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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the issuance of a Look Out Circular against the Petitioners was permissible under the consolidated guidelines/Office Memorandum dated 22.02.2021, in the absence of any registered cognizable criminal case and when only proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962 were pending.
(2) Whether the continued operation and renewals of the Look Out Circular, without periodic review by the Originating Agency, were valid in light of the Office Memorandum and the right to travel under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
(3) Whether the Look Out Circular could be justified on the ground of alleged non-cooperation in investigation and the seriousness of alleged economic offences, including by invoking the "exceptional cases" clause relating to economic/strategic interests of India.
(4) Whether the Petitioners' withdrawal of earlier writ proceedings before another High Court without liberty to file afresh operated as a bar to the present writ petitions.
(5) Whether a stay of the quashing of the Look Out Circular ought to be granted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Validity of issuance of LOC in absence of cognizable offence / criminal case
Legal framework
The Court considered the consolidated guidelines in the Office Memorandum dated 22.02.2021 governing issuance of Look Out Circulars, including clauses (H), (I) and (L): recourse to LOC is to be taken in cognizable offences under IPC or other penal laws; in cases where there is no cognizable offence, the LOC subject cannot be detained/arrested or prevented from leaving the country, and only intimation of arrival/departure can be requested; and in exceptional cases LOC may be issued where departure is detrimental to sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations, strategic and/or economic interests of India or larger public interest.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court found that no cognizable offence under IPC or other penal laws had been registered against the Petitioners; only proceedings under the Customs Act in the form of investigations and show cause notices were undertaken, some already adjudicated and some pending. The Petitioners had been granted anticipatory bail; no steps for its cancellation had been taken. The action against the Petitioners was essentially in the nature of fiscal/administrative proceedings rather than criminal prosecution.
The Court held that the guidelines clearly require that, for an LOC involving detention/prevention from travel, there must be a cognizable offence and reasons recorded that the person is evading arrest or likely to flee. Mere pendency of investigation under the Customs Act or issuance of show cause notices, without registration of a cognizable criminal case, did not satisfy the threshold of clause (H). The consolidated guidelines envisage that, where there is no cognizable offence, only a request for intimation of travel movements can be made, not detention or restriction on travel as in the present LOC.
The Court examined the internal notings produced and found no specific or reasoned order directing issuance of an LOC; instead, at the relevant time, in light of an earlier High Court order restraining coercive steps, it had been advised that LOC, being a coercive measure, should not be issued and only summons should be used. The Court thus found that even at the departmental level the basis for LOC was not transparently or properly recorded.
Conclusions
The issuance of the LOC against the Petitioners did not meet the parameters of the Office Memorandum, as there was no cognizable offence or criminal case, nor were the conditions for recourse to LOC in such circumstances fulfilled. The LOC was therefore contrary to the guidelines and invalid ab initio.
Issue (2): Legality of continued operation of LOC without review and impact on Article 21 right to travel
Legal framework
The Court relied on clause (J) of the consolidated guidelines, which stipulates that an LOC remains in force until deletion is requested by the Originator, but the Originating Agency must review LOCs quarterly and annually and submit proposals to delete them where appropriate, so that "liberty of the individual is not jeopardized". The Court further recognised the right to travel abroad as a facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Interpretation and reasoning
The LOC had remained in force for more than three years from 19/20.04.2022. The Court recorded the concession of the Respondent's counsel that no review of the LOC had been undertaken. This was directly contrary to clause (J), which mandates periodic review.
The Court observed that during this period, investigations had concluded in substantial part and show cause notices were issued and adjudicated, with appeals pending; yet no criminal proceedings were initiated. The Department had consciously resorted to proceedings under the Customs Act rather than criminal prosecution. Therefore, pendency of investigation or adjudication under the Customs Act could not justify indefinite continuation of an LOC.
The Court noted that, on multiple occasions, it had permitted the Petitioners to travel abroad for business; they had returned each time, which undermined any assertion of flight risk. The Petitioners had longstanding business operations, immovable properties, factories and roots in India. In this factual background, continued restriction on their travel was held to be an unjustified encroachment on their Article 21 right to travel.
The Court held that LOC, being a coercive measure, cannot be used as a substitute for statutory modes of investigation or enforcement, nor can it be kept in force indefinitely without review, especially when the foundational circumstances (investigation stage, absence of criminal case, cooperation of the Petitioners) did not warrant such a measure.
Conclusions
The continuation and renewals of the LOC without any periodic review were contrary to clause (J) of the Office Memorandum and constituted an unlawful and disproportionate restriction on the Petitioners' Article 21 right to travel. The LOC could not be allowed to remain in force indefinitely.
Issue (3): Justification of LOC based on alleged non-cooperation and seriousness of economic offence, including reliance on "exceptional cases" clause
Legal framework
The Respondents invoked the guidelines' emphasis on serious offences and the "exceptional cases" clause (L), which allows LOCs even beyond standard categories where departure is detrimental to sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations or the strategic/economic interests of India, or where larger public interest so requires.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Respondents argued that the Petitioners had not honoured summons and were non-cooperative, that there was a prima facie case of high-value duty drawback fraud causing huge economic loss to the exchequer, and that economic offences, especially during a pandemic, warranted strict measures such as LOC.
The Court held that mere assertions of non-cooperation and seriousness of economic offences, without a cognizable criminal case and without the Petitioners being shown to be evading arrest or trial, could not justify an LOC that detains or restricts travel, given the clear stipulation in clause (H) and (I). The Court accepted the Petitioners' position that they had appeared before the authorities and their statements were recorded, investigation had culminated in show cause notices and adjudication, and the Department had sufficient statutory powers under the Customs Act to secure documents or enforce compliance.
The Court specifically held that the insistence of the Respondent on obtaining US customs declarations from the Petitioners could not be a basis for invoking or continuing an LOC; if such documents were required, there were "ways and means" under the statute to secure them. LOC could not be converted into an investigative tool to compel production of documents.
As to clause (L), the Court did not find any material or reasoning that departure of the Petitioners would be detrimental to sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations, strategic or economic interests of India in the sense contemplated by that clause, nor that larger public interest required their departure to be blocked. The assertion of "economic offences" alone, at an investigative/adjudicatory stage under the Customs Act and without criminal prosecution, was insufficient to invoke the exceptional clause.
Conclusions
Alleged non-cooperation, pendency of investigation, and the gravity of supposed economic offences did not, in the facts of the case, satisfy the conditions of the consolidated guidelines, including the "exceptional cases" clause. These grounds were insufficient to justify either issuance or continuation of the LOC.
Issue (4): Effect of withdrawal of earlier writ petitions before another High Court without liberty
Interpretation and reasoning
The Respondents, relying on precedent, contended that the Petitioners' earlier withdrawal of writ petitions before another High Court without liberty to file afresh barred the present petitions. The Court noted this objection but proceeded to examine and decide the merits of the challenges to the LOC, including scrutiny of the Office Memorandum, internal notings, and factual matrix of investigation and travel permissions.
No finding was recorded that the present petitions were barred on this ground; conversely, the Court entertained and allowed the writ petitions, implying that the prior withdrawal did not preclude the present proceedings.
Conclusions
The objection based on earlier withdrawal of writ proceedings did not operate as a bar to the present writ petitions; the Court proceeded to and did adjudicate the matter on merits.
Issue (5): Request for stay of order quashing LOC
Interpretation and reasoning
Post-judgment, the Respondents sought a stay of the order quashing the LOC. The Court referred to its conclusions that (i) the LOC could not have been validly issued against the Petitioners under the applicable guidelines, and (ii) it could not have been continued without proper review and extension. In light of these merits, and given that the LOC was found to be contrary to the Office Memorandum and to have illegally restricted the Petitioners' liberty, the Court declined to suspend its operative directions.
Conclusions
The prayer for stay of the judgment and order quashing the LOC and its renewals was rejected.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act can be imposed solely on the basis of non-filling of Part B of the e-way bill, in the absence of any finding regarding intention to evade tax.
1.2 Whether a technical glitch preventing completion of Part B of the e-way bill, when all other documents are in order and goods match the tax invoice, justifies seizure and penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act.
1.3 Whether, upon setting aside the seizure and penalty orders, the authority is bound to refund amounts deposited pursuant to the impugned proceedings.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Imposition of penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act for non-filling of Part B of e-way bill in absence of intention to evade tax
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court proceeded on section 129(3) of the GST Act, which provides for levy of penalty in cases of detention/seizure of goods in transit. The Court relied on prior decisions holding that non-filling of an e-way bill, by itself, does not attract penalty under section 129(3) absent intention to evade tax.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the only ground for interception and seizure was that Part B of the e-way bill had not been generated. It found that all other requisite documents were produced at the time of interception and that the goods were found in accordance with the description in the tax invoice. The Court observed that in the penalty order under section 129(3), no reasons had been assigned indicating any intention to evade tax, and none of the authorities below had recorded any finding on such intention. Referring to the Division Bench decision which had "categorically held that non-filling of e-way bill will not attract penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act," and to other coordinate decisions reiterating the same view, the Court applied that legal position to the present facts.
Conclusions: The Court held that mere non-filling of Part B of the e-way bill, without any finding or material indicating intention to evade tax, does not justify imposition of penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act. The impugned penalty order and appellate order could not be sustained in law.
Issue 2: Effect of technical glitch preventing completion of Part B of the e-way bill when other documents are in order
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded the petitioner's stand that Part B could not be filled due to a technical glitch, and noted from the record that this explanation, based on technical error, had not been disputed at any stage. It further noted that all other documents were duly filled and the goods in transit matched the tax invoice description. The State could not dispute the legal proposition laid down in the precedents cited by the petitioner. In absence of any contrary material or challenge to the plea of technical error, and in view of the settled position that non-filling of e-way bill alone does not attract section 129(3) penalty, the Court accepted that there was no intention to evade tax.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that the non-filling of Part B of the e-way bill, occasioned by a technical glitch and accompanied by complete and correct supporting documents, could not trigger valid proceedings for seizure or penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act.
Issue 3: Consequential relief and refund of amount deposited
Interpretation and reasoning: Having found that there was no intention to evade tax and that penalty under section 129(3) was unsustainable, the Court held that the impugned orders of penalty and dismissal of appeal were liable to be quashed. It then considered the consequence of such quashing on amounts already deposited by the petitioner in pursuance of the impugned proceedings.
Conclusions: The Court quashed the impugned orders, allowed the writ petition, and directed the concerned authority to refund any amount deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the proceedings within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order.
Issues: (i) Whether the penalty imposed by the Settlement Commission on the importing company deserved interference and reduction; (ii) Whether the penalties imposed on the directors were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the penalty imposed by the Settlement Commission on the importing company deserved interference and reduction.
Analysis: The import of broadcasting equipment was found to have been misdeclared as temporary removal for "DEMO" use, whereas the goods were actually moved for commercial purposes. The Court accepted that the duty liability had arisen because of the misdeclaration and that the Settlement Commission was justified in treating the conduct as culpable. At the same time, the Court noted that the customs duty already paid was substantial and that the petition involved a temporary import arrangement, so the quantum of penalty required moderation.
Conclusion: The penalty on the company was upheld in principle but reduced to Rs. 50,00,000/-, with credit for the amount already deposited.
Issue (ii): Whether the penalties imposed on the directors were sustainable.
Analysis: The findings showed awareness of the misdeclaration, but the benefit of the arrangement accrued to the company in its business capacity rather than to the directors in their personal capacity. In those circumstances, the Court found that individual penal liability of the directors was not warranted on the facts of the case.
Conclusion: The penalties imposed on the directors were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part. The company's penalty was substantially reduced, the directors were relieved of penalty, and the remaining amount ordered by the Court was to be paid to complete the settlement.
Ratio Decidendi: Where misdeclaration in customs matters is established, the penalty may be sustained, but the Court may calibrate the quantum on equitable facts; individual penalties on directors will not be sustained where the benefit and liability are essentially attributable to the company alone.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether service of the pre-show-cause notice in Form DRC-01A, the show-cause notice under Section 73 and the adjudication order by uploading them only under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal constituted proper and due communication to the assessee.
