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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal deserved to be condoned on the reasons stated by the Revenue.
(ii) Whether an assessment framed under section 153C read with section 143(3) for Assessment Year 2014-15 was without jurisdiction because that year fell outside the six assessment years permissible with reference to the relevant "reference date"/"search year" applicable to the "other person".
(iii) Whether the first appellate authority erred in applying binding judicial precedents on computation of the six-year period for section 153C, merely because the Revenue had filed a further challenge against one of those precedents.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Condonation of delay in filing appeal
Legal framework: The Tribunal considered whether sufficient cause was shown to admit the appeal despite a reported delay.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal evaluated the explanation that the appellate order was received in the concerned office on a stated date, that authorization to file appeal was received later, and that intervening workload due to time-barring matters contributed to the delay.
Conclusion: The delay of 16 days was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.
Issue (ii) & (iii) (Grouped): Jurisdiction to assess AY 2014-15 under section 153C and effect of pending further challenge to precedent
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment): The controversy turned on the computation of the block of six assessment years assessable/reassessable in the case of a person other than the searched person under section 153C, and the relevant reference point for that computation as applied by the first appellate authority and examined by the Tribunal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the first appellate authority accepted the assessee's contention that the relevant reference date for initiating section 153C proceedings in the "other person" case is the date linked to the handing over of seized material / recording of satisfaction and issuance of notice in the "other person" case, and, on those facts, treated the relevant previous year as 2021-22. On that basis, the six preceding previous years corresponded only up to Assessment Year 2016-17, meaning that Assessment Year 2014-15 fell outside the legally permissible period. The Tribunal, after perusing the orders and the case law relied upon in the impugned order, agreed that "no assessment was possible prior to AY 2016-17" on the facts and that proceedings for AY 2014-15 "cannot be valid in the eyes of law." The Tribunal also considered the Revenue's argument that one relied-upon precedent was not accepted and was under further challenge, but it did not treat that circumstance as displacing the application of the reasoning relied on by the first appellate authority to the present facts.
Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the finding that the assessment for AY 2014-15 under section 153C read with section 143(3) was without jurisdiction, and therefore sustained deletion of the addition made in that assessment; the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether revision under section 263 could validly be invoked to set aside a reassessment order under section 147 for alleged error in allowing deduction under section 80IA(4), when the reassessment was reopened on a different, specific reason and no addition was made on that reopened issue.
(ii) Whether the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 263 was unsustainable where it was initiated solely on a proposal/report from the Assessing Officer without the revisional authority conducting an independent examination and forming its own satisfaction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Validity of invoking section 263 against a reassessment order to disallow section 80IA(4) deduction when reopening issue was different and yielded no addition
Legal framework (as discussed by the Tribunal): The Tribunal considered the requirement that revision under section 263 must relate to an error in the order sought to be revised which is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. It also applied the judicial principle relied upon by the Tribunal that, where reassessment is initiated for specific reasons and no addition is made on those reasons, the Assessing Officer would not proceed to make other additions in that reassessment.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that reassessment was initiated on the allegation of non-genuine/bogus billing with a particular party, but the reassessment was concluded without making any addition on that reopening reason. On these facts, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that, even assuming there was a mistake in the deduction under section 80IA(4), the Assessing Officer would not have disallowed it in the reassessment proceedings once the reopening reason itself did not result in any addition, applying the principle recognized in the relied-upon precedent. The Tribunal further held that the revisional authority's attempt to treat the reassessment order as erroneous for not disallowing the section 80IA(4) claim did not properly establish that such an "error" could have arisen in the reassessment order in the given legal-factual setting.
Conclusion: Invoking section 263 to revise the reassessment order for the purpose of disallowing section 80IA(4) deduction was held without jurisdiction in the circumstances, since the alleged error was not one that could validly be attributed to the reassessment order when no addition was made on the reopening issue and the reassessment could not have been used to make such disallowance in that context.
Issue (ii): Sustainability of section 263 action initiated solely on an Assessing Officer's proposal without independent satisfaction
Legal framework (as applied by the Tribunal): The Tribunal applied the settled position that revisional jurisdiction requires the revisional authority to independently examine the record and form its own satisfaction regarding error and prejudice; revision cannot be initiated solely on the basis of an Assessing Officer's proposal/report.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal recorded that the revisional authority itself noted receipt of a proposal from the Assessing Officer stating that section 80IA(4) deduction "ought to have been disallowed" as the claim had been made since a particular year, and the Tribunal found that the revision proceedings were initiated based on that proposal. The Tribunal held that such initiation, without independent examination and satisfaction by the revisional authority, renders the revision unsustainable.
Conclusion: The section 263 order was held invalid on the additional ground that it was initiated solely on an Assessing Officer's proposal without independent application of mind and satisfaction by the revisional authority; therefore, the revision order was quashed as without jurisdiction.
Clarification forming part of the decision: The Tribunal expressly stated that quashing the section 263 order does not amount to allowing the section 80IA(4) deduction on merits.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 (pursuant to an order under Section 148A(d)) was void for want of sanction from the correct "specified authority" under Section 151, where more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year.
(ii) If the notice under Section 148 is quashed as invalid, whether the consequential reassessment order and the addition made therein survive.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Validity of notice under Section 148 for lack of approval by the correct specified authority under Section 151
Legal framework (as applied by the Court): The Court treated prior approval by the "specified authority" under Section 151 (new regime) as a jurisdictional precondition for passing an order under Section 148A(d) and for issuing a notice under Section 148. The Court applied the principle that, after the coming into force of the new regime, approvals must be obtained from the authority specified under Section 151 corresponding to the elapsed time from the end of the assessment year; where more than three years have elapsed, approval must be from the higher authority contemplated by Section 151(ii).
Interpretation and reasoning: On the admitted facts, the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 were issued on 28/07/2022, i.e., beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The approval for the action was taken from a Principal Commissioner. The Court held that, in such a situation, the approving authority must be the authority prescribed under Section 151(ii) (i.e., the higher authority applicable where more than three years have elapsed), and that the approving authority cannot be substituted or altered. Since the approval in the present case was not from the appropriate specified authority mandated by Section 151(ii), the statutory precondition for valid assumption of jurisdiction to issue the notice was not satisfied.
Conclusion: The notice dated 28/07/2022 (and the connected action under Section 148A(d)) was held not to be in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Act and was therefore quashed.
Issue (ii): Effect of quashing the reassessment notice on the reassessment order and additions
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that once the initiation of reassessment proceedings is quashed, the consequential reassessment order lacks foundation and becomes null and void. As a result, the substantive addition made in the reassessment (including the challenged treatment of cash deposits as unexplained money) did not require adjudication, being rendered academic due to the invalidity of the reopening itself.
Conclusion: The reassessment order was quashed as null and void, and the appeal was allowed on the jurisdictional ground; the merits of the addition were not decided.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether cash deposits treated as unexplained money under section 69A were satisfactorily explained as daily collections from licensed stamp-vending activity, supported by verifiable correlation between sales records, bank deposits, and treasury purchases, so as to warrant deletion of the addition.
