Conscious possession and burden of proof under Customs law: uncorroborated suspicion cannot sustain confiscation-linked criminal liability.

In a prosecution under the Customs Act, the prosecution had to prove conscious possession of the seized car and the respondent's knowledge or reason to believe that it was liable to confiscation beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence was found insufficient: acquisition, possession or control of the vehicle was not proved, the brother-in-law's statement was partly hearsay, the driver was not examined, and the retracted confession was uncorroborated on material aspects. Mere suspicion could not replace proof, so the acquittal was sustained. Section 123 did not apply because vehicles were not notified goods, leaving the burden on the prosecution.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the respondent was proved to be in conscious possession of the car and to have dealt with it knowing or having reason to believe that it was liable to confiscation; (ii) whether the burden under section 123 of the Customs Act applied to the seized vehicle.

Issue (i): whether the respondent was proved to be in conscious possession of the car and to have dealt with it knowing or having reason to believe that it was liable to confiscation.

Analysis: The prosecution evidence did not establish acquisition, possession, control, or conscious possession of the vehicle by the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of the brother-in-law was not decisive and was partly hearsay, the driver was not examined, and the respondent's alleged confession was retracted and remained uncorroborated on the crucial aspects. Mere suspicion, even if grave, could not substitute proof in a criminal prosecution under the Customs Act. In an appeal against acquittal, interference was unwarranted where the appellate court's view was reasonably possible.

Conclusion: The respondent was not proved guilty under section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act and the acquittal was not liable to be interfered with.

Issue (ii): whether the burden under section 123 of the Customs Act applied to the seized vehicle.

Analysis: The statutory presumption under section 123 applies only to goods of the class specified by the Central Government. Vehicles had not been notified as goods to which that burden-shifting provision applied, and therefore the prosecution retained the burden of proving smuggling, possession, and the requisite knowledge or reason to believe.

Conclusion: Section 123 of the Customs Act did not apply to the seized vehicle.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was unsupported by sufficient proof of conscious possession or guilty knowledge, and the order of acquittal was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, the prosecution must prove conscious possession and the requisite knowledge or reason to believe beyond reasonable doubt, and the statutory burden under section 123 applies only to notified goods.

---