1.2 Whether passing an order under Section 73 without affording an opportunity of personal hearing, where an adverse decision was contemplated, violated Section 75(4) of the Act of 2017 and the principles of natural justice.
1.3 What consequential directions were warranted upon finding that the adjudication order was not duly communicated and was passed in breach of Section 75(4) and natural justice.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of service by uploading notices and order only under "additional notices and orders" tab on GST portal
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The proceedings arose under Section 73 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017. The Court referred to a coordinate Bench decision which, relying on a Division Bench decision, held that accessibility of a notice only under the "additional" tab on the GST portal, as opposed to the "normal" tab, does not constitute proper communication or uploading as contemplated under Section 73(1) read with the applicable Rules.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 It was undisputed that the pre-show-cause notice in Form DRC-01A, the show-cause notice under Section 73 and the adjudication order were all uploaded only under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal.
2.3 The petitioners asserted that they had no reason to access the said tab, remained unaware of the notices and the order, and came to know of the proceedings only upon recovery being effected from their electronic cash ledger after issuance of a recovery notice in Form DRC-13 to their bank.
2.4 The Court, following the reasoning in the coordinate Bench decision, held that uploading notices only under the "additional notices and orders" tab cannot be treated as due or proper communication/ service upon a person against whom an adverse decision is contemplated.
2.5 In the light of these facts and precedents, the Court held that it could not be said that the petitioners had due knowledge of the proceedings or the adjudication order at any time proximate to their issuance.
Conclusions
2.6 Service of the pre-show-cause notice, the show-cause notice under Section 73 and the adjudication order solely by uploading them under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal did not amount to proper or due service/communication in law.
2.7 The petitioners were prevented by sufficient cause from participating in the adjudication and from challenging the order in time, owing to such defective mode of service.
Issue 2 - Requirement of personal hearing under Section 75(4) and principles of natural justice
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.8 The Court reproduced and relied upon a coordinate Bench judgment which interpreted Section 75(4) of the Act of 2017. As there noted, Section 75(4) mandates that an opportunity of hearing shall be granted: (a) where a request in writing is received from the person chargeable with tax or penalty; or (b) where any adverse decision is contemplated against such person.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The coordinate Bench had held that issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 73(1) clearly indicates that an adverse decision is contemplated, thereby triggering the statutory obligation on the Proper Officer to afford an opportunity of hearing before passing an order under Section 73(9).
2.10 The Court found the facts in the present case to be identical to those considered earlier: the show-cause notice contemplated an adverse decision, yet the adjudication order was passed without granting any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners.
2.11 The Court observed that the adjudication order was passed ex parte without hearing the petitioners, and this was directly contrary to the mandate of Section 75(4) and to the principles of natural justice.
Conclusions
2.12 Since the show-cause notice contemplated an adverse decision, the Proper Officer was under a statutory obligation under Section 75(4) to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing prior to passing the order under Section 73.
2.13 Failure to grant such hearing rendered the adjudication order violative of Section 75(4) and the principles of natural justice and therefore unsustainable.
Issue 3 - Consequential relief and directions
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The Court noted the combined effect of: (i) improper service of the show-cause notice and order by uploading under the "additional notices and orders" tab only; and (ii) absence of mandatory opportunity of hearing despite an adverse decision being contemplated.
2.15 Relying on the approach adopted in the coordinate Bench decision, the Court found no reason to depart from that view and considered it appropriate to set aside the impugned adjudication order while preserving the proceedings at the show-cause notice stage and granting a further opportunity to the petitioners.
Conclusions
2.16 The adjudication order dated April 24, 2024 was set aside on the dual grounds that it was neither appropriately served nor passed in accordance with Section 75(4) of the Act of 2017.
2.17 The petitioners were granted two weeks' time from the date of the order to file their reply to the show-cause notice dated December 19, 2023.
2.18 The adjudicating authority was directed to conclude the proceedings as early as possible, preferably within four weeks from the date of filing of the reply, without granting unnecessary adjournments.
2.19 No order as to costs was made.
Issues: Whether the faceless assessment order and consequential demand and penalty proceedings were vitiated for want of adequate opportunity, non-consideration of the assessee's adjournment request and reply, and breach of Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the principles of natural justice.
Analysis: The final show cause notice granted less than the prescribed seven days under the assessment scheme, the adjournment request was not dealt with, and the assessee had in fact transmitted its objections by email before the assessment order was passed. The record therefore did not justify the finding that no reply had been furnished. Section 144B(1)(xv) required consideration of the assessee's reply and all material available with the assessment unit before finalising the assessment. On these facts, the assessment was passed without proper consideration of the assessee's response and without a fair opportunity of hearing, amounting to procedural unfairness and breach of natural justice.
Conclusion: The impugned assessment order and consequential proceedings could not be sustained and were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The matter was restored to the stage of the show cause notice for fresh consideration by the faceless assessing authority, with directions to reopen the portal, consider the existing and additional replies, and afford a hearing through video conferencing.
Ratio Decidendi: Under faceless assessment, failure to give adequate notice time, to consider an adjournment request, and to take into account a timely filed reply before passing the final assessment order vitiates the assessment for breach of Section 144B and the principles of natural justice.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the timelines and interest requirement under Schedule I, Rule 12 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 for payment of balance sale consideration are mandatory and attracted in this auction sale.
1.2 Whether the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of balance sale consideration and, if so, what is the effect of such extension on the auction purchaser's liability to pay interest.
1.3 Whether the attachment of the auctioned land by the State Tax Department and the Liquidator's inability to immediately convey title/execute a sale deed could relieve the auction purchaser from (a) the obligation to adhere to the statutory payment schedule, and (b) liability for statutory interest.
1.4 Whether the doctrine of reciprocal promises under Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 could be invoked by the auction purchaser to resist payment of interest on the balance sale consideration.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Mandatory nature and applicability of Schedule I, Rule 12 timelines and interest
Legal framework
2.1 The Court examined Schedule I, Clauses 12 and 13 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. Clause 12 mandates that the highest bidder must pay the balance sale consideration within ninety days or such period as mentioned in the auction notice, with the first proviso stipulating that payments after thirty days shall attract interest at 12% per annum, and the second proviso stipulating that the sale shall be cancelled if payment is not received within that period. Clause 13 contemplates completion of sale and execution of the sale certificate/deed "on payment of the full amount".
2.2 The Court relied on the decision in V.S. Palanivel v. Sri Lakshmi Hotels (P) Ltd., where it was held that Rule 12 of Schedule I is mandatory and that the consequence of non-payment within 90 days is cancellation of the sale.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tender Document and Sale Confirmation Advice expressly incorporated the Liquidation Process Regulations, provided that the sale was on "as is where is, as is what is, whatever there is and non-recourse basis", and stipulated that (a) the balance amount must be paid within 30 days without interest; (b) the amount could be paid within 90 days with 12% interest after 30 days, in line with Regulation 33 and Schedule I; and (c) the transfer process is an independent process and shall not in any way affect the payment schedule.
2.4 The Court rejected the Adjudicating Authority's observation that the timeline for payment of sale price is only directory. Following V.S. Palanivel, it held that Rule 12 is mandatory: both (i) the outer limit of 90 days and (ii) the stipulation that payments made after 30 days shall attract 12% interest must be treated as mandatory.
2.5 The Court noted that the Sale Confirmation Advice was issued on 29.12.2022; the 30-day period expired on 28.01.2023. By that time only Rs. 20 crores had been paid and Rs. 305 crores remained as balance. Under Rule 12, payment of the balance after 30 days necessarily attracted 12% interest. The subsequent payment of Rs. 50 crores on 13.03.2023, though within 90 days, did not alter the statutory requirement of interest after the initial 30 days.
2.6 The Court further held, following V.S. Palanivel, that Rule 12 and Rule 13 are not interlinked; Rule 12 governs timelines and consequences for payment, while Rule 13 only prescribes the procedure for completion of sale after full payment. No adverse consequence is attached to non-compliance with Rule 13, whereas Rule 12 explicitly provides for cancellation for non-payment within time, reinforcing its mandatory character.
Conclusions
2.7 The statutory timelines under Schedule I, Rule 12 are mandatory. The auction purchaser was statutorily liable to pay 12% interest on the unpaid balance consideration after the expiry of 30 days from 29.12.2022.
2.8 The Adjudicating Authority's finding that the timelines were merely directory, and its consequent exoneration of the auction purchaser from interest on that basis, is unsustainable in law.
Issue 2 - Jurisdiction to extend time and impact on interest liability
Legal framework
2.9 The Court considered Section 35 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Liquidator's powers "subject to the directions of the Adjudicating Authority") and Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 (inherent powers to make orders to meet the ends of justice). Relying on V.S. Palanivel and Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., it noted that while the Liquidator cannot extend the Rule 12 timeline, the Adjudicating Authority can, in appropriate cases, extend time under its statutory and inherent powers.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Adjudicating Authority's order dated 15.06.2023 on IA/364(AHM)2023: (a) required the Liquidator to intimate the State Tax Department regarding its treatment as secured creditor; (b) directed the governing bidder to lift the attachment within 10 days of such intimation; (c) directed the Liquidator to intimate the successful bidder within 2 days of lifting of attachment; and (d) directed the successful bidder to pay the balance Rs. 255 crores within 5 days of such intimation. It expressly postponed consideration of prayer (b) for waiver of interest.
2.11 The Court held that this order effectively extended the time for payment of balance sale consideration, and such extension was granted by the Adjudicating Authority, not by the Liquidator. In light of V.S. Palanivel, the Adjudicating Authority was competent to grant such extension by exercising powers under Section 35 IBC read with Rule 11 NCLT Rules in appropriate circumstances.
2.12 The order dated 15.06.2023 was never challenged by any party and therefore attained finality. It was not a bare extension of timeline; it structured a sequence of steps linked to lifting of attachment before the obligation to pay the remaining amount arose.
2.13 The Court drew a temporal distinction: (a) the period from expiry of the initial 30 days (29.12.2022 + 30 days) up to 15.06.2023, when there was no protective order suspending the statutory obligation, and (b) the period after 15.06.2023, when the Adjudicating Authority's order was in force and temporarily relieved the auction purchaser from the obligation to pay until the specified preconditions were met.
Conclusions
2.14 The Adjudicating Authority validly exercised jurisdiction to extend the time for payment by its order dated 15.06.2023; that order, being unchallenged, binds the parties.
2.15 The auction purchaser remained liable to pay interest at 12% per annum on the unpaid balance consideration from the expiry of the 30-day period after 29.12.2022 until 15.06.2023.
2.16 For the period covered by the operative extension (post 15.06.2023), when the obligation to pay balance consideration stood deferred by order of the Adjudicating Authority, the auction purchaser cannot be saddled with interest; liability to pay interest for that extended period stands waived.
Issue 3 - Effect of State Tax attachment and Liquidator's inability to immediately convey title
Legal framework
2.17 The Court examined the Tender Document, including: (a) disclaimers that the information was not comprehensive and bidders must conduct independent due diligence; (b) stipulations that the land was to be sold on "as is where is", "as is what is", "whatever there is" and "no recourse" basis; (c) express advisory that bidders should verify revenue records, title, encumbrances, liens, statutory dues etc.; and (d) Clause 4.2(g), stating that the seller shall ensure transfer of title "as available", that the transfer process is an independent process, and that it shall not in any way affect the payment schedule under Clause 4.10, framed in accordance with Regulation 33 and Schedule I.
2.18 The Court relied on V.S. Palanivel, where it was held that an auction purchaser who participates in an auction conducted on "as is where is, as is what is, whatever there is" basis, with knowledge of an income tax attachment, cannot later contend that payment of balance consideration was contingent upon lifting of such attachment.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.19 The auction purchaser had raised queries in March 2023 about encroachment, State Tax attachment and revenue entries. The Liquidator, by letter dated 20.03.2023, reiterated that: (a) all documents had been shared earlier; (b) the sale was on "as is where is, as is what is, whatever there is and no recourse basis"; (c) Clause 4.2(g) clearly stipulated transfer as an independent process not affecting the payment schedule; and (d) though registration of sale deed was not possible until attachment was removed, the sale would stand confirmed once the sale certificate was issued against full payment and possession would be handed over.
