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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a writ petition under Article 226 challenging an order-in-original involving alleged fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit is maintainable in the presence of an efficacious statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
1.2 Whether there was a violation of the principles of natural justice on account of alleged non-grant of proper hearing and a typographical error in the due date for filing reply in the show cause notice.
1.3 Whether directions are warranted to the tax administration to exercise greater caution in recording material particulars such as financial years and due dates in show cause notices and orders.
---2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Maintainability of writ petition in presence of appellate remedy under Section 107 CGST Act in fraudulent ITC matters
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court referred to Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 providing a statutory appellate remedy against orders-in-original.
2.2 The Court relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in "The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors. v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited" on when writ jurisdiction under Article 226 may be exercised despite an alternate remedy, viz., only in exceptional circumstances involving: (i) breach of fundamental rights; (ii) violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) challenge to vires of statute/delegated legislation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the impugned order arises from an investigation into large-scale fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit, involving 16 taxpayers, 79 allegedly fake entities, 1155 recipients and transfer of ITC exceeding Rs. 122 crores, with the petitioner being one of the noticees and saddled with liability in the impugned order.
2.4 The Court reiterated its consistent view that in matters involving fraudulent availment of ITC, writ jurisdiction ought not ordinarily to be exercised, since such cases involve complex, interlinked transactions, voluminous evidence and detailed factual determinations, which are more appropriately examined by the statutory appellate authority.
2.5 The Court emphasized the systemic impact and burden on the exchequer of fraudulent ITC claims, observing that misuse of the Input Tax Credit mechanism under Section 16 CGST Act, if unchecked, would create a serious dent in the GST regime.
2.6 The Court relied on its earlier decisions in similar ITC fraud matters (including those in Mukesh Kumar Garg, Sheetal and Sons, MHJ Metal Techs and Toshniwal Electricals) where petitioners were relegated to the appellate remedy under Section 107, noting that such approach had been accepted by the Supreme Court (which only extended time to file appeal in the MHJ Metal Techs matter).
2.7 The Court found that the impugned order is a detailed, appealable order; no case was made out of any of the exceptional grounds (breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction, or challenge to vires) that alone could justify bypassing the appellate remedy.
2.8 The Court also observed that entertaining writ petitions in such fact-intensive ITC fraud matters could result in multiplicity of proceedings and potentially contradictory findings across forums.
Conclusions
2.9 The writ petition was held not maintainable in view of the efficacious statutory remedy under Section 107 CGST Act, particularly considering the nature of the allegations of fraudulent ITC and the need for factual adjudication by the appellate authority.
2.10 The petitioner was relegated to avail the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act, with liberty to file appeal by a specified outer date along with requisite pre-deposit, and with a direction that if so filed, the appeal shall be entertained on merits and not dismissed on limitation.
---Issue 2 - Alleged violation of natural justice due to lack of hearing and typographical error in due date
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The petitioner contended that no proper hearing was afforded and that there was a typographical error in the show cause notice specifying the due date for reply as 28th August 2025 instead of 28th August 2024, asserting violation of principles of natural justice.
2.12 The Court noted that even if the erroneously printed date (28th August 2025) is taken at face value, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner ever filed any reply to the show cause notice.
2.13 The Court held that the typographical error in mentioning the due date was "merely an error" which could not be taken advantage of by the petitioner's counsel, especially in the absence of any substantive reply on record.
2.14 The Court observed that the show cause notice had been properly uploaded on the portal and that, even as per the petitioner's own showing, they had written to the Department seeking certain documents, which indicates knowledge of proceedings and opportunity to participate.
2.15 The Court, while relying on the Supreme Court's formulation in Commercial Steel, found that the facts of the case do not disclose a real violation of principles of natural justice that would justify exercise of writ jurisdiction in the face of an alternative remedy.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court rejected the plea of violation of natural justice, holding that neither the alleged lack of hearing nor the typographical error in the due date for filing reply constituted sufficient ground to bypass the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 CGST Act.
2.17 The petitioner was directed to raise all factual and legal contentions, including those relating to alleged procedural deficiencies, before the appellate authority.
---Issue 3 - Directions to tax administration on accuracy in show cause notices and orders
Interpretation and reasoning
2.18 While holding against the petitioner on maintainability and natural justice, the Court noted the existence of errors such as incorrect financial years and due dates for replies in show cause notices and orders, and considered it appropriate to address systemic concerns.
2.19 The Court "advised" the CGST Department to exercise caution in future while mentioning financial years, due dates for replies and other material particulars to avoid recurrence of such errors, especially in high-stake and large-scale proceedings.
2.20 The Court directed that a copy of the order be communicated to the Chief Commissioner of Central Tax, CGST, Delhi Zone, for information and compliance, and that the order be circulated to all Commissionerates highlighting that there are many errors in orders and show cause notices, so that they may be properly supervised and rectified.
Conclusions
2.21 The Court issued administrative directions to the tax administration to improve accuracy and supervision in issuance of show cause notices and orders, without granting any substantive relief to the petitioner on that ground.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether a writ petition challenging an Order-in-Original confirming GST demand on alleged fraudulent availment/passing on of ITC is maintainable when an efficacious alternative appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act is available.
2. Whether non-issuance of a pre-Show Cause Notice consultation in terms of Rule 142(1A) of the CGST Rules, 2017, after its amendment by Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax, renders the Show Cause Notice dated 12 March 2025 and the consequential Order-in-Original invalid.
3. How the pending challenge to the validity of Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax and the interpretation of amended Rule 142(1A) affect the present proceedings and the remedies available to the petitioner.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of writ petition in presence of alternative remedy and in a case of alleged fraudulent ITC
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted that the case concerns alleged large-scale fraudulent availment and passing on of ITC involving multiple entities and transactions worth crores of rupees. The respondent relied on prior decisions of the Court holding that in such matters of fraudulent ITC, writ petitions are generally not maintainable, and assessees must ordinarily pursue the statutory appellate remedy. The Court observed that the petitioner's limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act had not expired. It also recorded that the petitioner had already deposited Rs. 1.66 crores during investigation, which could be adjusted towards the pre-deposit required for the appeal.
Conclusions
The Court held that, in the circumstances of alleged fraudulent ITC involving complex transactions and given the availability of an efficacious appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act within the limitation period, it was not inclined to entertain the writ petition. The petitioner was relegated to the appellate remedy, with liberty to file an appeal and to seek adjustment of the amount of Rs. 1.66 crores as pre-deposit.
Issue 2: Effect of non-issuance of pre-SCN consultation under amended Rule 142(1A)
Legal framework
The Court extracted Rule 142(1A) of the CGST Rules, 2017 as amended with effect from 15 October 2020, which provides that the proper officer "may" before service of notice under Sections 73 or 74 communicate the details of tax, interest and penalty ascertained by him in Part A of FORM GST DRC-01A. The Court noted that prior to the amendment the rule used the expression "shall". It referred to its earlier decision in Gulati Enterprises which distinguished between the pre-amendment and post-amendment positions, holding that pre-SCN consultation was mandatory only for SCNs issued prior to the amendment. It also referred to Banson Enterprises and Zeta International, where the Court had considered the post-amendment regime.
Interpretation and reasoning
The petitioner argued that absence of a pre-SCN consultative notice under Rule 142(1A) vitiated the SCN dated 12 March 2025 and the Order-in-Original, contending that this issue had not been considered in the Order-in-Original and challenging the amendment which changed "shall" to "may". The Court noted that, in Banson Enterprises, it had already been held that after the amendment brought in by Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax, issuance of a pre-SCN consultation notice is no longer mandatory. The Court further observed that, particularly in cases of large-scale fraudulent ITC involving a complex maze of transactions and multiple entities with high-value demands, pre-SCN consultation would, in its prima facie view, be of little or no practical significance, unlike in simple or straightforward transactions. The Court indicated that even where searches are conducted, parties can tender illegally obtained amounts, but usually do not, reinforcing the limited utility of pre-consultation in such fraud cases.
Conclusions
The Court concluded that, post-amendment of Rule 142(1A) by Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax (effective 15 October 2020), issuance of a pre-SCN consultation notice is not mandatory. Since the SCN in the present case was issued on 12 March 2025, after the amendment came into force, non-issuance of a pre-SCN consultation did not render the SCN or the Order-in-Original invalid and did not justify interference in writ jurisdiction.
