Public recruitment cannot add a post-process viva voce cut-off; such deviation defeats legitimate expectation and is arbitrary.

A public recruitment authority cannot add a new viva voce cut-off after the selection process has begun and the interview stage is complete when the governing rules and notification required merit to be assessed on aggregate written and viva voce marks without such a cut-off. That departure from the notified method frustrated the candidates' substantive legitimate expectation and was arbitrary under Article 14. Although the challenge to the selection method succeeded, no direction was issued to induct the petitioners into the Higher Judicial Service because several years had passed and disturbing appointments already made would have been contrary to public interest.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could introduce a minimum cut-off for the viva voce after the selection process had begun and after the viva voce was conducted; (ii) Whether the petitioners had a substantive legitimate expectation that the merit list would be prepared only on the basis of aggregate marks in the written examination and viva voce without a viva voce cut-off; (iii) Whether the relief of induction into the Higher Judicial Service could be granted after the lapse of several years.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could introduce a minimum cut-off for the viva voce after the selection process had begun and after the viva voce was conducted.

Analysis: The governing rule, the examination scheme and the recruitment notification together required preparation of the merit list on the basis of aggregate marks obtained in the written examination and the viva voce. The scheme expressly stated that there would be no cut-off marks for the viva voce. The High Court introduced the cut-off only after the viva voce was completed, and the later amendment of the rules could not govern a process that had already commenced under the unamended regime.

Conclusion: The introduction of the viva voce cut-off was contrary to the unamended rules and was unlawful.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners had a substantive legitimate expectation that the merit list would be prepared only on the basis of aggregate marks in the written examination and viva voce without a viva voce cut-off.

Analysis: A public authority's established rule, scheme and notification can generate a legitimate expectation of consistent and predictable treatment. The petitioners were entitled to expect that the merit list would be drawn on the notified basis and that no new qualifying requirement would be added after the viva voce. The deviation from the notified method was inconsistent with good administration, lacked the required basis in the prevailing rules, and amounted to arbitrary state action under Article 14.

Conclusion: The petitioners' substantive legitimate expectation was frustrated and the High Court's action was arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Issue (iii): Whether the relief of induction into the Higher Judicial Service could be granted after the lapse of several years.

Analysis: Although the challenge to the selection process succeeded, the selected candidates had been functioning as District Judges for a long period by the time of decision. Unseating them at that stage would be harsh and contrary to public interest, especially where they were otherwise qualified and had acquired experience in judicial office.

Conclusion: No direction for induction of the petitioners into the Higher Judicial Service was granted.

Final Conclusion: The selection method was held to be unlawful, and the petitioners succeeded on the merits of their challenge, but the Court declined to disturb the appointments already made in view of the elapsed time and public interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a public recruitment process is governed by a statutory rule, a notified scheme and an examination notification, the authority cannot add a new disqualifying condition after the process has commenced and after the viva voce is over; such a departure defeats substantive legitimate expectation and is arbitrary unless justified by a compelling public interest established on the record.

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