Issues: (i) Whether operation of buses from point to point under the stated tourism arrangement amounted to tour operator service and attracted service tax; (ii) whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on third party insurance of buses used for exempt stage carriage services was admissible; (iii) whether the extended period of limitation was invocable on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether operation of buses from point to point under the stated tourism arrangement amounted to tour operator service and attracted service tax.

Analysis: The definition of tour operator under section 65(115) of the Finance Act, 1994 covered planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours and, after amendment, operation of tours in a tourist vehicle or contract carriage covered by a permit other than a stage carriage permit. The activity in question was found to be ordinary point-to-point transportation of passengers, with fares collected by the appellant and only a token amount passed to the tourism corporation. The arrangement did not show a common tour planning or organising activity of the kind contemplated by the statutory definition. The reasoning was aligned with the view that mere passenger transport without a common tour contract is closer to transport service than tour operation.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax on tour operator service was not sustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on third party insurance of buses used for exempt stage carriage services was admissible.

Analysis: Credit is not available where the input service is used for providing exempt or non-taxable output services. The buses were used for undisputedly non-taxable stage carriage operations, and the insurance related to those buses. On that basis, the service tax paid on the insurance premium could not be treated as eligible CENVAT credit for the appellant.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit on third party insurance of buses was upheld.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The appellant was a Government organization and the dispute involved activities already within the revenue's knowledge through prior proceedings, audits, and returns. In such circumstances, the ingredients of suppression of facts or wilful misstatement were not established. The principle applied was that once the department is aware of the relevant facts, the extended limitation period cannot be invoked merely by repeating the same or similar allegations in later notices.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not available to the Revenue and the appellant succeeded on limitation.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in part, with the service tax demand on tour operator activity and the disputed extended-period demands set aside, while the credit disallowance and the unresolved normal-period liabilities were left to be worked out by the adjudicating authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Point-to-point passenger transport without a genuine organised tour arrangement does not constitute tour operator service, and the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked where the relevant facts were already within the department's knowledge.

Issues: Whether the disallowance made under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (as computed under Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962) at Rs. 47,08,705/- is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the Assessing Officer recorded the requisite satisfaction before applying Rule 8D, having regard to the nature of the assessee and the assessee's suo moto apportionment. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had considered the assessee's calculations, the nature and quantum of investments, and the management of investment portfolios, and had recorded satisfaction in the assessment order prior to applying Rule 8D. The Tribunal also considered the assessee's contention that a substantial portion of exempt income arose from mutual fund investments managed by professionals and that fees for such management are charged by the mutual funds. The Tribunal observed that the detailed bifurcation of investments between mutual funds and other investments was not initially on record, directed the assessee to furnish the bifurcation, and held that the Assessing Officer should verify details and apply Rule 8D after excluding mutual fund investments, affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 14A is set aside and remitted to the Assessing Officer to verify the investments (including the bifurcation between mutual funds and other investments) and to apply Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, excluding investments in mutual funds, with an opportunity of hearing to the assessee; the appeal is partly allowed in favour of the assessee for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Before applying Rule 8D, the Assessing Officer must record satisfaction regarding the correctness of any suo moto disallowance under section 14A, and Rule 8D's prescribed computation must be applied after proper verification of the nature and allocation of investments (including exclusion of mutual fund investments where appropriate).

Issues: Whether the assessment/order dated 09.12.2024 (DRC-01A/DRC-01) is sustainable where the registered person had rectified wrongful ITC entries in GSTR-9/GSTR-9C and the officer had earlier issued ASMT-12 accepting the explanation under Section 61(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The petitioner had mistakenly reported ITC under CGST and SGST instead of IGST in GSTR-3B for 2018-19 and subsequently disclosed and rectified the error in GSTR-9 and GSTR-9C. An assessment notice (ASMT-10) was issued and, after the explanation was found acceptable, ASMT-12 was issued dropping proceedings. Section 61(2) provides that where the explanation is found acceptable the registered person shall be informed and no further action shall be taken. Despite issuance of ASMT-12, DRC-01A and DRC-01 were later issued for the same matter. The rectification by filing GSTR-9/GSTR-9C removed the basis for alleging short payment or revenue loss, and issuing recovery notices after ASMT-12 was barred by the statutory provision.

Conclusion: The assessment/recovery notices issued after ASMT-12 are not sustainable and the impugned assessment order dated 09.12.2024 is quashed; decision is in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: Whether the impugned ex-parte order passed under Section 74 of the GST enactments for the tax period 2023-2024 should be quashed and the matter remitted to the assessing authority for fresh adjudication subject to a pre-deposit condition.

Analysis: The petitioner challenged an ex-parte order confirming tax, interest and penalty under Section 74. The Court noted prior consistent decisions in similar circumstances where orders were quashed and matters remitted for fresh consideration on terms requiring pre-deposit of a portion of disputed tax. The petitioner asserted voluntary payments towards the demanded amount and sought relief contingent on a specified pre-deposit. The respondent could not confirm the payments. The Court directed that on compliance with the stipulated pre-deposit the assessing authority shall re-do the adjudication on merits and that bank attachment shall be vacated subject to conditions; prior payments shall be set off for the pre-deposit; failure to comply would permit the authority to proceed as if the petition were dismissed in limine.

