Arbitrator Appointment Limitation: Article 137 applies, but reference may be refused only if claims are manifestly time-barred.

Section 11(6) applications for appointment of an arbitrator are subject to the Limitation Act, with Article 137 applying where no specific period is prescribed; time runs from accrual of the right to apply after a valid notice invoking arbitration and failure to act under the appointment procedure. On the stated facts, the petition was filed within time and was not barred by limitation. At the referral stage, a court may decline reference only on a prima facie review where the underlying claim is manifestly dead, ex facie time-barred, or there is no subsisting dispute; because the claims were not hopelessly time-barred on commencement of arbitration, reference could not be refused and the dispute was referable to arbitration.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether the petition was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether a court may refuse reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie and hopelessly time-barred.

Issue (i): Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether the petition was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 11(6) contains no express limitation period, but Section 43 makes the Limitation Act applicable to arbitrations, and the residual Article 137 governs applications for which no specific period is provided. The limitation period for a Section 11(6) application begins when the right to apply accrues, which in the arbitration context is after a valid notice invoking arbitration is issued and the other side fails or refuses to act in accordance with the agreed appointment procedure. The Court held that the notice invoking arbitration was delivered on 29.11.2022, the response period expired on 28.12.2022, and the petition filed on 19.04.2023 was within three years.

Conclusion: The petition was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether a court may refuse reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie and hopelessly time-barred.

Analysis: Limitation for the Section 11 petition is distinct from limitation governing the underlying substantive claims. Limitation is ordinarily an admissibility issue for the arbitral tribunal, but at the referral stage the court may conduct only a prima facie review and refuse reference where the claim is manifestly dead, ex facie time-barred, or there is no subsisting dispute. On the facts, the Court treated 28.03.2018 as the crystallisation point for the dispute, applied the exclusion of time ordered during the Covid-19 period, and held that the arbitration notice was issued within time. The claims were therefore not dead or hopelessly time-barred on the date of commencement of arbitration.

Conclusion: The court could not refuse reference on the ground that the claims were ex facie time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was referable to arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal was appointed for adjudication of the parties' claims and counter-contentions.

Ratio Decidendi: For a Section 11(6) petition, the court applies Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 from the date the right to apply accrues after failure of the notice invoking arbitration, and may refuse reference only when the claim is manifestly ex facie time-barred or dead on a prima facie review.

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