Issue 3: Effect of pending challenge to Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax and future proceedings
Legal framework
The Court recorded that Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax, which amended Rule 142(1A) from "shall" to "may", had itself been challenged and that such challenge was already pending before the Court. It referred to the decision in Zeta International, wherein under similar circumstances and considering the same Notification, the Court had held that pre-SCN consultation is not mandatory after the amendment.
Interpretation and reasoning
While the petitioner sought to question the constitutional or legal validity of Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax within the present writ, the Court noted that this very challenge is sub judice in other proceedings. It held that there was no occasion in this writ to reopen or independently determine that issue. Instead, it clarified how the pending adjudication would impact the petitioner's statutory appeal.
Conclusions
The Court held that the decision to be rendered in the pending matter in Zeta International regarding Notification No. 79/2022-Central Tax and amended Rule 142(1A) would bind the further proceedings in the petitioner's appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act and thereafter. The Court disposed of the writ on this basis, expressly stating that its observations would not affect the merits of the case before the appellate authority.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the writ petition under Article 226 challenging a demand order relating to alleged fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit is maintainable in the presence of an alternative statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
1.2 Whether the alleged non-issuance / non-service of a show cause notice upon the petitioner and the incorrect mention of the financial year in Form DRC-07 render the adjudication order and demand unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice or for being legally invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Maintainability of writ petition in presence of statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act in cases of alleged fraudulent ITC
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 107 of the CGST Act providing a statutory remedy of appeal against adjudication orders and to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in relation to maintainability of writ petitions under Article 226 where an alternative remedy exists, particularly in the context of tax proceedings.
2.2 The Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court which held that although availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar, writ jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, namely: (i) breach of fundamental rights; (ii) violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation, and that factual assessment is to be undertaken by the appellate authority.
2.3 The Court also relied upon its own earlier decisions in matters involving fraudulent availment of ITC, where it consistently declined to exercise writ jurisdiction and relegated parties to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act, keeping in view the nature of allegations, complexity of transactions, burden on the exchequer, and impact on the GST regime.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court noted that the allegations relate to fraudulent availment of ITC from non-existent firms, involving complex transactions and a detailed investigation culminating in a speaking adjudication order and corresponding demand, including in respect of several entities.
2.5 The Court reiterated its consistent approach that cases of fraudulent ITC, which generally involve a "complex maze of transactions" and detailed fact-finding, are unsuitable for adjudication under writ jurisdiction, as the factual matrix, the role of the assessee, the correctness and proportionality of penalties, and the appreciation of evidence fall within the province of the statutory appellate authority.
2.6 The Court emphasized that the GST Input Tax Credit regime under Section 16 of the CGST Act is a key, business-friendly feature of the GST framework and that its misuse through fictitious or non-existent suppliers, without actual supply of goods or services or deposit of output tax, poses a serious threat to the GST regime and the public exchequer, which justifies reluctance in entertaining writ petitions in such matters.
2.7 The Court followed its earlier pronouncements that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised to aid "unscrupulous litigants" in such fraudulent ITC cases and that permitting parties to pursue parallel or alternative forums in such matters leads to multiplicity of proceedings and a risk of contradictory findings.
2.8 The Court noted that the impugned order is appealable under Section 107 of the CGST Act, and that in similar circumstances, in earlier matters, the Court had declined to entertain writ petitions and granted liberty to file appeals, with extended time where warranted; such an approach had also been upheld or recognized by the Supreme Court, which had in some cases only extended time for filing the statutory appeal.
Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that no exceptional circumstance was established to justify exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the face of the available statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act.
2.10 The Court therefore declined to entertain the writ petition on merits and relegated the petitioner to avail the appellate remedy, while granting liberty to file an appeal against the adjudication order and the DRC-07 and directing that, if filed by the stipulated extended date with the requisite pre-deposit, the appeal shall be decided on merits and not dismissed on limitation.
Issue 2 - Effect of alleged non-service of show cause notice and incorrect financial year in DRC-07 on validity of adjudication and demand; plea of violation of natural justice
Legal framework
2.11 The petitioner relied upon Section 73 of the CGST Act read with Rule 142(1A) of the CGST Rules and emphasized the mandatory nature of the requirement of issuance of show cause notice by referring to the use of the word "shall".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The petitioner's principal contention was that no show cause notice had been issued to it prior to passing of the adjudication order, thereby rendering the order void for lack of notice and violation of principles of natural justice; the petitioner also pointed out that the DRC-07 mentioned the wrong financial year.
2.13 On behalf of the department, it was submitted, with supporting documents, that a common show cause notice had in fact been issued on 1 August 2024 to all noticees, including the petitioner, and that the notice was sent to the registered email address of the petitioner and uploaded on the GST portal; it was further clarified that the DRC-07's reference to financial year 2017-18 was an inadvertent error, whereas the show cause notice and the proceedings related to FY 2023-24.
2.14 The Court examined the email dated 1 August 2024, noting that it was addressed from the department's email and showed the petitioner's registered email ID as one of the recipients. The Court observed that there was no categorical disclosure in the writ petition that the email was not received; nor was a proper rebuttal placed on record regarding non-receipt. At the hearing, a copy of the petitioner's reply dated 10 August 2024 was produced, which indicated that the petitioner had responded to the proceedings.
2.15 In light of the material produced, the Court held that it was not in dispute that the email dated 1 August 2024 was received by the petitioner and that the petitioner was under a duty to appear and participate fully in the adjudication proceedings, which undermined the plea of absence of show cause notice or violation of natural justice.
2.16 As regards the incorrect mention of the financial year as 2017-18 in DRC-07, the Court treated this as an "inadvertent error", especially since the show cause notice and substantive proceedings related to FY 2023-24. The Court found that such a mistake in DRC-07 could not be characterized as a "fatal error" vitiating the entire adjudication or demand.
Conclusions
2.17 The Court concluded that the requirement of issuance and service of a show cause notice had been substantially complied with, that the petitioner had notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to respond, and that no violation of principles of natural justice was made out on that ground.
2.18 The Court further concluded that the misdescription of the financial year in DRC-07 was a non-fatal, inadvertent error which did not, by itself, invalidate the adjudication order or the demand, and that such issues could appropriately be raised and examined in the statutory appeal.
2.19 On the combined effect of these findings, the Court held that neither the plea of absence of show cause notice nor the clerical error in DRC-07 constituted a ground to set aside the impugned order in writ proceedings, and that the petitioner's remedy lay in filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act within the extended time granted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Validity of initiation of proceedings under section 153C of the Act for AYs 2018-19 and 2019-20 based on seized material found in the case of a third party and the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer.
1.2 Whether additions on account of alleged bogus purchases of old bottles were to be made by disallowing the entire purchase value or by rejecting the books of account under section 145(3) and estimating profits, and the appropriateness of estimating net profit at 10% of turnover.
1.3 Whether, after rejection of books and estimation of income, separate disallowances under section 14A and in respect of sales promotion expenses could be sustained.
1.4 Whether disallowance of deduction under section 80G in respect of donations made to two registered charitable institutions was justified on the basis of search statements without corroborative material.
1.5 Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80GGB for AY 2018-19.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Validity of proceedings under section 153C
2.1.1 Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal reiterated that recording of a proper satisfaction note is a jurisdictional pre-condition for issuance of notice under section 153C. The Assessing Officer of the "other person" must reach a satisfaction that the seized material handed over by the Assessing Officer of the searched person belongs to/pertains to/relates to such other person and is incriminating in nature, having a bearing on determination of total income. The satisfaction must be contemporaneously recorded and demonstrate a live nexus between seized material and the other person's income, in line with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision cited in the order (Singhad Technical Education Society).
2.1.2 Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the satisfaction note for AYs 2018-19 and 2019-20 and found that the Assessing Officer (i) linked specific seized documents from the premises of the third-party concern with the assessee, (ii) correlated documents year-wise with the relevant assessment years, and (iii) quantified amounts believed to have escaped assessment for each year. The note referred to loose sheets, excel sheets, ledgers and statements under section 132(4) of the key person of the third-party entity, evidencing bogus purchases of old bottles on behalf of the assessee. It held that the Assessing Officer had objectively analysed and compartmentalised the material, and the common satisfaction note still contained year-specific correlation and quantification. The Tribunal rejected the argument that the seized material was not incriminating or that the satisfaction was vague or mechanical. It further held that the later direct search on the assessee and subsequent reliance primarily on material found therein for making additions did not vitiate the earlier jurisdictional satisfaction already validly formed on the basis of material received from the third-party search.
