Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order dated 24.04.2024 and the rejection of the rectification application under Section 161 warrant interference; (ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to interim relief and vacation of bank attachment pending appeal and on what terms.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned order dated 24.04.2024 and the order rejecting the rectification application dated 30.07.2025 under Section 161 can be set aside.

Analysis: The record shows non-response to the Show Cause Notice in GST DRC-01 dated 24.01.2024 and confirmation of demand in the impugned order dated 24.04.2024. Procedural compliance by the respondent under the GST enactments has been recorded. The rectification application filed on 25.03.2025 under Section 161 was considered and rejected by order dated 30.07.2025.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 24.04.2024 and the rejection of the rectification application dated 30.07.2025 do not warrant interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner may pursue remedy before the Appellate Authority and obtain vacation of bank attachment pending appeal, and on what conditions.

Analysis: Liberty to approach the Appellate Authority is granted subject to depositing 50% of the disputed tax in cash from the petitioner's Electronic Cash Register within thirty days. Compliance with this condition will permit the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal on merits without reference to limitation; attachment of the petitioner's bank account will be vacated and recovery proceedings kept in abeyance while the condition is met. Failure to comply permits the respondent to proceed as if the writ petition were dismissed in limine.

Conclusion: The petitioner is permitted to file appeal subject to depositing 50% of the disputed tax within thirty days; on such deposit the bank attachment will be vacated, recovery proceedings stayed, and the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal on merits without reference to limitation. Non-compliance permits normal recovery action.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by refusing substantive interference with the impugned orders while granting conditional liberty to prefer an appeal subject to specified deposit and compliance, with consequential interim reliefs conditional on that compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer has not replied to a Show Cause Notice and the authority has complied with procedural requirements, interference is not warranted; conditional interim relief including vacation of attachments may be granted on deposit of a specified proportion of the disputed tax to enable adjudication on merits by the Appellate Authority.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2015-16 is time-barred having regard to a search conducted on 09.05.2024 and the computation of the six-year and ten-year periods under Section 153A/153C and Section 149 (old regime).

Analysis: The Court applied Section 152(3) to hold that, because the search took place on 09.05.2024, the pre- Finance (No.2) Act, 2024 regime of Sections 147151 (and the then wording of Section 149) governs. Section 153A(1)(b) prescribes that the six assessment years are the six years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search is conducted; Explanation 1 to Section 153A prescribes that the ten assessment years are to be computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search is conducted. The Court adopted the established construction that the statute uses different starting points for the six-year block and the ten-year block: the six years are counted immediately preceding the search assessment year (excluding the search assessment year), whereas the ten-year period is reckoned backwards from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted (thus including the search assessment year in the ten-year computation). Applying these rules to a search in Financial Year 2024-25 (search assessment year AY 2025-26), the ten-year block terminates at AY 2016-17 and does not extend to AY 2015-16. The Court therefore found that issuance of a Section 148 notice for AY 2015-16 falls beyond the ten-year outer limit as it stood immediately before the Finance Act, 2021.

Conclusion: The notice dated 31.03.2025 issued under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2015-16 is quashed as time-barred; the writ petitions are allowed (decision in favour of the assessee).

Issues: Whether proceedings under Section 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be initiated against a director of a private company without an affirmative finding that the tax dues cannot be recovered from the company.

Analysis: Section 179 imposes personal liability on directors of a private company only upon satisfaction of the statutory contingency that tax due from the company "cannot be recovered". The impugned order initiating proceedings under Section 179 against the petitioner records no finding that recovery from the company was not possible. The Court relied on the requirement that the pre-condition of non-recoverability must be established before making a director liable and noted authority to similar effect. The matter was therefore examined only on whether the requisite finding of inability to recover was recorded prior to invoking Section 179.

Conclusion: The impugned order is set aside for want of any finding that the tax dues could not be recovered from the company. The petitioner (director) succeeds on this issue and the petition is disposed of accordingly.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty imposed under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 upon the appellant can be sustained; (ii) Whether the penalty imposed under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 upon the appellant can be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 imposed on the appellant is maintainable.

