Statutory notice and special limitation must both be satisfied cumulatively; partial admission did not waive objections, SC upheld validity.

A special limitation provision requiring one month's prior notice and suit within six months was applied cumulatively, so failure to satisfy either condition defeated maintainability. A letter sent before suit was held not to be a valid statutory notice because it did not clearly constitute notice of intended litigation, and the claim was also time-barred from the date the cause of action accrued. The partial decree on admission for an admitted amount did not amount to waiver of limitation or notice objections for the disputed balance, especially without proper pleading or proof. The SC also upheld the special limitation regime as constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19.

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Issues: (i) Whether the defendant Board had waived the plea of limitation and statutory notice by consenting to a decree on admission for part of the claim. (ii) Whether the letter dated 12.04.1984 satisfied the statutory notice requirement and whether the suit was barred by limitation under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. (iii) Whether Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, prescribing a shorter period of limitation and prior notice, was unconstitutional.

Issue (i): Whether the defendant Board had waived the plea of limitation and statutory notice by consenting to a decree on admission for part of the claim.

Analysis: The decree on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was confined to the admitted amount and did not adjudicate the remaining disputed claim. The plea of waiver had not been properly pleaded in the plaint or amended plaint, nor taken in the grounds of appeal. Waiver being a question of fact, it could not be raised in the absence of a factual foundation. The partial admission did not amount to abandonment of the Board's objections to limitation or statutory notice for the balance claim.

Conclusion: The plea of waiver failed, and the Board was entitled to raise limitation and statutory notice in respect of the remaining claim.

Issue (ii): Whether the letter dated 12.04.1984 satisfied the statutory notice requirement and whether the suit was barred by limitation under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 120 requires a suit to be preceded by one month's notice and also to be commenced within six months of accrual of the cause of action; the two requirements operate cumulatively. The letter of 12.04.1984 was not a notice of intended suit stating the cause of action, and in any event the cause of action arose only upon the Board's refusal dated 16.06.1984. The suit, filed on 11.09.1986, was far beyond the statutory period and was instituted without the mandatory notice.

Conclusion: The letter did not amount to notice under Section 120, and the suit was barred by limitation and not maintainable.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, prescribing a shorter period of limitation and prior notice, was unconstitutional.

Analysis: The special limitation attached to proceedings against port authorities was held to have a rational nexus with the object of enabling prompt assertion of claims, fresh evidence, and effective defence in litigation arising from port administration. A special law may validly prescribe a different limitation regime from the general Limitation Act. The classification of claims against the Board was found reasonable and not violative of Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: Section 120 was constitutionally valid.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on limitation, notice, and constitutional challenge, and the dismissal of the suit was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute makes prior notice and a fixed limitation period mandatory, both conditions must be satisfied cumulatively, waiver must be specifically pleaded and proved, and a rationally classified special limitation regime is constitutionally valid.

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