2.1.3 Conclusions: The Tribunal held that the statutory pre-conditions for assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C were satisfied. The satisfaction note was valid and in conformity with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court; the proceedings under section 153C for AYs 2018-19 and 2019-20 were therefore upheld and the assessee's legal challenge was dismissed.
2.2 Treatment of alleged bogus old bottle purchases; rejection of books and estimation of profit
2.2.1 Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of section 145(3) empowering rejection of books of account where they do not reflect true income and correct profits cannot be deduced, and consequent best-judgment assessment under section 144. It noted the statutory scheme under sections 29 and 30-43D and relied upon the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Empee Distilleries Ltd. on similar allegations of inflation of old bottle purchases in the same line of business, where disallowance of 10% of such purchases was approved as a reasonable estimate. Reference was also made (through the Commissioner (Appeals)'s reasoning adopted by the Tribunal) to various High Court decisions justifying rejection of books and estimation where stock/accounting records are defective or unreliable.
2.2.2 Interpretation and reasoning: On facts, the Tribunal noted that the pattern of reasoning by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) in the present years was identical to that in the assessee's own case for AYs 2020-21 to 2022-23, already adjudicated by the Tribunal. The Assessing Officer had relied on seized electronic data (excel sheets describing old bottle purchases, "Others" column indicating commission, "Total" indicating cash to be returned), SAP records, absence of GRNs for certain purchases, and statements of key employees and suppliers, to treat all purchases without GRNs as bogus and to add the entire amounts. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted that there were significant accounting discrepancies, particularly in handling SAP entries, offset accounts and documentation, and that the books did not reliably reflect true income. However, considering that (i) vendors were regular suppliers of genuine bottles, (ii) both regular and "emergency" purchases were debited to stock and reflected in production, (iii) no unaccounted assets or applications corresponding to the alleged bogus purchases had been found in extensive search operations, and (iv) the assessee's profit ratios were broadly in line with industry norms, the Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the books under section 145(3) and estimated profits at 10% of turnover instead of sustaining 100% disallowance of purchases. In the earlier order for AYs 2020-21 to 2022-23, the Tribunal had already held that accounting deficiencies and corroborated search statements may justify rejection of books and estimation but do not by themselves establish falsification of entries warranting addition of the entire purchase value. It also relied on Empee Distilleries Ltd. to approve a 10% disallowance/profit estimate in this industry.
2.2.3 Conclusions: Finding no change in facts or legal position from those considered for AYs 2020-21 to 2022-23, the Tribunal followed its earlier decision in the assessee's own case and upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s action in (i) rejecting the books of account under section 145(3) and (ii) estimating net profit at 10% of turnover for AYs 2018-19 and 2019-20. The separate grounds of both the assessee and the Revenue on the issue of bogus old bottle purchases were dismissed.
2.3 Effect of estimation after rejection of books on separate disallowances under section 14A and sales promotion expenses
2.3.1 Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal referred to section 29 read with sections 30-43D, and to the principle that where income is estimated after rejection of books, such estimate substitutes the computation of business income under the normal provisions. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Indwell Constructions and the Allahabad High Court in Banwari Lal Banshidhar, which hold that once net profit is estimated, separate disallowances of individual expenditure items ordinarily cannot be made as all such items are deemed to have been taken into account in the estimation.
2.3.2 Interpretation and reasoning: The Revenue argued that, notwithstanding rejection of books and estimation of income, disallowances under section 14A and in respect of sales promotion expenses should be separately adjudicated and added over and above the estimated income. The Tribunal held that, once the books are rejected under section 145 and income is determined on an estimated basis under section 144, this estimated figure represents the business income after considering all underlying expenditure governed by sections 30-43D. It therefore considered that any further separate disallowance of particular expenditure heads would amount to double taxation of the same income and would be inconsistent with the case law cited.
2.3.3 Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s deletion of disallowances under section 14A and of sales promotion expenses, holding that such separate additions were impermissible after rejection of books and estimation of profits. The Revenue's grounds on these issues were dismissed.
2.4 Disallowance of deduction under section 80G in respect of donations
2.4.1 Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal proceeded on general principles governing allowability of deduction under section 80G for donations to institutions approved under that provision, and on the settled rule that additions/disallowances cannot be based solely on uncorroborated statements recorded during search. It referred to CBDT's Instruction (F. No. 286/2/2003-IT(Inv) dated 10.03.2003) and judicial precedents (Best Infrastructure (I) Pvt. Ltd., Harjeev Aggarwal) which hold that statements under section 132(4) without supporting evidence are insufficient to sustain additions.
2.4.2 Interpretation and reasoning: The Assessing Officer had disallowed deduction of Rs. 62,50,000 under section 80G in respect of donations aggregating Rs. 1,25,00,000 paid to two registered charitable entities, treating them as bogus solely on the basis of one employee's statement that (i) in the case of one donee, he "understood" that the donation might have been received back in cash, and (ii) in respect of the other, he merely confirmed payment by cheque for educational/CSR purposes. The Tribunal observed that (a) no incriminating documents or WhatsApp chats relating to these two specific donations were found in the search on the third party (from whom evidence of other bogus CSR contributions had been obtained), (b) no material was seized from the assessee suggesting that these donations had been routed back in cash, and (c) the relevant employee did not clearly admit that any part of these donations was actually received back in cash, and in respect of one donee his answers positively indicated that the payment was genuine and for educational purposes. The Tribunal held that the inference of bogus donation was drawn purely on assumption, without corroborative material, and that mere suspicion or tentative expression of "understanding" by an employee could not displace the legal effect of donation paid by cheque to institutions duly approved under section 80G.
2.4.3 Conclusions: The Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner (Appeals)'s deletion of the disallowance of Rs. 62,50,000 under section 80G, holding that both donations, made to registered institutions holding valid section 80G approval, were not shown by any cogent material to be bogus or to have been received back in cash. The Revenue's grounds on this issue were dismissed.
2.5 Deduction under section 80GGB
2.5.1 Interpretation and reasoning: The only issue was the assessee's eligibility for deduction under section 80GGB for AY 2018-19. At the hearing, the assessee's authorised representative expressly stated that this ground was not being pressed, given the smallness of the amount involved.
2.5.2 Conclusions: The Tribunal treated the ground challenging disallowance of deduction under section 80GGB as not pressed and dismissed it accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, for the purposes of section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, the Assessing Officer was justified in rejecting a valuation of equity shares prepared by an approved valuer using the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method prescribed under Rule 11UA, on the grounds that (i) the projected figures in the valuation were not achieved in subsequent years, and (ii) the valuation report contained a standard disclaimer.
1.2 Whether, after rejecting the DCF-based valuation report, the Assessing Officer was justified in unilaterally adopting the Net Asset Value (NAV) method under Rule 11UA and making an addition of the difference as "consideration received over and above fair market value" under section 56(2)(viib).
1.3 Whether, in case of doubt regarding a valuation report obtained from an approved valuer using a recognized method, the Assessing Officer is required to refer the matter to a Valuation Officer rather than discarding the report and substituting his own valuation.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Rejection of DCF valuation report and substitution with NAV method; validity of addition under section 56(2)(viib)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, which permits taxation of consideration received for issue of shares to the extent it exceeds the fair market value of such shares. Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules was considered, which recognizes multiple methods of valuation, including the DCF method and NAV method, for determining the fair market value of unquoted equity shares.
2.2 The Court noted that DCF methodology is specifically prescribed in Rule 11UA(2)(b) and is a globally accepted standard valuation methodology, commonly used for high-growth companies and by venture capital/private equity investors. The Court also took note of the jurisdictional High Court decisions, particularly one where the reversal of a Tribunal decision on similar facts was reported, and another decision in which the approach to DCF valuations under section 56(2)(viib) was laid down.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 It was undisputed that the assessee had obtained a valuation report from a qualified chartered accountant, an approved valuer, who valued the shares using the DCF method, as recognized under Rule 11UA. The valuer's appearance under summons, confirmation on oath of having prepared the valuation on the basis of projections and management data, and justification of the discounting rate used, were all placed on record.
2.4 The Assessing Officer rejected this DCF valuation primarily on two grounds: (i) the projections used did not match the actual subsequent turnover figures; and (ii) the valuation report contained a disclaimer that the valuer was not certifying the accuracy or completeness of financial information and had relied on management assumptions.
2.5 The Court held that the non-achievement of projected turnover in subsequent years cannot by itself justify the rejection of a DCF valuation, since projections are, by their nature, estimates based on assumptions about future business performance, and variation between projected and actual results is inherent and depends on industry, company-specific, and economic factors.