Analysis: The record shows that a prior appellate order in connected proceedings concluded that, because the scrips were not cancelled before the Joint Commissioners order, the demand of duty and the imposition of penalty under Section 114(iii) could not be sustained. That finding formed the basis for setting aside the duty demand and the Section 114(iii) penalty in respect of the appellant. The appellate review in the present matter applied that determination to the appellants case and addressed whether the factual and procedural prerequisites for imposing the Section 114(iii) penalty were established.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 is set aside. (In favour of Appellant)

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 imposed on the appellant is maintainable.

Analysis: The relevant statutory test for Section 114AA requires that a person knowingly or intentionally make, sign or use a declaration, statement or document which is false or incorrect in any material particular. The connected appellate finding and the record show documentary evidence (Bills of Entry and Bills of Lading indicating Jebel Ali as port of discharge) and corroborative circumstantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the appellant deliberately made false statements as to destination. The appellate review found no infirmity in upholding the Section 114AA penalty on that basis.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 is maintained. (Against the Appellant)

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed in part by setting aside the penalty under Section 114(iii) while upholding the penalty under Section 114AA; the overall effect is a partial success for the appellant without disturbing the Section 114AA penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether the Customs Broker contravened Regulation 10(a) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by obtaining authorization from a third party rather than the importer; (ii) Whether the Customs Broker contravened Regulation 10(d) by failing to advise the client and report non-compliance; (iii) Whether the Customs Broker contravened Regulation 10(e) by failing to exercise due diligence regarding the nature of imported goods; (iv) Whether the Customs Broker contravened Regulation 10(n) by failing to verify IEC, GSTIN, identity and functioning of the client using reliable documents.

Issue (i): Whether Regulation 10(a) was violated because authorization was received from a third party rather than from the importer.

Analysis: The authorization letter in the record expressly authorized the broker for clearance. The impugned finding relied on statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act; however the procedure mandated by section 138B was not followed making those statements inadmissible for proving lack of authorization. There is no denial of the authorization by the importer and no finding of forgery or manipulation of the authorization document.

Conclusion: Regulation 10(a) was not violated; the finding of contravention is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether Regulation 10(d) was violated for failure to advise the client and report non-compliance.

Analysis: The departmental finding primarily relied on a statement recorded under section 108 about markings on the consignments. That statement could not be relied upon because the section 138B procedure was not followed to render it admissible.

Conclusion: Regulation 10(d) contravention is not established and the finding is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether Regulation 10(e) was violated by failing to exercise due diligence with respect to the consignments.

Analysis: The conclusion of failure of due diligence was based on statements under section 108 regarding package markings. Absent compliance with section 138B, those statements cannot sustain the charge. No independent admissible evidence establishes the broker's failure of due diligence.

Conclusion: Regulation 10(e) contravention is not established and the finding is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether Regulation 10(n) was violated by not verifying IEC, GSTIN, identity and functioning of the client using reliable documents.

Analysis: The record shows KYC documents were obtained (allegedly via a freight forwarder). There is no finding or allegation that the KYC documents were forged or manipulated. The regulatory requirement is verification of correctness using reliable documents; mere receipt of documents through a third party does not, without more, establish non-compliance.

Conclusion: Regulation 10(n) was not violated; the finding is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order revoking the license, forfeiting security and imposing penalty cannot be sustained as the established findings of contravention under Regulations 10(a), 10(d), 10(e) and 10(n) do not stand; the appeal is allowed and the order is set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act are inadmissible to prove substantive contraventions unless the mandatory procedure of section 138B is complied with; verification requirements under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations are met by authentic KYC/authorization documents unless forgery or falsity is shown, and receipt of documents via a third party does not ipso facto establish regulatory violation.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in confirming provisional attachment of immovable and movable properties (including properties acquired prior to the scheduled offence) as proceeds of crime or property of equivalent value; (ii) Whether retention/seizure of documents and digital devices ought to be continued; (iii) Whether freezing of bank accounts not subsequently provisionally attached was justified.

