Issues: Whether the stamp duty value as on the date of the Banakhat agreements, rather than the date of registered sale deeds, is to be adopted for computing income under Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 56(2)(x) permits adoption of the stamp duty value prevailing on the date of an agreement where the agreement date and registration date differ, provided consideration or part thereof was paid by account-payee cheque or through banking channels on or before the agreement date. The record did not establish the dates of the Banakhats, the linkage of those agreements to the registered sale deeds, or the presentation and encashment of the alleged advance cheques. Verification of the agreements, bank statements, cheques, accounting entries, receipts and related evidence was therefore necessary.

Conclusion: The stamp duty value prevailing on the agreement date shall be adopted only if verification establishes that the statutory condition of payment through the prescribed banking mode on or before that date is fulfilled.

Issues: (i) Whether additional reimbursement income accrued under the MOU on account of subsequently reconciled deposit liabilities; (ii) Whether expenses relating to earlier periods were deductible in the year of crystallisation; (iii) Whether Bharat Parv and Silver Jubilee celebration expenditure was allowable as business expenditure; (iv) Whether printing and stationery expenditure and replacement of UPS batteries were capital expenditure; (v) Whether expenditure alleged to be personal in nature was deductible; (vi) Whether expenses allegedly relating to sister concerns were allowable after reimbursement and allocation; (vii) Whether expenses alleged to be unsupported by documents were deductible; (viii) Whether commission, collection charges and field-force incentives could be restricted by applying NBFC-based limits; (ix) Whether deposit collections awaiting remittance to the principal constituted deemed dividend; (x) Whether Kartavya Council expenditure was incurred for business purposes.

Issue (i): Whether additional reimbursement income accrued under the MOU on account of subsequently reconciled deposit liabilities.

Analysis: Under the MOU, reimbursement was determinable at a fixed percentage of the principal's opening aggregate deposit liability reflected in its finalised accounts. Applying the accrual principle under Section 145, income could arise only when the contractual entitlement was ascertainable. Reconciliation adjustments identified after finalisation could be recognised in the subsequent period; the timing difference was also revenue-neutral because the applicable tax rate was unchanged.

Conclusion: No additional reimbursement income accrued in the relevant year. The deletion of the addition is sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether expenses relating to earlier periods were deductible in the year of crystallisation.

Analysis: In the mercantile system, a liability is deductible when it is identified, quantified and crystallised, rather than merely because its underlying transaction relates to an earlier period. The expenses were recorded on their contractual relevance and crystallisation, and their genuineness was not disputed. The sustained estimated amount accounted for a possible short recognition of expenses.

Conclusion: The residual disallowance sustained for possible prior-period expenditure remains undisturbed; the balance expenditure is allowable. The issue is partly against the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether Bharat Parv and Silver Jubilee celebration expenditure was allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: Section 37(1) permits expenditure incurred from commercial expediency for business promotion and employee welfare. The vouchers substantially showed expenditure on gifts, awards and promotional activities connected with the assessee's operations. However, the scale of the celebratory expenditure, being a substantial proportion of operational and administrative expenditure, warranted a reasonable restriction for possible extravagant or entertainment elements.

Conclusion: The disallowance is restricted to 10% of the total Bharat Parv and Silver Jubilee celebration expenditure, with the balance allowed. The issue is partly in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether printing and stationery expenditure and replacement of UPS batteries were capital expenditure.

Analysis: Printing and stationery do not create a capital asset. Replacement of consumable UPS batteries periodically restores the existing system to working condition without increasing its capacity, useful life or creating an enduring advantage.

Conclusion: The expenditure is revenue expenditure and is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether expenditure alleged to be personal in nature was deductible.

Analysis: The impugned items consisted principally of gifts and promotional articles distributed in connection with the celebrations and were not incurred for partners or their relatives. They were therefore connected to business promotion. The 10% restriction imposed on the balance expenditure was considered reasonable.

Conclusion: The 10% disallowance of the remaining expenditure is sustained, against the assessee; the balance deduction remains allowable.

Issue (vi): Whether expenses allegedly relating to sister concerns were allowable after reimbursement and allocation.

Analysis: The assessee incurred expenses while acting for group principals and recovered them through debit notes and reimbursements under service arrangements. The allocation method was scientific, consistently followed and accepted in prior years. Bills in the names of landlords or other group descriptions did not displace the demonstrated business use and reimbursement of the expenditure.

Conclusion: The sister-concern expense disallowance is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether expenses alleged to be unsupported by documents were deductible.

