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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether interest income earned by a primary credit co-operative society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction as "profits and gains of business attributable to" providing credit facilities to members under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
1.2 Whether, in light of section 80P(4) and the judicial precedents cited, deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on interest from co-operative banks to a co-operative society stands excluded or restricted, and whether this question required adjudication in the present case.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on interest from deposits with co-operative banks
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.1 The Tribunal considered section 80P(2)(a)(i), which grants deduction of the "whole of the amount of profits and gains of business attributable to" the business of providing credit facilities to members.
2.2 The Tribunal relied on the interpretation of the word "attributable" as laid down by the Supreme Court (11 ITR 842) and as applied by the jurisdictional High Court in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Co-operative Ltd., holding that "attributable to" has a wider ambit than "derived from".
2.3 The Tribunal also considered section 80P(4), which excludes certain co-operative banks from claiming deduction under section 80P, and the Supreme Court judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., clarifying that section 80P(4) is aimed at excluding co-operative banks functioning on par with commercial banks from claiming deduction in their own case, and that section 80P continues to apply to co-operative societies as defined in section 2(19).
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal found as a fact that the assessee is a primary credit co-operative society, not a bank, carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members and dealing in seeds and fertilizers to members only.
2.5 The assessee received interest of ?20,64,423 from deposits with co-operative banks, which was credited in the profit and loss account; the net profit of ?10,20,139 was claimed as deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Assessing Officer disallowed deduction only to the extent of ?10,20,139, though the interest income itself was higher, thereby in effect allowing deduction on part of the interest while denying it on the remainder. The Tribunal characterised this as an internal inconsistency and a fallacy in the assessment order, amounting to the Assessing Officer both accepting and rejecting the same kind of income for deduction.
2.6 On the core legal issue, the Tribunal applied the ratio of the jurisdictional High Court in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Co-operative Ltd., where it was held that a co-operative society carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members may deposit temporarily surplus funds (not immediately required for lending) in banks, and the interest so earned is "attributable to" the business of providing credit to members and hence eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), so long as the society is not carrying on any separate distinct business.
2.7 The Tribunal noted that in that decision, the High Court, following the Supreme Court's interpretation of "attributable to", held that such interest forms part of the profits and gains of the business of the co-operative society and is fully deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
2.8 The Tribunal also examined the later Karnataka High Court judgment in Totagars Co-operative Sale Society (395 ITR 611) which had distinguished Tumkur Merchants on facts, particularly where it is established that the assessee is carrying on the business of banking; and the earlier decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society (392 ITR 74), which was held by the High Court itself to be distinguishable in the later ruling. The Tribunal observed that, on a survey of these rulings, two decisions of the jurisdictional High Court (Tumkur Merchants and Totgars - 392 ITR 74) supported the assessee's position, while one (395 ITR 611) went against, but on distinguishable facts.
2.9 With reference to Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., the Tribunal read that judgment to mean that section 80P(4) was introduced to withdraw deduction from co-operative banks themselves, and that neither section 80P(4) nor the CBDT circulars/clarifications considered therein state that co-operative societies receiving interest from co-operative banks are denied deduction under section 80P(2). It further noted that section 80P deductions are to be allowed from the "gross total income" if the income falls within the specific heads of section 80P(2), regardless of whether such income is assessed as "business income" or "income from other sources".
2.10 The Tribunal concluded that in the present case the assessee's factual position was closer to Tumkur Merchants and Totgars (392 ITR 74) than to the Karnataka High Court judgment relied upon by the Revenue, since the assessee is a primary credit co-operative society and not a co-operative bank.
(c) Conclusions
2.11 The Tribunal held that interest earned by the assessee from deposits with co-operative banks is "profits and gains of business attributable to" the business of providing credit facilities to its members and, therefore, eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
2.12 It directed deletion of the disallowance of ?10,20,139 and reversed the orders of the lower authorities.
Issue 2: Necessity to decide claim under section 80P(2)(d)
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.13 Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction in respect of "any income by way of interest or dividends derived by the co-operative society from its investments with any other co-operative society". The Assessing Officer had contended that, post insertion of section 80P(4), deduction under section 80P(2)(d) stood effectively curtailed where deposits were made with co-operative banks.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The Tribunal, having already held that the assessee was entitled to deduction on the relevant interest income under section 80P(2)(a)(i), considered that adjudication of the alternative claim under section 80P(2)(d) was not required for disposal of the appeal.
(c) Conclusions
2.15 The Tribunal treated the assessee's alternative ground under section 80P(2)(d) as academic and did not render a decision on the merits of that provision in the facts of the case.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cash deposits of Rs. 39,30,000/- in the bank account could be treated as "unexplained cash credit" under section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Act, when the assessee had recorded corresponding cash sales in its regularly maintained books of account and offered the same as part of its total turnover.
1.2 Whether receipts aggregating to Rs. 1,22,00,000/- from two identified purchasers, recorded as sale proceeds in the books of account and subjected to tax as part of turnover, could be treated as "unexplained cash credit" under section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Act on the basis of investigation wing information and third-party statements.
1.3 Whether separate additions under section 68 in respect of the aforesaid cash deposits and sale proceeds, when the corresponding sales already formed part of declared turnover, resulted in impermissible double addition.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 3: Addition of Rs. 39,30,000/- towards cash deposits as unexplained cash credit and allegation of double addition
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee is engaged in manufacturing excisable products, has disclosed total sales of Rs. 101.81 crores in the audited profit and loss account, and has shown cash sales as part of that turnover. The Assessing Officer accepted the returned income including these sales.
2.2 The assessee had made total cash deposits of Rs. 48,00,000/- in its bank account during the year and explained the source as cash sales duly recorded in the books. In support, it furnished: complete details of cash transactions; month-wise and day-wise cash and total sales; stock details; cash book; revised VAT returns with reasons; purchase bills; and excise returns. The products being excisable, corresponding excise and VAT records supported the turnover.
2.3 The Tribunal noted as undisputed that: (a) cash sales were part of the declared total sales; (b) purchases were not doubted; (c) total sales, both cash and credit, were not doubted by the revenue; (d) adequate stock was available and stock was correspondingly reduced for sales; (e) sales were subjected to VAT and accepted by VAT authorities; (f) complete month-wise purchases and sales for the year under consideration and the preceding year were furnished; (g) complete cash book with month-wise movement was produced; and (h) no negative cash balance on any day was alleged.
2.4 The books of account, including the cash book, were not rejected by the Assessing Officer and no defect in the books was pointed out. In these circumstances, the Tribunal held that the assessee had clearly established that the cash deposits emanated from recorded cash sales forming part of the regular books.
2.5 Having accepted the returned income which already included the cash sales, the Assessing Officer's separate addition of Rs. 39,30,000/- as unexplained cash credit on account of cash deposits would amount to taxing the same income twice. The Tribunal treated such separate addition as a "double addition".
Conclusions
2.6 The Tribunal held that the source of the cash deposits was fully explained from the regularly maintained books of account and cash book, and that there was no independent basis for treating the deposits as unexplained cash credits under section 68 read with section 115BBE.
2.7 The addition of Rs. 39,30,000/- on account of cash deposits was deleted, both on the ground that the source was established from the books and that separate addition would lead to double taxation of the same sales.
Issue 2 & 3: Addition of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- towards sale proceeds from identified purchasers as unexplained cash credit and allegation of double addition
Legal framework (as referred)
3.1 The impugned addition was made under section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Act, treating the receipts from two named entities as unexplained cash credits on the basis of information from the investigation wing and a third-party statement.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.2 The assessee had received Rs. 1,22,00,000/- from the two purchasers as sale proceeds, which were recorded as sales in the books and included in the total turnover disclosed in the return and audited accounts. In support of the genuineness of these sale transactions, the assessee furnished: names and addresses of parties; PAN and TIN; sale invoices; details of C-Forms issued; its own bank statements evidencing receipt of sale proceeds; stock registers; and sales registers.
3.3 The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer, relying on information from the investigation wing and an alleged link of a third person with one of the purchaser entities, considered the receipts as accommodation entries. However, the statement of the third person, heavily relied upon by the Assessing Officer, was never confronted to the assessee despite specific requests, and no independent inquiry regarding the actual sale transactions between the assessee and the purchasers was carried out.
3.4 It was further observed that: the purchases and overall sales of the assessee were not doubted; the assessee had sufficient stock with corresponding reduction for the sales; the turnover was accepted by VAT authorities; and the books of account were not rejected. The sales in question were part of the same set of accounts and supporting documentation.
3.5 The Tribunal held that, in these facts, the receipts from the purchasers were established as sale proceeds from recorded business transactions, forming part of the declared turnover. Treating the same receipts again as unexplained cash credits under section 68 would therefore amount to double addition, as those sales had already been brought to tax in computing business results.
Conclusions
3.6 The Tribunal concluded that no separate addition under section 68 read with section 115BBE could be sustained in respect of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- received from the purchasers, since the amounts represented duly recorded and supported sales already reflected in the profit and loss account.
3.7 The addition of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- was directed to be deleted, both for want of any independent basis to treat the recorded sales as unexplained cash credits and because sustaining such addition would lead to impermissible double taxation of the same income.
Overall disposition
4.1 On the combined reasoning that (i) the assessee had satisfactorily explained the source of both cash deposits and receipts from the purchasers through its regularly maintained books and contemporaneous records, and (ii) the impugned sums already formed part of the declared turnover and profits, the Tribunal held that the separate additions under section 68 read with section 115BBE were unsustainable.
4.2 All additions were deleted and the appeal was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cash deposits of Rs. 25,04,000 made during the demonetization period were unexplained money liable to be taxed as deemed income under section 69A read with section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Taxability of cash deposits during demonetization under section 69A read with section 115BBE
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The addition was made by the Assessing Officer by invoking section 69A treating the cash deposits as unexplained money, and subjected to tax as per the special rate prescribed under section 115BBE of the Act. The first appellate authority confirmed the said addition.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal noted from bank statements that the assessee had a consistent pattern of substantial cash withdrawals and deposits in earlier years, including financial years 2015-16 and 2016-17, in the same bank accounts in which the impugned cash was later deposited during demonetization.
2.3 It was found that during financial year 2015-16 the assessee had withdrawn Rs. 46,80,000 and deposited Rs. 16,50,000 in one bank account, and withdrawn Rs. 28,51,500 and deposited Rs. 65,000 in another bank account, evidencing a regular conduct of cash handling and banking.
2.4 The Statement of Affairs as on 31 March 2016 reflected a cash-in-hand balance of Rs. 54,41,148, which the Tribunal treated as corroborative evidence that the assessee was holding substantial cash prior to the demonetization period.
2.5 The assessee's explanation that larger cash withdrawals had been made for proposed renovation of her residential premises, supported by filed builder quotations, was accepted as a plausible and specific purpose for accumulation and retention of cash.
2.6 The Tribunal recorded that the renovation proposal failed due to lack of consensus among co-owners and breakdown of negotiations with the builder, and that demonetization compelled the assessee to redeposit the accumulated cash in the bank.
2.7 It was noted that the Revenue had not brought on record any material to show that the earlier withdrawn cash was spent or utilized elsewhere, or that the cash balance disclosed in the Statement of Affairs was incorrect or fictitious.
2.8 On this factual matrix, the Tribunal held that there was a direct and reasonable nexus between prior cash withdrawals (for a specific, unexecuted purpose) and the subsequent cash deposits during demonetization, and that this nexus satisfactorily explained the source of the impugned deposits.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal held that the assessee had properly and satisfactorily explained the source of cash deposits of Rs. 25,04,000, and therefore the conditions for invoking section 69A were not met.