(ii) Whether the first appellate authority's failure to adjudicate the claim for deduction of housing-loan interest under section 24(b) on merits required interference, and whether the issue should be restored for fresh examination.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Addition under section 69A for cash deposits-whether explained as stamp-paper sale collections
Legal framework (as discussed/applied by the Court): The Court proceeded on the basis that an addition under section 69A is not sustainable where the assessee satisfactorily explains the nature and source of cash deposits through reliable and verifiable material, and that mere cash deposits in a bank account do not automatically constitute unexplained money if supported by evidences correlating receipts and outflows.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the bank statements and the daily sales register produced, and accepted the assessee's demonstration of a clear, date-wise, one-to-one correlation between daily stamp-paper collections recorded in the sales register and the corresponding cash deposits into the bank account. The Court also noted that the assessee furnished supporting material showing purchase of stamp papers from the treasury out of the deposited amounts, along with indents. It found that these documents were verifiable and convincingly established the business pattern consistent with stamp-vending operations. Crucially, the Revenue did not bring material to discredit the genuineness of these records or to suggest any alternative source for the deposits. On these facts, the Court held that when the assessee acts as an agent earning only commission, the gross daily collections routed through the bank could not be treated as unexplained income.
Conclusion: The Court held that the assessee satisfactorily explained the nature and source of the cash deposits, set aside the appellate order sustaining the addition, and directed deletion of the addition made under section 69A.
Issue (ii): Deduction for housing-loan interest under section 24(b)-non-adjudication by first appellate authority
Legal framework (as discussed/applied by the Court): The Court applied the requirement that the first appellate authority must dispose of issues arising in appeal by a speaking and reasoned decision, and that failure to adjudicate a claim impacting computation of income is legally unsustainable.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the claim for deduction of interest on housing loan formed part of the appellate proceedings, yet the first appellate authority did not decide it on merits and merely recorded that no separate ground/details were furnished. The Court held that once such a statutory deduction issue is before the appellate authority, it must be examined in accordance with law; omission to do so warranted interference. Since the merits required factual verification, the Court considered it appropriate to restore the issue for fresh examination rather than deciding it conclusively on the existing record.
Conclusion: The Court set aside the issue of deduction under section 24(b) to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification and decision after granting adequate opportunity to produce evidence, expressly stating that no opinion on merits was being expressed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether an addition for alleged unexplained cash receipt of Rs. 4,50,000/- could be sustained when it was made solely on the basis of a third-party seized Excel sheet and a third-party statement, without supplying the relied-upon material to the assessee and without affording an opportunity of cross-examination.
(ii) Whether, on the facts, the impugned addition was vitiated as being based on mere circumstantial evidence without direct or corroborative material connecting the assessee to the alleged cash receipt.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Sustainability of addition based on third-party material without supply of material and cross-examination
Legal framework: The Court examined the requirement of adherence to principles of natural justice where an addition is founded on third-party material and statements. The Court applied the principle that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements are relied upon results in breach of natural justice and renders the resulting order unsustainable.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated it as an admitted factual position that the assessee was not provided with the seized material (the Excel sheet/ledger data) and was unaware of the statement and the Excel sheet data used against him until receipt of the assessment order, thereby depriving him of any opportunity to rebut the material or cross-examine the person whose statement was relied upon. The Court noted that the addition was founded solely on the third-party ledger/seized Excel sheet and the third-party statement, without the assessee being given the foundational material or the procedural safeguard of cross-examination.
Conclusions: The Court held that the addition could not be sustained because the material relied upon was not furnished and the assessee was denied the opportunity of cross-examination, resulting in violation of principles of natural justice.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition rested only on circumstantial evidence without corroboration
Legal framework: The Court considered whether the evidentiary basis was sufficient to connect the assessee to the alleged cash receipt, noting that an addition cannot be sustained when it is based only on circumstantial evidence without direct or corroborative material.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the assessee had disclosed consultancy receipts from the concerned entity in his return and had denied any cash receipt, asserting that payments were received only through bank transfers and were duly disclosed. Against this, the departmental case relied only upon an Excel sheet found in a third party's premises and a statement said to confirm cash payment. The Court found from the record that the impugned addition was made only on circumstantial evidence and was not supported by corroborative materials. The Court also emphasized that the assessee had not been provided the relied-upon material, reinforcing the inadequacy of the evidentiary foundation for the addition.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that the addition of Rs. 4,50,000/- was based on mere circumstantial evidence without direct or corroborative material and therefore deleted the addition; the appeal was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether notices issued under Section 153C, when issued after 01.04.2021 on the basis of seized material found in a third-party search, are barred by Section 153C(3) if the seized material was handed over to the assessee's jurisdictional Assessing Officer after 01.04.2021.
(ii) Whether, for the purposes of Section 153C(3), the "date of initiation of search" in the case of the "other person" is to be construed as the date of handing over/receipt of seized material by the assessee's jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i) & (ii) (Grouped): Validity of Section 153C notices in light of Section 153C(3) where seized material is handed over after 01.04.2021
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined Section 153C(3), which provides that nothing contained in Section 153C shall apply in relation to a search initiated under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132A on or after 01.04.2021. The Court also treated the "date of initiation of search" for the "other person" as linked to the handing over/receipt of seized material by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer of that "other person", as applied from the reasoning adopted in the jurisdictional High Court decision relied upon.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found, on the facts, that although the physical search occurred earlier in the premises of a third party, the seized materials relevant to the assessee were handed over to the assessee's jurisdictional Assessing Officer on 08.09.2022. The Court construed 08.09.2022 as the operative "date of initiation of search" for the assessee for purposes of Section 153C(3). Since that operative date fell after 01.04.2021, the Court held that Section 153C proceedings could not be invoked against the assessee, and therefore the notices lacked legal authority.
Conclusions: The Court quashed/set aside the notices issued under Section 153C dated 08.09.2022 as being contrary to Section 153C(3), holding that the relevant initiation date (for the assessee as "other person") was the date of handing over of seized materials (08.09.2022), which was after 01.04.2021. As the same legal issue governed all years under appeal, the ruling was applied mutatis mutandis across all connected appeals, resulting in the assessee's appeals being allowed and the revenue's appeal being dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the demand confirmed on the ground of "irregular availment of ITC in terms of Section 16(4)" for FY 2019-20 remained sustainable in view of the subsequent statutory insertion of Section 16(5) with retrospective effect.
(ii) Whether, for the remaining confirmed issues (GSTR-3B vs GSTR-2A mismatch and interest for belated payment/late filing), the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication on merits when no reply to the show cause notice had been filed, and if so, on what conditions (including pre-deposit) and consequential relief regarding bank attachment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Sustainability of demand based on Section 16(4) in view of insertion of Section 16(5) with retrospective effect
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted a "statutory intervention" by insertion of Section 16(5) to the relevant GST enactments by Finance (No.2) Act, 2024, with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the retrospective insertion as settling the controversy in favour of the taxpayer to the extent of the demand confirmed under the head "Irregular availment of ITC in terms of Section 16(4)." On that basis, the Court formed a prima facie view that the confirmed demand under this head was not sustainable.
Conclusion: The Court concluded that, to the extent of the amount confirmed under the Section 16(4) issue, the impugned confirmation was prima facie unsustainable due to the retrospective statutory change, and the matter required reconsideration consistent with that intervention.
Issue (ii): Remand on surviving issues; conditions for remand; filing reply and treatment of impugned order; bank attachment relief
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court proceeded on the basis that adjudication arose from a show cause notice in GST DRC-01 and that a final order must be passed "on merits and in accordance with law," after "due notice."
