Issues: (i) Whether the resolution applicant's non-disclosure of pending proceedings and attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act rendered it ineligible or vitiated the resolution plan under Section 29A and Regulation 39(1)(c); (ii) Whether interference with the Committee of Creditors' approval of the resolution plan was warranted on alleged deficiencies in feasibility, valuation, source of funds, and treatment of the appellant's claimed secured-creditor status.

Issue (i): Whether the resolution applicant's non-disclosure of pending proceedings and attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act rendered it ineligible or vitiated the resolution plan under Section 29A and Regulation 39(1)(c).

Analysis: Section 29A(d) prescribes ineligibility on the basis of the specified conviction, not merely the pendency of an inquiry, investigation, criminal proceeding, or attachment action. Although attachment of proceeds of crime is civil in form, it is connected with alleged criminal activity; nevertheless, attachment or pending proceedings alone do not establish the statutory disqualification. Regulation 39(1)(c) must be harmoniously read with Section 29A. The Committee of Creditors was apprised of the proceedings, deferred voting, obtained an independent eligibility assessment, deliberated on the disclosures and feasibility of the plan, and approved it after being fully informed. Any omission consequently did not establish a material irregularity affecting the integrity of the resolution process.

Conclusion: The pending proceedings and alleged non-disclosure did not render the resolution applicant ineligible or invalidate the resolution plan. The issue is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether interference with the Committee of Creditors' approval of the resolution plan was warranted on alleged deficiencies in feasibility, valuation, source of funds, and treatment of the appellant's claimed secured-creditor status.

Analysis: Judicial review of a plan approved by the requisite majority is confined to statutory non-compliance under Section 30(2) and the limited appellate grounds under Section 61(3); it does not permit substitution of the Committee of Creditors' commercial wisdom on feasibility, viability, valuation, or funding arrangements. The plan disclosed its funding sources and payment structure. Appointment of a third valuer is discretionary under Regulation 35(1)(b), and a plan need not match liquidation value. The appellant's secured-creditor status remained sub judice, while the plan provided for automatic modification of distribution among secured financial creditors if that status is ultimately recognised, adequately safeguarding the claimed entitlement.

Conclusion: No reviewable statutory non-compliance or material irregularity justified interference with the Committee of Creditors' approval of the plan. The issue is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The approved resolution plan remains operative, and any eventual recognition of the appellant as a secured financial creditor is to be accommodated through the plan's stipulated distribution-adjustment mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: Pending criminal proceedings or attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act do not, absent a statutory conviction-based disqualification or a material irregularity affecting the integrity of the insolvency process, invalidate a resolution plan approved by an informed Committee of Creditors; feasibility and viability remain within its commercial wisdom subject to the limited statutory review.

Issues: (i) Whether the arbitral award dated 23.03.2017 extinguished the continuing guarantee or converted the personal guarantor into a co-borrower; (ii) Whether the financial creditor retained locus standi under Section 95 notwithstanding the alleged assignment of debt and sale of secured property by an asset reconstruction company; (iii) Whether the MOU and third-party assumption of the corporate debtor's liabilities released the personal guarantor; (iv) Whether an alleged restructuring or variation discharged the guarantor under Section 133 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (v) Whether the Section 95 petition was barred by limitation; and (vi) Whether the alleged contractual cap and dispute as to quantum prevented admission of the Section 95 petition.

Issue (i): Whether the arbitral award dated 23.03.2017 extinguished the continuing guarantee or converted the personal guarantor into a co-borrower.

Analysis: The arbitral award provided a revised repayment arrangement for existing liabilities, but neither cancelled the guarantee nor created a fresh borrowing arrangement. Its terms preserved liability upon default, and no substituted contract, fresh loan documentation, or express release of the guarantor was established. The irrevocable and continuing character of the guarantee remained operative until full repayment.

Conclusion: The arbitral award did not novate or extinguish the guarantee, and the guarantor did not become a co-borrower.

Issue (ii): Whether the financial creditor retained locus standi under Section 95 notwithstanding the alleged assignment of debt and sale of secured property by an asset reconstruction company.

Analysis: Assignment by other consortium lenders did not prove assignment of the financial creditor's independent share of debt. No assignment instrument executed by the financial creditor was produced. Enforcement and sale of security by the asset reconstruction company could arise from rights assigned by other lenders and did not establish transfer or satisfaction of the financial creditor's claim. A surety's liability remains co-extensive with that of the principal debtor unless the debt is fully satisfied or the surety is released.

