Cheque dishonour convictions in revision are rarely disturbed; statutory presumptions stood unrebutted, but compensation sentencing was modified.

Concurrent conviction for cheque dishonour under the Negotiable Instruments Act was not interfered with in revision, as revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and requires perversity, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or miscarriage of justice before concurrent findings can be disturbed. The cheque transaction and dishonour were proved, and the accused failed to rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 on a preponderance of probabilities; the blank security cheque theory was unsupported. The conviction under Section 138 was therefore sustained, but the sentence was modified to restructure the compensation and default sentence in line with the statutory scheme.

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Issues: (i) whether the concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be interfered with in revision; (ii) whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted; (iii) whether the sentence, particularly the mode of compensation, required modification.

Issue (i): whether the concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be interfered with in revision.

Analysis: Revisional power is supervisory and is not to be exercised as though it were an appellate jurisdiction. Interference with concurrent findings is justified only where there is perversity, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or a gross miscarriage of justice. On the evidence accepted by the courts below, the cheque transaction and dishonour stood proved and no glaring defect was shown to warrant reappreciation of evidence in revision.

Conclusion: The concurrent conviction was not disturbed and stood confirmed.

Issue (ii): whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted.

Analysis: Once execution of the cheque and the foundational transaction were proved, the presumptions as to consideration and legally enforceable liability operated in favour of the complainant. The accused could rebut them only on a preponderance of probabilities, either through defence evidence or by relying on the complainant's materials. The suggestion that the cheque was a blank security cheque was not supported by any cogent evidence and did not displace the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The presumptions were not rebutted and the conviction under Section 138 was sustained.

Issue (iii): whether the sentence, particularly the mode of compensation, required modification.

Analysis: Where imprisonment is imposed with fine in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the compensation mechanism has to conform to the scheme governing fine and compensation. The earlier sentence warranted interference to the limited extent that the compensation component and default sentence were restructured so that the amount could be paid as compensation in accordance with the applicable provision.

Conclusion: The sentence was modified while the conviction remained intact.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded only to the limited extent of sentence modification, while the finding of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: In revision, concurrent findings of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not to be disturbed unless they are perverse or illegal, and the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operate once the cheque transaction is proved, rebuttable only on a preponderance of probabilities; where fine and compensation are imposed, the sentence must conform to the statutory scheme for compensation.

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