2.20 The Court held that the Tender Document clearly allocated the risk of existing encumbrances, including statutory attachments, to the bidders. Payment timelines were expressly decoupled from completion of title-transfer formalities. Thus, the existence of State Tax attachment did not legally suspend or condition the obligation to pay under Schedule I, Rule 12.
2.21 Referring to V.S. Palanivel, the Court held that Rule 12 (timelines and interest/cancellation consequence) is not contingent on removal of encumbrances or completion of procedures under Rule 13. The inability to immediately execute a conveyance deed due to attachment does not negate or postpone the obligation to pay within the statutory schedule.
Conclusions
2.22 The attachment of the land by the State Tax Department and the Liquidator's temporary inability to execute a registered sale deed did not relieve the auction purchaser from complying with the statutory payment schedule under Schedule I, Rule 12.
2.23 The contention that no obligation to pay arose until lifting of the attachment was rejected in view of the auction's express "as is where is" terms and the clear separation between payment schedule and transfer process.
2.24 The Court held that the Adjudicating Authority erred in reasoning that because the Liquidator could not then convey title due to attachment, the purchaser could not be compelled to pay the balance or interest.
Issue 4 - Applicability of Section 51, Indian Contract Act, 1872 and reciprocal promises
Legal framework
2.25 The auction purchaser invoked Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, arguing that, in the absence of performance of reciprocal promises by the promisee (Liquidator's ability to convey title free of attachment), the promisor (purchaser) was not bound to perform its obligation to pay. Reliance was placed on Nathulal v. Phoolchand, Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim, and a Delhi High Court decision in I.C.M. Airport Technics v. International Airports Authority of India.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.26 The Court distinguished these precedents as arising from conventional contractual disputes (including those under the Arbitration Act, 1940) where contractual covenants and sequences of reciprocal obligations governed performance.
2.27 It held that the instant matter concerns sale of liquidation assets governed by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. The payment obligations and timelines of an auction purchaser in liquidation are primarily statutory and regulatory in character, not purely contractual.
2.28 The Tender Document expressly subjected the sale to the provisions of the IBC and Liquidation Process Regulations, and clearly stipulated that the transfer process is independent and will not affect the payment schedule. Therefore, the premise that the Liquidator's ability to convey clear title was a reciprocal condition precedent to the purchaser's payment obligation was inconsistent with the governing statutory and tender terms.
Conclusions
2.29 Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act and the doctrine of reciprocal promises do not apply in the manner contended so as to suspend or negate the statutory obligation to pay balance consideration with interest under Schedule I, Rule 12.
2.30 The authorities cited on reciprocal promises and contractual sequencing do not assist the auction purchaser in the context of a liquidation sale conducted under the IBC framework and binding Tender Document clauses.
Overall determination on interest liability
2.31 The auction purchaser was liable to pay 12% interest on the balance sale consideration for the period starting after the expiry of 30 days from 29.12.2022 up to 15.06.2023, when the Adjudicating Authority first granted extension of time.
2.32 For the period during which the extension order dated 15.06.2023 operated, the obligation to pay balance consideration stood deferred by judicial order; consequently, interest for that extended period stands waived.
2.33 The direction of the Adjudicating Authority fully exonerating the auction purchaser from payment of interest on the balance consideration was set aside and substituted with a limited direction that the auction purchaser must pay 12% interest on the balance sale consideration for the period after 30 days from 29.12.2022 until 15.06.2023, to be paid within two weeks, while the remainder of the impugned order was left undisturbed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether amounts received as "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" for advertising, promotion and marketing of beverages bearing the PEPSI brand are liable to service tax under "Business Auxiliary Service" under section 65(19)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994.
1.2 Whether the judgment concerning availment of CENVAT credit on advertisement services in relation to aerated waters is applicable for determining liability under "Business Auxiliary Service" in the present case.
1.3 Whether promotion of a client's brand name/trademark, in the factual matrix of this case, is covered by the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" prior to and after insertion of a specific taxable entry for brand promotion service.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Service tax liability on "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" under Business Auxiliary Service
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal, through the Larger Bench order referred to and relied on, examined section 65(19)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994, defining "Business Auxiliary Service" as any service in relation to promotion or marketing of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The client in the present arrangement is Pepsi Foods, which produces "concentrates", while the appellant manufactures "aerated water" using such concentrate as a raw material.
2.3 The definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" in section 65(19)(ii) does not employ the phrase "directly or indirectly", nor does it refer to promotion/marketing of inputs or raw materials used by the service provider. It contemplates promotion or marketing of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client.
2.4 The promotion schemes and advertisements undertaken by the appellant related to aerated water and beverages manufactured by the appellant, and did not relate to "concentrates" manufactured by Pepsi Foods.
2.5 The departmental stand that advertisement of aerated water indirectly enhances the sale of concentrates, and therefore constitutes BAS rendered to Pepsi Foods, was held to be too farfetched and not supported by the language of section 65(19)(ii).
2.6 The Larger Bench, after reviewing similar bottler agreements and consistent Tribunal precedents (including Superior Drinks, Narmada Drinks, Brindavan Bottlers, Wave Beverages, Kandhari Beverages, Ludhiana Beverages and Beltek Canadian Water), found that receipt of incentives for advertising, promoting and marketing the brand did not amount to BAS provided to the concentrate manufacturer.
2.7 It was further held that the appellant undertook marketing and promotion essentially on its own account for its own products, with financial support from Pepsi Foods, and not as a service "for" Pepsi Foods in the sense required under BAS.
Conclusions
2.8 Amounts received as "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" for advertising, promotion and marketing of beverages bearing the PEPSI brand are not consideration for "Business Auxiliary Service" to Pepsi Foods under section 65(19)(ii).
2.9 The demand of service tax, interest and penalties on such receipts under BAS is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
Issue 2 - Applicability of the judgment on input service credit (Coca Cola) to BAS liability
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.10 The Larger Bench examined rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, defining "input service", particularly clause 2(l)(ii), which covers services used directly or indirectly, in or in relation to manufacture of final products and includes "advertisement or sales promotion" and "activities relating to business".
2.11 The Bombay High Court in Coca Cola considered whether advertisement and sales promotion of aerated waters by a manufacturer of "concentrates" qualified as "input service" to allow CENVAT credit of service tax paid on such advertisement.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The High Court's reasoning turned on the wide, inclusive definition of "input service", particularly the expressions "directly or indirectly" and "activities relating to business", enabling credit when advertisement of aerated water indirectly promoted the sale of concentrates.
2.13 By contrast, the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" in section 65(19) contains no similar language ("directly or indirectly", "activities relating to business") and is more restrictive, requiring that the service be in relation to promotion or marketing of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client.
2.14 The issue in Coca Cola concerned eligibility to CENVAT credit for the person incurring advertisement expense, not liability to pay service tax by treating another entity's promotional activity as BAS. Hence, the factual and legal contexts were distinct.
2.15 Several Tribunal decisions in analogous bottler cases had already distinguished Coca Cola in the BAS context, holding that its rationale, derived from the specific wording of rule 2(l), could not be extended to impose BAS liability.
Conclusions
2.16 The judgment relating to input service credit on advertisement in respect of aerated waters has no application to determine BAS liability in the present case.
2.17 The earlier Tribunal decision in favour of the appellant, holding that BAS demand is not sustainable, does not require reconsideration in light of Coca Cola.
Issue 3 - Coverage of brand/trademark promotion within BAS and effect of specific brand promotion entry
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.18 The Larger Bench noted that section 65(19) does not cover promotion of brand name or trademark of a client.
2.19 Brand promotion service was made taxable separately with effect from 01.07.2010 under section 65(105)(zzzzq) of the Finance Act.
2.20 Reference was made to the principle laid down by the Bombay High Court in Indian National Shipowners' Association that introduction of a new taxable entry, specifically covering certain services, presupposes that such services were not covered under earlier entries.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.21 The activities for which the appellant received incentives were found to be advertising, promoting and marketing the PEPSI trademark/brand name.
2.22 Since section 65(19) did not, by its text, encompass promotion of a client's brand name or trademark, such activities could not be brought within BAS merely because they might incidentally support the client's business.
2.23 The later specific entry taxing brand promotion indicated that, prior to its introduction, such services were not envisaged within existing categories like BAS, and the new entry was not a mere carve-out or clarification of BAS.
Conclusions
2.24 Promotion of the PEPSI brand name/trademark for which "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" were paid is not covered by the definition of BAS under section 65(19).
2.25 In light of the Larger Bench's analysis and the earlier final order in the appellant's own case, the impugned order confirming BAS demand is unsustainable and is set aside, and the appeal is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether deduction of interest on borrowed capital under section 24(b) was allowable in absence of a housing loan interest certificate and sanction letter.
1.2 Whether consultancy charges of Rs. 5,00,000 for A.Y. 2019-20 were genuine and allowable as business expenditure.
1.3 Whether disallowance of Rs. 5,70,774 out of sales promotion and travelling expenses for A.Y. 2019-20 was justified.
1.4 Whether disallowance under section 43B of GST payable of Rs. 11,84,777 for A.Y. 2019-20 was warranted.
1.5 Whether addition of unsecured loans of Rs. 64,81,702 under section 68 for A.Y. 2019-20 was sustainable.
1.6 Whether deduction under section 80C of Rs. 1,50,000 towards principal repayment of housing loan was allowable without proper housing loan evidence.
1.7 For A.Y. 2020-21, whether addition of Rs. 4,70,316 being difference between contract receipts as per Form 26AS and receipts shown in the profit and loss account was justified.
1.8 Whether disallowance of Rs. 6,75,012 under section 36(1)(va) on account of ESIC contribution (linked to A.Y. 2019-20) was permissible or resulted in double disallowance.
1.9 Whether consultancy charges of Rs. 60,000 for A.Y. 2020-21 were substantiated and allowable.
1.10 Whether disallowance of Rs. 3,03,218 out of sales promotion and travelling expenses for A.Y. 2020-21 was justified.
1.11 Whether disallowance of Rs. 1,98,089 on account of bonus and ex-gratia payable for A.Y. 2020-21 was correct.
1.12 Whether disallowance under section 43B of GST payable of Rs. 90,000 for A.Y. 2020-21 was warranted.
1.13 Whether addition of Rs. 1,165 towards interest from a co-operative bank for A.Y. 2020-21 was warranted when assessee claimed it was already included in returned income.
1.14 Whether capital introduction of Rs. 3,50,000 during A.Y. 2020-21 was satisfactorily explained as arising from sale proceeds of agricultural land.
1.15 Whether unsecured loan of Rs. 3,75,000 from M.P. Enterprises for A.Y. 2020-21 was liable to addition under section 68.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Deduction of interest on housing loan under section 24(b) (A.Y. 2019-20)
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal reproduced section 24(b) and its provisos, especially the proviso stipulating that no enhanced deduction shall be allowed unless the assessee furnishes a certificate from the lender specifying the amount of interest payable for acquisition or construction of the property.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The claim of Rs. 55,292 as interest on borrowed capital for a self-occupied property was supported only by an SBI "loan statement".
2.3 The loan statement did not indicate that it related to a home loan, nor did it specify the property for which the loan was taken.
2.4 No interest certificate or loan sanction letter from the bank was produced either before the Assessing Officer, first appellate authority, or the Tribunal.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that the statutory proviso requires a certificate from the lender; in absence of such certificate, the conditions for allowance were not met.
Conclusion
2.6 Deduction of Rs. 55,292 under section 24(b) was rightly disallowed and the disallowance was upheld.
Issue 2: Allowability and genuineness of consultancy charges of Rs. 5,00,000 (A.Y. 2019-20)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The assessee claimed consultancy expenses of Rs. 5,00,000 allegedly paid to one consultant for liaison with Government Departments, supported by five invoices and ledger account.
2.8 The first appellate authority doubted genuineness due to: invoices being simple computer printouts, absence of GST number, serial numbering 1-5 all in favour of the assessee only, no TDS deduction, absence of written agreement, and the fact that almost all receipts were from a private company, making "government liaison" inexplicable.
2.9 The Tribunal noted that the invoices carried a PAN of the consultant and once such documents were produced, the Assessing Officer ought to have conducted further enquiry, including verification from the consultant.