Issue (i): Whether provisional attachment of properties (including those acquired prior to the scheduled offence) could be sustained as proceeds of crime or as property of equivalent value under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Evidence from investigation included statements and transaction tracing showing large cash deposits and transfers into accounts of non-existent entities and attribution of instructions for deposits to the appellant. The definition of "proceeds of crime" under section 2(1)(u) PMLA includes (a) property derived from criminal activity and (b) the value of such property where proceeds are not traceable, thereby permitting attachment of property of equivalent value. Authorities and precedent interpreting the definition to permit attachment of property of equivalent value where proceeds have been laundered or are not traceable were applied.

Conclusion: The confirmation of provisional attachment of the properties is justified and is upheld; attachment of properties acquired prior to the scheduled offence is permissible as property of equivalent value where proceeds are not traceable.

Issue (ii): Whether continued retention of seized documents and digital devices was warranted.

Analysis: Seized documentary material in part was already released after taking copies; the investigative record and subsequent provisional attachments addressed the evidentiary need for many seized items. No continuing justification remained for retention of items already released or for those superseded by provisional attachment.

Conclusion: The earlier detention/retention of seized documents and digital devices does not survive to the extent already released; no interference is required for matters already dealt with by release and by subsequent provisional attachment.

Issue (iii): Whether freezing of bank accounts that were not provisionally attached should be sustained.

Analysis: The majority of frozen accounts were subsequently provisionally attached; two specified bank accounts were not provisionally attached and no further justification for their continued freezing was shown. Where provisional attachment was not effected, freezing cannot be sustained absent specific grounds or subsequent attachment.

Conclusion: Freezing of the two bank accounts not subsequently provisionally attached is unjustified and interference is warranted to lift the freezing in respect of those accounts; freezing upheld for accounts that were subsequently provisionally attached.

Final Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority's confirmation of provisional attachment is sustained based on the act of laundering and the availability of authority to attach property of equivalent value where proceeds are not traceable; retention of seized documents has been rendered largely moot by release of copies and by provisional attachments; limited relief is granted by directing release/unfreezing of specific bank accounts that were not provisionally attached.

Ratio Decidendi: The definition of "proceeds of crime" in section 2(1)(u) PMLA encompasses both property derived from scheduled offences and the value of such property, permitting provisional attachment of property of equivalent value where the actual proceeds are laundered or not traceable, and provisional attachment of properties acquired prior to the offence is permissible under the second limb when proceeds are not available.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Authority erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 107 of the WBGST Act, 2017 and whether the petitioners should be permitted to prefer the appeal despite the delay.

Analysis: The Court examined the reasons advanced by the petitioners for delay, namely non-obvious upload of the adjudication order on the GST Portal under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab, inadvertent deletion of e-mails, and awareness only upon receipt of recovery intimation. The Appellate Authority had found these explanations insufficient. The Court noted the petitioners' prior knowledge of earlier notices, rendering the portal-upload explanation not fully satisfactory, but also recognised that refusing to permit the appeal would cause loss of an important forum. To balance competing equities between procedural strictness and access to remedy, the Court considered conditional relief by imposing terms allowing the appeal to be heard on merits if certain conditions are met.

Conclusion: The petitioners are permitted to prefer their appeal before the Appellate Authority provided they pay Rs. 20,000 to the State Legal Services Authority, West Bengal within two weeks and furnish proof to the Appellate Authority; upon compliance the impugned order dated November 18, 2025 shall be treated as set aside. Failure to make the payment will leave the impugned order effective.

Ratio Decidendi: Where refusal to condone delay would work substantial prejudice by denying an important forum, a court may exercise its discretion to permit the delayed appeal to proceed on merits upon reasonable terms imposed to balance the equities between the parties.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants were denied valid service of notice and were consequently proceeded against ex parte; (ii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had a valid reason to believe for confirmation of attachment; (iii) Whether the appellants established legitimate sources for purchase of the attached property and whether the attachment could be sustained in view of the plea that the scheduled offences were added later and the money-laundering charge was retrospective.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants were denied valid service of notice and were consequently proceeded against ex parte

Analysis: The record showed that notice and the accompanying complaint were sent by speed post and delivery was confirmed. The file of the Adjudicating Authority also reflected prior intimation of service and later confirmation of delivery. The applicable procedure then in force permitted service in the manner prescribed under Order 5 of Schedule I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and service by speed post was held to be valid. The appellants had actual awareness of the proceedings but chose not to appear.