2.6 As regards the disclaimer, the Court held that such disclaimers are standard in valuation reports prepared by consultants, chartered accountants, and merchant bankers. They merely record that the valuer has relied on management-provided data without conducting an audit or certifying the underlying financial statements. The Court found that this type of disclaimer does not undermine the legitimacy of the valuation or provide a legally sustainable ground for outright rejection of the report.
2.7 The Court emphasized that, once the assessee chooses a recognized method (DCF) under Rule 11UA and obtains a valuation from an approved valuer, the Assessing Officer cannot disregard that method merely because he considers the projections to be optimistic or because the results subsequently differed. If the Assessing Officer had doubts about the reasonableness of the assumptions or the computation, the proper course was to examine the valuer's workings, seek clarifications, or refer the valuation to a Valuation Officer, not to substitute a different method (NAV) of his own choice.
2.8 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer directly compared projected turnover to actual turnover and, on that basis, discarded the DCF approach and adopted NAV, which, although also recognized by Rule 11UA, was not the method chosen by the assessee or its investors. The Court found this approach inconsistent with the statutory scheme, which allows the assessee to adopt a prescribed method, and with the judicial guidance laid down by the jurisdictional High Court.
2.9 The Court also recorded that a merchant banker's valuation report, filed before the appellate authority, endorsed the chartered accountant's DCF valuation. This supported the reasonableness and bona fides of the assessee's valuation exercise and undermined the justification for the Assessing Officer's substitution of NAV.
2.10 The Tribunal distinguished and declined reliance on a prior coordinate bench decision cited by the Assessing Officer, in view of its subsequent reversal by the jurisdictional High Court. It instead followed the binding decisions of the jurisdictional High Court, including a case directly dealing with section 56(2)(viib) and DCF-based valuations.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court concluded that the Assessing Officer was not justified in rejecting the DCF-based valuation report solely on the grounds that projections were not subsequently achieved and that the report contained a standard disclaimer. These grounds were held to be legally untenable.
2.12 The unilateral adoption of the NAV method by the Assessing Officer in place of the DCF method chosen by the assessee and recognized under Rule 11UA was held to be contrary to law, particularly in the absence of any reference to a Valuation Officer despite the availability of that recourse.
2.13 Following the jurisdictional High Court's precedents, the Court held that the fair market value determined under the DCF method by an approved valuer could not be disregarded in the manner done by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 8,39,55,840/- made under section 56(2)(viib) as consideration received in excess of fair market value was directed to be deleted.
2.14 The appeal was allowed, and all grounds of the assessee relating to the addition under section 56(2)(viib) were decided in its favour.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether an addition under Section 69C in respect of a donation could be sustained when based solely on third-party statements recorded under Section 132(4), without any seized material, corroborative evidence, or opportunity of cross-examination to the assessee.
1.2 Whether a donation made by a registered charitable trust to another registered charitable trust, through accounted banking channels and duly recorded in the books, could be treated as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C in view of the statutory scheme and CBDT Circular No. 1132.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Sustainability of addition under Section 69C based solely on uncorroborated third-party statements without cross-examination
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal examined the evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 132(4) in the absence of supporting incriminating material, relying on judicial precedents holding that such uncorroborated statements cannot, by themselves, form the sole basis for addition and that denial of cross-examination vitiates reliance on such statements.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The addition of Rs. 10,00,000 was made and sustained solely on the basis of statements of office-bearers of the donee trust recorded during search, wherein they admitted to providing accommodation entries and returning donations in cash after deducting commission.
2.3 The Tribunal noted that: (i) no seized documents or material evidencing "cash back" or accommodation entries were brought on record; (ii) no bank trail or independent corroborative evidence was shown to demonstrate that the impugned donation was returned to the assessee; and (iii) despite specific request, the assessee was never confronted with the said statements nor afforded opportunity of cross-examination.
2.4 It was held, relying on the cited decisions, that a statement recorded under Section 132(4), without supporting evidence, has no independent evidentiary value and that uncorroborated statements cannot validly form the basis of an addition. The Tribunal also reiterated that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
Conclusions
2.5 The Tribunal concluded that, in the absence of seized material, corroborative evidence, or opportunity of cross-examination, the addition under Section 69C based solely on third-party search statements was bad in law and unsustainable.
Issue 2: Characterisation of inter-trust donation as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C and effect of CBDT Circular No. 1132
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.6 The Tribunal considered Section 69C, holding that it applies only where the source of expenditure is unexplained, and referred to CBDT Circular No. 1132 dated 05.01.1978 clarifying that donation by one charitable trust to another registered charitable trust constitutes proper application of income for charitable purposes under Section 11.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 It was undisputed that: (i) the donee trust was a registered charitable trust holding valid Section 12A and Section 80G certificates; (ii) the donation of Rs. 10,00,000 was made through banking channels; (iii) the transaction was duly recorded in the assessee's books of account; and (iv) the donation was supported by a receipt.
2.8 On these facts, the Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by furnishing primary evidence demonstrating the genuineness of the transaction. The burden therefore shifted to the Revenue to prove that the transaction was not genuine. No material was brought on record by the Revenue to discharge this burden.
2.9 The Tribunal further held that, since the funds used for the donation were from accounted bank sources, the condition for invoking Section 69C-that the source of expenditure be unexplained-was not satisfied, and hence Section 69C could not be applied.
2.10 Referring to CBDT Circular No. 1132, which is binding on the Department, the Tribunal observed that an inter-trust donation between registered charitable trusts is to be treated as application of income under Section 11. As the donation in question fell squarely within this category, it was to be regarded as a valid application of income and not as unexplained expenditure.
Conclusions
2.11 The Tribunal held that the donation by the assessee trust to another registered charitable trust, being through banking channels, duly recorded, and supported by documentary evidence, constituted a genuine transaction and a valid application of income under Section 11 in terms of CBDT Circular No. 1132.
2.12 The invocation of Section 69C was held to be legally untenable, as the source of expenditure was explained and accounted. The addition of Rs. 10,00,000 under Section 69C was therefore directed to be deleted.
2.13 In view of the deletion of the addition on merits, the challenge to the validity of the reassessment proceedings was treated as academic and was not adjudicated.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether income from sale of cut Silver Oak trees grown as shade trees in a tea estate is "agricultural income" exempt from tax, or taxable as income from capital gains.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Characterisation of income from sale of Silver Oak shade trees as agricultural income or capital gains
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal examined the judicial tests for what constitutes "agriculture" and "agricultural produce" as laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Court, particularly:
2.1.1 The principle that "some basic operation prior to germination involving application of human effort on the land itself" is necessary to constitute agriculture (CIT v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy).
2.1.2 The principle that "irrespective of the nature of the produce or the product of the land whatever is grown on land aided by human labour and effort, whatever does not grow wild or spontaneously on soil without human labour or effort, would constitute 'agricultural produce'" (CIT v. Sundara Mudaliyar).
2.2 The Tribunal relied on the decision of the High Court which held that Silver Oak trees grown as shade trees in tea estates, requiring planting, periodic attention and human labour, and not growing wild or spontaneously, constitute "agricultural produce", and income from their sale constitutes "agricultural income".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal noted that the assessee had grown Silver Oak trees as shade trees in a tea estate and realised income from their cut and sale.
2.4 The Assessing Officer treated the sale proceeds as taxable long-term capital gains, and this view was confirmed by the first appellate authority.
2.5 Referring to the High Court decision regarding Silver Oak shade trees in tea estates, the Tribunal highlighted the following aspects accepted there:
2.5.1 Silver Oak is an exotic plant variety, used as shade trees in tea estates.
2.5.2 These trees are not of wild or spontaneous growth; they are planted at specific intervals/distances and require periodic attention, human effort and labour.
2.5.3 On these facts, such trees constitute "agricultural produce" because they are grown on land aided by human labour and do not grow spontaneously.
2.6 The Tribunal observed that the Revenue had not controverted the factual premise that the assessee's Silver Oak trees were planted, nurtured and maintained as shade trees and were not of spontaneous growth.
2.7 Applying the tests laid down in the cited judgments, the Tribunal held that income derived from the sale of Silver Oak trees in such circumstances is "undoubtedly an agricultural income".
Conclusions
2.8 Income derived from the sale of Silver Oak trees grown as shade trees in a tea estate, which are planted and nurtured by human effort and are not of spontaneous growth, constitutes "agricultural income" and is not taxable as capital gains.