Analysis: Documentation and payment details established the shared sports sponsorship, advertising, retainership and other expenditure as business outgoings. The ad hoc disallowance of small expenses merely because they were supported by internal records was unwarranted. However, communication equipment represented capital expenditure and could not be allowed as a revenue outgo.

Conclusion: The expense claim is allowable except communication-equipment expenditure, which remains disallowed as capital expenditure. The issue is partly in favour of both the Revenue and the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether commission, collection charges and field-force incentives could be restricted by applying NBFC-based limits.

Analysis: The payments were supported by agent details and tax identifiers and were made for mobilising deposits and providing agency services. The NBFC-based limits relied upon did not govern the assessee, a partnership firm, and identical expenditure had been accepted in earlier years.

Conclusion: Commission, collection charges and incentives are fully allowable business expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ix): Whether deposit collections awaiting remittance to the principal constituted deemed dividend.

Analysis: Section 2(22)(e) requires a payment by a company by way of loan or advance. The credit balance represented public deposits collected by the assessee as agent under the principal's schemes and awaiting transmission in the ordinary course of business. It was not an outgoing payment, loan or advance from the principal to the assessee.

Conclusion: No deemed dividend arises from the unremitted deposit collections, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (x): Whether Kartavya Council expenditure was incurred for business purposes.

Analysis: The redressal forum addressed grievances of depositors, subscribers, field personnel and staff connected with the agency operations. Its functioning directly facilitated the assessee's business of mobilising and servicing deposits and related instruments for its principals. No basis existed for either a gross or ad hoc disallowance.

Conclusion: Kartavya Council expenditure is fully allowable as business expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxable computation must recognise the MOU-based income and admissible business outgoings, with only the sustained portions of prior-period, celebratory or personal, and capital communication-equipment expenditure remaining disallowed.

Issues: Whether the attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 of properties mortgaged to the bank should be released to enable enforcement of its security interest.

Analysis: The RBI guidance concerning advances against a depositor's own fixed deposits was inapplicable because the advances were secured by third-party fixed deposits. The attached properties were linked to the accounts of the cooperative society and were owned by family members of the accused. The bank had not timely initiated recovery action when the loan accounts became irregular and had become active only after issuance of the provisional attachment order. The material regarding fund flows between the society and the bank, and the prior association of office bearers, warranted further investigation. A mortgagee seeking release of attached property must demonstrate absence of involvement in the offence and adequate due diligence both in sanctioning and recovering the loan; those requirements were not satisfied on the facts.

Conclusion: The bank was not entitled to release of the mortgaged properties from attachment or to enforce its security interest through the Tribunal. It may seek appropriate relief concerning auction and outstanding dues before the Special Court under Sections 8(6) to 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issues: (i) Whether Tasty Peanuts were classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90 99 and eligible for exemption under Sl. No. 37 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (ii) Whether Salted Peanuts were classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Sub-heading 2008 11 00 and ineligible for exemption under Sl. No. 37 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (iii) Whether ISD-distributed CENVAT credit was available to a contract manufacturing unit for the pre-01.04.2016 period; and (iv) Whether penalties were sustainable in an interpretational classification and CENVAT credit dispute.

Issue (i): Whether Tasty Peanuts were classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90 99 and eligible for exemption under Sl. No. 37 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: The product was prepared by coating peanuts with gram-flour batter, deep-frying them in edible oil, and adding salt and spices. This extensive processing, additional ingredients and the resulting commercial identity established that the product had ceased to retain the essential character of an agricultural peanut or merely roasted nut. The commercial parlance test and the distinction between roasted peanuts and gram-flour-based namkeen preparations supported classification as a food preparation under Chapter 21.

Conclusion: Tasty Peanuts are classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90 99 and qualify for the stated exemption. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Salted Peanuts were classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Sub-heading 2008 11 00 and ineligible for exemption under Sl. No. 37 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Salted Peanuts were only fried in edible vegetable oil and sprinkled with salt, without batter, gram flour or other ingredients producing a distinct snack preparation. The HSN Explanatory Notes specifically include groundnuts that are oil-roasted or fat-roasted, with vegetable oil, salt, flavours or spices. Applying the principle that a specific entry prevails over a general or residuary entry, the product remained covered by Heading 20.08.

Conclusion: Salted Peanuts are classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Sub-heading 2008 11 00 and do not qualify for the stated exemption. This finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether ISD-distributed CENVAT credit was available to a contract manufacturing unit for the pre-01.04.2016 period.