Conclusion: The objection regarding non-service and ex parte disposal was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had a valid reason to believe for confirmation of attachment

Analysis: The order and the surrounding record showed that the Adjudicating Authority acted on the materials placed by the Enforcement Directorate and the complaint accompanying the provisional attachment proceedings. In proceedings under section 8(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Authority was not required to record reasons in the same manner as under section 5(1), and subjective satisfaction on the basis of the material before it was sufficient. The attachment proceedings were therefore not invalid merely because the reasons were drawn from the complaint and supporting materials.

Conclusion: The challenge based on absence of independent reason to believe failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellants established legitimate sources for purchase of the attached property and whether the attachment could be sustained in view of the plea that the scheduled offences were added later and the money-laundering charge was retrospective

Analysis: The documentary support for the claimed lawful sources was found inadequate and unreliable, including unregistered and unsupported transactions and an unproved bank loan narrative. The appellants did not satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing that the flat was acquired from untainted funds. On the retrospectivity plea, the governing principle applied was that money laundering is assessed with reference to the act of dealing with proceeds of crime, and continued possession or use of such proceeds after the relevant offence is scheduled attracts liability. The fact that the predicate offences were committed earlier did not defeat the proceedings where the alleged laundering continued thereafter.

Conclusion: The attachment of the property was upheld and the plea of retrospectivity was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The attachment order was confirmed, the appellate challenge failed, and the attached property was allowed to remain under restraint pending completion of the prosecution and confiscation process.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, valid service by the prescribed mode, subjective satisfaction of the Adjudicating Authority under section 8(1), and continued possession or dealing with proceeds of crime are sufficient to sustain attachment even if the predicate offences were scheduled later.

Issues: (i) Whether the transactions between OMIPL and HEPL including advancement of Rs.12 crores, acquisition of shares and land in the name of HEPL, and subsequent repayments through inter-company and related party transfers constitute a benami transaction within the meaning of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988; and whether the Adjudicating Authority correctly confirmed the Provisional Attachment Order.

Analysis: The material examined includes the loan of Rs.12 crores from OMIPL to HEPL, bank transfers showing HEPL transferring significant sums to the SPV (TEGNA) for acquisition of shares and land, the timing and source of repayments traced through the bank accounts of Mr. Mohinder Singh Malik and related entities, redemption of fixed deposits and credits from companies connected to OMIPL, and evidence that HEPL had negligible independent revenue while repayments were effected by funds traced to OMIPL-connected parties. The statutory standard under Section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 requires establishing that the consideration for the property was provided by one person while ownership stands in the name of another, and that the arrangement is not covered by recognised exceptions. The pattern of transfers, redemption of FDs, and credits from entities under OMIPL control were found to demonstrate that the consideration for the impugned properties (land and shares) originated from OMIPL and that repayments were effectuated by rotating funds among related parties rather than genuine independent repayment by HEPL or its principals. The evidence was held sufficient to satisfy the statutory ingredients of a benami arrangement and to justify confirmation of provisional attachment.

Conclusion: The payment of consideration for the impugned properties was provided by OMIPL while ownership was recorded in the name of HEPL; the repayments were not bona fide but effected by rotation of funds among OMIPL-controlled entities. Therefore the transactions constitute a benami transaction and confirmation of the Provisional Attachment Order is upheld in favour of the respondent.