Interpretation and reasoning: For the mismatch between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A and for interest relating to belated payment/late filing, the Court relied on the admitted fact that no reply had been filed to the show cause notice. Considering this and the need for adjudication on merits, the Court held remand appropriate, but balanced it by directing a pre-deposit condition limited to 50% of the disputed tax pertaining to the mismatch issue. The Court also directed that, within the same time, the taxpayer must file a reply with documents, and specifically ordered that the impugned order be treated as an addendum to the original show cause notice for the purpose of response and reconsideration. The Court further linked automatic vacation of bank attachment to compliance with the pre-deposit and clarified that attachment would be lifted only if there were no other arrears apart from the impugned demand. Non-compliance would permit recovery proceedings as if the writ had been dismissed at admission, subject to prior notice.
Conclusion: The Court remitted the matter for a fresh order on merits on the surviving issues, subject to (a) deposit of 50% of the disputed tax relating to the mismatch issue in cash from the electronic cash register within 30 days, and (b) filing of a reply to the show cause notice with supporting documents within that time, treating the impugned order as an addendum to the show cause notice. Upon compliance, the authority was directed to pass a final order preferably within three months, and the bank attachment would stand automatically vacated, subject to the deposit and absence of other arrears; failure to comply would allow recovery action after due notice.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the support/assistance services provided in India to a foreign principal under a principal-to-principal, bi-partite arrangement constitute "intermediary" services under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act, thereby fixing place of supply in India under Section 13(8)(b).
(ii) Consequent to the above, whether the impugned demand/show cause notice (proceeding on "intermediary" classification) could be sustained, or were liable to be quashed in view of the Court concurring with earlier High Court decisions on identical facts in the petitioner's own case.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Classification as "intermediary" versus principal-to-principal support services; effect on place of supply/export treatment
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The dispute was examined with reference to Section 2(13) of the IGST Act ("intermediary"), Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act (place of supply for intermediary services), and the petitioner's claim of "export" treatment under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court proceeded on undisputed facts that the petitioner provided assistance to Indian students for admission to universities abroad through the foreign principal, that consideration flowed from the foreign principal to the petitioner, and that the relationship was principal-to-principal with the final decision on admissions resting with the foreign principal. The Court concurred with earlier High Court determinations (in the petitioner's own case) that, on such facts, the arrangement involved not more than two contracting parties (the petitioner and the foreign principal) for the services rendered by the petitioner; the petitioner had no contractual arrangement with the universities or the students and no role in the final admission decision. On that basis, the Court accepted the view that the petitioner was not "facilitating or arranging" a supply as an intermediary but was rendering services to its foreign principal under a bi-partite contract.
Conclusion: The Court accepted that the petitioner was not an "intermediary" for the impugned period/transactions, and therefore the revenue's premise for applying Section 13(8)(b) (place of supply in India) to raise tax demand was not sustainable on the facts as conclusively viewed by the Court.
Issue (ii): Sustainability of the impugned demand/show cause notice in light of final, implemented decisions on identical facts
Legal framework (as applied): The Court based its disposal on its concurrence with earlier High Court judgments on the same issue in the petitioner's own case, noting their finality and implementation, and the revenue's fair statement that the matter was covered.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded that two Division Bench judgments from other High Courts had already considered and decided the identical issue in the petitioner's favour, and that those judgments had not been challenged by the revenue and had been implemented. The revenue conceded that, in these circumstances, the petitioner's case was squarely covered. The Court expressly concurred with the views in those judgments and applied them to the present petitions.
Conclusion: The petitions were allowed, and the impugned order and show cause notice-both founded on treating the petitioner as an intermediary and requiring tax deposit accordingly-were quashed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable against the penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, despite the availability of an appellate remedy under the Act.
(2) Whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to pass the penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) on 26 September 2025 when the quantum appeal against the assessment order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal, in the context of Section 275 (both unamended and as amended by the Finance Act, 2025) and the binding precedents on prematurity of penalty orders.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Maintainability of writ petition despite alternate remedy
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted that the challenge went to the very jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to pass the impugned penalty order, as it was alleged to be premature and contrary to binding decisions of the Court. The rule of alternative remedy was characterised as a self-imposed restraint, not an absolute bar.
The Court referred to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks and Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd, holding that writ jurisdiction can be exercised, notwithstanding an alternate remedy, where there is a jurisdictional error or an order is patently without authority of law.
Since the impugned order was alleged, on the face of it, to contravene binding precedents (particularly R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad and Kellogg India Private Limited) which held that penalty orders passed during pendency of appeals on the quantum are premature, illegal and without jurisdiction, the Court held that this was an appropriate case to exercise powers under Article 226 rather than relegating the petitioner to the statutory appeal.
(b) Conclusion
The objection based on availability of an alternate remedy was rejected. The writ petition was held to be maintainable, as the impugned penalty order involved a clear jurisdictional error and violation of binding precedent.
Issue (2): Jurisdiction to levy penalty under Section 271(1)(c) during pendency of quantum appeal; effect of Section 275 and its amendment by Finance Act, 2025
(a) Legal framework as discussed
The Court considered Section 275 of the Income-tax Act, which prescribes the period and scheme of limitation for passing penalty orders under Chapter XXI. It examined:
(i) Section 275(1)(a) as it stood prior to 1 April 2025, which linked the limitation for passing penalty orders to the receipt of orders of appellate authorities, including the Appellate Tribunal.
(ii) The amended Section 275 (including sub-clause (1)(d)), as introduced by the Finance Act, 2025 with effect from 1 April 2025, and whether the amended provision applies to penalty proceedings already initiated and pending as on that date.
(iii) The binding judgment of this Court in R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad, which held that the language of Section 275(1)(a) "clearly shows that the order imposing penalty cannot be passed if the appeal against the basic order of assessment is pending before the competent superior authority", and characterised such premature penalty orders as "illegal and without jurisdiction".
(iv) The decision in Kellogg India Private Limited (following R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad) quashing penalty orders passed when quantum appeals were pending before appellate authorities.
The Court also examined several authorities on limitation and procedural law to decide whether the amended Section 275 applies to pending proceedings:
- CIT vs. Royal Motor Car Co. (Gujarat High Court);
- CIT vs. Bhikari Charan Panda (Orissa High Court);
- Addl. CIT vs. Watan Mechanical and Turning Works (Full Bench, Andhra Pradesh High Court);
- S.C. Prashar vs. Vasantsen Dwarkadas (Supreme Court);
- S.S. Gadgil vs. Lal & Co. (Supreme Court);
- C.B. Richards Ellis Mauritius Ltd vs. Assistant Director of Income-tax (Delhi High Court).
These decisions were considered on the nature of limitation as procedural, the application of amended limitation provisions to pending proceedings, and the non-revival of time-barred actions unless expressly provided.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
(i) Existence and pendency of appeal before ITAT
The Revenue argued that there was no "valid" appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal because the appeal filed on 8 April 2025 was beyond the prescribed limitation and there was, as yet, no order of condonation of delay by the Tribunal. On this basis, it was contended that Section 275(1) could not operate to defer jurisdiction to pass penalty.
The Court noted:
- The original appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed before the Tribunal on 28 March 2025 within limitation and registered as ITA No. 2188/M/2025.
- To cure a defect (Form No. 36 not signed by the Managing Director), a fresh set of papers, including Form No. 36 duly signed, was filed on 8 April 2025, along with an application for condonation of delay, and registered as ITA No. 2552/M/2025.