Analysis: Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 did not confine credit distribution to the principal manufacturer's own units. A contract manufacturing unit operating under the applicable registration exemption arrangement was within the expression "its manufacturing units." The subsequent amendment to Rule 2(m) and Rule 7 rectified a lacuna and had effect from the inception of the scheme. This beneficial construction prevents cascading of duties and taxes where the relevant service costs form part of the assessable value of the manufactured goods.

Conclusion: ISD-distributed CENVAT credit was admissible to the contract manufacturing unit for the pre-01.04.2016 period. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalties were sustainable in an interpretational classification and CENVAT credit dispute.

Analysis: The disputes concerned interpretation of tariff classification and CENVAT credit provisions. No mens rea, fraud, collusion, wilful suppression, or deliberate intent to evade duty was established.

Conclusion: The penalties were not sustainable and stand set aside. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tariff treatment differentiates batter-coated and seasoned fried peanut snacks from merely oil-fried salted peanuts; ISD credit to the contract manufacturing unit remains available, and penal consequences do not follow from the interpretational dispute.

Issues: (i) Whether a builder's construction after an agreement for sale is a "works contract" and exigible to VAT under Section 2(1)(zo) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004; (ii) Whether VAT demand for assessment year 2005-06 is sustainable where the machinery for determination of taxable turnover under Rule 3 of the Delhi Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 came into effect only on 07.09.2006.

Issue (i): Whether a builder's construction after an agreement for sale is a "works contract" and exigible to VAT under Section 2(1)(zo) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

Analysis: Construction undertaken after the builder enters into an agreement for sale with the purchaser is carried out for and on behalf of that purchaser and constitutes a works contract. Construction completed without a prior agreement with a purchaser does not constitute a works contract.

Conclusion: The petitioner is covered by the definition of works contract and is exigible to VAT; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether VAT demand for assessment year 2005-06 is sustainable where the machinery for determination of taxable turnover under Rule 3 of the Delhi Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 came into effect only on 07.09.2006.

Analysis: Rule 3, providing the mechanism to determine taxable turnover in respect of indivisible works contracts, was substituted with effect from 07.09.2006. For assessment year 2005-06, no machinery provision existed to calculate the taxable turnover attributable to goods used in a builder's works contract. Though the levy could not be disputed, it was unenforceable without a prescribed assessment mechanism.

Conclusion: The VAT demand for assessment year 2005-06 was unsustainable and was quashed; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A works-contract levy relating to the period before the effective machinery for determining taxable turnover cannot be enforced, notwithstanding that the builder's activity falls within the statutory definition of works contract.

Ratio Decidendi: A VAT levy on a builder's works contract is unenforceable for a period in which no machinery provision exists to determine the taxable turnover attributable to goods transferred in execution of that contract.

Issues: Whether a notification is a condition precedent for Central and State tax officers to exercise cross-empowerment under Section 6 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 6(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 statutorily authorises officers appointed under the Central and State GST enactments to act as proper officers under the corresponding enactments. The notification contemplated by that provision operates to impose conditions or restrictions on cross-empowerment; it is not the source of the authority itself. The applicable framework under Section 6(2)(b) bars parallel formal adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject matter, while intelligence-based inquiry, summons, search, seizure, and evidence-gathering do not by themselves amount to initiation of proceedings. Whether there is duplication depends on identity or overlap of the liability, contravention, and relief sought.

Conclusion: Cross-empowerment is available under Section 6 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 without a separate notification, and the absence of a notification does not invalidate the exercise of that power.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the Tribunal's classification of the respondent's services as not falling within the category of Goods Transport Agency service was maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, or lay exclusively before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 form a mutually exclusive appellate scheme. Section 35G excludes questions relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L(1)(b), read with Section 35L(2), channels questions concerning taxability or excisability for assessment to the Supreme Court. The Tribunal's determination that the services did not meet the requirements of Goods Transport Agency service involved classification and taxability of the services and was directly connected with assessment.

Conclusion: The appeal was outside the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the proper statutory forum was the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to consider and decide the appellants' grounds of appeal through reasoned orders; (ii) Whether the appeals should be remitted for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original proceedings are challenged for inadequate notice, document access and hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to consider and decide the appellants' grounds of appeal through reasoned orders.

Analysis: The requirement that a quasi-judicial authority record cogent reasons is integral to principles of natural justice, fairness, and effective appellate review. The appellate orders merely stated that insufficient evidence had been produced and confirmed the original orders, without addressing the material grounds raised or the authorities relied upon. Identical and conclusory orders in matters involving distinct evidentiary foundations did not constitute reasoned or speaking decisions and reflected a failure to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to record reasons and decide the material grounds of appeal; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals should be remitted for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original proceedings are challenged for inadequate notice, document access and hearing.