Issues: Whether the seizure of two Demat accounts under Section 37A of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 may be substituted by furnishing a Fixed Deposit (FD) of equivalent value, with lien in favour of the respondent, pending adjudication and subject to any compounding by the Reserve Bank of India.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the limited relief sought by the appellants without adjudicating the merits of the alleged contravention under Section 4 of the Act. The competent authority below had confirmed the seizure but observed that it lacked jurisdiction to order substitution of seized items; it nonetheless recommended sympathetic consideration of substitution. The Tribunal noted the purpose of seizure under Section 37A is to secure an equivalent sum in India and that a Fixed Deposit existing for equivalent value would serve the same protective purpose while preserving parties' rights in pending adjudication and any RBI compounding process. The Tribunal considered potential volatility in share values and the equitable interests of both parties, and restrained from pronouncing on substantive guilt or penalty which remain for adjudication under Sections 13 and 16 of the Act.

Conclusion: The seizure of the two Demat accounts is substituted by an FD of equivalent value of Rs. 30,60,11,193/- furnished by the appellants with a lien in favour of the respondents; the seizure of the Demat accounts is lifted subject to the final outcome of the adjudication proceedings and any order on compounding by the Reserve Bank of India.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of the appellant's assets as proceeds of crime was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The attachment was examined in the context of a large-scale fraud investigation in which funds collected from the public through payment gateways were traced into the appellant's bank accounts and then routed to trading and self-accounts. The appellant did not comply with summons issued under the money-laundering law and failed to produce credible evidence of the asserted lawful sources of funds such as tuition income, savings, loans, or other personal earnings. In view of the statutory burden and the material showing that the credited amounts were linked to the fraud proceeds, no basis was found to dislodge the finding that the attached amounts represented proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The challenge to the provisional attachment failed and the attachment was sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against the appellants (NBFCs and fintech/service providers) was valid though the appellants were not named as accused in the FIRs; (ii) Whether the contractual/service-agreement model and conduct of the appellants (outsourcing, control of lending apps, revenue sharing/FLDG) amounted to involvement in scheduled offences/proceeds of crime and breach of RBI outsourcing guidelines such as to justify attachment.

Issue (i): Whether provisional attachment under Section 5 PMLA can be made in respect of persons not named as accused.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined statutory definitions and provisions defining "proceeds of crime" and the attachment regime and relied on precedent interpreting the scope of Section 5 to cover "any person" in possession of proceeds derived from scheduled offences. The Tribunal considered whether material in possession of the authorised officer provided recorded reasons to believe that the appellants were in possession of proceeds of crime and whether non-naming as accused precluded attachment.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment was valid and could be made against persons not named as accused where material establishes possession or involvement with proceeds of crime; this issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the contractual scheme and operational conduct of the NBFCs and fintech/service providers established sufficient involvement in the generation or handling of proceeds of crime and violative outsourcing of core functions.

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed the terms of the service agreements, scope of services (including app control, data capture, loan processing, collections), the revenue sharing/FLDG arrangements, evidence of high effective interest/processing fees and use of call centres, and relevant RBI outsourcing directions. The Tribunal found that the agreements and practical operation conferred effective control of lending and recovery on service providers, enabled capture and misuse of borrower data, and resulted in a business model generating proceeds through the scheduled offences; it also held that the arrangements outsourced core NBFC activities contrary to RBI guidance.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the appellants' contractual model and conduct amounted to involvement with proceeds of crime and breaches of regulatory outsourcing norms; this issue is decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicatory findings sustain the confirmation of provisional attachment under the PMLA against the appellants; the appeals are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where material shows a person (even if not named as accused) is in possession of or involved in processes connected with proceeds of crime, provisional attachment under Section 5 of the PMLA is permissible; contractual allocation of tasks that in practice vests control of core lending and recovery activities with service providers can establish involvement in generation and handling of proceeds of crime and justify attachment.

Issues: (i) Whether the Provisional Attachment Order and its confirmation attaching land, building, plant and machinery of the appellant company (OSISL) were justified on the ground that proceeds of crime were injected into the company (by purchase/conversion of share warrants and via NBFCs); (ii) Whether the Provisional Attachment Order and its confirmation attaching 55,00,000 shares held by the appellant shareholder (BKM Mining Pvt. Ltd.) were justified as being derived from proceeds of crime.

Issue (i): Whether attachment of immovable and movable assets of the appellant company could be sustained on the finding that proceeds of crime were injected into the company by way of purchase/conversion of share warrants and through NBFCs controlled by the accused.