2.10 Consequently, the addition made under section 69A read with section 115BBE was deleted, and the assessee's appeal was allowed in full.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether auction-purchasers of assets of a 100% Export Oriented Unit, sold during court-supervised liquidation under the Companies Act, 1956, are liable for pre-liquidation central excise/customs dues of the erstwhile unit.
1.2 Whether, in the absence of a specific statutory charge or non-obstante provision in the fiscal statutes, customs and excise authorities can bypass the official liquidator and recover pre-liquidation dues from purchasers of assets.
1.3 Whether, on the terms of the winding up and sale orders passed by the Company Court, any statutory dues, including excise/customs duties, can be recovered from auction-purchasers beyond taxes directly applicable on the sale transaction itself.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the show cause notice and demand for duty, interest and penalty issued to auction-purchasers of assets are without jurisdiction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability of auction-purchasers of assets of a 100% EOU for pre-liquidation excise/customs dues
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The unit in question, a 100% Export Oriented Unit, was ordered to be wound up by the High Court, which appointed an official liquidator to take possession of assets and conduct the sale under the Companies Act, 1956. The appellants acquired only assets of the unit through auction and not the running business or entire undertaking as a going concern.
2.2 The High Court, while approving the sale, specifically directed that: (i) the purchaser shall be liable to pay all statutory dues, if any, due and payable on the subject properties for the period after the date of the winding-up order; (ii) payment of dues for the pre-liquidation period shall be settled as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956; and (iii) dues, taxes, cess, if any, applicable on the sale of assets shall be paid by the purchaser.
2.3 On a plain reading of these directions, the Tribunal held that: (a) only post-winding-up statutory dues on the property are recoverable from the purchaser; (b) all pre-liquidation dues, including excise and customs duties, are to be settled under the Companies Act, 1956 through the liquidation process; and (c) the obligation of the purchaser regarding "dues, taxes, cess applicable on the sale of assets" is limited to taxes arising from the sale transaction itself (e.g., sales tax), not to historical liabilities of the erstwhile unit.
2.4 The Tribunal noted that only assets, and not the entire business or unit as such, had been transferred. Relying on precedent, it held that a subsequent purchaser of assets cannot be fastened with liabilities of the previous licensee/unit unless the entire business unit is purchased as such, or there is a specific statutory provision creating such liability or a "first charge" over the property.
2.5 In particular, reliance was placed on the reasoning adopted in decisions (as cited) that: (i) the relationship between the assessee/licensee and the tax authorities is personal and does not automatically bind an auction purchaser; (ii) in the absence of a specific statutory provision creating a charge or first charge, the auction purchaser is not liable for the arrears of the previous owner; and (iii) where only assets and not the entire business are purchased, the buyer is not responsible for government dues of the earlier unit.
Conclusions
2.6 Auction-purchasers of assets of the EOU are not liable for excise/customs dues incurred by the erstwhile unit for the pre-liquidation period, as they purchased only assets and not the entire unit as a running concern, and there is no statutory provision making them liable for such arrears.
Issue 2: Ability of fiscal authorities to bypass the liquidation framework and official liquidator; absence of statutory charge or non-obstante clause
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.7 The Tribunal examined the effect of the High Court's winding-up and sale orders passed under the Companies Act, 1956, which mandated that payment of pre-liquidation dues shall be settled as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It considered whether any provision of the customs or excise law, including any non-obstante clause, allowed recovery of such dues directly from the auction-purchasers notwithstanding the liquidation framework.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Tribunal held that, by the terms of the High Court's orders, the recovery of pre-liquidation dues, including excise and customs duties, is subsumed within and governed by the Companies Act, 1956 process. Accordingly, these dues must be asserted before the official liquidator and settled in accordance with the statutory scheme applicable to liquidation.
2.9 The department failed to point to any non-obstante clause or specific provision in the relevant fiscal statutes that would override the Companies Act, 1956 or permit customs or excise authorities to bypass the official liquidator and recover claims directly from purchasers of assets.
2.10 The Tribunal, noting the absence of a statutory charge or "first charge" created under the Central Excise Act for the relevant period, followed judicial authority that: (i) where no statutory first charge exists, government dues do not automatically override rights of secured creditors or subsequent purchasers; and (ii) in such circumstances, recovery must take place within the framework of the Companies Act and liquidation proceedings, not by proceeding directly against the asset purchasers.
Conclusions
2.11 In the absence of a specific non-obstante provision or statutory charge in the applicable fiscal enactments, the customs and excise department cannot override the liquidation regime under the Companies Act, 1956 or bypass the official liquidator to recover pre-liquidation dues from auction-purchasers of assets.
2.12 All pre-liquidation excise and customs dues are required to be claimed and settled under the Companies Act, 1956 in the winding-up process and cannot be enforced against the appellants as asset-purchasers.
Issue 3: Scope of purchaser's liability under the High Court's sale directions and characterization of "dues, taxes, cess ... applicable on the sale of assets"
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The High Court's order expressly stipulated that: (i) the purchaser shall be liable to pay statutory dues "for the period after the date of winding-up order"; (ii) pre-liquidation dues shall be settled as per the Companies Act; and (iii) "dues, taxes, cess, if any, applicable on the sale of assets shall be paid by the purchaser."
2.14 The Tribunal construed this clause to mean that only taxes that are incident on, or arise from, the sale transaction itself (such as sales tax or similar levies) are to be borne by the purchaser. It rejected any interpretation that would extend this phrase to cover past excise or customs duties foregone or unpaid by the previous owner.
2.15 On this construction, the purchaser's liability is strictly limited to: (a) statutory dues on the property post-winding-up; and (b) transactional taxes on the sale of assets. Historical central excise and customs liabilities of the wound-up company, being pre-liquidation dues, were to be dealt with only under the Companies Act, 1956 scheme and not passed on to purchasers.
Conclusions
2.16 The expression "dues, taxes, cess ... applicable on the sale of assets" in the sale order does not include pre-liquidation excise or customs arrears of the former EOU; it is limited to levies incident on the auction sale itself.
2.17 The appellants, as purchasers, have no liability for pre-liquidation statutory dues of the wound-up EOU beyond such transactional levies.
Issue 4: Validity and jurisdiction of the demand proceedings against auction-purchasers; need to consider limitation and penalty
Interpretation and reasoning
2.18 Having held that the legal framework of liquidation under the Companies Act, 1956 governs pre-liquidation dues and that purchasers of assets are not liable for historical excise/customs arrears in the absence of a statutory charge or specific provision, the Tribunal examined the jurisdictional basis of the notice and demand issued to the appellants.
2.19 In light of the above findings, the Tribunal held that the show cause notice seeking recovery of excise duty "foregone by the previous owner" from the appellants as auction-purchasers of assets was inherently without jurisdiction. The department could not lawfully demand such dues from the appellants when the only proper avenue for recovery of pre-liquidation dues was through the official liquidator under the Companies Act, 1956.
2.20 Having thus decided the core question of recovery in favour of the appellants on jurisdictional grounds, the Tribunal considered it unnecessary to examine ancillary issues, including applicability of limitation, extended period, or joint and several liability, or the imposition of penalty.
Conclusions
2.21 The demand of excise duty, interest and penalty raised against the auction-purchasers of assets is without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.
2.22 In view of the finding on lack of jurisdiction and non-liability of the appellants, questions of limitation, extended period, joint and several liability, and penalty do not arise for consideration.
2.23 The appeals are allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act could be relied upon without complying with the mandatory procedure under section 138B for purposes of adjudication.
1.2 Whether the appellant could be treated as the "owner" of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars seized from Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar and, consequently, saddled with the burden of proof under section 123 of the Customs Act.
1.3 Whether confiscation of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars and the Indian currency seized from Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar under sections 111(b), 111(d) and 121 of the Customs Act was sustainable as against the appellant.
1.4 Whether penalties imposed on the appellant under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act in relation to the 12 gold bars and associated transactions were legally sustainable.
1.5 Whether confiscation under sections 111(a), 111(b), 111(d) and 119 of the Customs Act of gold jewellery weighing 20756.3 gms seized from Subhash Tukaram Karan and gold jewellery/cut pieces seized from the premises of M/s. Bikaner Jewellers, allegedly linked to the appellant, was legally justified.
1.6 Whether, in the absence of any finding that the appellant imported smuggled gold or that section 120 of the Customs Act was invoked, gold jewellery/ornaments manufactured in India could be confiscated under section 111 on the allegation that they were made from smuggled gold.
1.7 Whether the adjudicating authority was justified in rejecting documentary evidence, including invoices, approval vouchers, GST records and affidavits of manufacturers/owners, and in drawing adverse inferences regarding alleged "planting" of 19 documents during de-sealing of the appellant's premises.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements under section 108 read with section 138B
Legal framework
2.1.1 The Court examined section 108 (power to summon and record statements) and section 138B (relevancy of statements under certain circumstances) of the Customs Act. Under section 138B(1)(b), read with section 138B(2), a statement made before a Gazetted Officer during inquiry can be treated as relevant in adjudication proceedings only when (i) the maker is examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority, and (ii) the adjudicating authority then forms an opinion, in the interests of justice, to admit the statement in evidence. Only thereafter can cross-examination be afforded.
2.1.2 The Court relied on decisions interpreting section 9D of the Central Excise Act, which is materially identical to section 138B, holding that the scheme is mandatory and aims to neutralise the possibility of statements being obtained under coercion: Ambika International; Jindal Drugs; Hi Tech Abrasives; and Tribunal decisions following these principles, as well as the Delhi High Court decision in Its My Name Pvt. Ltd. on section 138B itself.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court held that, where the circumstances in clause (a) of section 138B(1) do not apply, the adjudicating authority must: (i) summon and examine the person whose statement was recorded under section 108; (ii) then decide whether to admit that earlier statement in evidence; and (iii) only thereafter allow cross-examination. This sequence is mandatory.
2.1.4 As this procedure was admittedly not followed in respect of the statements of the appellant, Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar, those statements could not legally be treated as relevant or relied upon to prove the truth of their contents.
2.1.5 The Court rejected the departmental contention that the original section 108 statements could be relied upon irrespective of later retractions, holding that, in the absence of compliance with section 138B, such statements must be eschewed from consideration.
Conclusions
2.1.6 The statements under section 108 of the appellant, Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar were inadmissible as evidence for proving the facts contained therein, since the mandatory procedure under section 138B(1)(b) was not followed. The Commissioner could not base adverse findings against the appellant on those statements.
2.2 Ownership of 12 foreign-marked gold bars; applicability of section 123; validity of confiscation and treatment of seized currency
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The Commissioner had held the appellant to be the "owner" of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars solely on the basis of section 108 statements, and then invoked section 123 to place the burden on the appellant to prove licit possession.
2.2.2 The Court found that once the section 108 statements are excluded for non-compliance with section 138B, there is no reliable material to treat the appellant as owner of the 12 gold bars.
2.2.3 The Court noted that the appellant, while in judicial custody, formally retracted his earlier statement in a communication to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 30.01.2023, and consistently denied ownership of the 12 bars in subsequent section 108 statements and in his reply to the show cause notice. Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar also retracted their statements and did not support the case against the appellant thereafter.
2.2.4 As the appellant was neither the person from whose possession the goods were seized nor a person claiming ownership, and there being no sustainable finding of ownership, the presumption under section 123 could not be invoked against him.
2.2.5 In the absence of proof that the appellant was the owner or otherwise liable under section 123, the confiscation of the 12 gold bars under section 111(b) and 111(d) qua the appellant could not be sustained.