2.10 The Tribunal found that no such enquiry had been carried out, though the onus was initially on the assessee; in the given circumstances, further factual verification was necessary.
Conclusion
2.11 The disallowance of Rs. 5,00,000 was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after proper enquiry, including possible summons under section 131. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 3: Disallowance of sales promotion and travelling expenses (Rs. 5,70,774) - A.Y. 2019-20
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The assessee debited Rs. 3,07,352 as sales promotion and Rs. 8,34,195 as travelling expenses. The Assessing Officer disallowed 50% (Rs. 5,70,774) due to failure to establish that expenses were wholly and exclusively for business, particularly when almost all receipts were from a single company with a labour-supply / job-work arrangement.
2.13 Sample invoices submitted were deficient: absence of GST and PAN, incomplete or vague addresses (e.g., only partial address for one payee), and no substantive supporting detail.
2.14 Even before the Tribunal, no improved or concrete evidence was furnished beyond the assertion that payments were through banking channels, which was held insufficient to establish business nexus or genuineness.
Conclusion
2.15 The onus to prove business purpose and genuineness was not discharged; the disallowance of Rs. 5,70,774 was upheld.
Issue 4: Disallowance of GST payable of Rs. 11,84,777 under section 43B (A.Y. 2019-20)
Legal framework
2.16 Section 43B allows deduction for certain statutory dues, including taxes, only on actual payment, with allowance if payment is made up to the due date for filing the return of income.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The assessee had shown GST payable of Rs. 11,84,777. No proof of payment was produced before the Assessing Officer, leading to disallowance under section 43B.
2.18 Before the first appellate authority, GSTR-3B returns for December 2018 to March 2019 were furnished. A tabulation of these returns showed that the GST liability was largely discharged in cash, not via input tax credit, contradicting the assessee's claim.
2.19 As no tax payment challans were produced to substantiate cash payments, the first appellate authority confirmed the disallowance.
2.20 The Tribunal observed that GSTR-3B data indicated apparent payment of GST on specified dates. Given the nature of section 43B, the decisive factor was whether payment was made before the due date of filing the return.
Conclusion
2.21 The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify, including from GST authorities if necessary, whether the GST amount was actually paid before the due date of filing the return. Disallowance was set aside for this limited verification; ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 5: Addition of unsecured loans of Rs. 64,81,702 under section 68 (A.Y. 2019-20)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.22 Unsecured loans from four creditors aggregating to Rs. 64,81,702 were credited. The assessee failed before the Assessing Officer to furnish confirmations, income-tax returns or bank statements of creditors and the addition was made under section 68.
2.23 Before the first appellate authority, confirmations and returns for some creditors (M.P. Enterprises and Tip Top Services) and confirmation of one individual creditor were filed, though one creditor's return of income remained unfiled.
2.24 The first appellate authority sustained the addition, holding that the assessee had not satisfactorily discharged the burden regarding identity, creditworthiness and genuineness.
2.25 Before the Tribunal, the assessee claimed that all unsecured loans had been repaid in subsequent years, but this fact had not been placed on record earlier.
Conclusion
2.26 In the interest of justice and considering new assertions regarding repayment, the entire addition of Rs. 64,81,702 under section 68 was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after full verification. Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 6: Deduction under section 80C of Rs. 1,50,000 for principal repayment of housing loan (A.Y. 2019-20)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.27 The assessee claimed deduction under section 80C on account of principal repayment, relying only on an SBI loan statement.
2.28 The statement did not indicate that the loan was a housing loan nor identify the property acquired.
2.29 No loan sanction letter or bank certificate was produced at any stage, including before the Tribunal, to establish that the borrowing was specifically for acquisition of a residential house.
Conclusion
2.30 The requirement to establish that the repayment related to a qualifying housing loan was not met; disallowance of Rs. 1,50,000 was upheld.
Issue 7: Difference in contract receipts vis-à-vis Form 26AS (Rs. 4,70,316) - A.Y. 2020-21
Interpretation and reasoning
2.31 There was a difference between contract receipts as per Form 26AS and revenue from operations in the profit and loss account, leading to an addition of Rs. 4,70,316.
2.32 The assessee contended before the Tribunal, with reference to computation of income, that the differential amount had already been considered in taxable income under other heads.
Conclusion
2.33 As this assertion required factual verification, the issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after providing opportunity to the assessee. Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 8: Disallowance of ESIC contribution under section 36(1)(va) - Rs. 6,75,012 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.34 The assessee claimed that the amount represented ESIC contribution of A.Y. 2019-20, already disallowed earlier, and that allowing disallowance again would be duplicative.
2.35 The first appellate authority examined the earlier year's assessment and appellate proceedings and recorded that the originally disallowed employer's ESIC contribution of Rs. 5,71,290 for A.Y. 2019-20 had been fully allowed in appeal, as payments were made in April 2019.
2.36 It was thus found that there was no subsisting disallowance for A.Y. 2019-20 which could justify a corresponding allowance in A.Y. 2020-21; allowing the assessee's claim would result in double deduction.
2.37 The assessee failed to substantiate that Rs. 6,75,012 had been taxed in earlier year and corresponded to employer's ESIC contribution.
Conclusion
2.38 The disallowance of Rs. 6,75,012 under section 36(1)(va) was confirmed; the claim was rejected as it would otherwise amount to double deduction.
Issue 9: Consultancy charges of Rs. 60,000 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.39 The assessee described consultancy expenses as cash payments for PF/ESIC return filing, accounting charges, GST filing through bank, and income-tax return filing charges, aggregating to Rs. 60,000.
2.40 The particulars furnished only indicated general nature of expenses, with no names, addresses or PAN of recipients (except one item indicating a name but without further particulars), and no supporting invoices, despite specific requisition by the Assessing Officer.
2.41 The Tribunal agreed that mere ledger entries and generic descriptions without supporting evidence do not satisfy the onus under section 37 to prove genuineness and business purpose.
Conclusion
2.42 The disallowance of Rs. 60,000 was upheld.
Issue 10: Disallowance of sales promotion and travelling expenses (Rs. 3,03,218) - A.Y. 2020-21
Interpretation and reasoning
2.43 The nature of this disallowance and the assessee's failure to substantiate business nexus paralleled the disallowance examined for A.Y. 2019-20.
2.44 The Tribunal applied its reasoning for A.Y. 2019-20 mutatis mutandis, noting absence of sufficient supporting evidence and failure to discharge the onus of proving that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for business.
Conclusion
2.45 The disallowance of Rs. 3,03,218 was upheld.
Issue 11: Disallowance of bonus and ex-gratia payable - Rs. 1,98,089 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.46 The assessee contended that this liability had already been disallowed in A.Y. 2019-20.
2.47 The first appellate authority found that no such self-disallowance had been made in the return for A.Y. 2019-20; instead, an addition of Rs. 1,98,089 made by the Assessing Officer in that year had been deleted in appeal because payment was made on 23.04.2019.
2.48 For A.Y. 2020-21, the amount of Rs. 1,98,089 was reflected as outstanding as on 31.03.2020, indicating that a liability was recorded in F.Y. 2019-20 which remained unpaid till the date of filing the return.
2.49 In absence of evidence of payment or justification for deduction on any other basis, the disallowance was considered appropriate.
Conclusion
2.50 The disallowance of Rs. 1,98,089 was upheld.
Issue 12: Disallowance of GST payable of Rs. 90,000 under section 43B (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.51 The disallowance was made for GST shown as payable, for which no proof of payment was furnished.
2.52 The Tribunal held that its reasoning in relation to the larger GST disallowance for A.Y. 2019-20 should apply mutatis mutandis, focusing on whether actual payment had been made before the due date of filing the return.
Conclusion
2.53 The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify actual payment (including, if necessary, by obtaining information from GST authorities). Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 13: Addition of interest income of Rs. 1,165 from co-operative bank (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.54 The addition was made for interest of Rs. 1,165 from a co-operative bank not specifically identified as included in the declared income.
2.55 The assessee claimed before the Tribunal that total interest income of Rs. 32,195 in the return already included this amount, but no supporting break-up had been given earlier to the Assessing Officer.
Conclusion
2.56 The issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo verification whether the amount of Rs. 1,165 formed part of the interest income already offered. Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 14: Capital introduction of Rs. 3,50,000 during A.Y. 2020-21
Interpretation and reasoning
2.57 The Assessing Officer noticed that the capital account disclosed income from other sources of Rs. 8,07,195, whereas the computation reflected only Rs. 4,57,195 under that head, leading to an unexplained difference of Rs. 3,50,000 treated as unexplained capital introduction.
2.58 The assessee claimed that this represented part of sale proceeds of land transferred to a purchaser by a registered sale deed.
2.59 The Tribunal examined the sale deed: it recorded total consideration of Rs. 11,55,000, stated to have been paid on various dates, but did not specify individual dates or modes of payment. The deed was dated and registered on 25.06.2018 (relevant to an earlier financial year).
2.60 On this basis, the Tribunal inferred that the consideration must have been received on or before 25.06.2018 and not during the financial year corresponding to A.Y. 2020-21. No other evidence linked the alleged receipt to the capital introduced in the later year.
Conclusion
2.61 The assessee failed to substantiate the source of capital introduction of Rs. 3,50,000 in A.Y. 2020-21. The addition was confirmed.
Issue 15: Unsecured loan of Rs. 3,75,000 from M.P. Enterprises under section 68 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.62 The auditor reported unsecured loan of Rs. 3,75,000 from M.P. Enterprises. The addition under section 68 was made for failure to substantiate identity, creditworthiness and genuineness.
2.63 The Tribunal had already remanded the broader unsecured loan issue involving M.P. Enterprises for A.Y. 2019-20 for de novo adjudication.
Conclusion
2.64 Consistently, the Tribunal set aside the addition of Rs. 3,75,000 for A.Y. 2020-21 and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination along with the related issue in the earlier year.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the rejection by the competent authority of the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking condonation of a 30-month delay in filing the income tax return for AY 2018-19, to enable carry forward of loss and refund of TDS, was legally justified.
1.2 Whether internal disputes between directors and financial hardship of a company constitute "genuine hardship" within the meaning of Section 119(2)(b) so as to warrant condonation of such delay.
1.3 Whether the case law relied upon by the assessee regarding liberal construction of "genuine hardship" and refund claims under Section 119(2)(b) was applicable to the facts of the present matter.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Justification of rejection under Section 119(2)(b); scope of "genuine hardship" for condoning 30-month delay
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis of Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which empowers the competent authority to condone delay in specified cases where "genuine hardship" is shown, and on CBDT Circular No. 09/2015 which emphasizes that such power is to be exercised in cases of genuine hardship and extraordinary circumstances, and not routinely.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court recorded that the due date for filing the return for AY 2018-19 (for a company) was 30.09.2018, extended first to 15.10.2018 and thereafter to 31.10.2018, whereas the return was actually filed on 20.09.2021, resulting in a delay of about 30 months.
2.3 The assessee's explanation was: (i) internal dispute and lack of cohesion among directors; (ii) consequent resignations and management disruptions; (iii) serious financial crunch; and (iv) that these factors collectively made it impossible to ensure timely statutory compliance.
2.4 The Court found this explanation unconvincing. It accepted the stand of the revenue that internal disputes among directors of a company do not, by themselves, constitute "genuine hardship" in law for non-compliance with statutory filing timelines, since the company is a separate legal entity which is obliged to comply with the Act.
2.5 The Court emphasized that, even if a company's management faces internal disputes, that cannot, in the absence of cogent supporting material, justify total failure to file the return for such a long period when the business remains an ongoing concern. The statutory obligation to file an ITR is independent and continuing.
2.6 The Court noted there was no documentary material produced either before the authorities or before the Court to substantiate any serious or litigated dispute between the directors, or any other extraordinary circumstance that rendered timely filing impossible.
2.7 The Court further reasoned that the conduct of the assessee in filing returns for AYs 2017-18 and 2019-20 showed that returns could and were being filed in proximate years, contradicting the plea that disputes made it impossible to comply for AY 2018-19 alone. The fact that the return for AY 2018-19 was filed much later than those for AYs 2017-18 and 2019-20 undermined the contention that the same dispute had disabled filing only for that particular year during the prescribed/extended period.