Analysis: The material under consideration includes the investigative charting of fund flows, statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, documentary evidence of investments and conversions of share warrants, and tracing of funds through multiple entities and NBFCs. The respondents case is that funds originating from the predicate offence were layered through identified entities and NBFCs and injected into the company by purchase and conversion of share warrants and by loans/funding routed through such NBFCs. The appellants relied on antecedent incorporation, historical acquisition of fixed assets, servicing of loans, and asserted absence of direct receipt of tainted funds into the companys accounts. The Tribunal examined the contemporaneous investigative findings, the identified money trail, the role of NBFCs as conduits for routed funds, and admissions in recorded statements, and evaluated whether these established a sufficient link between the predicate offence proceeds and the investments/loans to justify provisional attachment under the Act.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation in respect of the companys land, building, plant and machinery are sustained; the Court finds that proceeds of crime were injected into the company by means of purchase/conversion of share warrants and via NBFCs, justifying attachment.

Issue (ii): Whether attachment of the shares held by the appellant shareholder could be sustained on the finding that acquisition was financed by proceeds of crime routed through NBFCs and related entities.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the evidence of the share purchase, the financing arrangements involving NBFCs, statements indicating the role of the accused and intermediaries, and the traced flow of funds from entities identified in the investigation to the acquisition. The respondents investigation linked the source of funds for the share acquisition to proceeds of the predicate offence, including admissions and documentary tracing; the appellants contended that the purchase was made from a bank and financed by legitimate loans and that the acquisition post-dated the check-period. The Tribunal evaluated the nexus between the routed funds and the share acquisition and the sufficiency of the material to treat the shares as derived from proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation in respect of the shares held by the shareholder appellant are sustained; the Court finds that the shares were acquired using funds traced to proceeds of crime and that attachment is justified.

Final Conclusion: The appeals challenging confirmation of the provisional attachment orders are without merit and are dismissed, upholding the investigative findings that proceeds of the predicate offence were routed into the subject company and the share acquisition through identified entities and NBFC conduits, thereby justifying attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Ratio Decidendi: Provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is justified where investigative material establishes a tracible nexusby money trail, admissions, and routing through intermediary entities (including NBFCs)between proceeds of a predicate offence and the assets or investments sought to be attached.

Issues: (i) Whether the filing of a prosecution complaint proposing confiscation ousts the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal against an Adjudicating Authority's order under Section 8 of the PMLA; (ii) Whether, on merits, there was sufficient material to justify continued retention/freezing of the seized properties, digital devices and bank accounts under Section 8(3) of the PMLA.

Issue (i): Whether the filing of a prosecution complaint proposing confiscation ousts the Appellate Tribunal's jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal against an AA order under Section 8.

Analysis: The appeal record shows a prosecution complaint was filed and confiscation was proposed; however, the question of jurisdiction depends on the statutory scheme and the specific provisions applicable at the relevant time. The prior authority relied upon concerned a different statutory period and factual matrix and does not establish a general rule that filing a prosecution complaint renders an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal infructuous. The Appellate Tribunal retains the power to examine legitimacy of the AA's order and to decide the appeal on merits regardless of subsequent prosecution proceedings.

Conclusion: The filing of a prosecution complaint proposing confiscation does not oust the Appellate Tribunal's jurisdiction; the Tribunal may entertain and decide the appeal against the AA's order.

Issue (ii): Whether there was sufficient material to justify continued retention/freezing of the seized items and accounts under Section 8(3).

Analysis: The impugned order contains factual findings including transactional links, account analysis, and chat-extract inferences connecting the seized items and frozen funds to the alleged criminal syndicate and routing of funds. On the preponderance of probabilities at the interlocutory stage, the material relied upon supports a finding of involvement of the properties in money laundering. The appellants did not discharge the onus to show absence of involvement or illegality of the retention.

Conclusion: On the merits, there was sufficient material to uphold continued retention/freezing of the seized properties and accounts under Section 8(3); the appeal on merits fails.