2.2.6 Regarding currency seized from Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar, the Court held that there was no evidence conclusively linking the cash to any smuggling consideration for the 12 gold bars; the Commissioner's conclusion that the cash was monetary consideration for carriage of smuggled gold was based on conjectures.
Conclusions
2.2.7 The finding that the appellant was the owner of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars is unsustainable.
2.2.8 Section 123 could not be invoked to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant with respect to those bars; consequently, confiscation of the 12 gold bars under section 111(b)/(d) against the appellant is not legally tenable.
2.2.9 There was no sufficient basis to treat the seized Indian currency as sale consideration of smuggled gold for purposes of confiscation in relation to the appellant.
2.3 Validity of penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA in relation to 12 gold bars and associated conduct
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Commissioner had held the appellant to be the "mastermind" of smuggling of foreign-origin gold bars and gold jewellery, and imposed penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA on the basis of the alleged ownership of the 12 bars, alleged smuggling, and alleged use/planting of forged documents.
2.3.2 The Court held that once confiscation of the 12 bars under section 111 could not be sustained against the appellant, the foundational requirement for penalty under section 112(b)(i) (dealing with goods liable to confiscation) failed.
2.3.3 On section 114AA, the Court found no evidence that the appellant had signed any document knowingly or intentionally concerning the transaction of any business so as to render such document false or incorrect in any material particular. The conclusion of "planting" or using forged documents was not substantiated.
Conclusions
2.3.4 Penalty on the appellant under section 112(b)(i), built on the alleged confiscability of the 12 bars, is unsustainable.
2.3.5 Penalty under section 114AA is also unsustainable, as there is no proof that the appellant knowingly or intentionally signed or used any false or fraudulent document in relation to the alleged smuggling transactions.
2.4 Confiscation of gold jewellery (20756.3 gms) from Subhash Tukaram Karan and gold jewellery/cut pieces from M/s. Bikaner Jewellers under sections 111 and 119
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4.1 The jewellery weighing 20756.3 gms seized from Subhash Tukaram Karan and the gold jewellery (11224.4 gms) and cut pieces (2818.5 gms) seized from M/s. Bikaner Jewellers were treated by the Commissioner as manufactured out of smuggled gold and confiscated under sections 111(a), 111(b), 111(d) and 119, relying primarily on statements under section 108 and alleged failure to discharge burden under section 123.
2.4.2 The appellant's case was that the seized jewellery was Indian-manufactured, brought on approval basis for marketing in Delhi, either by the appellant's firm or other manufacturers, and was duly backed by invoices, GST records and approval/delivery challans, including:
2.4.3 The Court observed that the department did not undertake verification of these invoices or GST entries, despite their availability and the ease with which authenticity could have been checked. The rejection of such documentary evidence was thus unjustified.
2.4.4 The Court further noted that it was not the department's case that the seized jewellery itself had been imported. Section 111 applies to "goods brought from a place outside India", and in the absence of any finding that the appellant imported gold or jewellery, section 111 could not be applied merely on the allegation that the jewellery was manufactured out of smuggled gold.
2.4.5 The Court reiterated that evidence must justify an inference of "unauthorised importation" rather than merely "unauthorised possession". Reliance was placed on Tribunal decisions and the Supreme Court's ruling that mere possession of smuggled goods does not establish that a person was concerned in the illegal import; other circumstances linking the person to importation must be shown. Such circumstances were neither alleged nor established in respect of the appellant.
2.4.6 Neither the show cause notice nor the impugned order established that the appellant had any connection with the importation of gold prior to its entry into India. Section 120 of the Customs Act, which deals with goods made from smuggled goods, was not invoked, and in any event there was no evidence that the appellant smuggled the base gold from which the jewellery was allegedly manufactured.
2.4.7 The Commissioner's reliance on non-production of e-way bills as evidence against the appellant was rejected. The Court found that, as per the Circular dated 12.09.2022 of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, issuance of e-way bills for transport of jewellery was not prescribed as a mandatory requirement; non-production of e-way bills could not be a conclusive basis for confiscation or adverse inference.
Conclusions
2.4.8 There was no legal or factual basis to treat the seized jewellery/ornaments and cut pieces, manufactured in India, as liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, in the absence of proof of importation or smuggling of the underlying gold by the appellant.
2.4.9 Confiscation under section 119, on the premise that some jewellery covered by invoices (e.g., SG-160 and SG-460) was used to "cover up" other smuggled jewellery, was also unsustainable for want of reliable foundational evidence of smuggling and of any link between the appellant and importation.
2.5 Treatment of affidavits, ownership claims and allegation of "planting" documents
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5.1 The appellant produced affidavits from manufacturers and owners, including:
2.5.2 The Court held that the Commissioner could not reject these affidavits arbitrarily without giving cogent reasons or undertaking verification. If doubts existed, the adjudicating authority ought to have summoned the deponents for cross-examination or tested the statements by other permissible means. Reliance was placed on the Bombay High Court's view that affidavits normally cannot be discarded without affording an opportunity to test their correctness.
2.5.3 Regarding the 19 documents allegedly "planted" during de-sealing of the appellant's shop on 03.05.2023, the Court found that:
Conclusions
2.5.4 The rejection of affidavits and supporting documentary evidence by the adjudicating authority was improper and contrary to settled principles; such evidence should have been either accepted or duly tested but not summarily discarded.
2.5.5 The allegation that the appellant planted 19 documents at the time of de-sealing was unsupported by evidence and could not form a valid basis for adverse findings or penalties.
2.6 Overall consequence for penalties on the appellant
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6.1 The Court held that the department's case against the appellant was fundamentally based on inadmissible section 108 statements and unverified assumptions of smuggling/import, without compliance with section 138B and without adequate corroborative evidence.
2.6.2 As the confiscation of 12 foreign-marked gold bars and the related currency could not be maintained against the appellant, and as the confiscation of Indian-manufactured jewellery/cut pieces under sections 111 and 119 was itself unsustainable, the foundation for imposing penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA fell.
Conclusions
2.6.3 The Commissioner was not justified in imposing penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act on the appellant in respect of the seized gold bars, jewellery and related transactions.
2.6.4 The impugned order was set aside to the extent that it imposed penalties on the appellant under section 112(b)(i) and section 114AA; the appeal was allowed accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a writ petition under Article 226 challenging show cause notices and a consequential order is maintainable when an alternate and efficacious statutory appellate remedy is available.
1.2 Whether vague and cursory pleadings alleging breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and violation of constitutional rights are sufficient to invoke the recognised exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies.
1.3 Whether, while declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy, the Court should grant liberty regarding limitation for filing appeal and keep open the challenge to the show cause notices.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of writ petition in the presence of an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy of appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that the impugned order is appealable and that an appellate remedy is available to the petitioner under the statute.
2.2 The Court found from the petition that the petitioner essentially wishes to assail the impugned order on merits but has chosen not to approach the Appellate Authority, apparently to avoid the statutory requirement of pre-deposit of a percentage of the demanded amount.
2.3 The Court held that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in equity to bypass clear statutory provisions providing for an appeal, nor can it be invoked to permit parties to circumvent such alternate remedies.
2.4 Relying on the reasoning in a prior decision of the Court on exhaustion of alternate remedies, and the precedents considered therein, the Court reaffirmed that deviation from the settled practice of insisting on exhaustion of alternate remedies is not warranted in the present case.
2.5 The Court further relied on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reiterating that High Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226 when effective statutory remedies are available, except in exceptional cases falling within recognised exceptions.
Conclusions
2.6 The writ petition challenging the impugned order was held not maintainable in view of the available and efficacious statutory appellate remedy, and the Court declined to entertain it on this ground.
Issue 2: Adequacy of pleadings to attract exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The petitioner contended that certain submissions were not considered in the impugned order and invoked grounds including contravention of procedural fairness, lack of jurisdiction, absence of authority of law, being contrary to settled law, violation of principles of natural justice, and breach of rights under Articles 14, 265 and 300A of the Constitution.
2.8 The Court examined the pleadings, particularly the relevant paragraph, and characterised the averments as extremely vague and cursory, noting that practically all possible grounds were mechanically invoked without elaboration or supporting particulars.
2.9 The Court observed that to attract the recognised exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of alternate remedies, a petitioner must plead and establish an exceptional case, supported by proper pleadings and material.
2.10 It was further observed that in the present matter, an attempt was made at the stage of arguments to advance a case that was not even properly pleaded, while the case that had been cursorily pleaded was effectively given up.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court held that the vague and unsupported allegations of breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and constitutional violations did not bring the case within any recognised exception to the rule of alternate remedy.
2.12 On this basis also, no ground was made out to entertain the writ petition in preference to the statutory appellate remedy.
Issue 3: Directions on liberty to appeal, limitation, and preservation of challenge to show cause notices
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 While declining to entertain the writ petition, the Court considered the need to ensure that the petitioner is not prejudiced on the question of limitation in availing the appellate remedy.
2.14 The Court directed that if an appeal against the impugned order is filed within four weeks from the date of the order, and all legal requirements (including pre-deposit, if any) are complied with, the Appellate Authority shall entertain the appeal on its own merits without going into the issue of limitation.
2.15 The Court also noted the existence of a separate prayer challenging the show cause notices and considered it appropriate to preserve the petitioner's right to raise that challenge in the future, depending on the outcome of the appellate proceedings under the statute.
Conclusions
2.16 Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file an appeal against the impugned order within four weeks, with a specific direction to the Appellate Authority not to reject such appeal on the ground of limitation.
2.17 The challenge to the show cause notices, as contained in the relevant prayer clause, was expressly kept open to be pursued if the petitioner does not obtain relief from the appellate authorities.
2.18 The petition was disposed of in these terms, with no order as to costs.
Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in connection with allegations under the Chhattisgarh GST Act, 2017.
Analysis: The applicant was in custody since 08.08.2025, the complaint had already been filed, and the conclusion of trial was likely to take some time. On these considerations, the Court found it to release the applicant on bail.
Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to regular bail.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, for the international transaction of import of finished goods for resale without value addition by a routine distributor, the Resale Price Method or the Transactional Net Margin Method is the Most Appropriate Method for determination of arm's length price.
1.2 Whether incurring substantial advertisement, marketing and promotion and related brand-building expenses by a distributor precludes adoption of the Resale Price Method.
1.3 Consequential treatment of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation in light of the decision on transfer pricing adjustment.
1.4 Consequential levy of interest under section 234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1.5 Sustainability of initiation of penalty proceedings under section 274 read with section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in view of the deletion of transfer pricing adjustment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Most Appropriate Method for benchmarking import of finished goods for resale
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1 The Court referred to Rule 10B(1)(b) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and the jurisprudence holding that the Resale Price Method is best suited where goods are purchased from an associated enterprise and resold as such, with no or insignificant value addition, to unrelated parties.
2.1.2 Reliance was placed on decisions holding that for pure distributors or traders, where no value is added to the goods before resale, Resale Price Method is the Most Appropriate Method, and that Resale Price Method loses accuracy where the reseller substantially adds value to the product or further processes it.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The assessee was characterized as a "routine distributor" undertaking fashion retail operations in India, purchasing 100% of its finished goods inventory from associated enterprises and reselling the same through retail outlets without any value addition.
2.1.4 The assessee performed routine distribution functions: procurement based on local demand forecasts with associated market risk; inventory management including warehousing and stocking in its retail outlets at its own cost; sales, distribution and after-sales services; and pricing decisions in line with group policy but based on local market knowledge.