Conclusion: The financial creditor retained locus standi to invoke the guarantee and commence proceedings under Section 95.

Issue (iii): Whether the MOU and third-party assumption of the corporate debtor's liabilities released the personal guarantor.

Analysis: A third party's undertaking to discharge the corporate debtor's liabilities and payments made under that arrangement did not amount to an express release of the guarantor or establish full satisfaction of the financial creditor's debt. No binding substitution of the guarantor's obligations was shown.

Conclusion: The MOU and third-party payments did not discharge the personal guarantor.

Issue (iv): Whether an alleged restructuring or variation discharged the guarantor under Section 133 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 133 requires a variation between the creditor and principal debtor without the surety's consent. The alleged restructuring concerned debts assigned by other lenders, with no evidence that the financial creditor participated in a variation of its own contract. The guarantee also provided that variations, modifications, or releases of security would not affect the guarantor's liability.

Conclusion: No variation by the financial creditor was proved that could discharge the guarantor under Section 133.

Issue (v): Whether the Section 95 petition was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The subsequent default following the demand notice of July 2020 occurred in September 2020, and the Section 95 petition was filed in May 2023, within three years of that default. The timely filing conclusion did not depend solely on treating payments under the arbitral award as an acknowledgement.

Conclusion: The Section 95 petition was within limitation.

Issue (vi): Whether the alleged contractual cap and dispute as to quantum prevented admission of the Section 95 petition.

Analysis: The guarantee terms extended to interest, charges, costs, and consequential liabilities in addition to the principal amount. At the admission stage, a dispute over computation did not negate the established debt and default. Recoveries from the corporate debtor, co-sureties, or securities must be credited in final determination, preventing double recovery.

Conclusion: The dispute concerning the contractual cap and quantum did not invalidate admission of the Section 95 petition.

Final Conclusion: The statutory basis for commencing the personal insolvency resolution process against the guarantor remained established, and the admission order was not shown to suffer from legal or material error.

Issues: Entitlement of the applicants to regular bail for offences under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The applicants had remained in custody for approximately 18 to 20 months. The prosecution case involved a voluminous charge-sheet and numerous proposed witnesses, making an early commencement and conclusion of trial unlikely. The maximum sentence was seven years. Parity with a co-accused already enlarged on bail, prolonged pre-trial detention, and the constitutional right to speedy trial justified bail notwithstanding the statutory twin conditions. The apprehensions of absconding, reoffending, and interference with investigation could be addressed through stringent bail conditions, including deposit of passports, periodic reporting, and restrictions on travel and witness contact.

Conclusion: The applicants are entitled to regular bail subject to stringent conditions.

Issues: Whether the appellant's pending application under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, alleging collusive initiation of insolvency proceedings and asserting likely prejudice to its proprietary interests, was required to be decided before a final decision on the financial creditor's Section 7 application.

Analysis: Although the appellant was not a party to the Section 7 proceedings, it had filed an interlocutory application seeking intervention and challenging the proceedings as collusive. The application raised concerns that the corporate debtor's non-participation could affect the appellant's rights in the sugar factory and its assets. In the peculiar circumstances, procedural fairness required adjudication of that application before the company petition could be finally determined.

Conclusion: The appellant's interlocutory application under Section 60(5) must be decided within three months, if not already decided, before any final order is passed on the Section 7 company petition.

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded during investigation were admissible without compliance with Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944; (ii) Whether data retrieved from CPUs, computers and pen drives was admissible without compliance with Section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944; and (iii) Whether the charge of clandestine manufacture and clearance and the consequent duty demand were sustainable on the evidence available.

Issue (i): Whether statements recorded during investigation were admissible without compliance with Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 9D prescribes mandatory conditions for treating investigation statements as evidence. Unless the exceptional circumstances under Section 9D(1)(a) exist, the maker must be examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority, the statement must be admitted by a reasoned determination, and the assessee must have an opportunity for cross-examination. The relied-upon witnesses were neither examined in chief nor offered for cross-examination.

Conclusion: The investigation statements were inadmissible and could not be relied upon to sustain the demand, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether data retrieved from CPUs, computers and pen drives was admissible without compliance with Section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Computer printouts and data retrieved from electronic devices require fulfilment of the conditions in Section 36B(2) and a certificate under Section 36B(4) identifying the record and device, the manner of production, and the relevant operational conditions. The data was not supported by the prescribed certificate or compliance with the statutory conditions.

Conclusion: The retrieved electronic data and printouts were inadmissible for proving clandestine clearances, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the charge of clandestine manufacture and clearance and the consequent duty demand were sustainable on the evidence available.