- The first appeal was subsequently withdrawn as a duplicate, with the Tribunal dismissing it as withdrawn on 7 July 2025, whereas the second appeal (ITA No. 2552/M/2025), accompanied by a condonation application, remained pending before the Tribunal.
- As on the date of the impugned penalty order (26 September 2025), both the assessee's and the Revenue's appeals on the quantum were pending adjudication before the Tribunal.
The Court proceeded on the factual position that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was "the subject matter of an appeal" before the Tribunal within the meaning of Section 275.
(ii) Principle from R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad and Kellogg India Private Limited
The Court reaffirmed that under Section 275(1)(a), as interpreted in R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad and followed in Kellogg India Private Limited, an order imposing penalty "cannot be passed if the appeal against the basic order of assessment is pending before the competent superior authority", and that penalty orders passed during such pendency are "premature, and therefore illegal and without jurisdiction".
The Court held that these decisions directly governed the present case, as the assessment order forming the basis of penalty was under challenge before the Tribunal at the time the penalty order was passed.
(iii) Applicability of amended Section 275 to pending proceedings
The Court addressed whether the amendments to Section 275 by the Finance Act, 2025 (effective 1 April 2025) governed the limitation and jurisdiction for passing the impugned penalty order when penalty proceedings had been initiated earlier (notice dated 27 December 2019), but were still pending within limitation on 1 April 2025.
Relying on Royal Motor Car Co., Bhikari Charan Panda and Watan Mechanical and Turning Works, as well as the Supreme Court's discussion in S.C. Prashar, the Court applied the following principles:
- Limitation provisions are generally procedural; no vested right exists in a particular period of limitation so long as the earlier limitation has not expired.
- Where an amending Act substitutes the limitation provision and the old limitation period has not yet expired on the date of amendment, the new (amended) period of limitation applies to pending proceedings, unless the statute clearly indicates otherwise.
- Only where the earlier limitation period has already expired before the amendment comes into force, a right of immunity from proceedings accrues, and such immunity is not taken away unless the legislature gives the amendment genuine retrospective effect reviving time-barred matters (as illustrated in S.S. Gadgil).
The Court held that, in the present case, as on 1 April 2025, the penalty proceedings initiated in December 2019 were pending and within limitation. Therefore:
- The amended Section 275 applied prospectively to all such pending cases.
- Only cases where the time limit had already expired on or before 31 March 2025 would not be revived by the amendment.
(iv) Consequence under amended Section 275 in the present case
On application of the above principles, the Court concluded that under the amended Section 275 (including Section 275(1)(d)), where the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is the subject matter of an appeal, the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to pass a penalty order arises only after receipt of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. This is consistent with the ratio of R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad and Kellogg India Private Limited as to prematurity of penalty orders when appellate proceedings in quantum are pending.
The Court further observed that even assuming, arguendo, that the Tribunal were ultimately to reject the assessee's condonation application and dismiss the appeal as time-barred, such an order would still constitute an order for the purposes of Section 275(1)(d), and jurisdiction to consider penalty would arise only upon receipt of that order.
(v) Position under unamended Section 275
Independently of the amendment, the Court held that even under the unamended Section 275(1)(a), the result would be the same. Applying the binding interpretation in R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad and Kellogg India Private Limited, any order imposing penalty while the quantum appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal is premature, illegal and without jurisdiction.
(vi) Rejection of Revenue's contentions
The Court rejected the Revenue's submission that, absent an order condoning delay, there was no "appeal in the eyes of law" before the Tribunal, and therefore the Assessing Officer was compelled to pass the penalty order to protect revenue and avoid limitation. The Court held that:
- On the facts, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was "the subject matter of an appeal" before the Tribunal, and the pendency of that appeal attracted the principle in R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad.
- Proper application of Section 275 (as amended) required that jurisdiction to pass a penalty order be exercised only after disposal of the appeal before the Tribunal; hence, the concern that Revenue would be "denuded" of its power to impose penalty was misplaced.
The Court also found it unnecessary, in view of its conclusion on jurisdiction and prematurity, to examine the Revenue's reliance on Section 275(1A), which deals with modification of penalty consequent upon appellate orders.
(c) Conclusions
(i) The amendment to Section 275 by the Finance Act, 2025 is procedural, applies prospectively to all penalty proceedings that were pending and within limitation as on 1 April 2025, and does not revive proceedings already time-barred as of 31 March 2025.
(ii) In cases where the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is the subject matter of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to pass a penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) arises only after receipt of the Tribunal's order in appeal.
(iii) Whether under the amended Section 275 or the unamended Section 275(1)(a), and in light of the binding decisions in R.B. Shreeram Durgaprasad and Kellogg India Private Limited, a penalty order passed while the quantum appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal is premature, illegal and without jurisdiction.
(iv) On the facts of the present case, as the assessment order was under challenge before the Tribunal on the date of the impugned penalty order, Respondent No. 1 was bound to keep the penalty proceedings in abeyance and lacked jurisdiction to pass the penalty order dated 26 September 2025.
(v) Consequently, the impugned penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) was quashed and set aside, with the clarification that jurisdiction to consider penalty would vest only pursuant to disposal of the appeals by the Tribunal. The Revenue's apprehension of losing the power to levy penalty if the order were quashed was rejected.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1) Whether a financial debt assignee which is not a "related party" in praesenti is disqualified from representation, participation, and voting in the Committee of Creditors on the footing that the original lender was treated as a related party of the corporate debtor/shareholder.
2) Whether the orders disqualifying the lender's vote (and consequently rejecting the resolution plan for want of requisite voting threshold) required modification once the debt stood assigned, unchallenged, to independent third-party asset reconstruction entities having no common shareholding/directorship with the corporate debtor.
3) What consequential directions should follow regarding reconstitution of the Committee of Creditors and consideration of pending resolution plans in light of the assignee's entitlement to participate with proportionate voting rights.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Eligibility of a third-party assignee (in praesenti not a related party) to be in the CoC with voting rights
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined the disqualification concerning CoC participation/voting for "related party" financial creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and applied the Supreme Court's reasoning that such disqualification is relationship-based and operates in praesenti, not as an attribute of the debt.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the question of the original lender's "related party" status as of diminished relevance after assignment, because the debt had been assigned first to one asset reconstruction company and later to another, and both assignments were accepted and not challenged. The Court noted that there was no case that the present assignee is a related party of the corporate debtor. On the materials placed, the Court found no common directors or shareholders between the corporate debtor and the assignee entities, and no basis to infer that the assignment was undertaken merely to gain CoC entry or to circumvent the statutory disqualification. The Court therefore applied the principle that the disability attaches to the related-party financial creditor (relationship), not to the debt itself, and that an unrelated third-party assignee does not carry that disability merely by taking an assignment.
Conclusions: The Court held that the present assignee, being the financial creditor in praesenti and not a related party of the corporate debtor, is entitled to participate in the CoC with proportionate voting rights. The impugned directions disqualifying participation/voting were modified accordingly.
Issue 2: Consequence for the rejection of the resolution plan based on exclusion of the lender's vote
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered the statutory voting threshold for approval of a resolution plan (as referenced in the judgment) and the basis on which the plan had been rejected by excluding the vote share of the creditor treated as a related party.