Analysis: Although an appellate forum should ordinarily decide disputes on merits, a first appeal is a valuable right requiring adjudication of factual and legal grounds. Determination of the disputes directly at the second-appellate stage would deprive the aggrieved party of a statutory appellate level. The unresolved objections concerning the show-cause notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective personal hearing in the original proceedings also required consideration at the original adjudicatory stage.

Conclusion: Fresh original adjudication is required after identification and availability of relied-upon documents, reasonable opportunity to respond, an effective personal hearing, and a reasoned determination; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The demands cannot be sustained on unreasoned appellate affirmance, and the adjudicatory process must be undertaken afresh in compliance with procedural fairness and reasoned decision-making.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order that does not address material grounds and provide cogent reasons violates principles of natural justice; where such failure would deprive a party of an effective appellate level, fresh adjudication is warranted.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the determination that services provided to an overseas entity are not intermediary services and qualify as export of services is maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 create mutually exclusive appellate forums. Section 35G excludes matters relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L channels such matters to the Supreme Court; taxability and excisability are included within that excluded category. The determination concerning the characterisation of the services as intermediary services and their qualification as export services concerns classification, excisability and value of the services for assessment.

Conclusion: The appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not maintainable; the challenge lies before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the Tribunal's determination on intermediary status and export of services was maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 35G excludes High Court appeals relating to questions having a relation to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L(1)(b) assigns such matters to the Supreme Court. Section 35L(2) includes questions of taxability or excisability within that excluded category. The Tribunal's determination of whether the services were intermediary services and whether they qualified as export of services involved classification, excisability and valuation of the services for assessment; it therefore fell within the statutory exclusion from the High Court's jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable before the High Court; the proper forum was the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issues: Whether delay in filing a GST appeal beyond the statutory limitation period could be condoned where the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not effectively served on the assessee through the designated GST portal tab.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 binds the appellate authority to the prescribed limitation. The show-cause notice had been uploaded under an additional, rather than the designated, notices-and-orders tab, and the assessee lacked effective knowledge of the proceedings and resulting demand. In these circumstances, refusal of adjudication on merits would cause substantial prejudice. The writ jurisdiction could therefore be invoked to grant relief notwithstanding the appellate authority's limited power to condone delay.

Conclusion: The delay of 121 days was condoned, the limitation-based appellate order was set aside, and the assessee was permitted to institute a fresh appeal within the stipulated period for adjudication on merits without objection as to limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter; (ii) Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice; and (iii) Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.

Issue (i): Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) bars proceedings by a proper officer under the Central enactment only where proceedings under the State enactment were initiated earlier and both proceedings concern the same subject matter. The DGST proceedings arose from reconciliation of turnover declared in GSTR-3B returns, whereas the CGST proceedings were founded on search material concerning non-existent suppliers, wrongful availment of ITC, and issuance of invoices without corresponding supplies. The allegations, evidentiary material and defaults were therefore distinct.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 6(2)(b) did not bar the CGST proceedings, and the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not non est.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: Multiple hearing notices were sent through speed post and registered e-mail. The assessee neither appeared on the notified dates nor filed a substantive response to the show-cause notice, having only sought additional time and a hearing.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded, and the ex parte order was not vitiated by breach of natural justice.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.

Analysis: The provision had been held intra vires by a High Court, and that view was affirmed by a speaking order of the Supreme Court. The constitutional position was consequently treated as settled.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 remains intra vires and constitutionally valid.

Final Conclusion: The statutory bar was inapplicable, no denial of hearing was established, and the constitutional challenge could not be sustained; the merits of the ITC demand remain unadjudicated.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory bar on parallel GST proceedings operates only when prior proceedings under the State enactment and the subsequent proceedings concern the identical subject matter; distinct allegations and evidentiary foundations preclude its application.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-disclosure of bank details and multiple registrations linked to a joint bank account should be quashed and reconsidered.