2.8 The Court also took note of the revenue's contention that the extensions of statutory due dates up to 31.10.2018 afforded sufficient time and opportunity to file the return, which the assessee failed to utilize, and that the narrative of financial hardship and personal circumstances of one director was unsubstantiated by documentary evidence.
2.9 The Court aligned with the approach, as cited from a recent decision, that statutory time limits for filing returns and availing deductions/refunds must retain sanctity, and that powers of condonation under Section 119(2)(b) can only be exercised in "extraordinary circumstances" and not upon a generic plea of inadvertence or internal management issues.
Conclusions
2.10 The Court held that internal disputes among directors and unsubstantiated allegations of financial hardship, in the facts presented, did not amount to "genuine hardship" under Section 119(2)(b).
2.11 Absence of documentary proof of any severe dispute or litigation impacting the ability to file the return, coupled with the fact of timely filing for neighbouring assessment years, led the Court to uphold the authority's refusal to condone the 30-month delay.
2.12 Consequently, the rejection of the assessee's application under Section 119(2)(b) seeking condonation of delay, and thereby the consequential denial of carry forward of loss and TDS refund for AY 2018-19, was held to be justified, and the writ petition was dismissed.
Issue 3: Applicability of cited precedents on liberal construction of "genuine hardship" and refund under Section 119(2)(b)
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.13 The Court examined a series of authorities relied upon by the assessee concerning (i) liberal interpretation of "genuine hardship" under Section 119(2)(b); and (ii) the need to avoid denial of legitimate refunds and prevent unjust enrichment of the State. The Court compared the factual matrices and legal holdings in these decisions with the present case.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 With respect to a decision where delay was condoned owing to internal disputes between management and promoters/investors, the Court observed that in that case the disputes were supported by cogent evidence, including proceedings before the Company Law Board and appellate proceedings before a High Court, and an auditor had been appointed by order of court to complete statutory audits and enable filing of returns. Those "glaring" facts, judicially recognized, demonstrated genuine hardship. In contrast, in the present matter, no litigation records or equivalent documentary proof of disabling disputes were produced.
2.15 The Court also noted that while the Supreme Court had declined to interfere in that matter on facts, it expressly kept open the legal question regarding the scope of CBDT's power under Section 119(2)(b) and directed that the judgment should not be treated as a precedent, further limiting its applicability.
2.16 Regarding a case where deduction under Section 80IC was denied because an audit report (Form 10CCB) had not been uploaded though the return was filed in time and the accounts were duly audited, the Court recorded that the assessee there had substantially complied with statutory obligations and the lapse related to a procedural omission despite bona fide efforts. That factual setting, showing clear and timely compliance except for a technical lapse, was held to constitute "genuine hardship." The present case, involving complete non-filing of the return for 30 months without extraordinary substantiated cause, was held to be materially different.
2.17 As to a decision where a delay of 60 days occurred due to the accountant's poor health, the Court held that a short delay supported by a specific, medically explained inadvertence is not comparable with a prolonged delay of 30 months based on generic assertions of director disputes, without documentation.
2.18 Concerning a precedent which elaborates that "genuine hardship" should be construed liberally and that substantive justice should generally prevail over technicalities in refund and limitation matters, the Court accepted the principle but held that a liberal construction cannot be stretched to the extent of condoning a delay of 30 months on a vague and unsubstantiated plea. Doing so, the Court held, would itself amount to a travesty of the very legislative intent behind Section 119(2)(b).
2.19 With respect to a Kerala decision relied upon to argue about absence of limitation for filing a Section 119(2)(b) application, the Court noted that: (i) it dealt with the question of limitation for moving a condonation application, not with the determination of "genuine hardship" on facts; and (ii) it has been overruled by a Division Bench of the same High Court, rendering it inapplicable in any event.
2.20 The Court also noted, in alignment with another recent decision cited by the revenue, that statutory timelines must not be rendered nugatory by routine condonation; powers under Section 119(2)(b) are reserved for extraordinary circumstances and must be exercised sparingly.
Conclusions
2.21 The Court held that none of the precedents cited by the assessee assisted it on the specific facts of this case, as each turned on materially different circumstances where either (i) substantial statutory compliance was demonstrably made; (ii) the hardship was convincingly established through objective evidence; or (iii) the legal issue concerned limitation or refund principles distinct from the present factual context.
2.22 The general principles of liberal interpretation of "genuine hardship" and avoidance of unjust enrichment of the State were not considered sufficient, in the absence of extraordinary, proven hardship, to justify condonation of a 30-month delay in filing the return. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rejection of the condonation application and dismissed the petition.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, after issuance of the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022 introducing the "e-assessment of income assessment Scheme, 2022", a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can validly be issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), or whether it is mandatory that such notice be issued only by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO).
1.2 Whether the notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024, issued by the JAO and not by the FAO/NFAC, is invalid for non-compliance with the said CBDT Scheme and the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court.
1.3 What is the effect, if any, of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions by the Supreme Court, including in related matters, on (a) the applicability of the doctrine of merger and (b) the binding nature of High Court decisions under Article 141 of the Constitution, in relation to the jurisdictional issue under section 148.
1.4 Whether the Tribunal is bound to follow the jurisdictional High Court's decision holding that notices under section 148 issued by the JAO, instead of the FAO, are invalid, and whether similar liberty for revival should be preserved if the Supreme Court reverses that view.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of section 148 notice issued by JAO after CBDT "e-assessment of income assessment Scheme, 2022"
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal noted CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022 formulating the "e-assessment of income assessment Scheme, 2022". As recorded in the order, the Scheme provides inter alia that: (i) assessment/re-assessment or re-computation under section 147, and (ii) issuance of notice under section 148 shall be through automated allocation, in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board, and in a faceless manner to the extent provided in section 144B of the Act.
2.2 The Tribunal also referred to multiple High Court decisions (Telangana, Bombay, and Delhi) which have examined the post-29.03.2022 regime and the requirement that notices under section 148 be issued by FAO/NFAC in a faceless manner, including decisions setting aside notices issued by JAO in violation of the Scheme.
2.3 The jurisdictional High Court's Division Bench decision was specifically relied upon, wherein, following the Bombay High Court judgment in "Hexaware Technologies Ltd", it was held that it is mandatory for the FAO to issue the concerned notices and that issuance by the JAO would render the notice invalid.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal recorded that the impugned notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024 was issued by the Income Tax Officer, Ward 1, Tiruvarur (JAO) and not by NFAC/FAO.
2.5 Since the notice was issued after the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, the Tribunal held that the Scheme of 29.03.2022 squarely applied, requiring automated allocation and faceless issuance of notices under section 148.
2.6 Relying on the decisions of the Telangana High Court (including Kankanala Ravindra Reddy, Ta Infra Projects, Sri Venkatramana Reddy Patloola, and Deepanjan Roy) and the Bombay High Court (Hexaware Technologies Ltd), the Tribunal noted that the consistent judicial view in those cases was that non-compliance with the mandatory faceless procedure and issuance of notices by JAO instead of FAO under the Scheme vitiates the notices and consequential assessments.
2.7 The Tribunal particularly noted the finding of the Telangana High Court that failure to issue section 148 notices in a faceless manner in accordance with the Scheme renders "the entire further proceeding founded upon it and assessment orders" vitiated and liable to be set aside.
2.8 The Tribunal then turned to the jurisdictional High Court's Division Bench order, which (a) recognised divergent single-judge views, (b) followed the Bombay High Court's decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd, and (c) expressly held that it is mandatory for the FAO to issue the notices and that issuance by JAO makes the notices invalid, quashing such notices while reserving liberty to Revenue to seek revival if the Supreme Court reverses Hexaware.
2.9 The Tribunal also noted the Departmental Representative's argument that the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022 is not applicable; however, in light of the wording of the Scheme, the timing of the notice (post-Notification), and the jurisdictional High Court's adoption of the Hexaware ratio, the Tribunal rejected this contention and treated the Scheme as directly applicable.
(c) Conclusions
2.10 The Tribunal held that, post-CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, issuance of notices under section 148 is required to be done through automated allocation and in a faceless manner by FAO/NFAC as per the Scheme and section 144B, and that a JAO-initiated notice is contrary to this mandatory framework.
2.11 Following the binding jurisdictional High Court decision, which in turn followed Hexaware, the Tribunal concluded that the impugned section 148 notice dated 28.03.2024 issued by the JAO is invalid and not sustainable in law.
2.12 Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024 and all consequential orders/proceedings, thereby allowing the assessee's jurisdictional ground.
Issue 3: Effect of Supreme Court's dismissal of SLPs - doctrine of merger and Article 141
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
3.1 The Tribunal discussed the doctrine of merger and the effect of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, with reference to the Supreme Court decisions in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala and S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, and reiterated the settled principles, namely:
- Merger occurs when a superior forum, in appellate or revisional jurisdiction, modifies, reverses or affirms the order under challenge; in such a case, the subordinate forum's decision merges into the superior forum's order.
- Jurisdiction under Article 136 has two stages; the doctrine of merger applies only after leave is granted and appellate jurisdiction is exercised, not at the stage of dismissal of an SLP.
- An order refusing special leave (speaking or non-speaking) does not attract the doctrine of merger and does not substitute the High Court's order.
- A speaking order refusing special leave may constitute a "declaration of law" under Article 141, but still does not result in merger of the High Court's order into the Supreme Court's order.
3.2 The Tribunal further noted Supreme Court reiteration of these principles in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and other cases, and the distinction between dismissal of SLP at the threshold and decisions rendered after grant of leave.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
3.3 The Tribunal examined the Supreme Court order dated 16.07.2025 dismissing the Revenue's SLP (Civil) against the Telangana High Court's decision in Deepanjan Roy, and observed that the SLP was dismissed at the admission stage, with the Supreme Court stating that it found no good reason to interfere with the impugned order.
3.4 Applying Kunhayammed and related authorities, the Tribunal reasoned that such dismissal of SLP at the threshold does not result in merger of the High Court's judgment into the Supreme Court's order and does not, by itself, constitute a binding declaration of law under Article 141 beyond what is explicitly stated as law in the Supreme Court's own order.
3.5 On that basis, the Tribunal held that simplicitor dismissal of the Revenue's SLP in Deepanjan Roy does not create an independent binding precedent under Article 141 and does not alter the legal position beyond affirming that the Supreme Court did not see any reason to interfere in that particular matter.
3.6 The Tribunal also noted that the Revenue's SLP against the Bombay High Court judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd is still pending, and hence no merger or final Supreme Court pronouncement exists thereon as yet.
(c) Conclusions
3.7 The Tribunal concluded that the doctrine of merger is not attracted to the mere dismissal of SLPs at the threshold and that such dismissal does not, by itself, operate as a binding declaration of law under Article 141 except to the limited extent of any law expressly stated in a speaking order.
3.8 Accordingly, while the Tribunal noted the Supreme Court's refusal to interfere in Deepanjan Roy, it grounded its decision primarily on the binding jurisdictional High Court judgment and the statutory Scheme, not on any supposed merger or Article 141 effect of the SLP dismissal.
Issue 4: Binding effect of jurisdictional High Court decision and liberty to revive in event of Supreme Court reversal
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 The Tribunal recognised that the jurisdictional High Court, faced with conflicting single-judge views on whether JAO or FAO can issue section 148 notices post-Scheme, constituted a Division Bench, which then followed the Bombay High Court's decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd and held that it is mandatory for FAO to issue the notices and that JAO-issued notices are invalid.
4.2 The Tribunal noted that the jurisdictional High Court, while quashing such JAO-issued notices, expressly kept open all rights and contentions of parties and granted liberty to apply for revival of the petitions if the Supreme Court were to reverse Hexaware Technologies Ltd, thereby recognising the possibility of a change in law pursuant to a future Supreme Court decision.
4.3 Being subordinate to the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal held itself bound to apply the law as laid down therein, namely that only FAO has jurisdiction to issue section 148 notices under the post-29.03.2022 faceless scheme, and that JAO-issued notices are invalid.
(b) Conclusions
4.4 Respectfully following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the Tribunal set aside the impugned notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024 and the consequential assessment orders, allowing the assessee's jurisdictional ground.