Interpretation and reasoning: The plan had been rejected because, after excluding the vote share attributed to the lender treated as a related party, the plan did not meet the requisite voting threshold. The Court held that, once the assignee is found eligible to sit and vote in the CoC (being unrelated in praesenti), the premise for continuing the impugned disqualification and the consequent effect on plan consideration cannot stand to that extent. The Court therefore did not sustain the impugned orders insofar as they denied CoC rights to the present assignee.
Conclusions: The Court modified the impugned orders dated 04.01.2024 and 16.01.2024 to the extent they operated to exclude the present assignee from CoC participation/voting; the assignee must be included with proportionate voting rights, removing the basis for treating its vote as excludable on "related party" grounds.
Issue 3: Directions on reconstitution of CoC and consideration of pending resolution plans; effect on interim restraint
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court addressed the operational consequence of its finding on CoC composition and referred to the interim restraint that had prevented the resolution professional from placing received plans before the CoC.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded that a fresh and revised invitation for resolution plans had been issued and that two plans were received but were not placed before the CoC due to an interim order restraining such consideration. With the assignee's entitlement to be included and vote restored, the Court held that the interim restraint no longer served and stood vacated. The proper course was to reconstitute the CoC by including the assignee with proportionate voting rights and allow the insolvency process to proceed by considering the pending plans.
Conclusions: The Court directed that the assignee be made a CoC member with proportionate voting rights and that the pending resolution plans may be considered by the reconstituted CoC to carry forward resolution of the corporate debtor; the earlier interim order restraining consideration of plans stood vacated. Appeals were disposed of with no costs.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1) Whether refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 could be denied by examining "nexus"/eligibility of input services (short-term accommodation, outdoor catering, club/association services) without first proceeding under Rule 14 for recovery of allegedly wrong credit.
2) Whether, post 01.04.2011 exclusion in the definition of "input service", the disputed services were excludible only upon a finding that they were used "primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee", and whether the authorities applied this test on record.
3) Whether refund/benefit relating to Swachh Bharat Cess on input services was admissible despite invoices being issued prior to 03.02.2016 and/or prior to 01.04.2012, and whether realization of export proceeds after 21 months could justify denial where foreign exchange was ultimately received.
4) Whether adopting the Rule 5 refund formula for computing refund (including treatment of export turnover/total turnover) was permissible where the notification invoked for cess refund did not itself prescribe a formula.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Denial of refund by deciding nexus/eligibility at refund stage without Rule 14 action
Legal framework: The Court examined Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (as amended) and its linkage with refund under Rule 5, and noted that Rule 14 contains a clause enabling recovery even where credit is wrongly taken but not utilised.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the eligibility of a service for refund under Rule 5 is "inextricably linked" to its eligibility as "input service" under Rule 2(l). However, if Revenue seeks to deny eligibility by asserting wrong availment/lack of nexus, it must take recourse to Rule 14 rather than adjudicating nexus while processing a Rule 5 refund. The Court rejected Revenue's contention that post-amendment Rule 14 requires both "taken and utilised" by pointing out that Rule 14(1)(i) expressly covers credit wrongly taken but not utilised, which is significant for exporters who may not utilise accumulated credit.
Conclusion: Revenue cannot deny the refund by deciding nexus/eligibility within the refund adjudication itself; if credit is alleged to be wrongly availed, recovery must be pursued under Rule 14.
Issue 2: Application of post-01.04.2011 "primarily for personal use" test to excluded services
Legal framework: The Court considered the amended definition of "input service" effective 01.04.2011, under which certain services are excluded only when used "primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee."
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court acknowledged that the disputed categories fall within the excluded list, but emphasised that exclusion is conditional: the services are excluded only if primarily for personal use/consumption of employees. The Court found that nothing on record established such primary personal use, and further found that neither the appellate authority nor the original authority analysed the disputed services through this statutory lens. Because the necessary factual inquiry was not undertaken, the Court determined that the matter required reconsideration based on evidence as to actual use.
Conclusion: The rejection on these services could not be sustained without examining and finding, on evidence, that the services were used primarily for employees' personal use/consumption; remand was required for fresh determination on this aspect.
Issue 3: Admissibility of benefit for Swachh Bharat Cess and treatment of delayed realization of export proceeds
Legal framework: The Court addressed admissibility of refund/rebate of Swachh Bharat Cess paid on input services, and the impact of timing of invoices and receipt of export proceeds, considering that export completion was argued with reference to receipt of foreign exchange.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the appellant's submissions that, absent a specific embargo, substantial benefit should not be denied. It accepted admissibility of benefit for Swachh Bharat Cess even where input invoices were issued prior to 03.02.2016 and/or prior to 01.04.2012. It also accepted the position that where export proceeds are realized after 21 months but are ultimately received in foreign exchange, denial on the ground of delayed realization was not justified. The Court additionally noted that Revenue did not oppose these submissions on these "other issues."
Conclusion: Denial of benefit/refund on the grounds of (i) invoice dates being prior to 03.02.2016 and/or prior to 01.04.2012, and (ii) receipt of export proceeds after 21 months, was not sustainable; the appellant's contentions on these points were accepted.
Issue 4: Use of Rule 5 formula where the notification does not prescribe a computation formula
Legal framework: The Court considered the computation objection relating to export turnover/total turnover and the absence of a formula in the notification under which cess refund was claimed.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that there was "nothing wrong" in adapting the Rule 5 formula for computation where the relevant notification did not prescribe a formula. It treated such adoption as permissible for quantification, and did not accept objections premised on formula-based reduction issues, particularly in the absence of opposition from Revenue on the point.
Conclusion: Adopting the Rule 5 formula for calculating the refund amount was permissible where the governing notification lacked a formula.
FINAL DISPOSITION (as decided on the material issues)
The Court allowed the appeal by remand: (i) the nexus/exclusion of the disputed services was to be reconsidered by applying the correct "primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee" test based on evidence, and (ii) objections relating to Swachh Bharat Cess timing, delayed realization of export proceeds, and adoption of the Rule 5 formula were resolved in favour of the appellant as stated above.
Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 16(8) of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 could be sustained without a fresh notice when the dealer had already been put to notice in Form VAT-XXIX. (ii) Whether, in revision under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, interference was warranted with the concurrent findings upholding the levy of penalty and tax demand.
Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 16(8) of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 could be sustained without a fresh notice when the dealer had already been put to notice in Form VAT-XXIX.
Analysis: Section 16(8) requires that the dealer be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard before penalty is imposed. The notice in Form VAT-XXIX had already informed the dealer to produce evidence and show cause why penalty should not be imposed. The statutory scheme did not require a separate fresh notice for the penalty proceedings once the dealer had been put to notice of the possible penalty and the material basis for it.
Conclusion: The penalty was held sustainable and the plea based on absence of a fresh notice was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether, in revision under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, interference was warranted with the concurrent findings upholding the levy of penalty and tax demand.
Analysis: The authorities at three levels had recorded concurrent factual findings that the dealer had claimed an excessive deduction, had suppressed the taxable value, and had thereby justified the levy of penalty. Revisional interference was confined to cases involving an erroneous decision of law or failure to decide a substantial question of law. No such substantial question arose from the record.
Conclusion: No revisional interference was warranted and the concurrent orders were upheld.