2.1.5 The Court found that the assessee assumed routine risks including market risk, limited inventory risk, product liability risk and limited bad debts risk, whereas the associated enterprise functioned as the principal undertaking manufacturing, headquarter and marketing functions and assuming entrepreneurial risks including shareholders' risk.
2.1.6 It was undisputed that the assessee did not make any value addition to the imported finished goods; it merely resold apparel, clothing, accessories and footwear as purchased.
2.1.7 The Transfer Pricing Officer rejected the Resale Price Method and applied the Transactional Net Margin Method on the premise that the assessee was not a mere routine distributor since it incurred costs mandated by the associated enterprise on brand building, promotion, marketing, advertising and creation of intangibles; however, the functional characterization of the assessee as a distributor and the set of comparables were otherwise accepted.
2.1.8 The Court, following coordinate bench and High Court precedents in similar factual situations of pure distributors/pure traders reselling products without value addition, held that the Resale Price Method is the appropriate method for such distribution/marketing activities where goods are purchased from associated enterprises and sold to unrelated parties without further processing.
Conclusions
2.1.9 The assessee, being a routine distributor reselling imported finished goods without value addition, is correctly considered as the tested party.
2.1.10 The Resale Price Method is held to be the Most Appropriate Method for benchmarking the international transaction of import of finished goods for resale, and not the Transactional Net Margin Method adopted by the Transfer Pricing Officer.
2.1.11 The assessee's margin computed using Gross Profit/Sales as the Profit Level Indicator under Resale Price Method is accepted as correctly reflecting the arm's length price for the impugned international transaction, and the transfer pricing adjustment made by substituting Transactional Net Margin Method is deleted.
2.2 Effect of substantial AMP and related expenses on applicability of Resale Price Method
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.2.1 The Court referred to tribunal precedent holding that high advertisement and marketing expenses, which are debited to the profit and loss account (below the gross profit line), do not impact the determination of arm's length price under Resale Price Method, which is based on gross profit/sales.
2.2.2 It was noted that where expenditure on advertisement and promotion is considered to create marketing intangibles for the associated enterprise, a separate transfer pricing adjustment on account of such AMP expenses may be warranted; however, this has no bearing on the computation of arm's length price under the Resale Price Method itself.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.3 The Dispute Resolution Panel had observed that the assessee incurred substantial AMP and other expenses in relation to its turnover and, on that basis, opined that the assessee is not a simple distributor for the purpose of applying Resale Price Method.
2.2.4 The Court, relying on the cited precedent, reasoned that since Resale Price Method uses gross profit on sales as the Profit Level Indicator, only expenses that affect gross profit (those debited to the trading account) are relevant; expenses such as AMP, being debited below the gross profit line in the profit and loss account, do not affect gross profit and therefore do not interfere with the appropriateness or application of Resale Price Method.
2.2.5 The absence of any separate transfer pricing adjustment specifically on account of AMP expenses by the Transfer Pricing Officer reinforced that AMP expenditure should not be used to displace Resale Price Method in favour of Transactional Net Margin Method.
Conclusions
2.2.6 Incurring substantial AMP and related brand-building or marketing expenses does not disqualify the assessee from being treated as a routine distributor for Resale Price Method purposes.
2.2.7 High AMP expenditure does not affect the determination of arm's length price under Resale Price Method and cannot be a valid ground for rejecting Resale Price Method in favour of Transactional Net Margin Method when the assessee resells goods without value addition.
2.3 Consequential issues: brought forward losses, interest under section 234B and penalty initiation
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 In view of the acceptance of Resale Price Method and deletion of the transfer pricing adjustment (allowing the substantive ground on method selection), other transfer pricing-related grounds were treated as academic and left open.
2.3.2 The assessee sought set-off of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation of an earlier assessment year; this became relevant in light of the revised income position following deletion of the transfer pricing adjustment.
2.3.3 Levy of interest under section 234B was characterized as consequential, dependent on the finally assessed income after giving effect to the appellate decision.
2.3.4 Initiation of penalty proceedings under section 274 read with section 270A, being premised on the additions made (in particular the transfer pricing adjustment), was considered unsustainable where such core addition did not survive.
Conclusions
2.3.5 The Assessing Officer is directed to consider and allow, in accordance with law, the set-off of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation in light of the deletion of the transfer pricing adjustment.
2.3.6 Interest under section 234B is to be recomputed, if at all, only as a consequential matter based on the recomputed total income after giving effect to the appellate order.
2.3.7 The initiation of penalty proceedings under section 274 read with section 270A has no foundation in view of the deletion of the substantive transfer pricing adjustment and consequently cannot be sustained.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cash deposits in the assessee's bank account, initially taxed as unexplained money under section 69A, were rightly treated by the appellate authority as business turnover and income estimated thereon.
1.2 Whether, on the facts of a commission-based scrap trading activity and absence of books of account, the net profit/commission rate should be estimated at 5% or at 8% by applying section 44AD of the Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Characterisation of cash deposits - unexplained money under section 69A versus business turnover
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Assessing Officer treated the total cash deposits of Rs. 99,73,439/- in the assessee's bank account as unexplained money under section 69A, in the absence of a return of income and compliance to notices.
2.2 The appellate authority examined the bank account and found regular cash deposits and withdrawals, cash payments and cheque transfers throughout the year, and noted that such deposits were not concentrated in the demonetisation period.
2.3 The assessee's explanation that he was engaged in purchase and sale of scrap, collecting cash from different buyers and depositing the same into the bank account, and earning commission on such transactions, was found to have some truth based on the nature and pattern of banking transactions.
2.4 While the assessee did not fully substantiate his claim with complete details, partial details and the consistency of account operations led the appellate authority to accept the deposits as representing business transactions.
Conclusions
2.5 The cash deposits in the relevant bank account are to be treated as turnover from the assessee's business activity rather than as unexplained money under section 69A, and income is to be estimated on such turnover.
Issue 2: Appropriate rate of income estimation on turnover - applicability of section 44AD and adoption of 5% commission/net profit
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.6 The Revenue contended that in the absence of books of account, the net profit should be estimated in line with section 44AD at 8% of the turnover, arguing that such presumptive rate should be taken as the benchmark.
2.7 The appellate authority, instead, estimated income at 5% of the cash deposits treated as turnover, considering the assessee's stated commission-based scrap business.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Tribunal noted that the only dispute raised by the Revenue was against the rate applied by the appellate authority, namely 5% instead of 8% as urged with reference to section 44AD.
2.9 It was not disputed before the Tribunal that the assessee was engaged in business activity. The assessee had contended that he carried out scrap transactions on a commission basis, generally earning commission between 2% to 5%, and claimed to have earned 2% in the relevant year.
2.10 The appellate authority, after considering the nature of the assessee's activity as commission-based dealings in scrap and examining the bank account, rejected the specific 2% claim but adopted a higher estimate of 5% of the deposits as income, treating the deposits as turnover.
2.11 The Tribunal found no inconsistency or infirmity in the appellate authority's approach, holding that the nature of the assessee's business as a commission agent justified estimating income at 5%, rather than mechanically applying 8% as per the Revenue's reliance on section 44AD.
Conclusions
2.12 In the facts of a commission-based scrap trading business, estimation of income at 5% of cash deposits treated as turnover is reasonable and proper.
2.13 Section 44AD and its presumptive rate of 8% do not mandate substitution of the 5% rate adopted by the appellate authority in this case.
2.14 No interference is warranted with the appellate authority's estimation; the Revenue's grounds seeking application of 8% under section 44AD are rejected, and the appeal is dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, for an electronically filed return accompanied by ITR-V sent by speed post, the denial of benefit of the new tax regime under section 115BAC was justified on the ground that e-verification/ITR-V was not completed within 30 days of electronic transmission.
1.2 Whether, in view of the applicable CBDT Notification concerning e-verification and ITR-V dispatch, the return was to be treated as filed within the due date under section 139(1) for the purpose of eligibility to opt for the new tax regime under section 115BAC.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of denial of new tax regime under section 115BAC due to alleged delayed verification and determination of date of filing under CBDT Notification
Legal framework
2.1 The judgment considers the CBDT framework on e-filing and verification of income-tax returns, including:
(a) Circular No. 3/2009 dated 21-05-2009 introducing electronic filing with subsequent submission of ITR-V within a prescribed period, and treating the date of transmitting data electronically as the date of furnishing the return if ITR-V is submitted within the stipulated time.
(b) Extension of time limit for filing ITR-V to 120 days from uploading, as per Press Release dated 27-01-2010.
(c) Centralised Processing of Returns Scheme, 2011, notified vide Notification No. 2/2012 dated 04-01-2012, particularly Rule 14, delegating power to specify mode, manner and time for verification of ITR-V.
(d) Notification No. 05 of 2022 dated 29-07-2022 issued by DGIT (Systems), CBDT, effective from 01-08-2022, prescribing a 30-day time limit for e-verification/submission of ITR-V from the date of electronic transmission of return data, and clarifying:
(i) If e-verification/ITR-V submission is within 30 days, the date of electronic transmission is the date of furnishing the return.
(ii) If e-verification/ITR-V submission is beyond 30 days, the date of e-verification/ITR-V submission is the date of furnishing the return and consequences of late filing follow.
(e) Para 8 of Notification No. 05 of 2022, which states that the date of dispatch of speed post of duly verified ITR-V shall be considered for determining the 30-day period from the date of electronic transmission of return data.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The CPC denied the benefit of the new tax regime under section 115BAC on the ground that the return was not e-verified within 30 days from the date of filing and that the e-verification was beyond such prescribed time.
2.3 The appellate authority sustained the denial, holding that e-verification on 24-08-2023 was after the due date for filing the return (31-07-2023) and, relying on Notification No. 05 of 2022, treated the date of verification as the date of filing of the return.
2.4 The Tribunal examined Para 8 of Notification No. 05 of 2022, which provides that, for determination of the 30-day period from the date of transmitting the return data electronically, the relevant date is the date of dispatch of the duly verified ITR-V by speed post.
2.5 On facts, the assessee had electronically filed the return on 24-07-2023 and produced the postal receipt showing that the duly verified ITR-V was dispatched by speed post on 21-08-2023.
2.6 Applying Para 8, the Tribunal treated 21-08-2023 (date of dispatch of ITR-V) as the reference date for determining whether verification was within the 30-day limit counted from 24-07-2023 (date of electronic transmission).
2.7 Since 21-08-2023 falls within 30 days from 24-07-2023, the Tribunal held that the requirement of e-verification/ITR-V submission within 30 days was satisfied in terms of the Notification.
2.8 Consequently, in line with the Notification, the Tribunal held that the date of furnishing the return is deemed to be the date of electronic transmission, i.e., 24-07-2023.
2.9 As 24-07-2023 is before the due date under section 139(1), the return was to be treated as filed within time, thereby preserving the assessee's valid exercise of option for the new tax regime under section 115BAC.
Conclusions
2.10 The return, though e-verified/ITR-V processed later, was deemed to have been furnished on 24-07-2023 because the ITR-V was dispatched by speed post within 30 days from the date of electronic transmission, in accordance with Para 8 of Notification No. 05 of 2022.
2.11 The return was thus filed within the due date under section 139(1), and the assessee's option to be taxed under the new regime under section 115BAC was validly exercised.