4.5 In line with paragraph 8 of the jurisdictional High Court's judgment, the Tribunal expressly kept open the rights and contentions of both parties and reserved liberty to either party to approach the Tribunal for revival of the present appeal in case the Revenue succeeds before the Supreme Court. In the event of such revival, the assessee would retain the right to argue all grounds originally raised in the appeal.
4.6 On this basis, the appeal was allowed "in terms above", solely on the jurisdictional ground relating to the invalidity of the section 148 notice issued by the JAO under the post-Scheme regime.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether delay of 155 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation on the grounds shown by the appellant.
1.2 Whether estimation of business income at 8% (earlier 25%) of certain contract receipts, after rejection of books, was justified in light of the assessee's past profit history and nature of business.
1.3 Whether separate addition on account of cash deposits, when the same represented business receipts already subjected to profit estimation, resulted in impermissible double taxation.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Condonation of delay of 155 days in filing the appeal
Interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal examined the affidavit explaining reasons for delay and heard both parties. The reasons stated were found to be bona fide and such as actually prevented timely filing of the appeal.
Conclusion:
The delay of 155 days in filing the appeal was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.
Issue 2 - Validity and quantum of profit estimation on contract receipts after rejection of books
Legal framework (as discussed):
The Tribunal applied the settled principle that, once books are rejected, estimation of income must be fair and reasonable, and that an assessee's own past history is an established and reliable basis for such estimation. Courts have repeatedly held that arbitrary or ad hoc rates without supporting material are not justified.
Interpretation and reasoning:
The assessee was engaged in advertisement services, acting as an intermediary, a line of business which ordinarily operates on thin margins. The Tribunal noted:
- Past profit ratios from earlier assessment years (AYs 2009-10 to 2012-13) consistently ranged between about 3.16% and 3.70%, with an average of about 3.5%.
- For the relevant year, the assessee disclosed contract receipts of Rs. 8,40,12,821 and net profit of Rs. 28,72,757, yielding a profit ratio of 3.42%.
- The income declared under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016, was consistent with the profit shown in audited financials and supported the claim of low margins.
The Tribunal found no material brought by the Assessing Officer to justify estimation at 25% or even 8%, such as comparable cases, industry benchmarks, evidence of inflation of expenses, or specific defects in financials. In the absence of such material, the estimation at higher rates was regarded as ad hoc and excessive.
Considering the assessee's average past profit margin of 3.5%, the thin-margin nature of the advertisement agency business, and the requirement of a fair and reasonable estimate, the Tribunal held that a profit rate moderately higher than past margins would meet the ends of justice.
Conclusion:
Income was directed to be estimated at 5% of the contract receipts of Rs. 8,40,12,821, resulting in income of Rs. 42,00,641 (approx.). The Assessing Officer was directed to adopt this figure in place of the addition sustained by the first appellate authority and recompute the assessed income accordingly.
Issue 3 - Separate addition on account of cash deposits leading to double taxation
Interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal accepted the contention that the cash deposits in question formed part of the business receipts already taken into account while estimating profit. Making a separate addition on such deposits, after income had been estimated on the total contract receipts, would amount to taxing the same income twice, which is not permissible.
Conclusion:
The entire separate addition relating to cash deposits was deleted as it resulted in double taxation of income already embedded in the estimated business receipts.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether interest income earned by a primary credit co-operative society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction as "profits and gains of business attributable to" providing credit facilities to members under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
1.2 Whether, in light of section 80P(4) and the judicial precedents cited, deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on interest from co-operative banks to a co-operative society stands excluded or restricted, and whether this question required adjudication in the present case.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on interest from deposits with co-operative banks
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.1 The Tribunal considered section 80P(2)(a)(i), which grants deduction of the "whole of the amount of profits and gains of business attributable to" the business of providing credit facilities to members.
2.2 The Tribunal relied on the interpretation of the word "attributable" as laid down by the Supreme Court (11 ITR 842) and as applied by the jurisdictional High Court in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Co-operative Ltd., holding that "attributable to" has a wider ambit than "derived from".
2.3 The Tribunal also considered section 80P(4), which excludes certain co-operative banks from claiming deduction under section 80P, and the Supreme Court judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., clarifying that section 80P(4) is aimed at excluding co-operative banks functioning on par with commercial banks from claiming deduction in their own case, and that section 80P continues to apply to co-operative societies as defined in section 2(19).
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal found as a fact that the assessee is a primary credit co-operative society, not a bank, carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members and dealing in seeds and fertilizers to members only.
2.5 The assessee received interest of ?20,64,423 from deposits with co-operative banks, which was credited in the profit and loss account; the net profit of ?10,20,139 was claimed as deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Assessing Officer disallowed deduction only to the extent of ?10,20,139, though the interest income itself was higher, thereby in effect allowing deduction on part of the interest while denying it on the remainder. The Tribunal characterised this as an internal inconsistency and a fallacy in the assessment order, amounting to the Assessing Officer both accepting and rejecting the same kind of income for deduction.
2.6 On the core legal issue, the Tribunal applied the ratio of the jurisdictional High Court in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Co-operative Ltd., where it was held that a co-operative society carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members may deposit temporarily surplus funds (not immediately required for lending) in banks, and the interest so earned is "attributable to" the business of providing credit to members and hence eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), so long as the society is not carrying on any separate distinct business.
2.7 The Tribunal noted that in that decision, the High Court, following the Supreme Court's interpretation of "attributable to", held that such interest forms part of the profits and gains of the business of the co-operative society and is fully deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
2.8 The Tribunal also examined the later Karnataka High Court judgment in Totagars Co-operative Sale Society (395 ITR 611) which had distinguished Tumkur Merchants on facts, particularly where it is established that the assessee is carrying on the business of banking; and the earlier decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society (392 ITR 74), which was held by the High Court itself to be distinguishable in the later ruling. The Tribunal observed that, on a survey of these rulings, two decisions of the jurisdictional High Court (Tumkur Merchants and Totgars - 392 ITR 74) supported the assessee's position, while one (395 ITR 611) went against, but on distinguishable facts.
2.9 With reference to Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., the Tribunal read that judgment to mean that section 80P(4) was introduced to withdraw deduction from co-operative banks themselves, and that neither section 80P(4) nor the CBDT circulars/clarifications considered therein state that co-operative societies receiving interest from co-operative banks are denied deduction under section 80P(2). It further noted that section 80P deductions are to be allowed from the "gross total income" if the income falls within the specific heads of section 80P(2), regardless of whether such income is assessed as "business income" or "income from other sources".
2.10 The Tribunal concluded that in the present case the assessee's factual position was closer to Tumkur Merchants and Totgars (392 ITR 74) than to the Karnataka High Court judgment relied upon by the Revenue, since the assessee is a primary credit co-operative society and not a co-operative bank.
(c) Conclusions
2.11 The Tribunal held that interest earned by the assessee from deposits with co-operative banks is "profits and gains of business attributable to" the business of providing credit facilities to its members and, therefore, eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
2.12 It directed deletion of the disallowance of ?10,20,139 and reversed the orders of the lower authorities.
Issue 2: Necessity to decide claim under section 80P(2)(d)
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.13 Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction in respect of "any income by way of interest or dividends derived by the co-operative society from its investments with any other co-operative society". The Assessing Officer had contended that, post insertion of section 80P(4), deduction under section 80P(2)(d) stood effectively curtailed where deposits were made with co-operative banks.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The Tribunal, having already held that the assessee was entitled to deduction on the relevant interest income under section 80P(2)(a)(i), considered that adjudication of the alternative claim under section 80P(2)(d) was not required for disposal of the appeal.
(c) Conclusions
2.15 The Tribunal treated the assessee's alternative ground under section 80P(2)(d) as academic and did not render a decision on the merits of that provision in the facts of the case.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cash deposits of Rs. 39,30,000/- in the bank account could be treated as "unexplained cash credit" under section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Act, when the assessee had recorded corresponding cash sales in its regularly maintained books of account and offered the same as part of its total turnover.
1.2 Whether receipts aggregating to Rs. 1,22,00,000/- from two identified purchasers, recorded as sale proceeds in the books of account and subjected to tax as part of turnover, could be treated as "unexplained cash credit" under section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Act on the basis of investigation wing information and third-party statements.
1.3 Whether separate additions under section 68 in respect of the aforesaid cash deposits and sale proceeds, when the corresponding sales already formed part of declared turnover, resulted in impermissible double addition.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 3: Addition of Rs. 39,30,000/- towards cash deposits as unexplained cash credit and allegation of double addition
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee is engaged in manufacturing excisable products, has disclosed total sales of Rs. 101.81 crores in the audited profit and loss account, and has shown cash sales as part of that turnover. The Assessing Officer accepted the returned income including these sales.
2.2 The assessee had made total cash deposits of Rs. 48,00,000/- in its bank account during the year and explained the source as cash sales duly recorded in the books. In support, it furnished: complete details of cash transactions; month-wise and day-wise cash and total sales; stock details; cash book; revised VAT returns with reasons; purchase bills; and excise returns. The products being excisable, corresponding excise and VAT records supported the turnover.
2.3 The Tribunal noted as undisputed that: (a) cash sales were part of the declared total sales; (b) purchases were not doubted; (c) total sales, both cash and credit, were not doubted by the revenue; (d) adequate stock was available and stock was correspondingly reduced for sales; (e) sales were subjected to VAT and accepted by VAT authorities; (f) complete month-wise purchases and sales for the year under consideration and the preceding year were furnished; (g) complete cash book with month-wise movement was produced; and (h) no negative cash balance on any day was alleged.
2.4 The books of account, including the cash book, were not rejected by the Assessing Officer and no defect in the books was pointed out. In these circumstances, the Tribunal held that the assessee had clearly established that the cash deposits emanated from recorded cash sales forming part of the regular books.
2.5 Having accepted the returned income which already included the cash sales, the Assessing Officer's separate addition of Rs. 39,30,000/- as unexplained cash credit on account of cash deposits would amount to taxing the same income twice. The Tribunal treated such separate addition as a "double addition".
Conclusions
2.6 The Tribunal held that the source of the cash deposits was fully explained from the regularly maintained books of account and cash book, and that there was no independent basis for treating the deposits as unexplained cash credits under section 68 read with section 115BBE.
2.7 The addition of Rs. 39,30,000/- on account of cash deposits was deleted, both on the ground that the source was established from the books and that separate addition would lead to double taxation of the same sales.
Issue 2 & 3: Addition of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- towards sale proceeds from identified purchasers as unexplained cash credit and allegation of double addition
Legal framework (as referred)
3.1 The impugned addition was made under section 68 read with section 115BBE of the Act, treating the receipts from two named entities as unexplained cash credits on the basis of information from the investigation wing and a third-party statement.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.2 The assessee had received Rs. 1,22,00,000/- from the two purchasers as sale proceeds, which were recorded as sales in the books and included in the total turnover disclosed in the return and audited accounts. In support of the genuineness of these sale transactions, the assessee furnished: names and addresses of parties; PAN and TIN; sale invoices; details of C-Forms issued; its own bank statements evidencing receipt of sale proceeds; stock registers; and sales registers.
3.3 The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer, relying on information from the investigation wing and an alleged link of a third person with one of the purchaser entities, considered the receipts as accommodation entries. However, the statement of the third person, heavily relied upon by the Assessing Officer, was never confronted to the assessee despite specific requests, and no independent inquiry regarding the actual sale transactions between the assessee and the purchasers was carried out.
3.4 It was further observed that: the purchases and overall sales of the assessee were not doubted; the assessee had sufficient stock with corresponding reduction for the sales; the turnover was accepted by VAT authorities; and the books of account were not rejected. The sales in question were part of the same set of accounts and supporting documentation.
3.5 The Tribunal held that, in these facts, the receipts from the purchasers were established as sale proceeds from recorded business transactions, forming part of the declared turnover. Treating the same receipts again as unexplained cash credits under section 68 would therefore amount to double addition, as those sales had already been brought to tax in computing business results.
Conclusions
3.6 The Tribunal concluded that no separate addition under section 68 read with section 115BBE could be sustained in respect of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- received from the purchasers, since the amounts represented duly recorded and supported sales already reflected in the profit and loss account.
