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Issues: (i) whether the cancellation of the cinema permission was an order of the Commissioner or merely an intimation of the Government's order, (ii) whether Rule 250 vested in the Commissioner the power and duty to consider cancellation of the licence, and (iii) whether relief in the nature of mandamus could be granted under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act on the facts, including compliance with the demand-and-denial requirement.
Issue (i): whether the cancellation of the cinema permission was an order of the Commissioner or merely an intimation of the Government's order.
Analysis: Public orders made by a statutory authority must be construed objectively from their language and surrounding circumstances, and cannot be explained away by later affidavits as to what the officer intended. The communication withdrawing the permission did not state that the Commissioner was acting on his own authority; its wording, the prior correspondence, and the subsequent reply all showed that the Commissioner was transmitting Government's decision rather than exercising an independent power of cancellation.
Conclusion: The cancellation was not the Commissioner's own order but an intimation of an order made by the Government.
Issue (ii): whether Rule 250 vested in the Commissioner the power and duty to consider cancellation of the licence.
Analysis: The rules regulating places of public amusement showed that the Commissioner alone was the authority empowered to grant, refuse, suspend, or cancel the licence. Rule 250 conferred an absolute discretion to cancel or suspend any licence already granted, but that discretion was vested in the Commissioner and in no other authority. Because the power was conferred for public reasons affecting safety, convenience, morality, and welfare, the grant of the power carried with it a duty to exercise an independent judgment when cancellation was called for.
Conclusion: The power to cancel existed under Rule 250, but it could be exercised only by the Commissioner in his own discretion, and the occasion required him to apply that discretion himself.
Issue (iii): whether relief in the nature of mandamus could be granted under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act on the facts, including compliance with the demand-and-denial requirement.
Analysis: Section 45 permits a specific command only where there is a legal duty to do or forbear from doing a specific act and where no other specific and adequate remedy exists. A duty may arise where an enabling power conferred for public benefit is coupled with an obligation to act when the occasion demands. Here, the Commissioner had to decide the objections for himself, and the applicant was not left with an adequate alternative remedy by merely ignoring the order or by a suit for injunction, given the practical consequences and delay involved. The correspondence also showed a substantial demand for justice and a denial in substance, satisfying section 46.
Conclusion: A mandamus was maintainable to compel the Commissioner to consider the matter himself and exercise his own discretion under Rule 250.
Final Conclusion: The appeal substantially failed, but the operative relief was modified so that the Commissioner was directed to reconsider the request and pass a definite order in the lawful exercise of his own discretion.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a public authority is vested with an absolute discretion for public benefit, the power is coupled with a duty to consider and decide the matter independently when the occasion arises, and a court may compel that exercise of discretion by mandamus if no other specific and adequate remedy exists.