2.12 The denial of the benefit of the new tax regime by CPC and its confirmation by the appellate authority were unsustainable; the Tribunal directed CPC to grant the benefit of the new tax regime as claimed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether an ad hoc disallowance of a lump sum amount from purchases, cost of sales and other expenses is sustainable when the assessee has furnished supporting details and no specific defects or instances of non-genuineness are identified by the tax authorities.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Sustainability of ad hoc disallowance from purchases and expenses
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The assessment was made under scrutiny pursuant to notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer relied on the assessee's alleged failure to discharge the onus of proving the genuineness of purchases and expenses and consequently made an ad hoc disallowance of Rs. 50,00,000. Penalty proceedings under section 270A were also initiated for underreporting of income. The Tribunal also considered its own coordinate bench decision in the case of a sister concern, where under similar facts disallowances had been deleted.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Assessing Officer held that the assessee did not provide party-wise details of local purchases and other expenses, did not produce books of account, bills and vouchers, and failed to furnish confirmations from sundry creditors exceeding Rs. 1 lakh, resulting in inability to issue notices under section 133(6). On this basis, the entire claim of purchases and expenses was treated as unverifiable, and a lump sum disallowance of Rs. 50 lakhs was made.
2.3 The first appellate authority accepted the Assessing Officer's version that complete details were not filed, specifically observing that alleged details of parties for expenses exceeding Rs. 1 lakh stated to have been filed on 05.09.2019 were not found on record, and consequently upheld the ad hoc disallowance.
2.4 The Tribunal examined the paper book and the assessee's replies to the notices issued under section 142(1). It found that, contrary to the Revenue's contention, the assessee had, in fact, furnished various details during the assessment proceedings, including: details of purchases (inter-state, local and imports), purchase register, creditors list with names, addresses and PAN, ledger accounts, and sample bills; and details and ledger accounts of major expenses such as job work and clearing and forwarding charges.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that the authorities below had not pointed out any specific defect, inconsistency or instance of non-genuineness in the books of account or in the supporting documents furnished. The disallowance was purely on an ad hoc basis without identification of particular items of expenditure or purchase found to be bogus or unverifiable.
2.6 The Tribunal also took note that in the case of a sister concern, on similar facts and circumstances, disallowances made on such grounds had been deleted and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed, indicating that where supporting details are on record and no concrete defects are found, ad hoc additions are not justified.
Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal held that the assertion that the assessee had not filed any details was factually incorrect in view of the material on record. Once relevant details such as purchase registers, creditors' details, ledger accounts and sample invoices were furnished and no specific defects were pointed out therein, an ad hoc disallowance of Rs. 50,00,000 could not be sustained.
2.8 The order of the first appellate authority upholding the ad hoc disallowance was set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the disallowance of Rs. 50,00,000 made out of purchases, cost of sales and various expenses. The assessee's appeal was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether commission received for facilitating import and sale of goods in India for foreign suppliers, including on high seas sale basis, constitutes taxable "Business Auxiliary Service" during the relevant period.
1.2 Whether such commission-based services provided to foreign entities qualify as "export of service" under the Export of Service Rules, 2005, having regard to the CBEC circulars and judicial precedents.
1.3 Whether, in the light of the above, the confirmation of service tax demand along with interest and penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is legally sustainable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Nature of services, characterization as BAS, and eligibility as export of service
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The services were alleged to be taxable under "Business Auxiliary Service" in terms of Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994.
2.2 The classification and taxability were examined with reference to Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 and CBEC Circular No. 141/10/2011-TRU dated 13.05.2011 clarifying the expression "used outside India" and "accrual of benefit" under Rule 3(2)(a) as it stood prior to 28.02.2010.
2.3 The Court also considered CBEC Circular No. 111/05/2009-ST (referred to in cited precedents) and multiple judicial decisions holding that services of Indian agents to foreign principals, where benefits accrue abroad, constitute export of service and are not liable to service tax.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court found that the appellant acted as an indenting agent for foreign entities, facilitating sale of imported goods in India (including high seas sales), receiving commission/indenting commission from such foreign entities.
2.5 On examination of agreements and records, the Court held that:
(a) The appellant had no authority to bind the foreign entities contractually, negotiate or conclude prices, sign contracts, or make commitments on their behalf.
(b) The relationship was that of independent contractor and contractee, not that of an intermediary empowered to represent or bind the foreign principal vis-à-vis Indian customers.
(c) No services were provided by the appellant to the end customers on behalf of the foreign entities.
2.6 In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be treated as an intermediary for levy of service tax under BAS in relation to the foreign suppliers' customers in India.
2.7 Applying CBEC Circular No. 141/10/2011-TRU, the Court held that the determinative test is where the "accrual of benefit" and effective "use and enjoyment" of the services take place. The benefit of the services, namely, promotion and facilitation of sale of goods, accrued to the foreign entities outside India, even though activities were performed in India.
2.8 The Court noted that:
(a) Foreign inward remittances for such services were received and duly accounted for.
(b) The services were rendered on instructions of foreign principals, who were liable to pay for the services and for whose business needs the services were performed.
(c) Therefore, the location of the service recipient (foreign entities) and the place where benefits accrue (outside India) determine the export character of the service.
2.9 Relying on Tribunal and High Court decisions (including those dealing with agents procuring orders or marketing goods for foreign suppliers, where consideration is received from abroad), the Court endorsed the principle that, for "Business Auxiliary Service" falling under Category III of the Export of Service Rules, the person to whom the benefit of service accrues and the location of such person decide whether the service is an export.
2.10 The Court accepted the ratio that:
(a) "Your customer's customer is not your customer"; the service recipient is the foreign principal who contracts, pays, and whose business need is satisfied, not the Indian buyers affected by the performance of the service.
(b) Where the foreign principal derives the benefit of services rendered from India, the services qualify as export of service and are not taxable in India.
2.11 On this reasoning, the Court held that the services in question satisfied the conditions of export under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, as interpreted by CBEC circulars and binding precedents, and therefore did not attract service tax as BAS in India, for the entire disputed period.
Conclusions on Issues 1 & 2
2.12 The commission/indenting commission earned for facilitating import and sale of goods in India for foreign entities, including high seas sale commission, constituted services rendered to foreign recipients, the benefit of which accrued outside India.
2.13 Such services qualified as "export of service" under the Export of Service Rules, 2005; no taxable "Business Auxiliary Service" liability could be fastened on the appellant in India for the disputed period.
2.14 The partial confirmation of demand by treating the services as taxable BAS prior to 22.05.2007 (based on pre-amendment wording of the Export of Service Rules) was inconsistent with CBEC's own interpretation and the judicial position, and hence unsustainable.
Issue 3: Validity of demand, interest and penalties
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 Having held that the services were export of services and not liable to service tax in India, the Court found that there was no legal basis for demand of service tax under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.
3.2 Consequently, the foundations for recovery of interest and imposition of penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 also failed.
3.3 The Court observed that the impugned appellate order, to the extent it upheld the adjudged demands, ignored binding CBEC clarifications and settled judicial precedents and therefore did not withstand legal scrutiny.
Conclusions on Issue 3
3.4 The service tax demands, along with interest and penalties, as partially upheld in the impugned order, were held to be not legally sustainable.
3.5 The impugned order was set aside in toto, and the appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee with consequential relief.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, on a proper construction of CBDT Circular No. 24/2019 dated 09.09.2019 and Circular No. 5/2020 dated 23.01.2020, prosecution under Section 276C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the tax sought to be evaded exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs, can be initiated by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax without (a) prior administrative approval of a collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers and (b) prior imposition and confirmation of penalty by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
1.2 Whether Circular No. 5/2020 dated 23.01.2020 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground that it vests unguided and unbridled discretion in the sanctioning authority for launching prosecution.
1.3 Whether pendency of appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), and the assessee's challenges to the validity and merits of assessment (including additions under Sections 69 and 69A, the legality of proceedings under Section 153C, ex parte assessments, and alleged lack of DIN on transfer order under Section 127), constitute grounds to quash the sanction for prosecution under Sections 276C and 278E.
1.4 Whether, in the facts, the impugned sanction notices issued under Section 279(1) authorising initiation of prosecution under Sections 276C and 278E suffer from non-application of mind or absence of reasons so as to be liable to be quashed.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Interpretation of CBDT Circulars 24/2019 and 5/2020; requirement of collegium approval and prior ITAT-confirmed penalty for tax evasion above Rs. 25 lakhs
2.1.1 Legal framework as discussed
(a) The Court examined CBDT Circular No. 24/2019 dated 09.09.2019, particularly paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 and its Annexure, dealing with offences under Section 276C(1) ("wilful attempt to evade tax, etc.").
(b) Under the Circular of 09.09.2019, for offences under Section 276C(1):
- Cases where the amount sought to be evaded or tax on under-reported income is Rs. 25 lakhs or below "shall not be processed for prosecution except with the previous administrative approval of the Collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers"; and
- It further provides that "prosecution under this section shall be launched only after the confirmation of the order imposing penalty by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal."
(c) Paragraph 3 of the Circular defines the "Collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers" and clarifies that the sanctioning authority under Section 279(1) (Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or Commissioner (Appeals) or appropriate authority) shall seek the prior administrative approval of such collegium only for "cases below the threshold limit as prescribed in Annexure".
(d) Paragraph 4 and the Annexure set out the "list of prosecutable offences under the Act specifying the approving authority". For Section 276C(1), the Annexure provides:
- Where tax which would have been evaded exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs: approving authority - "Sanctioning Authority";
- In other cases: "Sanctioning Authority with the previous administrative approval of the Collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers."
(e) Circular No. 5/2020 dated 23.01.2020 clarifies Circular No. 24/2019 in relation to Section 276C(1), stating that:
- Prosecution "shall be launched ordinarily after the confirmation of the order imposing penalty by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal"; and
- "Prosecution in other cases, including cases covered u/s 132/132A/133A, may be launched at any stage of the proceedings before an Income-tax Authority, with the previous approval of the Collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers as mentioned in para 3 of the Circular."
- The Circular applies only to cases "where the prosecution complaint is to be filed after the date of issuance of the Circular, i.e. 09.09.2019".
2.1.2 Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court noted that there is no dispute that in the present case the "amount sought to be evaded or tax on under-reported income is more than Rs. 25 lakhs", in fact, the aggregate demand exceeds Rs. 348 crores.
(b) On a conjoint reading of Circular 24/2019 and its Annexure, the Court concluded:
- The special requirement of prior administrative approval of a collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers applies only to cases "where the amount sought to be evaded or tax on under-reported income is Rs. 25 lakhs or below";
- In such below-threshold cases alone, prosecution under Section 276C(1) is to be launched only after confirmation of penalty by the ITAT.
(c) The Court held that the Annexure clearly demarcates two categories for Section 276C(1):
- Where tax which would have been evaded exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs: the "approving authority" is only the "Sanctioning Authority" (PCIT etc.), without any additional pre-condition; and
- For other (below-threshold) cases: the sanctioning authority must obtain previous administrative approval of the collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers.
(d) As to Circular 5/2020, the Court treated it as a "clarification" to be read as part of Circular 24/2019, and not as altering the basic scheme of the Annexure. The expression that prosecution "shall be launched ordinarily after the confirmation of the order imposing penalty by the ITAT" was read as:
- Prescribing an ordinary rule of timing, not an absolute or mandatory precondition; and
- To be understood in the context of the Circular's primary object of not launching prosecution in small cases and controlling initiation in cases where the amount is Rs. 25 lakhs or below.
(e) The clarification that prosecution "in other cases, including cases covered u/s 132/132A/133A, may be launched at any stage of the proceedings... with the previous approval of the Collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers" was construed as "primarily relat[ing] to the offences where amount sought to be evaded is less than Rs. 25 lakhs". The Court held that Circular 5/2020 "does not make any amendment to paragraph No. 4 and the annexure thereof."