2.9 The addition made by treating such income as long-term capital gains was unsustainable and was deleted, with a direction to treat the sale proceeds from Silver Oak trees as agricultural income.
Issues: (i) Whether the IPO could be faulted as impermissible under the regulatory framework governing public issues. (ii) Whether the disclosures in the offer documents concerning criminal proceedings, complaints, and brand-related risks were materially inadequate or misleading. (iii) Whether the petitions were liable to be rejected on grounds of delay, lack of bona fides, and suppression of material facts.
Issue (i): Whether the IPO could be faulted as impermissible under the regulatory framework governing public issues.
Analysis: The applicable framework was the SEBI issue and disclosure regime, under which eligibility for an IPO may be satisfied even where the issuer does not meet the primary financial thresholds, if the issue is made through the book-building process and the prescribed QIB allocation condition is met. The Court also noted that an offer for sale by shareholders is permitted by the Companies Act, and that the regulatory scheme does not require application of the fit and proper test urged by the petitioners. The older SEBI rejection order was treated as directory and superseded in the relevant field by the later ICDR Regulations.
Conclusion: The challenge to the very permissibility of the IPO was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the disclosures in the offer documents concerning criminal proceedings, complaints, and brand-related risks were materially inadequate or misleading.
Analysis: The offer documents disclosed the pending proceedings, the risk factors, the complaints received, and the corresponding responses, and also made the relevant material available for inspection. The Court held that the law requires material and adequate disclosure, not a recital of every allegation or every statutory detail, and that the primary responsibility for due diligence and accuracy of disclosures rests on the lead managers, with SEBI playing a supervisory role. The brand-license risk and possible consequences of adverse proceedings were also found to have been disclosed sufficiently.
Conclusion: The allegation of material non-disclosure or misleading disclosure was not accepted.
Issue (iii): Whether the petitions were liable to be rejected on grounds of delay, lack of bona fides, and suppression of material facts.
Analysis: The Court found that the petitioners had not satisfactorily explained the timing of their complaints after the draft offer document had been published and that the record raised doubts about bona fides. In the case of one petitioner, the Court found deliberate suppression of the replies received from WeWork India and the BRLMs, and held that withholding material documents disentitled him to relief. The Court nevertheless proceeded to decide the controversy on merits as well.
Conclusion: The petitions were liable to be dismissed on equitable grounds, and one petition was dismissed with costs for suppression.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions failed, the regulatory process behind the IPO was upheld, and no interference was warranted with the offer documents or the IPO process.
Ratio Decidendi: In challenges to securities offer documents, courts will defer to the expert regulator and the lead managers where the documents disclose the material risks and proceedings, because the law requires true and adequate disclosure rather than exhaustive narration of every allegation or statutory detail.
Outcome: The appeal was dismissed, with no interference called for in the impugned judgment dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether receipts for job work of printing of textiles/fabrics, as reflected in Form-26AS, including receipts from a particular client, are exempt from service tax under Sr. No. 30(ii)(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.
1.2 Whether the demand of service tax on receipts from a particular client could be sustained when supporting documentary evidence (certificate confirming nature of services) was produced at the appellate stage and the same nature of receipts from another client had already been accepted as exempt.
1.3 Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 could survive when the underlying demand of service tax is held to be unsustainable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Exemption for job work of printing textiles under Notification No. 25/2012-ST and sustainability of demand on receipts from one client
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Adjudicating Authority recorded that "services of job work related to printing of textile are exempted from payment of service tax" as per Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012, specifically under Sr. No. 30(ii)(a), and applied this exemption to receipts from one client after verification of documents and certificate.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.2 The proceedings were initiated solely on the basis of third-party data from the Income Tax Department, taking the gross receipts in Form-26AS as taxable value and proposing service tax on the entire amount.
2.3 On examination of documents, the Adjudicating Authority accepted that receipts from one client (amounting to Rs. 41,47,791/-) were on account of "job work related to printing of textile" and, based on delivery challans/invoices and a certificate from that client, held such services to be covered under Sr. No. 30(ii)(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST and therefore exempt.
2.4 For the remaining receipts of Rs. 4,54,916/- from another client, the Adjudicating Authority denied exemption only on the ground of absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence regarding the nature of services; a few invoices were found insufficient as the "nature of transaction is not mentioned therein". On that basis, the amount was treated as taxable and service tax of Rs. 68,237/- was confirmed.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that a certificate dated 20.03.2024 issued by the second client for Rs. 4,54,916/- was subsequently produced, confirming that the receipts were on account of job work related to printing of textiles/fabrics. The Tribunal further recorded that this certificate had also been submitted before the first appellate authority but was not taken into cognizance.
2.6 The Tribunal observed that the entire receipts reflected in Form-26AS pertain to printing of textiles/fabrics on job work basis, and that "the majority of the demand was dropped on the basis of documents and certificate" from the first client. It reasoned that, once it is held that job work receipts on account of printing of textiles/fabrics received by the assessee are exempt under Sr. No. 30(ii)(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST, there is no basis to take a different view for the similar receipts from the other client, particularly in the presence of a confirming certificate.
2.7 On this reasoning, the Tribunal held that the demand of service tax on Rs. 4,54,916/- from the second client, founded only on initial non-production of a certificate, could not be sustained after the certificate confirming the same nature of job work services was placed on record.
Conclusions:
2.8 Services of job work related to printing of textiles/fabrics rendered by the assessee fall within Sr. No. 30(ii)(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST and are exempt from service tax.
2.9 The receipts of Rs. 4,54,916/- from the second client, being of the same nature (job work of printing textiles/fabrics) and duly supported by a certificate, are also exempt; the demand of service tax of Rs. 68,237/- on this amount is unsustainable and is set aside.
Issue 3: Sustainability of penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.10 The Adjudicating Authority had imposed penalty equal to the tax amount under Section 78 for alleged suppression of value of taxable services, and the first appellate authority had upheld this penalty while setting aside penalties under Section 77.
2.11 The Tribunal, having held that the receipts in question are exempt and that the service tax demand itself is not sustainable, concluded that the foundation for invoking Section 78 no longer exists.
Conclusions:
2.12 With the service tax demand set aside on merits, the penalty imposed under Section 78 is also unsustainable and is accordingly set aside.
Issues: Whether the finding of clandestine removal of 68.996 MT of single ply yarn and the consequent demand and penalty could be interfered with in reference jurisdiction.
Analysis: The stock discrepancy was examined by the adjudicating authority, the appellate authority, and the Tribunal on the basis of the RG-1 register, invoices, and the manufacturing process. The authorities concurrently held that the shortage existed at the stage of single ply yarn and was not attributable to wastage arising from conversion into double ply yarn. The Court held that the question whether there was shortage on the date of search was a pure question of fact, and that it could not reappreciate evidence already considered by the fact-finding authorities. In the absence of any perversity, lack of evidence, or legal infirmity, the concurrent factual findings were not open to interference.
Conclusion: The finding of clandestine removal was upheld and the demand and penalty were sustained.
Final Conclusion: No referable question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and the reference petition failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence, including stock records and physical verification, are not interfered with in reference jurisdiction unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or otherwise legally infirm.
Issues: (i) Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the summoning order were liable to be quashed on the ground that the cheque was issued only as security and there was no legally enforceable debt or subsisting liability; (ii) Whether the complaint disclosed sufficient averments to prosecute the directors under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Issue (i): Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the summoning order were liable to be quashed on the ground that the cheque was issued only as security and there was no legally enforceable debt or subsisting liability.
Analysis: The loan arrangement was found to be a continuation of the earlier commercial transaction, and the amount earlier advanced was expressly carried forward and acknowledged in the later loan agreement. The cheque in question, though asserted to be a security cheque, had prima facie fructified against an existing liability under the loan agreement. The defence that the payment was stopped because the transaction had failed, that the liability had been discharged by alleged losses, or that the cheque was not supported by enforceable debt, was held to raise disputed questions of fact. Such defences were held to be matters for trial and not for exercise of inherent jurisdiction at the stage of quashing. The subsequent arbitral findings also supported the existence of liability to repay the balance amount.
Conclusion: The complaint was not liable to be quashed on the ground of absence of legally enforceable debt; the finding was against the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether the complaint disclosed sufficient averments to prosecute the directors under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: The complaint specifically alleged that the directors and officers were in charge of the company's day-to-day affairs and were responsible for its decisions. For vicarious liability under Section 141, it was sufficient at the threshold that the complaint contained such averments, particularly where the chairman and managing director was directly involved in the transactions. The court held that the sufficiency of the directors' defence could not be tested at the quashing stage, and the complaint was not required to reproduce the statutory language verbatim so long as the substance of the role attributed to the accused was clear.
