Arbitration appointment claims after unconditional withdrawal face maintainability, limitation, and condonation bars when insolvency proceedings are unrelated.

A fresh Section 11(6) arbitration application filed after unconditional withdrawal of the earlier one without liberty was held not maintainable on principles analogous to Order 23 Rule 1 CPC, because the later filing arose from the same cause of action. Time spent in insolvency proceedings could not be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, since a Section 9 IBC petition and a Section 11(6) appointment request are not for the same relief; the fresh application was therefore time-barred. Delay was also not condoned under Section 5, as the withdrawal of the first application was a conscious choice and no sufficient cause was shown.

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Issues: (i) Whether a fresh application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was maintainable after unconditional withdrawal of the earlier application without liberty; (ii) Whether the period spent in pursuing proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the fresh application was time-barred; (iii) Whether delay in filing the fresh Section 11(6) application could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether a fresh application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was maintainable after unconditional withdrawal of the earlier application without liberty.

Analysis: The governing principle underlying Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is a rule of public policy intended to prevent repeated proceedings on the same cause of action. Though a Section 11(6) application is not a suit, the same principle can extend to arbitration proceedings where a party abandons the earlier application without seeking liberty and later files another application arising from the same dispute. On the facts, the earlier petition was withdrawn unconditionally, not to cure any formal defect, and the subsequent petition arose from the same cause of action.

Conclusion: The fresh Section 11(6) application was not maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the period spent in pursuing proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the fresh application was time-barred.

Analysis: Section 14(2) applies where the earlier and later proceedings are for the same relief and the earlier proceeding failed for want of jurisdiction or a like cause. An application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 seeks initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process, whereas a Section 11(6) application seeks appointment of an arbitrator for adjudication of contractual disputes. These proceedings are not for the same relief. As the fresh Section 11(6) application was filed beyond the three-year limitation period, the exclusion under Section 14(2) was unavailable and the application was barred by limitation.

Conclusion: The benefit of Section 14(2) was unavailable and the fresh application was time-barred.

Issue (iii): Whether delay in filing the fresh Section 11(6) application could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 5 confers a discretionary power to admit an application filed beyond limitation on sufficient cause being shown. While Section 5 can apply to a Section 11(6) application, the party seeking condonation must make out a strong case of sufficient cause. Here, the withdrawal of the first application was a conscious choice to pursue insolvency proceedings, and the conduct did not disclose a circumstance warranting equitable indulgence.

Conclusion: Delay was not liable to be condoned under Section 5.

Final Conclusion: The judgment holds that a second Section 11(6) application, filed after unconditional withdrawal of the first and beyond limitation, cannot be sustained when the time spent in insolvency proceedings is not excludable under Section 14(2) and no sufficient cause exists for condonation under Section 5.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent arbitration-appointment application filed after unconditional withdrawal of an earlier one without liberty is barred on principles analogous to Order 23 Rule 1, and time spent in insolvency proceedings cannot be excluded under Section 14(2) where the two proceedings do not seek the same relief.

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