Final Conclusion: The Appellate Tribunal retains jurisdiction to entertain appeals under Section 8 of the PMLA notwithstanding the filing of a prosecution complaint, and on the facts presented the AA's order permitting continued retention/freezing is sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appeal challenges an Adjudicating Authority's order under Section 8, the Appellate Tribunal retains jurisdiction to decide the appeal irrespective of subsequent filing of a prosecution complaint proposing confiscation, and continued retention under Section 8(3) is justified at the interlocutory stage if, on the preponderance of probabilities, there is sufficient material linking the property to money laundering.

Issues: Whether the acquittal in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be set aside, and whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions arising under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Act by establishing a probable defence.

Analysis: The cheque and signatures were admitted, so the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 operated in favour of the complainant. Those presumptions were rebuttable, and the accused were required only to establish a probable defence on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. On the evidence, the Court found material inconsistencies in the complainant's version regarding the loan transaction, the absence of supporting loan records and account particulars, the conflicting stand regarding the earlier property transactions, and the circumstances surrounding the cheque and stop-payment instruction. The Court held that these circumstances were sufficient to rebut the presumption and shift the burden back to the complainant, who failed to prove that the cheque had been issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Conclusion: The accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption, and the complainant failed to establish the alleged debt and cheque liability. The acquittal was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, once the accused admits the cheque and signature, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arise, but they may be rebutted by a probable defence proved on a preponderance of probabilities from the complainant's own evidence and surrounding circumstances; if rebutted, the complainant must then independently prove the legally enforceable debt or liability.

Issues: Whether an assessee whose case has been selected for scrutiny and in respect of whom assessment proceedings are pending can be permitted to furnish an updated return under Section 139(8A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after the initiation of such proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 139(8A) (as amended) permits filing of an updated return within the prescribed period but contains provisos that restrict eligibility. The third proviso provides that no updated return shall be furnished where any proceeding for assessment or reassessment or recomputation or revision of income under the Act is pending or has been completed for the relevant assessment year. The facts involve selection for scrutiny under Computer-Assisted Scrutiny Selection (CASS) and issuance of notices under Section 143(2) and Section 142(1) followed by assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B. The Press Release relied upon by the assessee relates to a departmental outreach to identified taxpayers for a different assessment year and does not override the statutory bar in the proviso. The Assessing Officer's rejection of the request to file an updated return occurred after scrutiny proceedings were pending; accordingly the statutory prohibition in clause (b) of the third proviso to Section 139(8A) applies and disallows filing of an updated return at that stage. The petitioner retains the remedy of appeal against the assessment order and related disallowances and penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The statutory bar on filing an updated return where assessment proceedings are pending applies; the request to file an updated return is not permissible and the impugned assessment order refusing the updated return is upheld (in favour of Revenue).

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee trust, being a trust created for benefit of employees, falls within clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 164(1) and thereby is taxable at normal AOP rates instead of maximum marginal rate; (ii) Whether surcharge at highest rate (37%) could be levied given the assessee's taxable income being below threshold for surcharge.

Issue (i): Whether the trust qualifies under clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 164(1) and is therefore outside the ambit of section 167B.

Analysis: The decision applies CBDT Circular No. 577 (04.09.1990) and precedents recognising that trusts created bona fide for benefit of employees with trustees acting as representative assessee are covered by the first proviso to section 164(1). The proviso provides a specific charging mechanism for such trusts, displacing the general provision of section 167B which mandates taxation at maximum marginal rate where member shares are indeterminate.

Conclusion: The trust is within clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 164(1) and is not liable to taxation under section 167B; tax is to be computed at normal AOP rates (in favour of assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether surcharge at 37% is leviable when tax is computed at maximum marginal rate but the taxable income is below the statutory surcharge threshold.

Analysis: Reliance is placed on the Special Bench and coordinate bench decisions holding that where tax is computed at maximum marginal rate for private discretionary trusts, surcharge must nonetheless be determined with reference to the slab thresholds in the Finance Act; if taxable income falls below the threshold for a given surcharge slab, the highest surcharge cannot be imposed. The tribunal directed recomputation of tax and surcharge applying the applicable slab-based surcharge provisions.