Analysis: Rules 10A and 21(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 require disclosure of bank-account particulars and permit cancellation for specified defaults. Non-disclosure of correct bank details was treated as a curable lapse. Cancellation of GST registration carries severe civil consequences by disabling the dealer from carrying on business; where no allegation of fraudulent transactions, fake invoices, circular trading, or tax evasion exists and the taxpayer expresses bona fide willingness to regularise returns and outstanding dues, a liberal and pragmatic approach is warranted. A fresh representation supported by relevant bank documents and a personal hearing were required before a decision on restoration.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed, and the authority was directed to independently decide restoration of registration after considering the taxpayer's representation and granting a hearing, with restoration conditional on statutory compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority's failure to address the material grounds of appeal and give reasons violated the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order; (ii) Whether the matters should be sent for fresh original adjudication where the first appellate authority had not decided the grounds on merits and objections concerning notice, relied-upon documents and hearing remained unresolved.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority's failure to address the material grounds of appeal and give reasons violated the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order.

Analysis: The appellate orders merely stated that satisfactory evidence had not been produced and confirmed the original orders. They did not address the seven grounds of appeal or the authorities relied upon, and identical reasoning was used in all three matters despite distinct evidentiary disputes. The principles of natural justice require a quasi-judicial appellate authority to give cogent reasons and determine the material grounds raised before it.

Conclusion: The first appellate orders were unsustainable for failure to provide reasoned determinations of the material grounds.

Issue (ii): Whether the matters should be sent for fresh original adjudication where the first appellate authority had not decided the grounds on merits and objections concerning notice, relied-upon documents and hearing remained unresolved.

Analysis: A merits determination at the second-appellate stage would deprive the parties of effective appellate review of the factual and legal grounds not considered at the first stage. Although remand is ordinarily avoided, the original orders were ex parte and the objections regarding the contents of the notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective personal hearing had not received adjudication. These matters required examination on the original record with a meaningful opportunity to respond.

Conclusion: The impugned appellate and original orders were set aside for fresh original adjudication after consideration of the procedural objections and issuance of a reasoned decision.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicatory process must ensure identification and availability of relied-upon material, a reasonable opportunity to respond and be heard, and reasoned findings on the evidence before tax liability is redetermined.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order that does not address material grounds or give reasons is invalid; where foundational objections in the original adjudication remain unaddressed, fresh original adjudication is warranted to preserve effective appellate review.

Issues: (i) Whether invoices issued during the refund period for export goods may be included in zero-rated turnover where the goods were actually exported after that period; (ii) Whether Net ITC for the refund formula must be reduced by inadmissible ITC where the maximum refund remains higher than the amount claimed.

Issue (i): Whether invoices issued during the refund period for export goods may be included in zero-rated turnover where the goods were actually exported after that period.

Analysis: Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits refund of ITC on zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax under bond or letter of undertaking. The refund formula requires Net ITC, turnover of zero-rated supply and adjusted total turnover to relate to the same relevant period. Under Sections 12 and 31 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, a tax invoice for goods involving movement must be issued before or at removal, and the supply is accounted for through invoices issued in that period. Export goods supplied under bond or letter of undertaking consequently form part of zero-rated turnover in the period in which the export invoices are issued. Actual export remains a condition for grant of refund, but the later date of the shipping bill does not displace the invoice value from the relevant-period turnover once export is established.

Conclusion: Yes. The value of the four export invoices was includible in zero-rated turnover for the refund period despite the subsequent physical export of the goods. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Net ITC for the refund formula must be reduced by inadmissible ITC where the maximum refund remains higher than the amount claimed.

Analysis: The alleged inadmissible ITC of Rs. 23,560 did not materially affect the entitlement because, even on the Department's proposed calculation, the maximum refund permissible under Rule 89(4) remained substantially higher than the refund claimed and sanctioned.

Conclusion: No. The alleged inadmissible ITC did not warrant reduction of the sanctioned refund. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The refund claim remains legally sustainable on the invoice-based computation of zero-rated turnover, and the proposed ITC adjustment does not alter the admissible refund.

Ratio Decidendi: For refund under Rule 89(4), turnover of zero-rated supply of goods for the relevant period is determined by export invoices issued at or before removal of the goods, subject to proof of actual export, and not by the later date on which the goods leave India.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued after a search could be sustained where the seized cash had been disclosed by the petitioner as income and accepted as belonging to it in prior proceedings.

Analysis: For Assessment Year 2024-25, a search-related notice could be issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without recourse to Section 153C or the procedure under Section 148A(1). However, the seized cash had been offered by the petitioner as cash sales, and adjustment thereof towards tax liability had been accepted in prior appellate proceedings. The same Assessing Officer had also accepted, while assessing the director, that the cash belonged to the petitioner. The notice did not refer to the seized cash or assert the jurisdictional facts supporting the inference of escaped income; treating the known cash as deemed information was therefore found to raise a serious jurisdictional question requiring consideration.