(f) The Court held that "no pre-conditions have been attached while taking action in cases where the evasion is more than Rs. 25 lakhs" and that "the intent behind Circular No. 24/2019... as amended by Circular No. 5/2020" is essentially to avoid prosecution in small cases and to require collegium approval only in such below-threshold cases.
(g) In the present case, since the amount alleged to be evaded is more than Rs. 25 lakhs (indeed, over Rs. 348 crores), "the approval of the sanctioning authority would be adequate" and "in other words, the decision of the Sanctioning Authority granting approval would suffice the requirement, which in this case is PCIT."
2.1.3 Conclusions
(a) In cases under Section 276C(1) where the tax sought to be evaded exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs, the only approving authority required under CBDT Circular No. 24/2019 (as clarified by Circular No. 5/2020) is the "Sanctioning Authority" under Section 279(1), i.e., the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner etc.; prior approval of a collegium of two CCIT/DGIT rank officers is not required.
(b) The requirement that prosecution "shall be launched... after confirmation of penalty by the ITAT" and the requirement of collegium approval apply only to small (below Rs. 25 lakhs) cases and do not constitute preconditions in cases where the amount sought to be evaded exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs.
(c) The impugned sanction notices issued by the PCIT under Section 279(1) in the present case, where the alleged evasion far exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs, are in conformity with Circulars 24/2019 and 5/2020 and are not vitiated for want of collegium approval or for want of prior ITAT-confirmed penalty.
2.2 Challenge to constitutional validity of Circular No. 5/2020 under Article 14
2.2.1 Legal framework as discussed
(a) The petitioner contended that Circular No. 5/2020 is "manifestly arbitrary" as it vests the sanctioning authority with "unbridled and absolute discretion" to decide when prosecution may be launched in cases above Rs. 25 lakhs without any guidelines, and thus offends Article 14.
(b) Reliance was placed on Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India for the proposition that delegated legislation can be struck down as manifestly arbitrary, and on State of Punjab v. Khan Chand to emphasise that unguided discretion affecting personal liberty is unconstitutional.
2.2.2 Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court rejected the submission that Circular No. 5/2020 conferred unguided and unbridled power, holding that there is "a clear demarcation contemplated in terms of circular dated 09.09.2019 as followed by circular dated 23.01.2020."
(b) The Court characterised Circular 5/2020 as "a clarification to be read as part of the circular dated 09.09.2019." When so read, the scheme clearly:
- Draws an objective threshold at Rs. 25 lakhs; and
- Restricts prosecution in small cases by requiring collegium approval and tying it ordinarily to confirmation of penalty by the ITAT.
(c) Since in the present case the alleged evasion is far above the threshold (more than Rs. 348 crores), the Court held that the argument of unguided discretion is inapposite; the scheme clearly entrusts such major-evasion cases to the sanctioning authority alone.
(d) The Court observed that "it is precisely for this reason that an attempt has been made by the petitioner to challenge the very circular dated 23.01.2020", noting that the challenge was driven by the petitioner's inability to derive benefit from the small-amount safeguards in the Circular.
(e) The Court distinguished the reliance on Indian Express Newspapers and State of Punjab v. Khan Chand as inapplicable in the factual and statutory context at hand, particularly given the magnitude of tax alleged to be evaded and the structured differentiation embedded in the Circulars.
2.2.3 Conclusions
(a) Circular No. 5/2020 dated 23.01.2020, read with Circular No. 24/2019 dated 09.09.2019, is not manifestly arbitrary and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution.
(b) The classification and demarcation between cases where the amount sought to be evaded is Rs. 25 lakhs or below and those where it exceeds that threshold is rational and guided; the power vested in the sanctioning authority in cases above Rs. 25 lakhs is not unguided or unbridled in a constitutional sense.
(c) The challenge to the constitutional validity of Circular No. 5/2020 was rejected.
2.3 Effect of pendency of appeals and assessee's objections to assessment on validity of prosecution sanction
2.3.1 Legal and factual contentions as noted
(a) The petitioner argued that since appeals against the assessment orders are pending before the CIT(A) under Section 246A, and numerous objections-jurisdictional and on merits-have been raised (including that proceedings ought to have been under Section 153A rather than 153C; that additions under Sections 69 and 69A are based on loose papers/diaries and alleged benami investments; that assessment orders are ex parte and violate principles of natural justice; and that the transfer order under Section 127 is allegedly non est for want of DIN), prosecution should not be initiated.
(b) It was also contended that under Section 275, and as per certain decisions referred to, there is an embargo on passing penalty orders during pendency of appeals, and by extension, prosecution should be deferred.
2.3.2 Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court accepted the respondent's contention that neither Section 275 nor Section 276C(1) imposes any bar on initiation of prosecution proceedings during pendency of assessment appeals, nor any statutory precondition that penalty must first be imposed and confirmed.
(b) In relation to the various factual and jurisdictional objections (additions under Sections 69/69A based on loose papers, legality of 153C proceedings as opposed to 153A, ex parte assessments, DIN issues under Section 127, etc.), the Court held:
- These are "questions of fact" to be decided by the competent authority in appropriate appellate/assessment proceedings; and
- They do not constitute grounds at this stage to interfere with or quash the sanction for prosecution.
(c) The Court specifically stated that:
- The challenge to additions under Sections 69 and 69A being based on loose papers is factual and "needs to be decided by the competent authority", and reliance on CIT v. Ravi Kumar does not assist the petitioner at the sanction stage.
- Reliance on Vijay Krishnaswami (quashing prosecution where no attempt to evade tax was made and procedural requirements for criminal prosecution were not followed) is distinguishable; in the present case, the prosecution is premised on large-scale alleged evasion and the sanctioning procedure has been followed.
- Reliance on Karnataka High Court decisions in BS Uday Shetty and Anjanadari Fuel Station (relating to validity of appeal in penalty proceedings and timing of penalty orders) and on UCO Bank is distinguishable and does not bar prosecution in the present context.
- Reliance on Kamlesh Kumar Jha and Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd. to challenge the order under Section 127 for want of DIN raises factual questions not to be decided at this stage.
2.3.3 Conclusions
(a) Pendency of appeals before the CIT(A) against assessment orders, and alleged infirmities in assessment (including jurisdiction under Sections 153A/153C, evidentiary basis of additions under Sections 69/69A, ex parte nature of orders, and DIN-related objections), do not create a legal bar to initiation of prosecution under Sections 276C and 278E.
(b) Issues concerning merits or legality of assessment orders are to be adjudicated by the appropriate appellate/assessment authorities and cannot be used at the threshold to invalidate prosecution sanction in a case where the amount of alleged evasion exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs.
2.4 Alleged non-application of mind and insufficiency of reasons in sanction orders
2.4.1 Contentions as noted
(a) The petitioner contended that the impugned sanction orders under Section 279(1) were passed mechanically, without proper application of mind, and are "bereft of reasons" as to why the present case is a "deserving case" for initiation of prosecution despite pendency of appeals and absence of confirmed penalty by the ITAT.
2.4.2 Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court proceeded on the premise that the sanctioning authority (PCIT) has in fact granted approval and that the requirement of collegium approval or prior ITAT-confirmed penalty does not apply for cases involving evasion exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs.
(b) It was noted that the petitioner did not dispute:
- That the alleged amount under investigation is above Rs. 25 lakhs (indeed, above Rs. 348 crores); or
- That the competent sanctioning authority (PCIT) had granted the sanction.
(c) In light of the Court's interpretation of the Circulars and the magnitude of alleged tax evasion, the grievance of absence of detailed reasoning to categorise this as a "deserving case" for pre-penalty/ pre-ITAT prosecution was rendered untenable, as those preconditions were held inapplicable to such large cases.
(d) The Court did not find any established procedural infirmity or legal defect in the grant of sanction sufficient to warrant quashing; instead, it accepted the respondent's position that the PCIT was the appropriate authority and had duly sanctioned prosecution in accordance with the Circulars.
2.4.3 Conclusions
(a) The sanction orders issued by the PCIT under Section 279(1) authorising prosecution under Sections 276C and 278E in a case where alleged tax evasion far exceeds Rs. 25 lakhs are not vitiated for want of collegium approval, for lack of ITAT-confirmed penalty, or for alleged non-application of mind.
(b) No grounds were made out to quash the impugned sanction notices on the basis of procedural or substantive defects in the sanction.
2.5 Overall disposition
2.5.1 For the reasons recorded on the interpretation of CBDT Circulars 24/2019 and 5/2020, the rejection of the Article 14 challenge to Circular 5/2020, the finding that pendency of appeals and assessment objections do not bar prosecution, and the acceptance that the PCIT was the competent sanctioning authority in a case involving alleged evasion exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs, the Court held that the impugned sanction notices and Circular No. 5/2020 are not unconstitutional, non-est, or otherwise liable to be quashed.
2.5.2 The petition was dismissed and pending applications were dismissed as infructuous.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 for a later assessment year, on the same material and identical issue already examined in the assessment of a connected assessee, are vitiated as an impermissible "change of opinion" and hence without jurisdiction.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of the case, the writ petition challenging the notice under Section 148 was maintainable at the pre-assessment stage in view of alleged lack of jurisdiction and arbitrariness in reopening.
1.3 Whether the prior assessment/reassessment orders, said to be "cryptic" or non-speaking, could be treated as not involving any formation of opinion, thereby negating the plea of "change of opinion".
1.4 Whether the contention that reopening was bad for not being initiated under the faceless scheme in terms of Section 151A required adjudication.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of reassessment under Section 148 on the ground of "change of opinion"
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Court referred to the settled distinction between the Assessing Officer's power to "reassess" and the absence of any power to "review", and to the doctrine that reassessment cannot be based on a mere "change of opinion" on the same material. Reliance was placed on the principle laid down in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., that if "change of opinion" is removed, reassessment becomes a vehicle for review, which is impermissible.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.2 The Court noted that reassessment proceedings for the transporter's income for AY 2019-20 were initiated on two issues, one being alleged "cash return" of Rs. 80,62,000/- to the petitioner, based on material impounded during survey/search on 09.04.2021. A notice under Section 142(1) was issued to the transporter, and a notice under Section 133(6) to the petitioner on the same issue; both assessees denied any cash return.
2.3 After considering replies of both the transporter and the petitioner, the Assessing Officer passed an order dated 26.08.2022 for AY 2019-20 in the transporter's case, making addition only under Section 40A(3) and making no addition on account of alleged cash return or under Section 68. The Court treated this as an acceptance of the genuineness of transactions and of the denial of any cash return.
2.4 Separately, reassessment of the petitioner's income for AY 2018-19 had also been initiated on the same "cash return" theme, based on the same material from the 09.04.2021 search/survey. Notices under Sections 148, 143(2) and 142(1) were issued, specific queries regarding dealings with the same transporter were raised, and the petitioner filed detailed replies denying any cash return. The reassessment order dated 26.08.2022 for AY 2018-19 adopted the same income as originally assessed and made no addition on the alleged cash return.
2.5 The Court highlighted that both assessment/reassessment orders dated 26.08.2022-(i) the transporter's assessment for AY 2019-20, and (ii) the petitioner's reassessment for AY 2018-19-were passed by the same Assessing Officer, on the same day, on the same material obtained from the 09.04.2021 search/survey, and after considering the replies of both parties on the same allegation of cash return.
2.6 The impugned reopening notice under Section 148 and order under Section 148A(3) for AY 2019-20 against the petitioner again relied on the very same survey/search material (impounded data with identical ID marks), alleged identical cash return of Rs. 80,62,000/-, and the same pattern of purported bogus bills and return of cheque amounts in cash. A comparative reading of (a) the Section 142(1) notice to the transporter, (b) the Section 133(6) notice to the petitioner, and (c) the Section 148/148A materials in the petitioner's case revealed that the very same transaction, figures and basis were being re-agitated.