Conclusion: Surcharge at 37% cannot be levied where the taxable income is below the statutory threshold; no surcharge is payable in the present case (in favour of assessee).

Final Conclusion: The tax liability is to be recomputed treating the trust under the first proviso to section 164(1) with tax at ordinary AOP rates and applying surcharge only as per statutory slab thresholds; the appeal is allowed and the demand set aside accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a trust is covered by clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 164(1), that special provision governs taxation (taxed as AOP) and displaces section 167B; further, surcharge must be applied according to Finance Act slab thresholds and cannot be levied at the highest rate absent the requisite income threshold.

Issues: Whether countervailing duty could be demanded on vessels imported before Notification No. 12/2012-Cus dated 17-03-2012, merely because they were later converted from foreign run to coastal run, and whether the impugned communications demanding such duty were sustainable.

Analysis: The vessels had been imported into India in 2005 and 2011, before the exemption notification came into force. The governing principle applied was that customs duty on a vessel as goods is attracted at the time of its first import, and thereafter the vessel functions as a conveyance. The exemption notification was held to operate prospectively only, and the later conversion to coastal run could not create a fresh liability where none existed on the date of import. The communications were not treated as mere advisory letters, since they quantified the demand and called for payment within a fixed time. The reasoning also distinguished duty on ship stores from duty on the vessels themselves.

Conclusion: CVD could not be levied on the vessels on the basis of their later conversion to coastal run, and the demand communications were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Customs duty on an imported vessel is determined by the law in force on the date of its first import, and a subsequent exemption notification cannot retrospectively impose duty on a vessel already imported and exempt at that time.

Issues: Whether the appeal order dismissing the petitioner's appeal as time-barred was sustainable where the ex parte order was stated to have been communicated only later.

Analysis: The petitioner challenged the appellate order on the ground that the appeal authority had treated the appeal as barred by limitation despite the ex parte order having been communicated subsequently. The Court found, prima facie, that the impugned order appeared to run contrary to the law laid down in the cited precedent on computation of limitation from the date of communication.

Conclusion: The ex parte order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the appellate authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned appellate orders dated 12.12.2023 holding the petitioner to be an "intermediary" and denying export status, and the refund sanctioning authority's rejection dated 09.07.2024 founded on those orders, are sustainable; (ii) Whether the matter requires fresh consideration by the authorities in view of absence of findings on existence of a third party and other prerequisites for intermediary services.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned orders concluding that the petitioner's supplies are intermediary services and not exports are sustainable.

Analysis: The Court examined the appellate and sanctioning authorities' reliance on clause (C) of the agreement to characterise the petitioner as an intermediary and noted that the authorities did not record any finding establishing the existence of a third party, did not identify two distinct supplies (main and ancillary), nor did they determine that the petitioner merely arranged/facilitated a main supply rather than supplying on its own account. The authorities also failed to grapple with documentary material already filed by the petitioner and the requirements under Section 2(13), Section 2(6) and Section 13 of the IGST Act and the CBIC guidance on primary requirements for intermediary services.

Conclusion: The Court held that the impugned orders concluding intermediary status are cryptic, suffer from non-application of mind, and are not sustainable in their present form (in favour of the Appellant).

Issue (ii): Whether the matters should be remitted for fresh decision by the appellate authority and refund sanctioning authority.

Analysis: Given the absence of explicit findings on the essential prerequisites for intermediary classification (minimum of three parties, two distinct supplies, subsidiary/agent character) and the reliance of the sanctioning authority on earlier appellate observations without independent reasoning, the Court determined that a fresh evaluation is necessary. The Court directed the authorities to decide the appeals/applications after proper consideration of the record and documents, within a reasonable time frame (preferably within 12 weeks).

Conclusion: The Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters to the appropriate authorities for fresh consideration (in favour of the Appellant).

Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate orders dated 12.12.2023 and the refund rejection dated 09.07.2024 are set aside for lack of adequate findings on whether the services rendered were intermediary in nature; the matters are remitted to the authorities for fresh decision after examining the record and documents, and the writ petitions are allowed.