Analysis: Clandestine manufacture and removal require tangible, cogent and independently corroborated evidence, including proof of unaccounted raw materials, actual removal and transport, identified buyers, receipt of sale proceeds, manufacturing capacity, excess electricity consumption, and deployment of labour where relevant. After exclusion of the inadmissible statements and electronic material, no such independent evidence established the alleged clearances.

Conclusion: The charge of clandestine manufacture and clearance, the duty demand, and the consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: An excise liability for alleged clandestine removal cannot rest on investigation statements and electronic records that fail statutory admissibility requirements, without independent corroborative proof of manufacture and clearance.

Ratio Decidendi: In central excise adjudication, investigation statements and computer-generated records can support a demand only upon compliance with the mandatory evidentiary safeguards in Sections 9D and 36B; absent such compliance and independent corroboration, clandestine-removal allegations fail.

Issues: Whether penalty for failure to obtain an audit of accounts was leviable on a State-funded university whose income was exempt.

Analysis: Section 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires audit of accounts in prescribed circumstances, while Section 271B provides for penalty for non-compliance. The university was substantially funded by the State Government, existed solely for educational purposes, and its income was exempt under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In these circumstances, the audit requirement under Section 44AB did not apply so as to attract penalty under Section 271B.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not leviable and was directed to be deleted.

Issues: Whether a separate transfer-pricing adjustment for notional interest on outstanding trade receivables is warranted where the assessee is completely debt-free and incurs no interest cost on borrowings.

Analysis: Although outstanding trade receivables may require separate benchmarking under the transfer-pricing framework, imputing interest is unwarranted where the assessee has no interest-bearing borrowings and delayed recovery creates no additional financing burden. The claimed debt-free status during the relevant previous year required verification from the financial statements and other relevant records.

Conclusion: No separate transfer-pricing adjustment for notional interest on outstanding trade receivables is warranted if verification establishes that the assessee was completely debt-free during the relevant previous year; the adjustment must then be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the Registrar could wind up the co-operative society on the Reserve Bank's requisition without complying with the statutory procedure and principles of natural justice under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983; (ii) Whether a member could challenge the winding-up order notwithstanding the society's liquidation.

Issue (i): Whether the Registrar could wind up the co-operative society on the Reserve Bank's requisition without complying with the statutory procedure and principles of natural justice under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983.

Analysis: Section 145 required prior sanction of the Reserve Bank for action concerning an insured co-operative bank, but did not confer an independent power upon the Reserve Bank to direct winding up or enable the Registrar to disregard the procedure under Section 99. A winding-up order under Section 99(1) required the prescribed statutory foundation, including a valid inspection under Section 92, and the inspection report or its summary had to be communicated to the affected society. The inspection report was neither produced nor shown to have been served upon the actual stakeholders; the resulting adverse inference established non-compliance with the mandatory procedure.

Analysis: The elected board had been unlawfully superseded when the inspection and the Reserve Bank proceedings occurred. No effective opportunity was afforded to the affected members before the winding-up order. Although Section 99 did not expressly provide for a hearing, natural justice and audi alteram partem were implicit because winding up entailed grave civil consequences. The Registrar's unreasoned adoption of the Reserve Bank's requisition, without recording an independent opinion under Section 99, was arbitrary and offended Article 14.

Conclusion: The winding-up order was invalid for non-compliance with the statutory procedure and principles of natural justice, and was quashed in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether a member could challenge the winding-up order notwithstanding the society's liquidation.

Analysis: Entry 13 of the Third Schedule expressly permits any member of a co-operative society to appeal against a winding-up order under Section 99. Requiring a member to challenge the winding up through the liquidator, whose own appointment was under challenge, would defeat that statutory right and offend the rule against a person being a judge in their own cause.

Conclusion: A member was entitled to challenge the winding-up order notwithstanding liquidation of the society, in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The orders affirming the liquidation were set aside; the society was restored as a co-operative credit society, without authority to conduct banking business, while leaving the Registrar free to take fresh action in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A Reserve Bank requisition concerning an insured co-operative bank does not dispense with the Registrar's statutory duty to satisfy the conditions for winding up and to afford procedural fairness; non-service of the foundational inspection report, denial of a meaningful hearing, and absence of recorded reasons render the winding-up order invalid.