2.7 The Court reasoned that in the reassessment of the transporter for AY 2019-20 the Assessing Officer had already formed an opinion, on the same material, that no addition was warranted on the allegation of cash return of Rs. 80,62,000/- to the petitioner. Initiating reassessment of the petitioner for AY 2019-20 on the identical issue and material necessarily meant revisiting and reviewing that opinion, which the Assessing Officer was not empowered to do.
2.8 The Court extended the "change of opinion" doctrine to these facts even though the assessees and/or assessment years differed, holding that where the same Assessing Officer, on the same material and in respect of the same alleged transaction between the same parties for the same assessment year (AY 2019-20), had already taken a view in one assessment (the transporter's), reopening another assessment (the petitioner's) on the identical ground is in substance a review of that earlier decision.
2.9 The Court also emphasized that when, on 26.08.2022, the Assessing Officer reassessed the petitioner for AY 2018-19 and the transporter for AY 2019-20, he had all relevant information about transactions between the petitioner and the transporter pertaining to AY 2019-20 yet did not initiate reopening of the petitioner for AY 2019-20 at that time, which further indicated that he had accepted that there was no issue of cash return.
Conclusions:
2.10 The Court held that the impugned reassessment proceedings against the petitioner for AY 2019-20 were clearly based on a prohibited "change of opinion", amounting to an impermissible review of an earlier decision on the same material and same transaction, and thus without jurisdiction.
2.11 On this ground, the notice under Section 148 and the consequential reassessment proceedings were held unsustainable and were set aside.
Issue 2: Maintainability of writ petition at the notice stage under Section 148
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.12 The Court referred to the principle that while ordinarily writ courts do not interfere at the stage of notice where statutory remedies exist, they may intervene in exceptional cases, particularly where there is a wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, arbitrary reopening, or violation of settled legal limits on reassessment. Reference was made to Calcutta Discount Co. and Jeans Knit (P) Ltd. v. CIT, where the Supreme Court recognized maintainability of writs challenging reassessment notices based on lack of jurisdiction.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.13 The revenue contended, with reliance on Anshul Jain and other decisions, that the writ petition was premature and that the matter should proceed through the statutory assessment and appellate hierarchy, arguing that this case did not fall within the exceptions warranting writ interference.
2.14 The Court held that where reassessment is initiated not on "fresh material" but on the same material that had earlier been considered, the Assessing Officer lacks jurisdiction to reopen; such a case is one of wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, constituting an "exceptional circumstance" justifying writ intervention at the notice stage.
2.15 The Court reasoned that reassessment based on a mere change of opinion is itself an abuse of process and that, in such situations, Article 226 jurisdiction can and should be invoked without insisting upon exhaustion of alternate statutory remedies.
2.16 The Court distinguished the authorities cited by the revenue:
(a) The decision in Shri Shyam Sundar Dhanuka was said to involve a factual controversy requiring "deeper probe" and not a pure change-of-opinion issue; therefore, it did not govern the present situation.
(b) In M/s. Britannia Industries Limited, interference was declined because no exceptional circumstances were shown; by contrast, the present case involved clear jurisdictional error based on change of opinion.
(c) In Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-III, the original assessment order contained no formation of opinion, being entirely silent on the relevant liability; here, by contrast, the Assessing Officer had clearly dealt with the issue and dropped it.
(d) Anshul Jain was held inapplicable as the present case involved a direct challenge to the very assumption of jurisdiction in reopening on the same material.
Conclusions:
2.17 The Court concluded that the writ petition was maintainable at the stage of notice under Section 148 because the reassessment was initiated without jurisdiction, being founded on an impermissible change of opinion on the same material, and thus fell within the recognized exceptions permitting writ interference.
Issue 3: Effect of alleged "cryptic" prior assessment orders on the plea of change of opinion
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.18 The Court considered the nature of assessment proceedings as administrative/quasi-judicial rather than strictly judicial, with reference to S.S. Gadgil v. Lal & Co., which clarified that income tax authorities are administrative authorities tasked with estimating income under statutory machinery, and that assessment proceedings are not equivalent to a civil suit between the citizen and the State.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.19 The revenue argued that the assessment/reassessment orders dated 26.08.2022 were "cryptic" and did not disclose how the replies of the transporter or the petitioner had been dealt with, and therefore no real opinion could be said to have been formed; on that premise, the bar of change of opinion would not apply.
2.20 The Court observed that both assessment orders specifically referred to the assessees' replies (even if briefly) and that the Assessing Officer, after issuing detailed notices and receiving detailed responses, chose not to make any addition on the issue of alleged cash return. This necessarily implied that the Assessing Officer had accepted the explanation and had formed an opinion that no addition was warranted on that ground.
2.21 The Court held that an assessment order need not elaborate reasons for every point accepted in favour of the assessee; where a query has been raised and answered and no addition is made on that point, the formation of an opinion is implicit. The brevity of the order, by itself, does not negate the existence of such opinion.
Conclusions:
2.22 The Court rejected the contention that the prior assessment orders were too cryptic to evidence any opinion. It found that an opinion had in fact been formed and the issue of cash return had been consciously dropped; hence, reopening on the same material and issue was barred as a change of opinion.
Issue 4: Challenge on ground of non-faceless reassessment (Section 151A)
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.23 The petitioner had also challenged the reassessment proceedings on the ground that the impugned notice was issued by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of being issued in a faceless manner as contemplated by the scheme notified under Section 151A of the 1961 Act.
2.24 The Court expressly recorded that since the writ petition was being allowed on the ground of change of opinion and consequent lack of jurisdiction to reopen, the other ground of challenge, namely non-faceless issuance of notice, was not examined.
Conclusions:
2.25 No decision was rendered on the validity of the reassessment notice on the ground of alleged violation of the faceless regime under Section 151A; that issue was left open.
Overall Disposition
2.26 The Court held that the reopening notice under Section 148 and the reassessment proceedings initiated on that basis were unsustainable as they amounted to a prohibited change of opinion and a wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. The notice and proceedings were set aside, and the writ petition was allowed, without any order as to costs.
Issues: Whether the imported PVC suspension resin was classifiable under the specific tariff entry for poly(vinyl chloride) resins or under the residuary entry, and consequently whether the benefit of the customs exemption notification was available.
Analysis: The dispute turned on tariff classification of PVC suspension grade resin. The material had already been examined in earlier Tribunal and appellate decisions involving identical or substantially similar goods, where the specific heading for non-plasticized PVC resins was preferred over the general or residuary entry. Applying Rule 3(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of Import Tariff Schedule, the specific description was held to prevail over the more general description. Since the imported goods answered to the specific entry, the denial of exemption and the resultant demand could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The goods were correctly classifiable under the specific tariff entry, and the impugned order denying the exemption and confirming duty was unsustainable.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the imposition of penalty on the appellant under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 is legally sustainable on the basis of the allegations and evidence on record.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Sustainability of penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962
2.1.1 Legal framework as discussed
2.1.1.1 The Court reproduced and analysed Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962, noting that it applies where a person "knowingly or intentionally makes, signs or uses, or causes to be made, signed or used, any declaration, statement or document which is false or incorrect in any material particular, in the transaction of any business for the purposes of this Act", and that the penalty may extend to five times the value of the goods.
2.1.1.2 Relying on its earlier decision in J. Uthaman v. Commissioner of Customs, the Court reiterated that for imposition of penalty under Section 114AA, the following must be specifically established: (a) the person proceeded against; (b) the precise act alleged (making, signing, using or causing to be made, signed or used); (c) the nature of the document (declaration, statement or document); (d) that such document was false or incorrect in any material particular; and (e) that the acts were done knowingly or intentionally (mens rea) in the course of business under the Act.
2.1.1.3 The Court further held that, given the severity of the potential penalty, the show cause notice must clearly specify: the exact act complained of under Section 114AA, the particular declaration/statement/document involved, and the precise particulars alleged to be false or incorrect, so as to enable the noticee to effectively defend against the charge.
2.1.2 Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.2.1 The show cause notice alleged that the appellant, as CHA and managing person of two CHA entities, was obliged to verify IEC details and client identity, and that he "knowingly" undertook CHA work for fraudulent importers after knowing that IEC holders were not the real importers, thereby abetting the commission of offences and rendering himself liable for penalty under Section 114AA.
2.1.2.2 The Court noted from the records that the appellant had submitted KYC documents of the importers to the investigating agency under acknowledgment, and the Revenue had produced no contrary evidence rebutting this submission.
2.1.2.3 It was observed that the appellant had requested cross-examination of certain persons whose statements were relied upon, but such cross-examination was not granted. Consequently, the statements remained contested and untested.
2.1.2.4 The Court held that, in light of the requirements articulated in the earlier decision in J. Uthaman, the show cause notice and the adjudication did not clearly spell out which specific declarations, statements or documents the appellant was alleged to have made, signed, used, or caused to be made, signed or used, which of their particulars were false or incorrect, or how the appellant's acts fulfilled the element of "knowingly or intentionally" under Section 114AA.
2.1.2.5 The Court found that the adjudicating authority's conclusion that the appellant had "knowingly and intentionally used the declarations and fabricated documents containing false information regarding the actual importers, value and quantity" was not supported by cogent evidence, particularly in the absence of proved material showing fabrication, falsification, or conscious use of false documents by the appellant.
2.1.2.6 The Court emphasised that mens rea (deliberate and conscious knowledge of falsity or incorrectness) is an express requirement under Section 114AA, and the burden to establish such mens rea rests heavily on the Department. In the instant case, the Department had failed to discharge this burden as against the appellant.
2.1.2.7 Given that the statements relied upon by the Department were not tested by cross-examination and remained contested, the Court held that they could not be safely relied upon as evidence of any overt act or requisite mens rea on the part of the appellant for the purpose of Section 114AA.
2.1.2.8 The Court also noted that the judicial precedents cited by the appellant supported the requirement of specific pleading, clear attribution of acts, and proof of knowledge/intent for invoking Section 114AA, and found these authorities consistent with its own analysis. In view of its core findings on lack of proof of the statutory ingredients, the Court considered it unnecessary to examine the appellant's additional contentions.
2.1.3 Conclusions
2.1.3.1 The Court concluded that the Department failed to establish the statutory ingredients of Section 114AA against the appellant, namely: (a) specific acts of making, signing, using, or causing to be made, signed or used any particular declaration, statement, or document; (b) falsity or material incorrectness of such document; and (c) knowledge or intention on the part of the appellant regarding such falsity or incorrectness.
2.1.3.2 The Court held that, in the absence of adequate pleading in the show cause notice and in the absence of reliable, tested evidence demonstrating mens rea and overt acts by the appellant, the penalty imposed under Section 114AA was unsustainable in law.
2.1.3.3 The portion of the impugned order imposing a penalty of Rs. 25,00,000/- on the appellant under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was set aside, and the appeal was allowed to that extent, with consequential relief, if any, to follow in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the seized 12 gold bars were established to be "smuggled" and hence liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act could be relied upon, in the absence of compliance with section 138B and in the face of retraction, to prove smuggling and ownership of the seized gold bars.
1.3 Whether, in the facts of the case, the statutory burden under section 123 of the Customs Act was discharged by the appellants and whether the burden could be shifted back to the department to prove smuggling.