Conclusion: The complaint disclosed sufficient basis to proceed against the directors; the finding was against the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction was not warranted because the dishonour complaint disclosed a prima facie case under the negotiable instruments law, and the challenge to the summoning order failed.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of quashing a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a cheque asserted to be security may still attract criminal liability if the complaint and surrounding documents prima facie show an existing enforceable liability, while disputed questions regarding contractual breach or discharge of liability must be left to trial; for directors, specific averments that they in charge of and responsible for the company's affairs are sufficient to proceed under Section 141.
Issues: Whether the property valuation for the purpose of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was required to be with reference to the financial year 2009-10 and whether the matter required remand for verification of the assessee's additional evidence.
Analysis: The assessee had originally booked the flat in 2009 and made payment of the agreed consideration in that year. The later allotment and registration reflected a different flat number, but the area remained the same and the developer's subsequent letter accepted that one flat number in the amended allotment was a typographical error. The additional evidence in the form of the developer's confirmation and the assessee's affidavit was admitted. On these facts, the benefit of the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii)(b) was held to be available, and the valuation issue required verification by the Assessing Officer on the basis of the earlier booking and allotment documents.
Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to have the stamp duty valuation considered with reference to financial year 2009-10 relevant to assessment year 2010-11, and the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for limited verification and fresh assessment after giving an opportunity of hearing.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the delay of 71 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal deserved condonation.
1.2 Whether the addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs as unexplained cash deposit under section 69 read with section 115BBE, arising out of cash deposits during the demonetization period, was sustainable on merits.
1.3 Whether the enhanced rate of tax under section 115BBE (60%) was applicable to the addition made in respect of cash deposits made during the demonetization period, or whether only the earlier/normal rate of 30% was applicable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of delay in filing the appeal
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal considered the assessee's condonation petition and supporting affidavit explaining the 71 days' delay. Having regard to the contents of these documents and the relatively small period of delay, the Tribunal accepted the explanation.
Conclusions: The delay of 71 days in filing the appeal was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication on merits.
Issue 2: Sustainaibility of addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs under section 69
Legal framework (as discussed): The assessment was framed under section 144. The Assessing Officer had treated Rs. 3.19 lakhs, out of total cash deposits of Rs. 14.19 lakhs during the demonetization period, as unexplained investment under section 69 and subjected the same to tax under section 115BBE.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted from the assessee's replies before the lower authorities that, out of cash deposits of Rs. 14.19 lakhs, the assessee could not establish the sources of Rs. 3.19 lakhs. The Assessing Officer had already granted benefit for the portion explained as agricultural income and restricted the addition to the unexplained balance. Before the Tribunal, no one appeared on behalf of the assessee and no new material was produced to rebut the concurrent findings of the lower authorities or to substantiate the source of the impugned sum.
Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs as unexplained under section 69, affirming the findings of the Assessing Officer and the appellate authority on this point.
Issue 3: Applicability of enhanced rate of tax under section 115BBE to demonetization-period deposits
Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal considered section 115BBE and the amendment increasing the rate of tax from 30% to 60% with effect from 01.04.2017. It referred to the judgment of the High Court (Madura Bench) in "S.M.I.L.E. Microfinance Ltd. vs. ACIT (WP (MD) No. 2078 of 2020 dated 19-11-2024)". The High Court had examined the objects and reasons of the Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 2016, including the Press Information Bureau note explaining the legislative intent behind the changes introduced in connection with demonetization and the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, 2016.
The High Court, after extracting and analysing the objects and reasons, concluded that:
(a) The amendment to section 115BBE enhancing the rate to 60% was effective from 01.04.2017.
(b) The language of the objects and reasons, including the expression "instead of allowing people to find illegal ways of converting their black money into black again", indicated that the enhanced rate was intended to operate prospectively for future transactions from 01.04.2017 onwards.
(c) Consequently, the revenue was empowered to levy 60% tax only on transactions from 01.04.2017 onwards, and for transactions prior to that cut-off date, only the earlier rate of 30% was applicable.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the cash deposits in question pertained to the demonetization period between 08.11.2016 and 30.12.2016. Relying on and respectfully following the above decision of the High Court, the Tribunal held that the higher rate of 60% under the amended section 115BBE could not be applied to such pre-01.04.2017 transactions. Therefore, the addition sustained under section 69 had to be taxed at the normal/earlier rate of 30% and not at 60%.
Conclusions: While sustaining the quantum addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs as unexplained, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to apply only the normal rate of tax (30%) under section 115BBE and not the enhanced rate of 60%. The appeal was thus partly allowed to the extent of relief in the applicable tax rate.
Issues: Whether reimbursements made by Indian entities to the foreign assessee towards salary paid to seconded employees were liable to be treated as fees for technical services under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the India-Japan DTAA.
Analysis: The record showed that the seconded personnel entered into separate employment arrangements with the Indian entities, were paid salary by those entities, worked under their control and supervision, and had tax deducted at source on the salary payments. The reimbursements were made at cost without markup. On these facts, the payments retained the character of salary reimbursement and did not acquire the character of consideration for technical services. The treaty definition of fees for technical services also excluded payments to an employee, and the cited judicial authorities supported the view that salary reimbursements to secondees cannot be recharacterised as FTS.
Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the assessee. The reimbursements were not taxable as fees for technical services.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reliance by the Adjudicating Authority on the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 to appoint a liquidator other than the resolution professional recommended by the committee of creditors is legally permissible.
1.2 Whether the resolution professional has a vested right to be appointed as liquidator once recommended by the committee of creditors and having given consent under Section 34(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.3 Whether, after commencement and substantial progress of the liquidation process under a liquidator appointed by the Adjudicating Authority, it is appropriate or necessary to substitute that liquidator with the resolution professional originally recommended by the committee of creditors.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Reliance on IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 for appointment of liquidator
Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal referred to its earlier decisions, including the order in Manish Jaju v. CoC and others and the batch of appeals in Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. v. Amit Vijay Karia & another, wherein it was held that the IBBI does not have authority to override the statutory scheme for appointment of a liquidator under Section 34(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, and that the Adjudicating Authority has no authority to appoint a resolution professional as liquidator overlooking the choice of the committee of creditors.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the Adjudicating Authority "apparently has felt bound" by the IBBI letter dated 18.07.2023 when appointing the second respondent as liquidator, and was "not seen to assert any exclusive authority" to appoint a liquidator superseding the right of the committee of creditors to have its chosen resolution professional function as liquidator. In view of the Tribunal's own prior pronouncements, "the cloud over the appointment of the appellant" arising from the IBBI communication stood removed.
Conclusions: The IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 cannot legally override the statutory scheme under Section 34(4) for appointment of a liquidator, nor can it confer on the Adjudicating Authority a power to disregard the choice of the committee of creditors. The Adjudicating Authority's reliance on the IBBI letter as binding was legally misplaced, though this misstep did not, in the circumstances, require reversal of the ongoing liquidation under the liquidator already in place.
Issue 2 - Vested right of the resolution professional to be appointed as liquidator
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal expressly held that the appellant "does not have any vested right to be appointed as the liquidator." The facts that (i) the committee of creditors had resolved to appoint the appellant as liquidator, (ii) the appellant had given written consent in Form AA under Section 34(1), and (iii) no disciplinary proceedings were pending against him, were all noted. However, these factors did not elevate his claim to a legally enforceable or vested right to the office of liquidator. The Tribunal further observed that the third respondent, having more than 92% voting share, had no objection to the second respondent continuing and was focused only on completion of the liquidation process, thereby underlining that the appellant could not insist on "impos[ing] his wish to act as a liquidator" on the majority creditor.
Conclusions: Recommendation by the committee of creditors and the appellant's consent under Section 34(1) do not confer a vested or enforceable right on the resolution professional to be appointed or to continue as liquidator. The appellant cannot compel appointment merely because he was the prior resolution professional and was recommended by the committee of creditors.
Issue 3 - Appropriateness of changing the liquidator mid-process where substantial steps have been taken and majority creditor supports the incumbent liquidator
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the second respondent, appointed by the Adjudicating Authority, had already made "substantial progress" in the liquidation, including preparation of the liquidation estate, asset memorandum, verification of claims, and initiation of steps for sale of assets. It held that "it may not be appropriate to change the liquidator in the middle of the liquidation process as there will be cost implications," especially when the third respondent, holding more than 92% voting share and thus well above the 66% threshold, was "happy with the second liquidator" and keen only to complete liquidation expeditiously. While reaffirming that the Adjudicating Authority cannot overlook the committee of creditors' choice (as clarified in the Omkara Asset Reconstruction decision), the Tribunal stressed the practical and economic consequences of a mid-stream change, and the fact that the creditor with an overwhelming majority had accepted the incumbent liquidator.
