithi Kendra community hall is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Tax liability survives only for the post-1 July 2012 educational-trust construction; the pre-1 July 2012 educational works, SEZ construction and community-hall construction remain exempt.

Issues: Whether a merits adjudication must be afforded despite delay where the show-cause notice was uploaded on an additional notices portal and no personal hearing was notified.

Analysis: The show-cause notice was made available on the additional notices portal, creating a genuine possibility that it was overlooked. The personal-hearing column was marked as not applicable, and the original order was passed without considering a response or supporting documents. In these circumstances, rejection solely on limitation would deny an effective opportunity of hearing and offend the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The petitioners must be permitted to file their response and supporting documents, and the matter must be adjudicated afresh on merits without limitation being used to reject their contentions.

Issues: Whether a successive writ petition challenging the same adjudication order is maintainable after an earlier writ petition was withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, particularly where the statutory appellate remedy was not timely pursued.

Analysis: The earlier writ petitions and the present petition substantially sought to challenge the same adjudication order. The first petition had been withdrawn without permission to institute a fresh petition. Applying the public-policy principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, withdrawal without such liberty constitutes abandonment of the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of that cause of action. A subsequent petition cannot be sustained merely by urging altered grounds for identical relief. The statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was also available, and the unexplained delay of approximately one year in initially invoking writ jurisdiction weighed against its exercise.

Conclusion: The successive writ petition challenging the same adjudication order was not maintainable.

Issues: Whether coercive steps for recovery of alleged GST liability could be taken during the continuing inspection/search while the writ petition remains pending.

Analysis: The ongoing inspection/search and the dispute concerning pressure to discharge liability warranted interim protection with reference to the applicable investigation guidelines. Normal business activities were directed to remain permissible pending further consideration.

Outcome: Notice issued; no coercive steps for discharge of liability may be taken during the inspection/search until the returnable date.

Issues: (i) Whether the revised anti-profiteering computation, after adjustment of reversed unutilised input tax credit, established an amount required to be passed on to recipients? (ii) Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applied to the period from 01.07.2017 to 31.03.2019?

Issue (i): Whether the revised anti-profiteering computation, after adjustment of reversed unutilised input tax credit, established an amount required to be passed on to recipients?

Analysis: Section 171(1) requires the benefit of input tax credit to be passed to recipients through commensurate reduction in prices. The unutilised input tax credit of Rs. 5,26,200 reversed by the assessee was excluded from the calculation, leaving net post-GST credit of Rs. 57,68,679 and an additional credit benefit of 2.20%. The revised computation based on that net benefit was supported by the record. Rule 133(3)(b) requires return of the amount not passed on, with interest at 18% from collection until return.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: profiteering of Rs. 2,34,671, with GST of Rs. 28,161, totalling Rs. 2,62,832, was determined and must be passed on to eligible recipients with interest at 18%.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applied to the period from 01.07.2017 to 31.03.2019?

Analysis: The penal provision came into force on 01.01.2020, after the entire period under investigation had ended.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: no penalty under Section 171(3A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is imposable.

Final Conclusion: The liability is confined to restitution of the net input-tax-credit benefit, together with statutory interest, while no penal consequence arises for the pre-commencement period.

Ratio Decidendi: An anti-profiteering determination must be based on net available input tax credit after accounting for reversals, and a penalty provision cannot be imposed for conduct occurring before its commencement.

Issues: Whether the cost of Rs. 10,00,000 imposed as a condition for restoration of the company's name was proportionate and sustainable under Rule 87A(4)(c) of the NCLT Amendment Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 87A(4)(c) permits recovery of the Registrar of Companies' costs occasioned by the restoration appeal or application, unless otherwise directed. As such costs carry a penal consequence, their quantification must bear a rational correlation to the actual costs incurred and must reflect a determination supporting the amount imposed. The company's prolonged failure to file financial statements, annual returns and income-tax returns was a serious statutory lapse, and ignorance or oversight could not excuse that default. However, the record disclosed no computation, determination, or rational basis supporting the quantified cost of Rs. 10,00,000.

Conclusion: The cost of Rs. 10,00,000 was disproportionate and was reduced to Rs. 5,00,000.

Issues: (i) Whether a direct appeal against an interim status quo order is maintainable without first seeking its vacation or modification before the forum that issued it; (ii) Whether the interim status quo order and the fixed-deposit arrangement should continue pending determination of the winding-up petition.

Issue (i): Whether a direct appeal against an interim status quo order is maintainable without first seeking its vacation or modification before the forum that issued it.

Analysis: The principle of exhaustion of alternative remedies requires the party aggrieved by an interim protective order to first seek its vacation or modification from the issuing forum. No such recourse was taken before invoking appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The direct appeal was not maintainable at this stage, in favour of the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether the interim status quo order and the fixed-deposit arrangement should continue pending determination of the winding-up petition.