3.7 The addition of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- was directed to be deleted, both for want of any independent basis to treat the recorded sales as unexplained cash credits and because sustaining such addition would lead to impermissible double taxation of the same income.
Overall disposition
4.1 On the combined reasoning that (i) the assessee had satisfactorily explained the source of both cash deposits and receipts from the purchasers through its regularly maintained books and contemporaneous records, and (ii) the impugned sums already formed part of the declared turnover and profits, the Tribunal held that the separate additions under section 68 read with section 115BBE were unsustainable.
4.2 All additions were deleted and the appeal was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cash deposits of Rs. 25,04,000 made during the demonetization period were unexplained money liable to be taxed as deemed income under section 69A read with section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Taxability of cash deposits during demonetization under section 69A read with section 115BBE
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The addition was made by the Assessing Officer by invoking section 69A treating the cash deposits as unexplained money, and subjected to tax as per the special rate prescribed under section 115BBE of the Act. The first appellate authority confirmed the said addition.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal noted from bank statements that the assessee had a consistent pattern of substantial cash withdrawals and deposits in earlier years, including financial years 2015-16 and 2016-17, in the same bank accounts in which the impugned cash was later deposited during demonetization.
2.3 It was found that during financial year 2015-16 the assessee had withdrawn Rs. 46,80,000 and deposited Rs. 16,50,000 in one bank account, and withdrawn Rs. 28,51,500 and deposited Rs. 65,000 in another bank account, evidencing a regular conduct of cash handling and banking.
2.4 The Statement of Affairs as on 31 March 2016 reflected a cash-in-hand balance of Rs. 54,41,148, which the Tribunal treated as corroborative evidence that the assessee was holding substantial cash prior to the demonetization period.
2.5 The assessee's explanation that larger cash withdrawals had been made for proposed renovation of her residential premises, supported by filed builder quotations, was accepted as a plausible and specific purpose for accumulation and retention of cash.
2.6 The Tribunal recorded that the renovation proposal failed due to lack of consensus among co-owners and breakdown of negotiations with the builder, and that demonetization compelled the assessee to redeposit the accumulated cash in the bank.
2.7 It was noted that the Revenue had not brought on record any material to show that the earlier withdrawn cash was spent or utilized elsewhere, or that the cash balance disclosed in the Statement of Affairs was incorrect or fictitious.
2.8 On this factual matrix, the Tribunal held that there was a direct and reasonable nexus between prior cash withdrawals (for a specific, unexecuted purpose) and the subsequent cash deposits during demonetization, and that this nexus satisfactorily explained the source of the impugned deposits.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal held that the assessee had properly and satisfactorily explained the source of cash deposits of Rs. 25,04,000, and therefore the conditions for invoking section 69A were not met.
2.10 Consequently, the addition made under section 69A read with section 115BBE was deleted, and the assessee's appeal was allowed in full.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether auction-purchasers of assets of a 100% Export Oriented Unit, sold during court-supervised liquidation under the Companies Act, 1956, are liable for pre-liquidation central excise/customs dues of the erstwhile unit.
1.2 Whether, in the absence of a specific statutory charge or non-obstante provision in the fiscal statutes, customs and excise authorities can bypass the official liquidator and recover pre-liquidation dues from purchasers of assets.
1.3 Whether, on the terms of the winding up and sale orders passed by the Company Court, any statutory dues, including excise/customs duties, can be recovered from auction-purchasers beyond taxes directly applicable on the sale transaction itself.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the show cause notice and demand for duty, interest and penalty issued to auction-purchasers of assets are without jurisdiction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability of auction-purchasers of assets of a 100% EOU for pre-liquidation excise/customs dues
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The unit in question, a 100% Export Oriented Unit, was ordered to be wound up by the High Court, which appointed an official liquidator to take possession of assets and conduct the sale under the Companies Act, 1956. The appellants acquired only assets of the unit through auction and not the running business or entire undertaking as a going concern.
2.2 The High Court, while approving the sale, specifically directed that: (i) the purchaser shall be liable to pay all statutory dues, if any, due and payable on the subject properties for the period after the date of the winding-up order; (ii) payment of dues for the pre-liquidation period shall be settled as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956; and (iii) dues, taxes, cess, if any, applicable on the sale of assets shall be paid by the purchaser.
2.3 On a plain reading of these directions, the Tribunal held that: (a) only post-winding-up statutory dues on the property are recoverable from the purchaser; (b) all pre-liquidation dues, including excise and customs duties, are to be settled under the Companies Act, 1956 through the liquidation process; and (c) the obligation of the purchaser regarding "dues, taxes, cess applicable on the sale of assets" is limited to taxes arising from the sale transaction itself (e.g., sales tax), not to historical liabilities of the erstwhile unit.
2.4 The Tribunal noted that only assets, and not the entire business or unit as such, had been transferred. Relying on precedent, it held that a subsequent purchaser of assets cannot be fastened with liabilities of the previous licensee/unit unless the entire business unit is purchased as such, or there is a specific statutory provision creating such liability or a "first charge" over the property.
2.5 In particular, reliance was placed on the reasoning adopted in decisions (as cited) that: (i) the relationship between the assessee/licensee and the tax authorities is personal and does not automatically bind an auction purchaser; (ii) in the absence of a specific statutory provision creating a charge or first charge, the auction purchaser is not liable for the arrears of the previous owner; and (iii) where only assets and not the entire business are purchased, the buyer is not responsible for government dues of the earlier unit.
Conclusions
2.6 Auction-purchasers of assets of the EOU are not liable for excise/customs dues incurred by the erstwhile unit for the pre-liquidation period, as they purchased only assets and not the entire unit as a running concern, and there is no statutory provision making them liable for such arrears.
Issue 2: Ability of fiscal authorities to bypass the liquidation framework and official liquidator; absence of statutory charge or non-obstante clause
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.7 The Tribunal examined the effect of the High Court's winding-up and sale orders passed under the Companies Act, 1956, which mandated that payment of pre-liquidation dues shall be settled as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It considered whether any provision of the customs or excise law, including any non-obstante clause, allowed recovery of such dues directly from the auction-purchasers notwithstanding the liquidation framework.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Tribunal held that, by the terms of the High Court's orders, the recovery of pre-liquidation dues, including excise and customs duties, is subsumed within and governed by the Companies Act, 1956 process. Accordingly, these dues must be asserted before the official liquidator and settled in accordance with the statutory scheme applicable to liquidation.
2.9 The department failed to point to any non-obstante clause or specific provision in the relevant fiscal statutes that would override the Companies Act, 1956 or permit customs or excise authorities to bypass the official liquidator and recover claims directly from purchasers of assets.
2.10 The Tribunal, noting the absence of a statutory charge or "first charge" created under the Central Excise Act for the relevant period, followed judicial authority that: (i) where no statutory first charge exists, government dues do not automatically override rights of secured creditors or subsequent purchasers; and (ii) in such circumstances, recovery must take place within the framework of the Companies Act and liquidation proceedings, not by proceeding directly against the asset purchasers.
Conclusions
2.11 In the absence of a specific non-obstante provision or statutory charge in the applicable fiscal enactments, the customs and excise department cannot override the liquidation regime under the Companies Act, 1956 or bypass the official liquidator to recover pre-liquidation dues from auction-purchasers of assets.
2.12 All pre-liquidation excise and customs dues are required to be claimed and settled under the Companies Act, 1956 in the winding-up process and cannot be enforced against the appellants as asset-purchasers.
Issue 3: Scope of purchaser's liability under the High Court's sale directions and characterization of "dues, taxes, cess ... applicable on the sale of assets"
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The High Court's order expressly stipulated that: (i) the purchaser shall be liable to pay statutory dues "for the period after the date of winding-up order"; (ii) pre-liquidation dues shall be settled as per the Companies Act; and (iii) "dues, taxes, cess, if any, applicable on the sale of assets shall be paid by the purchaser."
2.14 The Tribunal construed this clause to mean that only taxes that are incident on, or arise from, the sale transaction itself (such as sales tax or similar levies) are to be borne by the purchaser. It rejected any interpretation that would extend this phrase to cover past excise or customs duties foregone or unpaid by the previous owner.
2.15 On this construction, the purchaser's liability is strictly limited to: (a) statutory dues on the property post-winding-up; and (b) transactional taxes on the sale of assets. Historical central excise and customs liabilities of the wound-up company, being pre-liquidation dues, were to be dealt with only under the Companies Act, 1956 scheme and not passed on to purchasers.
Conclusions
2.16 The expression "dues, taxes, cess ... applicable on the sale of assets" in the sale order does not include pre-liquidation excise or customs arrears of the former EOU; it is limited to levies incident on the auction sale itself.
2.17 The appellants, as purchasers, have no liability for pre-liquidation statutory dues of the wound-up EOU beyond such transactional levies.
Issue 4: Validity and jurisdiction of the demand proceedings against auction-purchasers; need to consider limitation and penalty
Interpretation and reasoning
2.18 Having held that the legal framework of liquidation under the Companies Act, 1956 governs pre-liquidation dues and that purchasers of assets are not liable for historical excise/customs arrears in the absence of a statutory charge or specific provision, the Tribunal examined the jurisdictional basis of the notice and demand issued to the appellants.
2.19 In light of the above findings, the Tribunal held that the show cause notice seeking recovery of excise duty "foregone by the previous owner" from the appellants as auction-purchasers of assets was inherently without jurisdiction. The department could not lawfully demand such dues from the appellants when the only proper avenue for recovery of pre-liquidation dues was through the official liquidator under the Companies Act, 1956.
2.20 Having thus decided the core question of recovery in favour of the appellants on jurisdictional grounds, the Tribunal considered it unnecessary to examine ancillary issues, including applicability of limitation, extended period, or joint and several liability, or the imposition of penalty.
Conclusions
2.21 The demand of excise duty, interest and penalty raised against the auction-purchasers of assets is without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.
2.22 In view of the finding on lack of jurisdiction and non-liability of the appellants, questions of limitation, extended period, joint and several liability, and penalty do not arise for consideration.
2.23 The appeals are allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act could be relied upon without complying with the mandatory procedure under section 138B for purposes of adjudication.
1.2 Whether the appellant could be treated as the "owner" of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars seized from Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar and, consequently, saddled with the burden of proof under section 123 of the Customs Act.
1.3 Whether confiscation of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars and the Indian currency seized from Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar under sections 111(b), 111(d) and 121 of the Customs Act was sustainable as against the appellant.
1.4 Whether penalties imposed on the appellant under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act in relation to the 12 gold bars and associated transactions were legally sustainable.
1.5 Whether confiscation under sections 111(a), 111(b), 111(d) and 119 of the Customs Act of gold jewellery weighing 20756.3 gms seized from Subhash Tukaram Karan and gold jewellery/cut pieces seized from the premises of M/s. Bikaner Jewellers, allegedly linked to the appellant, was legally justified.
1.6 Whether, in the absence of any finding that the appellant imported smuggled gold or that section 120 of the Customs Act was invoked, gold jewellery/ornaments manufactured in India could be confiscated under section 111 on the allegation that they were made from smuggled gold.
1.7 Whether the adjudicating authority was justified in rejecting documentary evidence, including invoices, approval vouchers, GST records and affidavits of manufacturers/owners, and in drawing adverse inferences regarding alleged "planting" of 19 documents during de-sealing of the appellant's premises.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements under section 108 read with section 138B
Legal framework
2.1.1 The Court examined section 108 (power to summon and record statements) and section 138B (relevancy of statements under certain circumstances) of the Customs Act. Under section 138B(1)(b), read with section 138B(2), a statement made before a Gazetted Officer during inquiry can be treated as relevant in adjudication proceedings only when (i) the maker is examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority, and (ii) the adjudicating authority then forms an opinion, in the interests of justice, to admit the statement in evidence. Only thereafter can cross-examination be afforded.
