Order 2 Rule 2 bar and void-at-inception contract defeat later specific performance claim over restricted urban land.
A later suit for specific performance was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC where the relief was available on the facts pleaded in the earlier suit, both plaints arose from the same agreement and dispute, and the claimant could not split causes of action into piecemeal litigation. The agreement was also unenforceable at inception because the property was subject to the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, and a contract void when made cannot be revived by later exemption or subsequent developments. On both grounds, the plaint was liable to rejection and specific performance could not be decreed.
Issues: (i) whether the subsequent suit for specific performance was barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and (ii) whether the agreement relied on by the plaintiff was void at inception because the property was subject to the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978.
Issue (i): whether the subsequent suit for specific performance was barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Analysis: The relief now claimed was held to have been available on the facts pleaded even when the earlier suit was filed. The earlier and later plaints were found to spring from the same agreement and the same underlying dispute, and the omission to seek specific performance in the first suit could not be cured by describing the later suit as based on a different cause of action. The Court also held that a party cannot be permitted to split claims and litigate in piecemeal fashion.
Conclusion: The suit was held barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Issue (ii): whether the agreement relied on by the plaintiff was void at inception because the property was subject to the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978
Analysis: The agreement was found to have been entered into when the property was under the statutory ceiling restriction, and therefore incapable of enforcement at its inception. The subsequent exemption or later developments were held not to validate a contract that was void when made. The Court relied on the statutory prohibition and the principle that a contract void at inception cannot be revived by later events.
Conclusion: The agreement was held unenforceable and incapable of supporting a decree for specific performance.
Final Conclusion: The plaint was liable to rejection on both grounds, as the subsequent suit was barred and the foundational agreement could not be enforced.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the relief sought in a later suit was available on the facts existing at the time of an earlier suit, the later suit is barred by Order 2, Rule 2; and a contract void at inception under a statutory prohibition cannot be validated by subsequent exemption or by later judicial order.