Issues: Whether the Revenue's appeals against the refund-sanction orders were barred by limitation under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(2) requires an appeal authorised by the Commissioner to be filed within six months from communication of the adjudicating authority's order, with condonation under Section 107(4) confined to a further one month. For intra-departmental communication, the date of communication is the date of issuance of the refund order; an internal delay in transmitting the order to the reviewing authority cannot defer limitation. The online review mechanism, post-audit timelines and mandatory portal-based service reinforce that the period cannot remain indeterminate. The availability of separate recovery proceedings for erroneous refund does not enlarge the statutory limitation for an appeal, and the delay in the present appeals exceeded the condonable period.

Conclusion: The Revenue's appeals were time-barred, and the appellate authority lacked jurisdiction to condone the delay or sustain the consequential reversal of the refunds. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether revision under section 263 could be invoked for failure to examine the allowability of loss on sale of assets in a limited-scrutiny assessment.

Analysis: In a limited-scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer's enquiry is confined to the specific issues selected for verification unless the scrutiny is lawfully converted into complete scrutiny. The selected issues concerned high liabilities as compared with low income and agricultural income. The loss on sale of assets had no established nexus with either issue: its allowability did not concern verification of liabilities, and it was not shown to relate to agricultural activity or agricultural income. There was no material showing conversion of the limited scrutiny into complete scrutiny. Accordingly, the deeming provisions in Explanation 2(a) and 2(b) to section 263(1) could apply only to enquiries falling within the lawful scope of the limited-scrutiny assessment.

Conclusion: The revision under section 263 was unsustainable; the revisional order was set aside and the original assessment order was restored.

Issues: Whether revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be invoked regarding cash deposits where the Assessing Officer had already examined the issue during assessment.

Analysis: Revision under Section 263 is unavailable merely because the Principal Commissioner takes another view where the assessment record demonstrates that the relevant issue was examined. The factual finding that the Assessing Officer had considered the cash deposits in detail during assessment supported the conclusion that the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on that issue.

Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the cash deposits was impermissible; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the noticees' futures and options trading prima facie amounted to cross-segment price manipulation and fraudulent or unfair trade practices; (ii) whether the directors were prima facie vicariously liable and jointly and severally accountable for impounding of the companies' alleged wrongful gains; and (iii) whether urgent interim protective directions were warranted pending investigation.

Analysis: The trading pattern showed repeated placement of aggressive futures buy orders above the last traded price and sell orders below it, alongside substantially larger, sentimentally opposite options positions. Inexecutable futures orders were allegedly used to create artificial order-book depth and cancelled after favourable execution of options orders. The resulting futures losses and significantly greater options gains, together with concentrated trading, recurring intraday sequencing, and the shift of activity to a connected entity, prima facie indicated manipulation of derivatives prices rather than hedging, arbitrage, speculation, or genuine profit-oriented trading. This conduct was prima facie found to attract the prohibitions on fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative dealings in securities.

Analysis: The directors in charge of the respective companies during the relevant period were prima facie treated as vicariously liable. Given their central role in the companies' operations and the alleged common scheme, the respective directors were held jointly and severally accountable with each company for impounding the wrongful gains attributed to that company.

Analysis: The repetitive and continuing nature of the alleged conduct, the magnitude of the prima facie wrongful gains, and the need to preserve market integrity and prevent dissipation of gains established a prima facie case and balance of convenience for immediate preventive action under the securities law framework.

Outcome: Ex parte interim market-access restraints, impounding and asset-preservation directions, disclosure obligations, and cooperation requirements were imposed pending detailed investigation, with an opportunity to file objections and seek a personal hearing.

Outcome: The rejection of the GST registration application was quashed and the matter was remitted for a fresh order after the applicant responds to the notice within the stipulated period.

Issues: (i) Whether payments described as CSR donations constituted taxable "sponsorship" under Section 65(99a) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked.

Issue (i): Whether payments described as CSR donations constituted taxable "sponsorship" under Section 65(99a) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Section 65(99a) covers sponsorship involving reciprocal promotional benefits, including naming an event after the sponsor, display of its logo or trade name, priority booking rights, or prizes in its name. Donations or gifts are excluded where the recipient is under no obligation to provide anything in return. The burden lay on the Revenue to establish the real character of the payments; a donor could not be required to prove the negative merely because it denied any agreement for reciprocal benefit. A unilateral acknowledgement of the contribution, or a description of the payment as sponsorship in records, was insufficient. Only two payments were supported by board resolutions requiring display of the bank's logo and therefore involved a stipulated reciprocal benefit; no such obligation was shown for the remaining payments.