Analysis: The material disclosed intricate factual disputes concerning share transfers and ownership, while the company records did not establish operational business activity or current transactions for several years. A prima facie case existed for discretionary status quo relief to preserve the subject matter and prevent further complications pending adjudication. The placement of idle funds in an interest-bearing fixed deposit similarly protected the parties' interests.

Conclusion: The status quo order and the fixed-deposit arrangement shall continue pending the winding-up petition, in favour of the respondents.

Final Conclusion: The protective interim regime remains operative pending expeditious adjudication of the underlying winding-up petition.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate challenge to an interim protective order is premature where the aggrieved party has not first sought its vacation or modification before the issuing forum, particularly where status quo is necessary to preserve the subject matter pending merits.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies retroactively to applications filed under Sections 94 or 95 that were pending when the amendment took effect; (ii) Whether recovery, auction and appellate proceedings could be restrained or withheld by invoking an interim moratorium that ceased under Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (iii) Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal could order interim restoration of possession of a secured asset on alleged oral directions and without applying the requisite interim-relief tests; (iv) Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal could restrain acceptance of auction consideration and issuance of sale certificates without hearing auction purchasers or recording reasons for interim relief.

Issue (i): Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies retroactively to applications filed under Sections 94 or 95 that were pending when the amendment took effect.

Analysis: Sections 94 and 95 commence the individual insolvency process, while the resolution professional examines the application under Section 99 and the adjudicating authority admits or rejects it under Section 100. The interval before an order under Section 100 is procedural and transitory; the interim moratorium under Section 96 does not confer an absolute or indefeasible vested right upon a debtor. Section 96(4), effective from 26.05.2026, was enacted to suppress identified misuse of pre-admission moratorium by personal guarantors to corporate debtors. The Mischief Rule and the distinction between retrospective and retroactive operation required the amendment to govern ongoing procedural stages without impairing vested rights.

Conclusion: Section 96(4) operates from 26.05.2026 and applies retroactively to qualifying applications pending on that date; the interim moratorium in such proceedings ceased from that date. This issue is decided against the beneficiaries of the interim moratorium.

Issue (ii): Whether recovery, auction and appellate proceedings could be restrained or withheld by invoking an interim moratorium that ceased under Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 96(1)(b)(ii) does not oust the jurisdiction of a competent court or tribunal; at most, a creditor proceeding during an operative interim moratorium remains inchoate and ineffective, rather than void. Once Section 96(4) applied to pending proceedings, neither a dismissed insolvency application nor a subsequently registered pending application could sustain restraints on recovery actions, auction processes, appellate proceedings, or execution of possession orders under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

Conclusion: Recovery, auction, appellate and possession proceedings could not be restrained or withheld on the basis of an interim moratorium that had ceased under Section 96(4). This issue is decided against the borrowers and guarantors.

Issue (iii): Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal could order interim restoration of possession of a secured asset on alleged oral directions and without applying the requisite interim-relief tests.

Analysis: Interim directions affecting possession must be supported by a written contemporaneous order recording reasons on prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Alleged oral directions had no recorded basis, and there was no finding that the borrowers satisfied the requirements for either protecting or restoring possession. An interim restoration order was particularly untenable where the tribunal itself recognised that restoration of mortgaged property is ordinarily unavailable at the interim stage.

Conclusion: No. The interim restoration order was unsustainable, and possession was required to revert to the secured creditor. This issue is decided against the borrowers and guarantors.

Issue (iv): Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal could restrain acceptance of auction consideration and issuance of sale certificates without hearing auction purchasers or recording reasons for interim relief.

Analysis: Directions preventing receipt of the balance auction amount and issuance of sale certificates materially prejudiced auction purchasers who had not been heard. The orders contained no analysis of prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable injury and were inconsistent with the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: No. Such unreasoned restraints, issued without hearing the affected auction purchasers, were unsustainable. This issue is decided against the borrowers and guarantors.

Final Conclusion: Section 96(4) removes the pre-admission interim-moratorium protection for personal guarantors to corporate debtors in qualifying pending proceedings, and creditor enforcement measures cannot be obstructed through procedurally unsupported interim orders.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment that removes a transitory procedural shield, creates no vested right, and is enacted to suppress demonstrated misuse applies retroactively from its commencement to pending proceedings unless the statutory language indicates otherwise.

Issues: Whether a post-admission settlement before constitution of the Committee of Creditors permits the Appellate Tribunal to set aside a Section 9 admission order and terminate the corporate insolvency resolution process under Rule 11, instead of following Section 12A.