2.1.2 The Court relied on decisions interpreting section 9D of the Central Excise Act, which is materially identical to section 138B, holding that the scheme is mandatory and aims to neutralise the possibility of statements being obtained under coercion: Ambika International; Jindal Drugs; Hi Tech Abrasives; and Tribunal decisions following these principles, as well as the Delhi High Court decision in Its My Name Pvt. Ltd. on section 138B itself.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court held that, where the circumstances in clause (a) of section 138B(1) do not apply, the adjudicating authority must: (i) summon and examine the person whose statement was recorded under section 108; (ii) then decide whether to admit that earlier statement in evidence; and (iii) only thereafter allow cross-examination. This sequence is mandatory.
2.1.4 As this procedure was admittedly not followed in respect of the statements of the appellant, Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar, those statements could not legally be treated as relevant or relied upon to prove the truth of their contents.
2.1.5 The Court rejected the departmental contention that the original section 108 statements could be relied upon irrespective of later retractions, holding that, in the absence of compliance with section 138B, such statements must be eschewed from consideration.
Conclusions
2.1.6 The statements under section 108 of the appellant, Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar were inadmissible as evidence for proving the facts contained therein, since the mandatory procedure under section 138B(1)(b) was not followed. The Commissioner could not base adverse findings against the appellant on those statements.
2.2 Ownership of 12 foreign-marked gold bars; applicability of section 123; validity of confiscation and treatment of seized currency
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The Commissioner had held the appellant to be the "owner" of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars solely on the basis of section 108 statements, and then invoked section 123 to place the burden on the appellant to prove licit possession.
2.2.2 The Court found that once the section 108 statements are excluded for non-compliance with section 138B, there is no reliable material to treat the appellant as owner of the 12 gold bars.
2.2.3 The Court noted that the appellant, while in judicial custody, formally retracted his earlier statement in a communication to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 30.01.2023, and consistently denied ownership of the 12 bars in subsequent section 108 statements and in his reply to the show cause notice. Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar also retracted their statements and did not support the case against the appellant thereafter.
2.2.4 As the appellant was neither the person from whose possession the goods were seized nor a person claiming ownership, and there being no sustainable finding of ownership, the presumption under section 123 could not be invoked against him.
2.2.5 In the absence of proof that the appellant was the owner or otherwise liable under section 123, the confiscation of the 12 gold bars under section 111(b) and 111(d) qua the appellant could not be sustained.
2.2.6 Regarding currency seized from Manish Kumar and Naresh Kumar, the Court held that there was no evidence conclusively linking the cash to any smuggling consideration for the 12 gold bars; the Commissioner's conclusion that the cash was monetary consideration for carriage of smuggled gold was based on conjectures.
Conclusions
2.2.7 The finding that the appellant was the owner of the 12 foreign-marked gold bars is unsustainable.
2.2.8 Section 123 could not be invoked to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant with respect to those bars; consequently, confiscation of the 12 gold bars under section 111(b)/(d) against the appellant is not legally tenable.
2.2.9 There was no sufficient basis to treat the seized Indian currency as sale consideration of smuggled gold for purposes of confiscation in relation to the appellant.
2.3 Validity of penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA in relation to 12 gold bars and associated conduct
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Commissioner had held the appellant to be the "mastermind" of smuggling of foreign-origin gold bars and gold jewellery, and imposed penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA on the basis of the alleged ownership of the 12 bars, alleged smuggling, and alleged use/planting of forged documents.
2.3.2 The Court held that once confiscation of the 12 bars under section 111 could not be sustained against the appellant, the foundational requirement for penalty under section 112(b)(i) (dealing with goods liable to confiscation) failed.
2.3.3 On section 114AA, the Court found no evidence that the appellant had signed any document knowingly or intentionally concerning the transaction of any business so as to render such document false or incorrect in any material particular. The conclusion of "planting" or using forged documents was not substantiated.
Conclusions
2.3.4 Penalty on the appellant under section 112(b)(i), built on the alleged confiscability of the 12 bars, is unsustainable.
2.3.5 Penalty under section 114AA is also unsustainable, as there is no proof that the appellant knowingly or intentionally signed or used any false or fraudulent document in relation to the alleged smuggling transactions.
2.4 Confiscation of gold jewellery (20756.3 gms) from Subhash Tukaram Karan and gold jewellery/cut pieces from M/s. Bikaner Jewellers under sections 111 and 119
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4.1 The jewellery weighing 20756.3 gms seized from Subhash Tukaram Karan and the gold jewellery (11224.4 gms) and cut pieces (2818.5 gms) seized from M/s. Bikaner Jewellers were treated by the Commissioner as manufactured out of smuggled gold and confiscated under sections 111(a), 111(b), 111(d) and 119, relying primarily on statements under section 108 and alleged failure to discharge burden under section 123.
2.4.2 The appellant's case was that the seized jewellery was Indian-manufactured, brought on approval basis for marketing in Delhi, either by the appellant's firm or other manufacturers, and was duly backed by invoices, GST records and approval/delivery challans, including:
2.4.3 The Court observed that the department did not undertake verification of these invoices or GST entries, despite their availability and the ease with which authenticity could have been checked. The rejection of such documentary evidence was thus unjustified.
2.4.4 The Court further noted that it was not the department's case that the seized jewellery itself had been imported. Section 111 applies to "goods brought from a place outside India", and in the absence of any finding that the appellant imported gold or jewellery, section 111 could not be applied merely on the allegation that the jewellery was manufactured out of smuggled gold.
2.4.5 The Court reiterated that evidence must justify an inference of "unauthorised importation" rather than merely "unauthorised possession". Reliance was placed on Tribunal decisions and the Supreme Court's ruling that mere possession of smuggled goods does not establish that a person was concerned in the illegal import; other circumstances linking the person to importation must be shown. Such circumstances were neither alleged nor established in respect of the appellant.
2.4.6 Neither the show cause notice nor the impugned order established that the appellant had any connection with the importation of gold prior to its entry into India. Section 120 of the Customs Act, which deals with goods made from smuggled goods, was not invoked, and in any event there was no evidence that the appellant smuggled the base gold from which the jewellery was allegedly manufactured.
2.4.7 The Commissioner's reliance on non-production of e-way bills as evidence against the appellant was rejected. The Court found that, as per the Circular dated 12.09.2022 of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, issuance of e-way bills for transport of jewellery was not prescribed as a mandatory requirement; non-production of e-way bills could not be a conclusive basis for confiscation or adverse inference.
Conclusions
2.4.8 There was no legal or factual basis to treat the seized jewellery/ornaments and cut pieces, manufactured in India, as liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, in the absence of proof of importation or smuggling of the underlying gold by the appellant.
2.4.9 Confiscation under section 119, on the premise that some jewellery covered by invoices (e.g., SG-160 and SG-460) was used to "cover up" other smuggled jewellery, was also unsustainable for want of reliable foundational evidence of smuggling and of any link between the appellant and importation.
2.5 Treatment of affidavits, ownership claims and allegation of "planting" documents
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5.1 The appellant produced affidavits from manufacturers and owners, including:
2.5.2 The Court held that the Commissioner could not reject these affidavits arbitrarily without giving cogent reasons or undertaking verification. If doubts existed, the adjudicating authority ought to have summoned the deponents for cross-examination or tested the statements by other permissible means. Reliance was placed on the Bombay High Court's view that affidavits normally cannot be discarded without affording an opportunity to test their correctness.
2.5.3 Regarding the 19 documents allegedly "planted" during de-sealing of the appellant's shop on 03.05.2023, the Court found that:
Conclusions
2.5.4 The rejection of affidavits and supporting documentary evidence by the adjudicating authority was improper and contrary to settled principles; such evidence should have been either accepted or duly tested but not summarily discarded.
2.5.5 The allegation that the appellant planted 19 documents at the time of de-sealing was unsupported by evidence and could not form a valid basis for adverse findings or penalties.
2.6 Overall consequence for penalties on the appellant
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6.1 The Court held that the department's case against the appellant was fundamentally based on inadmissible section 108 statements and unverified assumptions of smuggling/import, without compliance with section 138B and without adequate corroborative evidence.
2.6.2 As the confiscation of 12 foreign-marked gold bars and the related currency could not be maintained against the appellant, and as the confiscation of Indian-manufactured jewellery/cut pieces under sections 111 and 119 was itself unsustainable, the foundation for imposing penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA fell.
Conclusions
2.6.3 The Commissioner was not justified in imposing penalties under sections 112(b)(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act on the appellant in respect of the seized gold bars, jewellery and related transactions.
2.6.4 The impugned order was set aside to the extent that it imposed penalties on the appellant under section 112(b)(i) and section 114AA; the appeal was allowed accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a writ petition under Article 226 challenging show cause notices and a consequential order is maintainable when an alternate and efficacious statutory appellate remedy is available.
1.2 Whether vague and cursory pleadings alleging breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and violation of constitutional rights are sufficient to invoke the recognised exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies.
1.3 Whether, while declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy, the Court should grant liberty regarding limitation for filing appeal and keep open the challenge to the show cause notices.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of writ petition in the presence of an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy of appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that the impugned order is appealable and that an appellate remedy is available to the petitioner under the statute.
2.2 The Court found from the petition that the petitioner essentially wishes to assail the impugned order on merits but has chosen not to approach the Appellate Authority, apparently to avoid the statutory requirement of pre-deposit of a percentage of the demanded amount.
2.3 The Court held that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in equity to bypass clear statutory provisions providing for an appeal, nor can it be invoked to permit parties to circumvent such alternate remedies.
2.4 Relying on the reasoning in a prior decision of the Court on exhaustion of alternate remedies, and the precedents considered therein, the Court reaffirmed that deviation from the settled practice of insisting on exhaustion of alternate remedies is not warranted in the present case.
2.5 The Court further relied on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reiterating that High Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226 when effective statutory remedies are available, except in exceptional cases falling within recognised exceptions.
Conclusions
2.6 The writ petition challenging the impugned order was held not maintainable in view of the available and efficacious statutory appellate remedy, and the Court declined to entertain it on this ground.
Issue 2: Adequacy of pleadings to attract exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The petitioner contended that certain submissions were not considered in the impugned order and invoked grounds including contravention of procedural fairness, lack of jurisdiction, absence of authority of law, being contrary to settled law, violation of principles of natural justice, and breach of rights under Articles 14, 265 and 300A of the Constitution.
2.8 The Court examined the pleadings, particularly the relevant paragraph, and characterised the averments as extremely vague and cursory, noting that practically all possible grounds were mechanically invoked without elaboration or supporting particulars.
2.9 The Court observed that to attract the recognised exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of alternate remedies, a petitioner must plead and establish an exceptional case, supported by proper pleadings and material.
2.10 It was further observed that in the present matter, an attempt was made at the stage of arguments to advance a case that was not even properly pleaded, while the case that had been cursorily pleaded was effectively given up.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court held that the vague and unsupported allegations of breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and constitutional violations did not bring the case within any recognised exception to the rule of alternate remedy.
2.12 On this basis also, no ground was made out to entertain the writ petition in preference to the statutory appellate remedy.
Issue 3: Directions on liberty to appeal, limitation, and preservation of challenge to show cause notices
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 While declining to entertain the writ petition, the Court considered the need to ensure that the petitioner is not prejudiced on the question of limitation in availing the appellate remedy.
2.14 The Court directed that if an appeal against the impugned order is filed within four weeks from the date of the order, and all legal requirements (including pre-deposit, if any) are complied with, the Appellate Authority shall entertain the appeal on its own merits without going into the issue of limitation.
2.15 The Court also noted the existence of a separate prayer challenging the show cause notices and considered it appropriate to preserve the petitioner's right to raise that challenge in the future, depending on the outcome of the appellate proceedings under the statute.
Conclusions
2.16 Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file an appeal against the impugned order within four weeks, with a specific direction to the Appellate Authority not to reject such appeal on the ground of limitation.
2.17 The challenge to the show cause notices, as contained in the relevant prayer clause, was expressly kept open to be pursued if the petitioner does not obtain relief from the appellate authorities.
2.18 The petition was disposed of in these terms, with no order as to costs.
Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in connection with allegations under the Chhattisgarh GST Act, 2017.
Analysis: The applicant was in custody since 08.08.2025, the complaint had already been filed, and the conclusion of trial was likely to take some time. On these considerations, the Court found it to release the applicant on bail.
Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to regular bail.
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