Conclusion: The payments other than the two logo-conditioned payments were non-taxable donations, while the two logo-conditioned payments constituted sponsorship. The issue was partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period required credible material establishing fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts. No such material established misconduct by the assessee.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period was unavailable, and the proceedings, including those concerning the two sponsorship transactions, were time-barred. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No service-tax demand survived, since the remaining payments were not sponsorship and the residual taxable transactions were barred by limitation.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order denying input tax credit on account of belatedly filed returns required reconsideration under the inserted Section 65 of the CGST/KGST Act.

Analysis: Section 65 of the CGST/KGST Act, effective from 01.07.2017, protects input tax credit claimed through belated returns filed by 30.11.2021 for the specified financial years. The relevant returns were admittedly filed on 04.09.2020, before the prescribed cut-off. The adjudication required re-examination under the inserted provision.

Conclusion: The adjudication order and consequential garnishee notice were quashed, and the proceedings were restored to the stage of response to the show-cause notice for reconsideration under Section 65.

Issues: Whether assessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2018-19 could be initiated for foreign assets acquired before commencement of the Act where no declaration was made and the first notice under Section 10 was issued during Financial Year 2018-19.

Analysis: Section 72(c) applies where an asset was acquired before commencement of the Act and no declaration under Section 59 was made. It creates a conclusive statutory fiction that the asset is deemed to have been acquired in the year in which the notice under Section 10 is issued. Under the statutory distinction between previous year and assessment year, the year of deemed acquisition is the previous year and assessment can only occur in the immediately succeeding assessment year. Since the first Section 10 notice was issued on 04.12.2018, the assets were deemed acquired in Financial Year 2018-19, corresponding to Assessment Year 2019-20.

Conclusion: Assessment for Assessment Year 2018-19 was without jurisdiction; the deemed acquisition could be assessed only in Assessment Year 2019-20.

Outcome: The writ petitions were dismissed on account of the available statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether interest earned on funds belonged to the assessee or the Government of Gujarat for taxation. (ii) Whether the signature bonus received on transfer of developed power projects was a capital receipt or taxable revenue receipt.

Issue (i): Whether interest earned on funds belonged to the assessee or the Government of Gujarat for taxation.

Analysis: The earlier determination on substantially similar facts established that interest earned on funds provided by the Government legally belonged to the Government and could not be assessed as the assessee's income. The manner in which the income had earlier been treated did not determine its taxable ownership.

Conclusion: The interest was not taxable in the hands of the assessee; the issue was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the signature bonus received on transfer of developed power projects was a capital receipt or taxable revenue receipt.

Analysis: The signature bonus arose from the assessee's ordinary business activity of developing power projects, including surveys, testing, approvals and implementation work, and transferring such projects to investors. The related development expenditure had been claimed as revenue expenditure. The receipt was therefore not compensation for extinction or sterilisation of an income-producing source, but consideration generated in the normal course of business. The concurrent factual findings supporting this characterisation warranted no interference.

Conclusion: The signature bonus was a taxable revenue receipt; the issue was answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Taxable income must exclude the interest legally belonging to the Government, while including the signature bonus as business revenue.

Issues: Whether reassessment on identical additions was permissible when the original assessment and appellate orders concerning those additions were already under examination in pending tax appeals.

Analysis: Reassessment under Sections 147 and 148A(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was founded exclusively on a precedent permitting reopening where the first appellate authority had annulled the assessment solely on a technical ground without determining the additions on merits. That premise was absent because the first appellate authority had adjudicated the original assessment on merits as well as technical grounds, the reassessment reproduced the same additions without any variation, and the original assessment and additions were already the subject of pending tax appeals. The doctrine of merger and the bar against parallel proceedings distinguished the relied-upon precedent and precluded duplicative reassessment.

Conclusion: The issue was resolved in favour of the assessee; reassessment on the identical additions was legally impermissible.

Issues: Whether the seizure, confiscation and penalty in respect of gold bracelets recovered at a domestic airport were sustainable under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 requires a reasonable belief that the goods are smuggled before seizure. The gold bracelets were recovered during frisking at a domestic airport, were not recovered in a customs area, and had a purity of 74.19% (17.81 karat). No investigation established that the bracelets were smuggled goods. These circumstances did not support the requisite reasonable belief for seizure.

Conclusion: Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not attracted; the gold bracelets were not liable to confiscation and no penalty was imposable.

Ratio Decidendi: Seizure under the Customs Act requires reasonable belief, supported by circumstances, that the goods are smuggled; in its absence, confiscation and penalty cannot be sustained.