Final Conclusion: The revision petitions failed because the assessee had already been put to notice of the proposed penalty and no substantial question of law arose from the concurrent factual findings sustaining the demand and penalty.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute requires only a reasonable opportunity of being heard, a prior show-cause notice informing the dealer of the proposed penalty is sufficient, and revisional interference is unavailable in the absence of a substantial question of law arising from concurrent factual findings.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
i) Whether interest under Section 244A(1A), already determined as payable in the orders giving effect for the relevant assessment years, had to be released to the assessee when it remained unpaid.
ii) Whether interest under Section 244A(1) and Section 244A(1A) on the refund had to be computed and paid up to the actual date of refund payment (and not merely up to the date of the order giving effect), requiring rectification of the orders giving effect.
iii) Whether the assessee was entitled to interest/compensation for delayed payment of the interest component (i.e., delay in paying interest already determined), and if so, the applicable rate and period.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Non-payment of interest under Section 244A(1A) despite determination in orders giving effect
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court proceeded on the basis that interest under Section 244A(1A) had been determined as payable in the orders giving effect for the relevant assessment years.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the revenue did not dispute the factual position that the orders giving effect had determined interest under Section 244A(1A) for the concerned years, but that this determined interest remained unpaid. Since the amount stood determined as payable and no justification for non-payment was established, the relief had to follow.
Conclusion: The Court directed the revenue to pay the entire unpaid Section 244A(1A) interest amounting to Rs. 7,58,77,348/- as determined in the orders giving effect for the three assessment years.
Issue (ii): Whether interest under Sections 244A(1) and 244A(1A) must run till the date of actual refund payment, and rectification of the orders giving effect
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court addressed the computation of statutory interest on refunds under Sections 244A(1) and 244A(1A), in the context of the admitted timing mismatch between (a) computation in the orders giving effect and (b) the actual dates of refund payment.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found it undisputed that the orders giving effect computed interest only up to August 2023, whereas the refunds were actually paid later (May 2024 for one year and July 2024 for the other years). The Court held that interest is required to be calculated up to the date of payment of the refund and not merely up to the date of passing the order giving effect. Since the existing orders computed interest only till the order date, the Court accepted the necessity of rectification so as to extend the interest computation period to the date of actual refund payment.
Conclusion: The Court directed the revenue to rectify the orders dated 23.08.2023 to grant and pay (a) further interest under Section 244A(1) and (b) further interest under Section 244A(1A), in each case computed up to the actual date of refund payment for the respective assessment years.
Issue (iii): Entitlement to interest/compensation for delayed payment of the determined interest amount
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court considered whether interest/compensation could be awarded for delay in paying the interest component that had already been determined as payable, and referred to judicial principles treating refund dues (including the interest element) as amounts retained by the revenue warranting compensation for undue retention.
Interpretation and reasoning: The revenue contended that no provision permitted "interest on delayed payment of interest." The Court rejected this objection. It held that where statutory interest has been determined as payable but remains unpaid for a prolonged period, the assessee is entitled to further interest/compensation for the delay. The Court reasoned that the unpaid interest forms part of the total amount refundable due to the assessee, and non-payment results in wrongful retention by the revenue. The Court adopted the approach that such payment is not impermissible "compounding," but compensation for non-payment of the full refundable amount. It further held that, even assuming a lack of express provision, interest is payable as compensation for use and retention of money that is debt-owed and payable by the revenue.
Conclusion: The Court directed payment of interest/compensation at 6% per annum on the delayed payment of the determined interest amount of Rs. 7,58,77,348/-, for the period from 01.08.2023 until the date of payment of that interest amount, to be calculated in accordance with Section 244A.
Compliance direction material to relief: All monetary directions (payment of unpaid Section 244A(1A) interest, rectification and payment of further interest under Sections 244A(1) and 244A(1A), and interest/compensation for delayed payment of interest) were ordered to be complied with on or before 30 January 2026.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether, when the statutory second appellate remedy exists but the Appellate Tribunal is not constituted/functional and the filing timelines have been extended by notification and administratively structured by advisory, the tax authorities may lawfully initiate or continue recovery of the disputed demand before expiry of the permitted appeal-filing period.
(ii) Whether interim protection against recovery should be granted on the condition of the taxpayer completing the statutory pre-deposit contemplated for stay of recovery during pendency of the second appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Recoveries during the extended/structured period for filing second appeal when Tribunal is not functional
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted that the statutory right to file a second appeal is provided under Section 112 of the applicable GST enactment, but the Tribunal was not available due to non-constitution/non-functionality. The Court further relied on (a) a governmental notification extending the time up to which appeals may be filed before the Appellate Tribunal for orders communicated within the specified period, and (b) an administrative user advisory prescribing a staggered e-filing window and stating that filing would in any event be available up to the notified outer date.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the inability to approach the Tribunal as not attributable to the taxpayer. It reasoned that once the statute provides an appellate right, the State must make that remedy meaningfully available before initiating coercive recoveries. In light of the notification extending the appeal-filing timeline and the advisory operationalising filing windows, the Court expressed serious doubt that the administration could proceed to recover the disputed tax during the period in which the second appeal could still be filed. Allowing recovery in such circumstances would be contrary to the statutory scheme, inequitable and plainly unfair, and would also offend the constitutional scheme as articulated by the Court.
Conclusion: The Court ordered that, subject to satisfaction of the pre-deposit condition addressed separately, no further recoveries shall be made pursuant to the disputed adjudication demand until the relevant timeline, and bank garnishee proceedings shall remain in abeyance. The Court also directed the State to obtain and disclose its stand on recoveries and expected issuance of administrative instructions consistent with the notification and advisory; if a contrary stand is taken, reasons were required to be placed on record.
Issue (ii): Conditional interim protection based on completion of statutory pre-deposit for stay during second appeal
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 112(8) for obtaining the benefit of protection against recovery during pendency of a second appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded that the taxpayer had already deposited a substantial part of the required amount but had not yet deposited the full sum contemplated for availing statutory protection. Balancing the taxpayer's inability to access a functional Tribunal with the statutory pre-deposit scheme, the Court granted protection against further recovery, while conditioning that protection upon deposit of the remaining balance within the outer limit linked to the appeal-filing timeline or earlier upon actual filing.
Conclusion: Interim restraint on further recoveries (including keeping bank garnishee proceedings in abeyance) was granted subject to deposit of the balance pre-deposit amount by the earlier of (a) the date of filing the second appeal, or (b) the specified outer date aligned with the extended filing period.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the Court should entertain the petitions despite availability of an alternate statutory remedy, given that the GST Tribunal was not operational in the circumstances.
(ii) Whether the impugned orders rejecting the refund claim and upholding such rejection should be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication because the authorities had not considered the impact of a subsequent binding decision holding that omission of Rule 96(10) was without any saving for pending proceedings, and because related questions (including Rule 86(4B) retrospectivity and other objections) required reconsideration.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Entertaining the petitions notwithstanding alternate remedy
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered the objection that an alternate remedy lay before the GST Tribunal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that, as of the date of decision, the GST Tribunal was not operational. In these "peculiar facts" and considering the nature of the order proposed (setting aside and remanding), relegating the petitioner to the alternate remedy would serve no useful purpose.
Conclusion: The Court proceeded to entertain the petitions and did not dismiss them on the ground of alternate remedy.
