Fly ash collection MOU dispute over reduced allotment percentages and alleged diversion; writ relief denied, cuts upheld.

Writ relief under Article 226 was refused because the MOU governing fly ash collection was purely contractual and not "statutory" in character: the environmental notification required utilisation of fly ash but did not mandate allotment to any private party or any fixed percentage, and the competing claims on "poor take-off" versus diversion raised disputed questions of fact unsuitable for writ adjudication; the HC therefore declined interference and dismissed the petitions. Promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation were rejected since no enforceable assurance of fixed quantities was shown, the MOU contemplated review/penalty for short lifting, and overriding public interest in preventing environmental hazard justified reduction; consequently, the reductions were upheld. Natural justice, non-speaking order, and mala fides challenges failed because prior communications evidenced notice, the counter affidavit merely furnished particulars of the stated reason, and third-party allotment was not shown to vitiate the decision; the contractual percentage and period reductions were sustained.

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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether relief under Article 226 could be granted when the dispute arises from an MOU for collection of fly ash, including whether the MOU is "statutory" in character and whether the controversy involves impermissible disputed questions of fact.

(ii) Whether the reduction of the allotted percentage (and, for one petitioner, reduction of the contractual period) was liable to be set aside on grounds of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation, arbitrariness, mala fides, or violation of principles of natural justice, including the objection that the order was a non-speaking order whose reasons were impermissibly supplemented later.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Maintainability under Article 226; nature of the MOU; disputed questions of fact

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined whether the MOU could be treated as statutory by reason of an environmental notification directing thermal power plants to phase out dumping/disposal of fly ash, and applied the principle that a contract is not "statutory" merely because it is entered into by a statutory body or in the context of public utility functions.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the environmental notification only directed power plants to ensure utilisation/disposal of fly ash within the phased timelines, but did not mandate any particular mode of disposal or compel allotment to any particular private entity at any fixed percentage. The MOU's terms (including percentage allocation, review/penalty mechanisms, and operational conditions) were treated as contractual arrangements independent of any statutory compulsion. Consequently, the MOU could not be "elevated" to a statutory instrument. The Court further found that the parties' rival stands on "poor take-off" versus alleged diversion of quantities raised substantial disputed questions of fact requiring evidence beyond affidavits, making Article 226 an inappropriate forum for adjudication of such factual controversies.

Conclusions: The MOU was held to be non-statutory; contractual disputes about performance and implementation, involving strong disputed questions of fact, were not fit for resolution in writ jurisdiction. On the "peculiar facts", the Court declined interference under Article 226.

Issue (ii): Validity of reduction-promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation, natural justice, non-speaking order, and mala fides

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered the equitable nature of promissory estoppel, including that it cannot compel a public authority where equity/public interest demands otherwise, and treated legitimate expectation as an Article 14-related consideration that does not by itself create an enforceable right. It also addressed whether reasons in an administrative order can be "improved" by a counter affidavit, and whether prior notice/natural justice requirements were satisfied on the facts.

Interpretation and reasoning: On promissory estoppel, the Court found no promise akin to an incentive/benefit held out to induce industrial development; rather, the arrangement allowed collection of fly ash without payment for the fly ash itself, subject to conditions including installation of collection systems at the petitioner's cost which would become the respondent's property. The Court held that equity and public interest-here, prevention of environmental hazard from uncleared fly ash-were central, and the respondent's case (supported by data/communications) was that the petitioners consistently failed to clear the allotted quantity, compelling slurry conversion and alternative clearance measures. Given this asserted overriding public interest and the contractual clause providing for review/penalty for short collection, the Court rejected the plea that reduction was barred by promissory estoppel.

On legitimate expectation, the Court held that the MOU did not assure any fixed month-wise or year-wise quantity and that availability would vary with generation; therefore, the petitioners could not claim an enforceable expectation against reduction, especially when they did not establish necessity of the full allotted quantity for their own use and the dispute centred on short lifting. The Court also found no violation of natural justice: the respondent had, through multiple letters, informed the petitioners of poor off-take and proposed action, and the impugned order was therefore not treated as passed without notice.

Regarding the "non-speaking order / supplementation of reasons" objection, the Court held that the sole reason in the impugned order was "poor take-off" and that the counter affidavit merely provided particulars amplifying the same reason rather than introducing new reasons; hence, the challenge failed. On mala fides tied to allotment of 25% to a third party, the Court rejected the allegation because the reduction was supported by the finding of consistent failure to clear the allotted quota, and the third party's allotment was viewed as addressing clearance requirements unmet by the petitioners; the allotment itself was also not directly challenged. For the petitioner engaged in collection/sale to third parties, the Court additionally held that it failed to perform clearance as expected, and that reducing the period to align with others and reducing the percentage did not warrant interference given the MOU's review/penalty framework.

Conclusions: The Court conclusively rejected promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, found no breach of natural justice, held the reason was not impermissibly supplemented, and found no mala fides warranting intervention. The impugned reductions (including reduction of the period for one petitioner to achieve uniformity) were upheld, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

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