Conclusions: Even though the legal "cloud" created by the IBBI letter over the appellant's appointment stood removed, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to dislodge the second respondent as liquidator at an advanced stage of the liquidation. Considering the substantial progress made, the cost and delay implications of a change, and the explicit support of the majority creditor, the Tribunal declined to replace the current liquidator. The appeal challenging the appointment of the second respondent was held to be without merit and was dismissed without costs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether there existed a pre-existing dispute between the parties in respect of the claimed operational debt, warranting rejection of the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.2 Whether the defence raised by the corporate debtor to the operational creditor's claim was a mere "moonshine defence" or a plausible contention within the meaning of the law laid down in relation to Section 9(5)(i)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.3 Whether issues relating to alleged deficiencies in services, non-completion of work and warranty disputes between the parties could be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Existence of pre-existing dispute under Section 9 IBC
(a) Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal referred to Section 9(5)(i)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported as "Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited", particularly paragraph 51, regarding the scope of "dispute" and the duty of the adjudicating authority while considering a Section 9 application.
2.2 As per the cited ratio, an application under Section 9 must be rejected if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor or there exists a record of dispute, and the adjudicating authority is only to see whether there is a plausible contention requiring further investigation and that the dispute is not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or a patently feeble argument.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal examined contemporaneous correspondence from 2017 and 2018, including a letter dated 15.01.2018 and earlier communications dated 10.05.2017, 11.05.2017, 27.05.2017, 20.06.2017, 11.08.2017 and 12.08.2017, wherein the corporate debtor consistently raised concerns about delay, pendency and non-completion of works, resulting in substantial generation losses on a daily basis.
2.4 The Tribunal noted that through various emails in August 2017, the corporate debtor reiterated allegations of substandard quality of goods supplied, defective works and materials, suspension of warranty, abandonment of the project without formal handover, and unresolved critical issues such as faulty inverters, defective system designs and oil leakages.
2.5 The Tribunal then considered the operational creditor's email dated 21.02.2019, in which detailed outstanding amounts were claimed in respect of both projects, and the corporate debtor's immediate reply dated 22.02.2019. In this reply, the corporate debtor clearly stated that the operational creditor had not deducted the losses incurred due to non-completion of works and denial of services under warranty and indicated that it would review and revert.
2.6 The Tribunal held that the reply dated 22.02.2019 showed that the claim of the operational creditor was neither admitted nor acknowledged and that disputes were raised at the relevant time regarding losses, non-completion and warranty issues.
2.7 The Tribunal also noted that the demand notice under Section 8 was issued on 11.07.2022, more than three years after the alleged completion of work, and in the backdrop of an already existing chain of correspondence evidencing dispute.
(c) Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal concluded that there was a clear, pre-existing dispute between the parties regarding the alleged operational debt, relating to non-completion of work, deficiencies, losses and warranty issues.
2.9 Consequently, the statutory requirement for rejection of the Section 9 application, in terms of the existence of a "dispute" under Section 9(5)(i)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, stood satisfied.
Issue 2: Nature of the corporate debtor's defence - whether "moonshine defence"
(a) Legal framework
2.10 Relying on the principles in the Supreme Court's decision in "Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited", the Tribunal reiterated that the adjudicating authority is only required to assess whether there is a plausible contention requiring further investigation, and whether the dispute is not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or a patently feeble legal argument; the merits of the dispute are not to be finally adjudicated at the Section 9 stage.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The operational creditor contended that the corporate debtor's reference to losses and warranty issues in the email dated 22.02.2019 was vague, unsupported by particulars, and hence amounted to a "moonshine defence".
2.12 The Tribunal rejected this contention by placing weight on the entire sequence of contemporaneous emails and letters from 2017 and 2018, which consistently recorded complaints about delay, non-completion, defective work, substandard materials, suspension of warranty and resultant generation losses.
2.13 In view of these contemporaneous documents and the corporate debtor's immediate response to the outstanding claim in February 2019, the Tribunal held that the defence was not merely a belated or concocted assertion but was grounded in existing factual correspondence.
(c) Conclusions
2.14 The Tribunal held that the corporate debtor's defence could not be characterised as a "moonshine defence" or as a patently feeble argument unsupported by evidence.
2.15 Applying the test laid down in Mobilox, the Tribunal concluded that there existed a real and plausible dispute which required further investigation and, therefore, the Section 9 application was liable to be rejected.
Issue 3: Appropriateness of Section 9 IBC proceedings for adjudicating underlying contractual disputes
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 The Tribunal noted that the issues raised by the corporate debtor concerned non-completion of work, deficiencies in services, defective goods and designs, generation losses and disputes over warranty obligations, all arising out of the contractual relationship between the parties.
2.17 The Tribunal observed that these issues involved factual and contractual adjudication which could not appropriately be undertaken within the limited, summary scope of proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
(b) Conclusions
2.18 The Tribunal held that the present matter was not fit for resolution through insolvency proceedings under Section 9 but rather by way of appropriate remedies available under the contract and general law.
2.19 While upholding the rejection of the Section 9 application, the Tribunal clarified that such rejection would not preclude the operational creditor from availing contractual and other legal remedies for recovery of its alleged dues.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, under the statutory scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the authority to select and appoint a liquidator upon commencement of liquidation lies with the committee of creditors or with the Adjudicating Authority.
1.2 How Sections 7, 9, 10, 16, 22, 27 and 34 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, read with Regulation 31A(11) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, allocate roles between the committee of creditors, the Board and the Adjudicating Authority in the appointment or replacement of the interim resolution professional, resolution professional and liquidator.
1.3 Whether the Adjudicating Authority possesses any independent or residual power to appoint or replace a resolution professional or liquidator in situations involving fraud, gross misconduct or collusion between the resolution professional/liquidator and the committee of creditors or stakeholders.
1.4 On the facts of the case, whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in appointing liquidators of its own choice, disregarding the candidate proposed by the committee of creditors, and what directions ought to follow for appointment of the liquidator.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Allocation of authority between CoC and Adjudicating Authority for appointment/replacement of IRP, RP and liquidator under the IBC framework
Legal framework as discussed
2.1 The Court examined the scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code from the stage of appointment of an interim resolution professional, referring specifically to Sections 7(3)(b), 9(4), 10, 16, 22, 27 and 34 of the Code, and to Regulation 31A(11) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.
2.2 Under Sections 7(3)(b), 9(4) and 10, the petitioner (financial creditor, operational creditor or corporate debtor, as the case may be) has the choice to recommend an interim resolution professional. Section 16 governs appointment of the interim resolution professional by the Adjudicating Authority, including cases where no interim resolution professional is proposed (Section 16(3)).
2.3 Section 22 empowers the committee of creditors to (a) confirm the interim resolution professional as resolution professional or (b) replace the interim resolution professional with another resolution professional of its choice, subject to written consent and confirmation by the Board.
2.4 Section 27 enables the committee of creditors to replace the resolution professional at any stage, by forwarding the name of another resolution professional with his written consent to the Adjudicating Authority for appointment, subject to confirmation by the Board; no reasons are required to be furnished for such replacement.
2.5 Section 34(1) provides that, upon passing an order for liquidation, "the resolution professional appointed for the corporate insolvency resolution process ... shall, subject to submission of a written consent ... act as the liquidator ... unless replaced by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (4)." Section 34(4)(c) refers, inter alia, to a situation where "the resolution professional fails to submit written consent under sub-section (1)."
2.6 Regulation 31A(11) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 provides that the consultation committee may, by majority, propose to replace the liquidator and shall apply to the Adjudicating Authority for such replacement after obtaining the written consent of the proposed liquidator.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court drew a distinction between (i) selection of an insolvency professional (IRP/RP/liquidator) and (ii) formal appointment by the Adjudicating Authority. It held that the Code consciously separates the selection process from the act of appointment: selection is entrusted to the petitioning creditor/debtor or the committee of creditors (and in some cases to the Board), while the Adjudicating Authority is confined to making the formal appointment of the person so selected.
