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Issues: (i) Whether, for purposes of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the trial commences only after charge is framed and evidence is first taken thereafter; (ii) whether bail under Section 437(6) can be refused only on reasons connected with the delay in trial or may be declined on the ordinary grounds relevant to bail.
Issue (i): Whether, for purposes of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the trial commences only after charge is framed and evidence is first taken thereafter.
Analysis: The distinction between enquiry and trial was treated as material under the Code. The provisions governing warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report were read as showing a pre-charge stage where evidence is recorded to determine whether a charge should be framed, followed by the stage of trial after charge. The expression used in Section 437(6), namely the first date fixed for taking evidence, was construed harmoniously with the requirement that the trial must not be concluded within sixty days. On that construction, the relevant starting point is the date fixed for recording evidence after the accused has been charged and has pleaded not guilty.
Conclusion: The trial, for purposes of Section 437(6), begins after charge is framed and the case enters the stage of recording evidence; pre-charge evidence is not counted.
Issue (ii): Whether bail under Section 437(6) can be refused only on reasons connected with the delay in trial or may be declined on the ordinary grounds relevant to bail.
Analysis: The provision was read as giving discretion to the Magistrate to direct otherwise for reasons recorded in writing. No textual restriction was found confining that discretion only to causes of delay. The object of the provision to prevent delay was held to co-exist with the need to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly, the grounds ordinarily relevant to refusal of bail were held to remain available, provided the Magistrate records reasons in writing.
Conclusion: Bail under Section 437(6) may be refused on ordinary bail grounds and is not confined to reasons germane only to the cause of delay.
Final Conclusion: The reference was answered against the petitioner, and the bail application was rejected on the view that the statutory period had to be reckoned from the post-charge stage and that the Magistrate retained discretion to refuse bail on general bail considerations.
Ratio Decidendi: For Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the sixty-day period runs from the first date fixed for recording evidence after charge, and the Magistrate may refuse bail on ordinary bail grounds by recording reasons in writing.