Analysis: The amended Section 12A prescribes the statutory mechanism for withdrawal of an admitted insolvency application through an application by the resolution professional, subject to the conditions and restrictions in that provision. Its non-obstante restriction applies to withdrawal before constitution of the Committee of Creditors and after issuance of the first invitation for resolution plans. A settlement reached after commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process, even with the operational creditor's consent and before constitution of the Committee of Creditors, does not by itself efface the admission order or permit bypass of that statutory mechanism.

Conclusion: The request to directly set aside the admission order under Rule 11 could not be granted. The settlement may be placed by the interim resolution professional before the Adjudicating Authority through an appropriate application under Section 12A for consideration in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether fresh adjudication was warranted for want of an effective opportunity of hearing; (ii) Whether ITC could be rejected solely on a GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch and whether relevant supplier certificates could be considered; (iii) Whether CGST and SGST input tax credit was lawful for an intra-State renting supply where the supplier reported and paid IGST.

Issue (i): Whether fresh adjudication was warranted for want of an effective opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: Although notices had been issued at the appellate stage, the record showed that the assessee's ability to participate in the proceedings had been disrupted by grave personal circumstances, and the adjudication had proceeded without an effective hearing. An opportunity to present the case was required in furtherance of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: Fresh adjudication after affording an effective opportunity of hearing was warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether ITC could be rejected solely on a GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch and whether relevant supplier certificates could be considered.

Analysis: Section 16 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governs input tax credit eligibility, while the burden of proof under Section 155 remains on the claimant. A GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch alone does not establish inadmissibility of ITC. The reconciliation, supplier reporting errors, B2B/B2C reporting discrepancies, reverse charge mechanism credit, unclaimed credit, and subsequent reversals require category-wise and invoice-wise verification. CBIC Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022 applies to pending proceedings for the relevant period; supplier certificates relating to the disputed financial year are admissible for verification notwithstanding their later issuance.

Conclusion: ITC cannot be rejected solely on the basis of a GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch; the supplier certificates must be considered, and the remaining ITC eligibility must be determined through category-wise and invoice-wise verification. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether CGST and SGST input tax credit was lawful for an intra-State renting supply where the supplier reported and paid IGST.

Analysis: Under Section 12(3) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the place of supply of renting of immovable property is the location of that property. As the supplier and property were in the same State, the supply was intra-State under Section 8(2) of that Act and attracted CGST and SGST. The supplier's reporting and payment under the IGST head was a tax-head error and did not cause revenue loss.

Conclusion: The CGST and SGST input tax credit for the identified intra-State renting supply was lawful, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed ITC claim requires fresh verification on the applicable statutory conditions and supporting records, while the identified tax-head discrepancy does not invalidate the corresponding credit.

Ratio Decidendi: For the initial GST period, a GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch alone cannot establish ineligible ITC; the claimant must discharge the burden of proof, and eligibility must be determined through verification of the underlying invoices and evidence under the applicable statutory conditions.

Issues: Whether the proviso to Section 112(8), requiring a 10% pre-deposit of penalty in a penalty-only appeal, applies to proceedings initiated before its effective date.

Analysis: The right of appeal is a substantive right that vests when the lis commences. A later amendment imposing a fresh pre-deposit burden cannot apply to proceedings already instituted unless the legislature has expressly or necessarily provided for retrospective operation. The show-cause notice was issued before the proviso became effective, and the provision governing such proceedings at their commencement did not require a pre-deposit for a penalty-only appeal. The corresponding treatment of pre-deposit requirements under Section 107(6) supported the same construction.

Conclusion: The proviso to Section 112(8) does not apply to the appeal arising from the pre-amendment proceedings; no 10% penalty pre-deposit was payable.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer statutory limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders and restoring the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from pursuing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer statutory limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107 prescribes a three-month period for appeal and permits condonation only within the further period expressly fixed by Section 107(4). The equitable and extraordinary jurisdiction exercisable by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot enlarge the statutory jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law, and the Authority could not assume a power of condonation withheld by the statute.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; the condonation orders were ultra vires and coram non judice. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders and restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, after which the taxpayers resumed business and the registrations remained active. Annulment at that stage would unsettle intervening genuine transactions and related input-tax-credit consequences. Since the Department had acted upon the orders, no effective or workable appellate relief could be granted.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the appeals after implementing the impugned orders and restoring the registrations. This issue is decided in favour of the taxpayers.

Issue (iii): Whether failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from pursuing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The common portal did not permit applications for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period. The statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 is independent, and inability or failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23 does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through appeal.

Conclusion: Failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from availing the statutory appellate remedy, subject to its prescribed limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the taxpayers.

Final Conclusion: Although the First Appellate Authority could not lawfully extend the statutory limitation, the Department's completed implementation of the restoration orders precluded it from obtaining appellate relief in these matters.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot invoke equitable considerations or High Court orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to condone delay beyond an express statutory outer limit.