Issue (ii): Setting aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh decision in light of subsequent decision concerning Rule 96(10) and to reconsider connected contentions
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The dispute involved allegations that the petitioner had breached Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017, and the impugned orders also addressed Rule 86(4B), holding that it could not be given retrospective effect. The Court also noted a subsequent decision of the same Court holding that Rule 96(10) was omitted without any saving provision for pending proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the petitioner had been called upon to return refunded amounts inter alia on the basis of an alleged breach of Rule 96(10), and that Rule 86(4B) issues were also involved. Since the adjudicating and appellate authorities did not have the benefit of the later decision regarding the omission of Rule 96(10), that decision would have "some impact on the issues raised." At the present stage, the Court declined to make observations on the merits or on the precise effect of that later decision, but held that the interests of justice required that the impugned orders be set aside and the matter remanded so the refund application and show cause notice could be decided afresh after examining that impact. The Court further directed that the authority must hear parties, consider written submissions, and also consider all other contentions, including objections regarding retrospectivity and the bar (if any) on filing two refund claims.
Conclusions: The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority to decide afresh the refund application and show cause notice, after considering the impact of the later decision and all other contentions. The authority was directed to complete the exercise expeditiously and in any event within six months from uploading of the order, after granting hearing and considering written submissions.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered after the original order of the Tribunal, can constitute a "mistake apparent from the record" so as to justify rectification under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1.2 What is the scope and limitation of the Tribunal's rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly vis-à-vis change in law or subsequent judicial precedents.
1.3 Consequentially, whether the rectification order passed by the Tribunal under Section 254(2) sustaining the disallowance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI was valid, and what relief, if any, should be granted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Subsequent Supreme Court judgment as "mistake apparent from the record" and scope of Section 254(2)
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court noted that Section 254(2) empowers the Tribunal to rectify any "mistake apparent from the record" in its order. This jurisdiction is limited and akin to, though more restricted than, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct mistakes apparent on the face of the record.
2.2 The Court referred to and relied upon a prior Division Bench decision which had examined Section 254(2) in the context of the same Supreme Court judgment in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., and which in turn had discussed: (i) the principle that change in law or subsequent decisions/judgments of a coordinate or larger Bench cannot, by themselves, be grounds for review as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation; and (ii) the reiteration of this principle by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Agrawal v. State Tax Officer (1) and Another.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court found as an admitted position that, on the date of the Tribunal's original order (4 August 2022), the Tribunal had followed the then prevailing law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court in Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd., which itself followed the Supreme Court's decision in Alom Extrusions Ltd. Under that legal position, deduction for employees' share of PF/ESI was allowable if deposited before the due date of filing the return under Section 139(1).
2.4 The Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., which overruled the earlier proposition in Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd. and held that employees' contributions are deductible under Section 36(1)(va) only if deposited within the time prescribed under the respective statutes, was rendered on 12 October 2022, i.e., after the Tribunal's original order.
2.5 The Tribunal, in allowing the Revenue's rectification application and sustaining the disallowance, had relied solely on this subsequent judgment in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. as the basis for invoking Section 254(2).
2.6 The Court held that a subsequent change in the legal position by a later judgment, which did not exist when the original order was passed, cannot be treated as a "mistake apparent from the record." The Tribunal cannot be said to have overlooked or failed to follow a Supreme Court or High Court decision that was not in existence at the time of its original decision.
2.7 Applying the ratio of the earlier Division Bench decision (involving the same Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. judgment), and following the principles laid down in Beghar Foundation and Sanjay Kumar Agrawal, the Court reiterated that:
(a) Change in law or subsequent judicial decisions by themselves cannot be grounds for review; and
(b) The rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is even more restricted than review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and cannot be used to reopen or revisit decisions based solely on subsequent changes in the law.
2.8 The Court also noted its agreement with a Tribunal decision in ANI Integrated Services Ltd., which had rejected similar miscellaneous applications by the Revenue seeking rectification under Section 254(2) on the basis of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., applying the same principles on the limited scope of rectification jurisdiction.
2.9 The Court further observed that its view is consistent with other Bench decisions which have quashed rectification orders under Section 254(2) passed in an identical factual and legal backdrop (including decisions subsequently following the same Division Bench ruling).
Conclusions on Issues 1 & 2
2.10 A subsequent Supreme Court judgment rendered after the Tribunal's original order does not constitute a "mistake apparent from the record" and cannot be a valid ground for exercising jurisdiction under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2.11 The Tribunal's rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is narrow and cannot be equated with a power to review its own order on account of subsequent change in law or later judicial pronouncements. Such later decisions cannot, by themselves, justify rectification.
2.12 On the date of the original order (4 August 2022), the Tribunal had correctly applied the then prevailing legal position; hence, there was no mistake apparent from the record, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain and allow the rectification application filed by the Revenue.
Issue 3: Validity of the rectification order and consequential relief
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 Since the only ground for rectification was the subsequent judgment in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., and such subsequent decision could not constitute a "mistake apparent from the record," the Tribunal's order passed under Section 254(2) sustaining the disallowance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI was held to be without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable.
3.2 The Court therefore considered that the appropriate relief was to quash and set aside the impugned rectification order and restore the Tribunal's original order allowing the deduction, which had been passed in accordance with the law then prevailing.
3.3 At the same time, the Court clarified that by setting aside the rectification order and restoring the original order, the Revenue is not precluded from availing any statutory remedy of appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act against the original Tribunal order, if otherwise permissible in law.
Conclusions on Issue 3
3.4 The rectification order passed by the Tribunal under Section 254(2), based solely on the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., is invalid and is quashed and set aside.
3.5 The original order of the Tribunal dated 4 August 2022, granting deduction for employees' contribution to PF/ESI as per the law then prevailing, is restored.
3.6 The Revenue retains liberty, if otherwise entitled in law, to challenge the restored original Tribunal order by way of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption on inter se sales of aluminium sole moulds and cutting dyes under the cited notifications, and whether those items could be treated as raw materials, packing materials or consumables; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption on inter se sales of aluminium sole moulds and cutting dyes under the cited notifications, and whether those items could be treated as raw materials, packing materials or consumables.
Analysis: The claim under the 1994 notification failed because it was confined to inter-unit sales within the Madras Export Processing Zone, whereas the assessees were not located in that zone. The 1997 notification applied generally to sales of raw materials, packing materials and consumable goods to 100% export oriented units, but the items in question were not consumed in the manufacturing process; they were only aids or implements. The ordinary meaning of consumables, as reflected in the EXIM policy, supported the revenue's case, and the exemption notifications could not be stretched beyond their clear language.
Conclusion: The exemption claim was rejected and the issue was answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 was sustainable.
Analysis: Penalty under Section 16(2) required proof of willful non-disclosure of assessable turnover. All material facts were already on record, and the dispute turned only on the legal interpretation of the notifications. In those circumstances, the statutory condition for penalty was not met.
Conclusion: The penalty was set aside and the issue was answered in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The tax exemption claim failed, but the penalty component was annulled, leaving the appeals successful only to that limited extent.
Ratio Decidendi: An exemption notification in a fiscal statute must be confined to its clear terms, and penalty for escapement cannot be sustained where the dispute is only one of legal interpretation and there is no willful non-disclosure.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the refund directed by the Appellate Authority under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be withheld on the ground that an appeal against such order is contemplated.