Outcome: Notice was issued and reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice were stayed pending final hearing.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings complied with principles of natural justice when additional information was sought through a subsequent communication without adequate time to respond.

Analysis: The information concerning the source of funds was sought through a communication issued after the original show-cause notice. Considering that the communication was digitally signed shortly before intervening holidays and required a response by midday on the next working day, the effective time available was about three-and-a-half hours. The petitioner was therefore not afforded an adequate opportunity to furnish the requested particulars before the order under Section 148A(3) was made.

Conclusion: The denial of adequate opportunity violated principles of natural justice and vitiated the order made under Section 148A(3). The petitioner must be afforded a hearing after furnishing the requested details, with all merits kept open.

Issues: (i) Whether an objection filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel on the next working day after the thirtieth day, which fell on a Sunday, was within the period under Section 144C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether a final assessment could be made without adjudication and directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel upon such timely objection.

Issue (i): Whether an objection filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel on the next working day after the thirtieth day, which fell on a Sunday, was within the period under Section 144C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deems an act done on the next day on which the office is open to have been done in time where the last day of the prescribed period is a day on which the office is closed. Since the thirtieth day for filing the objection fell on a Sunday, the following working day was the valid last date.

Conclusion: The objection filed on 16 March 2026 was within limitation, and its rejection as time-barred was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a final assessment could be made without adjudication and directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel upon such timely objection.

Analysis: The procedure under Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is mandatory. Where a timely objection is filed, a final assessment may be made only after the Dispute Resolution Panel adjudicates the objection and issues directions under Section 144C(5); such directions are binding under Section 144C(10). A final assessment made before that process is completed lacks jurisdictional foundation.

Conclusion: The final assessment made without Dispute Resolution Panel adjudication and directions was without jurisdiction and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A timely objection before the Dispute Resolution Panel must be adjudicated on merits before a final assessment can lawfully be made, and the statutory Dispute Resolution Panel process is required to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the last day for filing a Dispute Resolution Panel objection falls on a day when the office is closed, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permits filing on the next working day; a timely objection precludes final assessment until binding Dispute Resolution Panel directions are issued.

Issues: Whether the five formulated grades of natural astaxanthin are classifiable as non-synthetic food colours under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 or as food preparations under Tariff Item 2106 90 99.

Analysis: Rules 1 and 6 of the General Rules for the Interpretation require classification by the terms of the relevant headings, notes and subheadings. Heading 3203, read with Note 3 to Chapter 32 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, covers vegetable or animal colouring matter and preparations of a kind used for colouring materials or for making colouring preparations. The formulations, in their condition as imported, were standardised to specified astaxanthin concentrations and contained carriers, stabilisers and, for certain grades, emulsifying, micro-encapsulation or spray-drying features. Their product specifications and safety data sheets identified dietary-supplement, food, beverage and nutraceutical applications rather than a colouring function.

Analysis: The goods were not crude algal extracts or separately chemically defined compounds, nor were they shown to be preparations mainly used for colouring. Heading 2106 applied because the formulated astaxanthin products were not more specifically covered elsewhere and answered the description of food or dietary-supplement preparations under Supplementary Note 5 to Chapter 21 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, which include food-supplement preparations based on extracts or concentrates despite the presence of colours, carriers or stabilisers.

Conclusion: The five astaxanthin grades are not classifiable under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 and are classifiable under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants may place the respondent's relied-upon documents on record in the pending attachment appeals; (ii) Whether costs imposed for belatedly seeking to place those documents on record should stand.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants may place the respondent's relied-upon documents on record in the pending attachment appeals.

Analysis: The documents sought to be produced were relied-upon documents forming part of the respondent's prosecution complaint. Their consideration was material to determining whether the attachment of the properties should continue during pendency of the complaint.

Conclusion: The refusal to take the documents on record was set aside, and the documents were treated as having been taken on record, in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether costs imposed for belatedly seeking to place those documents on record should stand.

Analysis: The appeals had remained pending since 2022, the documents were already within the appellants' knowledge and possession, and the applications were filed only when the appeals were listed for final hearing.

Conclusion: The costs imposed for the belated filing were sustained, against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The relied-upon documents form part of the appellate record for consideration of the continuing attachment, while the monetary consequence for the delayed application remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Relied-upon documents forming part of the prosecuting authority's complaint should be received on record where they are material to deciding the continuation of property attachment, though belated production may warrant costs.