1.4 Whether penalty under section 112(b)(i) of the Customs Act could be imposed on the appellants when liability of the gold to confiscation under section 111 was not established.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability of the seized gold bars to confiscation under section 111
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined sections 111(a)/(b)/(d), 120 and 123 of the Customs Act. Section 111 applies to goods "brought from a place outside India" and liable to confiscation if imported contrary to prohibitions or restrictions. Section 123 reverses the burden of proof in respect of certain notified goods (including gold) on the "person from whose possession" such goods are seized or the "person who claims to be the owner". Section 120 concerns confiscation of goods made from, or derived from, smuggled goods.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The impugned order had proceeded on the premise that the seized gold bars were owned by a particular person and that they were smuggled, relying mainly on statements recorded under section 108 and on the foreign markings on the gold.
2.3 In a connected appeal decided on the same date, the Court had already held that this alleged owner was not proved to be the owner of the 12 gold bars, as the section 108 statements (of that person and of the present appellants) could not be relied upon.
2.4 The appellants' specific explanation was that the 12 gold bars and Rs. 2,40,000/- were part of a documented job-work transaction originating from a jeweller at Jaipur (via a will and instructions to return the gold and cash), and that they were merely transporting those bars and cash to the legatee. This explanation, supported by reference to job-work issue orders, ledger entries and a will, directly addressed the question of licit possession.
2.5 The Court noted that this explanation was not examined in the impugned order. Further, the department did not examine or even attempt to examine the person (Rinkesh Kumar alias Prem Singh) who, according to the appellants, had handed over the gold and documents in Chennai, and whose testimony was crucial to test the veracity of the appellants' explanation.
2.6 The Court relied upon its own prior decisions and the Supreme Court's judgment in holding that for an inference of smuggling, the evidence must relate to "unauthorized importation" and not merely to "unauthorized possession" of gold. A mere finding that a person was in possession of smuggled goods does not justify the conclusion that such person was "concerned in the commission of the offence of illegal importation"; circumstances connecting such person with importation prior to the actual import must be established.
2.7 Applying this principle, the Court observed that neither the show cause notice nor the impugned order alleged or established any circumstances connecting the appellants with the importation of the gold prior to actual import. It was not even the department's case that the appellants were importers of the gold.
2.8 The Court further observed that, in the connected appeal, section 123 was held inapplicable to fasten the burden upon the alleged owner because he was not established as owner of the gold; consequently, section 123 could not be invoked to treat the gold as smuggled. The obligation thus lay on the department to establish smuggling without improperly relying on reversed burden.
2.9 Section 120 had not been invoked and, in any event, could not have been invoked in the absence of evidence that the appellants or the alleged owner had smuggled the gold bars. The Court referred to precedent clarifying that section 120 applies when goods are made from smuggled goods and the underlying smuggling is established.
2.10 The Court held that mere foreign markings on gold, absence of import documents from the alleged owner, and non-acceptance of appellants' documents, without proper investigation or testing of their explanation, could not by themselves establish that the bars were "brought from a place outside India" by way of smuggling for purposes of section 111.
Conclusions
2.11 The department failed to establish that the seized 12 gold bars were smuggled goods or that they had been imported in violation of prohibitions or restrictions under the Customs Act or allied laws.
2.12 Section 123 could not validly be used against the appellants in the circumstances of the case to presume smuggling; the primary burden remained on the department and was not discharged.
2.13 Section 120 was neither invoked nor factually attracted.
2.14 The seized 12 gold bars were not shown to be "goods brought from a place outside India" in contravention of law and, therefore, were not liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act.
Issue 2: Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements under section 108
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.15 The Court considered section 108 (power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents) and section 138B (conditions for use of statements made and signed before customs officers) of the Customs Act. It also noted that the appellants had retracted their earlier statements made under section 108.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 The department's case regarding smuggling, ownership of the gold, and the role of the appellants as carriers was primarily rested on statements recorded under section 108 from the appellants and the alleged owner.
2.17 The appellants specifically contended that their section 108 statements had been extracted under threat and coercion and were retracted while in judicial custody, with an alternate factual narrative then furnished.
2.18 The Court noted that the statutory safeguards contained in section 138B, which govern the admissibility and use of such statements, were not shown to have been complied with by the department.
2.19 In the connected appeal, the Court had already held that, in the absence of compliance with section 138B, no reliance could be placed upon statements recorded under section 108 for purposes of proving either ownership or smuggling in respect of the same gold bars.
2.20 Applying that reasoning, the Court held in the present appeals that such section 108 statements, especially when retracted and not tested in accordance with section 138B, could not form the legal basis for concluding that the gold was smuggled or that the appellants were knowingly acting as carriers of smuggled gold.
Conclusions
2.21 Statements recorded under section 108, in the absence of due compliance with section 138B and in view of their retraction, could not validly be relied upon to establish that the seized gold bars were smuggled, to fix ownership on the alleged owner, or to establish the appellants' conscious involvement in smuggling.
2.22 The department's reliance on such statements, without satisfying the statutory preconditions, rendered the foundation of the confiscation and penalty unsustainable.
Issue 3: Sustainability of penalty under section 112(b)(i)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.23 Section 112(b)(i) of the Customs Act provides for imposition of penalty on any person who acquires possession of, or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling, purchasing or dealing with any goods "which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.24 The Court emphasized that liability under section 112(b)(i) is contingent upon the foundational fact that the goods in question are "liable to confiscation under section 111". Knowledge or reason to believe on the part of the person penalized must relate to this confiscability.
2.25 Since, for the reasons recorded under Issue 1, the seized 12 gold bars were held not to have been established as smuggled goods and not liable to confiscation under section 111, the basic condition for the applicability of section 112(b)(i) itself failed.
2.26 Moreover, in the absence of admissible and reliable evidence (other than the inadmissible section 108 statements) linking the appellants with importation or with any prior stage of smuggling, the requirement that the appellants "knew or had reason to believe" that the goods were liable to confiscation was also not satisfied.
2.27 The impugned order treated the appellants as "carriers of smuggled gold" solely on the basis of the rejected evidentiary foundation and without independent evidence of their knowledge of smuggled character of the goods.
Conclusions
2.28 As the seized gold bars were not shown to be liable to confiscation under section 111, the essential jurisdictional precondition for imposing penalty under section 112(b)(i) was absent.
2.29 The department did not establish that the appellants knew or had reason to believe that the gold was liable to confiscation.
2.30 The penalties imposed on the appellants under section 112(b)(i) of the Customs Act were unsustainable and were therefore set aside.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether gold jewellery/gold ornaments weighing 4440.840 grams, claimed by the appellant out of a larger seized quantity, were liable to confiscation under section 119 of the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether, on the materials produced by the appellant, the burden of proof under section 123 of the Customs Act regarding non-smuggled origin of the gold stood discharged.
1.3 Whether statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act could be relied upon in the absence of compliance with the procedure prescribed in section 138B of the Customs Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Confiscation of 4440.840 grams under section 119 of the Customs Act
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined whether the conditions of section 119 of the Customs Act were met so as to justify confiscation of the appellant's gold jewellery/gold ornaments on the ground that they were used for concealment or as a cover for smuggled goods.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court confined itself to jewellery weighing 4440.840 grams out of the total 20,756.3 grams recovered from an employee of another person, which quantity the appellant specifically claimed as its own.
2.3 The appellant furnished details of the seized jewellery, including:
(i) Three GST invoices bearing numbers SG-460 dated 17.01.2023, SG-465 dated 18.01.2023 and SG-466 dated 18.01.2023 covering 1975.790 gms, 741.510 gms and 1427.890 gms respectively; and
(ii) Approval Voucher No. IA-26 dated 12.01.2023 covering 295.650 gms sent on approval basis.
2.4 The appellant asserted that the goods under these documents were manufactured from legitimately purchased gold, supported by stock registers, bills of gold bars, and ledger accounts, and that the transactions were duly reflected on the GSTN portal and in regular books of account.
2.5 The Commissioner, while confiscating the entire 20,756.3 gms including the appellant's 4440.840 gms, only observed that the invoices had been raised "to cover up" the full quantity of jewellery given to the carrier, and inferred that the appellant was "hand in glove" with another person in dealing in jewellery made from smuggled foreign-origin gold bars.
2.6 The Court noted that the adjudicating authority did not examine or discuss the specific documents and records furnished by the appellant, nor did it record any finding that the GST invoices were false, fabricated, or not reflected on the GSTN portal.
2.7 The Court held that in the absence of any finding that the jewellery covered by the appellant's invoices and approval voucher was prepared out of smuggled gold, and in view of the documentary trail produced, the mere suspicion that invoices were raised "to cover up" other jewellery was insufficient to attract section 119.
Conclusions
2.8 The statutory requirements of section 119 of the Customs Act were not fulfilled in respect of the 4440.840 gms of jewellery claimed by the appellant.
2.9 The confiscation of this quantity of gold jewellery/gold ornaments under section 119 could not be sustained and was set aside to that extent.
Issue 2: Discharge of burden under section 123 of the Customs Act
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.10 The Court considered the application of section 123 of the Customs Act, which places a burden on the person from whose possession or ownership gold is seized to prove that it is not smuggled.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The appellant, as the claimed owner of 4440.840 gms, had produced purchase invoices of gold, stock registers of gold bars, bills relating to gold bars, and ledger accounts of bullion suppliers, as well as GST invoices and approval documents for the jewellery in question.
2.12 The Court found that these materials constituted sufficient evidence that the seized jewellery belonging to the appellant was manufactured from legally procured gold and was duly accounted for in the appellant's books.
2.13 The Court further observed that the department had not produced any contrary evidence to show that the jewellery belonging to the appellant was manufactured from smuggled gold bars.
Conclusions
2.14 The burden of proof under section 123 of the Customs Act stood discharged by the appellant in respect of the 4440.840 gms of seized jewellery.
2.15 In the absence of evidence from the department to rebut this, the jewellery could not be treated as made from smuggled gold.
Issue 3: Admissibility and relevance of statements under section 108 without compliance with section 138B
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.16 The Court examined the evidentiary value of statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act in light of the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 138B of the Act.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The adjudicating authority had relied, inter alia, on the statements of the carrier and another person recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act.
2.18 The Court held that the procedure contemplated under section 138B had not been followed in relation to these statements.
2.19 Relying on a prior Division Bench decision of the Tribunal in M/s Surya Wires Pvt. Ltd. vs. Principal Commissioner, CGST, Raipur, the Court held that statements recorded under section 108 cannot be treated as relevant or relied upon unless the requirements of section 138B are complied with.
Conclusions
2.20 The statements of the carrier and the other individual recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act were not legally admissible or relevant for sustaining confiscation in the absence of compliance with section 138B.
2.21 Without such valid evidentiary support, the inference that the appellant's jewellery was involved in smuggling or used as a cover for smuggled goods could not be maintained.
Issues: Whether dispatch of imported goods obtained under Target Plus duty credit scrip to a job worker for manufacture of the final products violated condition 3 of Notification No. 73/2006-Cus and, if not, whether the demand of duty, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty could survive.
Analysis: Condition 3 of Notification No. 73/2006-Cus prohibits transfer or sale of the imported goods, while its proviso deals with utilisation by a supporting manufacturer in the case of a merchant exporter. The relevant Foreign Trade Policy provisions and the DGFT public notice indicate that imports for own use may be converted through job workers and that own use is not confined to direct physical use in the importer's own premises. The imported goods remained with the appellant and were sent for manufacture of the resultant products; there was no finding of sale or transfer of the goods to the job worker. The cited precedent on the same Target Plus scheme and similar condition also supports the view that use through job workers does not amount to prohibited transfer.
Conclusion: Dispatch of the imported goods to a job worker for manufacture did not violate the exemption condition. The denial of the notification benefit, the duty demand, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty were unsustainable.
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