1.2 Consequences, including liability for additional interest and recovery from responsible officers, for non-compliance with an appellate refund order not stayed or set aside.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Withholding of refund on the ground of a contemplated appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The Court noted that the Appellate Authority, by order dated 21 August 2025, had directed refund of Rs. 7,27,83,010/- to the petitioner along with applicable interest under Section 56 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
2.1.2 The Court recorded the petitioner's plea that the first respondent declined to grant the refund on the ground that an appeal against the said appellate order was contemplated.
2.1.3 The Court relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in "Mr. Brij Mohan Mangla vs. Union of India & Ors." which held that authorities cannot ignore or withhold implementation of orders passed by the Appellate Authority merely because they have decided, or are contemplating, to file an appeal; such a practice would be debilitating to the rule of law.
2.1.4 The Court held that so long as the Appellate Authority's order dated 21 August 2025 is neither set aside nor stayed, the first respondent is bound to comply with it and cannot refuse refund on the basis of a proposed appeal.
Conclusions
2.1.5 The Court concluded that the withholding of the refund solely on the ground that an appeal is contemplated is impermissible, and the first respondent is obliged to implement the appellate refund order in the absence of any stay or setting aside of that order.
2.2 Directions on refund, additional interest, and recovery from responsible officers
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 Having held that the respondents are bound by the appellate order, the Court directed the first respondent to refund the amount of Rs. 7,27,83,010/- to the petitioner within 10 days from the date of uploading of the Court's order, along with the statutorily applicable interest under Section 56 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
2.2.2 The Court further directed that, if the refund is not made within the stipulated period, the first respondent shall, over and above any statutorily payable interest, pay additional interest at 6% per annum to the petitioner.
2.2.3 The Court mandated that such additional interest shall first be paid to the petitioner by the respondents, and thereafter the respondents shall conduct an inquiry, determine liability, and recover the additional amount from the officer or officers responsible for the delay in implementing the appellate order.
2.2.4 The Court emphasized that under no circumstances should the State or Central Exchequer be made accountable for payment of such additional amounts from taxpayers' funds.
Conclusions
2.2.5 The Court allowed the petition, made the Rule absolute, and imposed a time-bound direction for refund, with a clear regime of additional interest and personal liability of erring officers to ensure compliance with appellate refund orders and to protect public revenue from bearing the burden of delays caused by officials.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the statutory preconditions under Section 147 read with Sections 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for reopening assessment on the ground of "income escaping assessment" were satisfied in respect of the relevant assessment year.
1.2 Whether the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer, namely third-party investigation findings and portal-based risk information concerning another assessee, constituted a valid "reason to believe" that the petitioner's income had escaped assessment, notwithstanding full disclosure of transactions in the original return and audited accounts.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reassessment proceedings under Sections 147, 148 and 148A; existence of "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment
Legal framework (as discussed by The Court)
2.1 The Court reproduced Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, emphasizing that reopening can be undertaken only if the Assessing Officer "has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment" for any assessment year, subject to Sections 148 to 153.
2.2 The Court noted the settled position that in assessment proceedings the assessee's obligation is to make full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for assessment for that year, and that all requirements stipulated by Section 147 must be given due and equal weight.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court found as undisputed that:
(a) The assessee filed its return of income for the relevant assessment year, declaring its net income and paying tax thereon.
(b) The total turnover was subjected to tax audit under the Act; regular books of account are maintained, audited every year, and uploaded on the portal.
(c) All transactions, including those with the third party (Vasudev Babubhai Kapadia and entities related to him), were disclosed and are reflected in the profit and loss account, as also stated in the reply dated 10.04.2025.
2.4 On examining the detailed reply to the show-cause notice under Section 148A(1), the Court recorded that the assessee had:
(a) Matched and reconciled the data provided by the department with its own books of account.
(b) Explained that the amount of Rs. 73,31,671/- did not figure in its books of account.
(c) Clarified that Rs. 1,73,89,827/- related to sales of rough diamonds to Vaibhav Enterprise (proprietorship of Janakbhai Vasudev Kapadia) pertaining to the earlier assessment year 2018-19, with supporting details offered.
2.5 The Court observed that, despite such categorical explanations, the Assessing Officer merely stated that the matters "would be looked into in detail during the assessment proceedings", thereby treating the explanation regarding Rs. 73,31,671/- cursorily and perfunctorily.
2.6 From the order under Section 148A(3) / Section 148, the Court found that the allegations of bogus purchases were entirely based on investigation in the case of the third party (Vasudev Babubhai Kapadia), where:
(a) Suspicious transactions and an undisclosed bank account were noticed.
(b) Discrepancies between his bank account and his own ITR were identified.
(c) His GSTR-1 data showed large purchases and sales, and he failed to furnish documentary evidence during inquiry.
(d) The investigating authority treated his unaccounted purchases as his unaccounted income.
2.7 The Court held that the reopening against the assessee was triggered solely because the third party and another related individual (Janakbhai Vasudev Kapadia) allegedly engaged in bogus purchases and did not cooperate with the investigation. The Assessing Officer, on that premise and portal-based risk information, sought to implicate the assessee for "bogus purchases and sales" aggregating to Rs. 5,66,44,146/-.
2.8 The Court reasoned that, where the assessee has already disclosed all the relevant transactions in its audited books and ITR, including the very transactions with the third party, and has given a detailed, transaction-wise explanation in response to the Section 148A notice, the statutory condition of "reason to believe" that the assessee's income has escaped assessment is not satisfied merely because:
(a) The third party is alleged to have unaccounted income; or
(b) The third party failed to cooperate with the revenue authorities.
2.9 The Court found that the order did not record any independent or specific satisfaction by the Assessing Officer that income chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee had escaped assessment. Instead, the authority had misdirected itself by transferring suspicions arising from the third party's case onto the assessee, despite full disclosure by the latter.
2.10 The Court also inferred that the reliance on portal-based information and the Risk Management Strategy of the CBDT, without objective evaluation of the assessee's books and explanations, resulted in a "fishing and roving inquiry" rather than a reasoned formation of belief based on tangible material indicating escapement of income of the assessee.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court concluded that:
(a) The statutory preconditions under Section 147 for reopening were not satisfied, as there was no proper "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee had escaped assessment.
(b) The proceedings under Section 148 were "uncalled for", being founded on misdirection in assessing the transactions of third parties, notwithstanding the assessee's full and true disclosure of its own transactions and income.
(c) The perfunctory manner in which the Assessing Officer dealt with the assessee's explanation, particularly in relation to Rs. 73,31,671/-, further showed absence of a legally sustainable belief of escapement of income.
2.12 Accordingly, the impugned notice issued under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(3) for the relevant assessment year were quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed.
Issues: Whether the applicant, as complainant in a complaint case ending in acquittal, was entitled to have the leave to appeal treated as an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The application was examined in the light of the later authoritative ruling recognising that, in a complaint case, the complainant answers the description of a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and that such victim may prefer an appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 372. The earlier debate whether recourse lay only under Section 378(4) stood concluded by that ruling. Following the same approach adopted in subsequent decisions of the Court, there was no basis to take a different view in the present matter.
Conclusion: The leave to appeal was rightly directed to be treated as an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to be heard by the Sessions Court on merits.
Final Conclusion: The application resulted in a direction that preserved the complainant's appellate remedy against acquittal and required merits-based consideration before the competent appellate court.
Ratio Decidendi: In a complaint case, the complainant is a victim for the purposes of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and may maintain an appeal against acquittal before the Sessions Court.
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