2.8 Analysing Sections 7, 9, 10 and 16, the Court observed that the Adjudicating Authority is nowhere given an independent authority to select an interim resolution professional of its own choice. Even when the recommended interim resolution professional faces disciplinary proceedings, the Code mandates dismissal of the petition or recourse to a recommendation from the Board, but does not authorise the Adjudicating Authority to choose an interim resolution professional independently.
2.9 From this scheme, the Court inferred a legislative intent to exclude the Adjudicating Authority from the selection process for the interim resolution professional and to deny it any veto over the petitioner's or the Board's choice, limiting its role to formal appointment of the professional so selected and approved.
2.10 At the next stage, under Section 22, the committee of creditors has the exclusive choice to either retain the interim resolution professional as resolution professional or to replace him with another resolution professional. The requirement of written consent of the proposed resolution professional and confirmation by the Board was characterised as procedural; the Adjudicating Authority neither participates in the selection nor overrides the committee of creditors' decision, save for an interim arrangement where the Board's confirmation is delayed.
2.11 Section 27 continues the same pattern: the committee of creditors alone chooses the replacement resolution professional; the Adjudicating Authority only appoints the professional so chosen, subject to confirmation by the Board. The Code does not require the committee of creditors to provide reasons for replacement, underscoring its primacy in the selection process.
2.12 Turning to Section 34(1) and Section 34(4)(c), the Court rejected the construction that the Adjudicating Authority has an exclusive power to select a liquidator whenever the existing resolution professional does not consent to act as liquidator. The Court emphasised that Section 34(1) merely provides that the resolution professional "shall ... act as the liquidator ... unless replaced by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (4)"; this language confers on the Adjudicating Authority a power of replacement, but not a power of initial selection contrary to the statutory scheme.
2.13 The Court held that "replacement of the resolution professional" in Section 34(1) read with Section 34(4)(c) must be understood in light of Section 27: the authority to select the replacement resolution professional (who may then act as liquidator) rests with the committee of creditors, while the Adjudicating Authority's role remains to formally appoint the person so selected after Board confirmation.
2.14 Any interpretation that would allow the Adjudicating Authority, in the specific situation where the existing resolution professional refuses consent to act as liquidator, to appoint a liquidator of its own choice, was considered anomalous and inconsistent with the broader legislative design which, at all other stages, denies the Adjudicating Authority an independent selecting role.
2.15 The Court accordingly read Section 34 harmoniously with Sections 22 and 27, holding that the Code does not carve out an exception at the liquidation stage to confer upon the Adjudicating Authority an overarching power to choose a liquidator in preference to the committee of creditors' nominee.
Conclusions on Issues 1 & 2
2.16 The authority to select and propose the person who will act as liquidator upon liquidation lies with the committee of creditors (by application of Section 27 procedures), and not with the Adjudicating Authority.
2.17 The Adjudicating Authority's power under Section 34(1) read with Section 34(4)(c) is confined to formally replacing and appointing the resolution professional/liquidator chosen in accordance with the statutory procedure; it does not include an independent power to select a liquidator of its own choice.
2.18 Regulation 31A(11) reinforces the position that stakeholder bodies (consultation committee/CoC) may propose replacement of a liquidator and that the Adjudicating Authority acts on such proposal; it does not vest any original power of selection in the Adjudicating Authority.
Issue 3: Residual or inherent power of Adjudicating Authority in cases of fraud, misconduct or collusion
Legal framework as discussed
3.1 The Court did not identify an express Code provision authorising the Adjudicating Authority to independently select a resolution professional or liquidator in situations of fraud or collusion. However, it considered the general principles flowing from the constitutional role of judicial fora and referred incidentally to Rule 11 of the NCLT and NCLAT Rules as reflecting inherent powers.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.2 The Court recognised that the IBC assigns a minimal and largely formal role to the Adjudicating Authority in the selection and appointment of insolvency professionals, but held that this does not denude the tribunal of its core judicial function to prevent abuse of process and "fraud on the statute."
3.3 It identified a "solitary circumstance" where the Adjudicating Authority may have to act independently of the committee of creditors or the stakeholders' consultation committee: where it has reason to believe, on the basis of tangible and incontrovertible facts, that the resolution professional or liquidator has committed gross misconduct, in connivance or collusion with the committee of creditors or consultation committee, thereby compromising the integrity of the resolution or liquidation process.
3.4 In such a scenario, the Court reasoned that it would be futile and contrary to the public interest for the Adjudicating Authority to rely on the same compromised bodies (CoC/SCC) to propose replacement, since their collusion is part of the mischief. To insist on their initiative would, in effect, compel the tribunal to remain a "mute spectator" to a fraud on the statute.
3.5 Drawing on constitutional and jurisprudential principles, and illustrative dicta from other jurisdictions and contexts, the Court affirmed that no judicial forum can justifiably abdicate its duty to intervene where procedural actors subvert statutory purpose through collusion or misconduct. The power to arrest statutory frauds is inherent in the judicial system and does not depend on express statutory conferment.
Conclusions on Issue 3
3.6 As a rule, the Adjudicating Authority has no original role in selecting a resolution professional or liquidator and must respect the choices made by the committee of creditors and confirmed by the Board, appointing them in terms of the Code.
3.7 Exceptionally, where there is credible and incontrovertible material of gross misconduct or fraud by the resolution professional or liquidator in collusion with the committee of creditors or consultation committee, the Adjudicating Authority may, in exercise of its inherent judicial powers, intervene independently to seek or effect replacement to safeguard the integrity of the process.
3.8 This exceptional power does not dilute the general statutory scheme; it operates only to prevent fraud on the statute and preserve public confidence in the insolvency framework.
Issue 4: Validity of the Adjudicating Authority's appointment of its own liquidators in the present case and consequential directions
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 On the facts, the committee of creditors in both matters had resolved that the corporate debtor be liquidated and had proposed a particular entity as liquidator, which was not the then acting resolution professional.
4.2 The Adjudicating Authority nevertheless appointed, as liquidator, a different person (the second respondent in each appeal), who was neither the resolution professional appointed during the corporate insolvency resolution process nor the candidate chosen by the committee of creditors.
4.3 The liquidators appointed by the Adjudicating Authority argued that because the existing resolution professionals had not given written consent to act as liquidators under Section 34(1), the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive authority to appoint replacements under Section 34(4)(c), and that neither the committee of creditors nor the stakeholders' consultation committee had any role in appointing a liquidator.
4.4 Applying its interpretation of Sections 27 and 34, the Court rejected this contention. It held that even where the existing resolution professional does not consent to act as liquidator, the selection of a replacement resolution professional (who will function as liquidator) remains with the committee of creditors; the Adjudicating Authority cannot bypass the committee's choice and unilaterally appoint a liquidator of its own preference.
4.5 The Court noted the appellant's explanation that the committee of creditors had initially chosen a person other than the then resolution professional as liquidator in the backdrop of an IBBI circular dated 18.07.2023, which required that the resolution professional and liquidator not be the same. Subsequent to the Tribunal's decision in another matter holding that the IBBI could not override Section 34 by such a circular, the basis for insisting on a different liquidator no longer persisted.
4.6 Although the minutes of the meetings in which the resolution professional was replaced did not explicitly record the IBBI circular or the unwillingness of the erstwhile resolution professional, the Court held that this omission did not bar it from recognising the committee of creditors' present choice of liquidator. It reiterated that the right to replace, for the purposes of Section 34(1), lies with the committee of creditors and that the procedure under Section 27 must be followed.
4.7 The Court clarified that the entity chosen by the committee of creditors as liquidator must first be appointed (or recognised) as resolution professional in the manner contemplated by Section 27 and its nomination confirmed by the Board. Upon such confirmation, that entity would then, under Section 34(1), act as liquidator, and the Adjudicating Authority would be obliged to appoint it as such.
Conclusions on Issue 4
4.8 The Adjudicating Authority acted beyond its jurisdiction in appointing liquidators of its own choice and in disregarding the candidate nominated by the committee of creditors; it misapplied Section 34(1) read with Section 34(4)(c) by treating itself as the primary selecting authority for the liquidator.
4.9 The authority to select the replacement resolution professional, who would then act as liquidator under Section 34(1), rests with the committee of creditors, and the Adjudicating Authority's role is limited to formal appointment of that person after confirmation by the Board.
4.10 The orders of the Adjudicating Authority appointing its own nominees as liquidators stand set aside. Upon confirmation by the Board of the entity chosen by the committee of creditors, the Adjudicating Authority is required to appoint that entity as the liquidator in accordance with the Code.
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