Conclusion: The impugned ex-parte order is quashed and the matter is remitted to the assessing authority to pass a fresh order on merits subject to the petitioner depositing one-third of Rs. 3,00,42,942/- in cash or from the petitioners Electronic Credit Ledger within thirty days; on such compliance the authority shall decide the matter preferably within three months and the bank attachment shall stand vacated; prior payments shall be set off for the pre-deposit; non-compliance permits the authority to proceed as if the petition were dismissed.

Issues: Whether, after a revisional order under Section 263 directing the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh assessment de novo, the Assessing Officer could lawfully pass a final assessment without issuing a draft assessment order as mandated by Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the variation arose from a Transfer Pricing Officer's order under Section 92CA(3).

Analysis: Section 144C requires that where a variation in returned income arises as a consequence of an order of the Transfer Pricing Officer under Section 92CA(3), the Assessing Officer must, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order to the eligible assessee and permit the assessee to either accept the variation or file objections with the Dispute Resolution Panel and the Assessing Officer. The status of the assessee as an eligible assessee under Section 144C(15)(b)(i) is established if the variation flows from a TPO order. A revisional direction under Section 263 setting aside a final assessment and directing a fresh assessment de novo does not, without clearer specification, displace the statutory mechanism and safeguards created by Section 144C where the variation arose from a TPO order. Precedent recognizes Section 144C as a self-contained code creating substantive rights for eligible assessees; failure to frame a draft order curtails those rights. Remanding for de novo assessment may be impermissible where limitation under Section 153 would bar completion of remanded assessment, but such limitation considerations do not validate bypassing the draft-order requirement where the statutory scheme applies.

Conclusion: The requirement of issuing a draft assessment order under Section 144C is mandatory where the variation arises from a TPO order; accordingly, the final assessment orders passed without resort to Section 144C are quashed and set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an assessee who files a return after the due date under section 139(1) but in compliance with a notice issued under section 148 is entitled to claim deduction under section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in light of section 80AC (as amended by the Finance Act, 2018).

Analysis: Section 80AC imposes a mandatory precondition that no deduction under Chapter VI-A (heading "C") is allowable unless the return of income for the relevant assessment year is furnished on or before the due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139. Section 80P falls within Chapter VI-A under heading "C" and therefore is subject to the requirement in section 80AC. A return filed only after the due date in response to a notice under section 148 is not a return furnished on or before the due date specified under section 139(1). The amendment effected by the Finance Act, 2018, effective 01.04.2018, does not revive or alter the expired due date by the issuance of a section 148 notice; consequently, a return filed pursuant to section 148 does not satisfy the condition prescribed by section 80AC for claiming Chapter VI-A deductions.

Conclusion: The claim for deduction under section 80P is disallowed because the return was not furnished on or before the due date specified under section 139(1), and therefore the requirement of section 80AC is not satisfied; outcome is against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned appellate order dated 22 February 2022 rejecting the petitioners refund claims (on ground that petitioner acted as agent/intermediary of its foreign parent and services did not qualify as export) should be quashed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The petition challenges the appellate authority's conclusion that the petitioner acted as an agent/intermediary of its foreign parent, resulting in the place of supply being in India and disqualification of export of services for refund of unutilised input tax credit under the GST statutory scheme. The record includes the service agreement between the subsidiary and parent, provisions of the IGST/CGST Acts (including definitions and place of supply rules), and departmental circular(s) clarifying scope of intermediary and Condition (v) of Section 2(6) IGST. The impugned order applied agent/intermediary concepts and place-of-supply rules to hold services were for Indian recipients. The Court examined (a) terms of the service agreement (including cost-plus/markup, marketing, consulting, license fee apportionment, indemnity, and business relationship clauses), (b) applicable statutory definitions and place-of-supply provisions, and (c) the CBIC circular and earlier Division Bench authority which had reached a contrary conclusion on similar facts. The Court concluded that the appellate authority had not afforded a sufficiently detailed, holistic scrutiny of the agreement, the circulars applicability, and the earlier precedent; multiple factual and legal contentions remained open and required fresh, reasoned consideration by the appellate authority after hearing parties.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 22 February 2022 is quashed and set aside and the departmental appeals are remitted to the appellate authority for de novo consideration and fresh decision in accordance with law after hearing the parties within three months.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand confirmed on account of belated availing of Input Tax Credit under Section 16(4) requires re-adjudication in view of statutory amendments (Sections 16(5) and 16(6)) inserted by Finance (No.2) Act, 2024; (ii) Whether the demand confirmed on account of mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B requires reconsideration and on what terms the matter should be remitted.

Issue (i): Whether liability confirmed for belated availing of Input Tax Credit under Section 16(4) should be re-adjudicated in view of the retrospective insertion of Sections 16(5) and 16(6) by Finance (No.2) Act, 2024.

Analysis: The Court notes the statutory intervention by Finance (No.2) Act, 2024 which inserted Sections 16(5) and 16(6) into the GST enactments with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017 (SO 4253(E) dated 16.08.2024). The insertion affects the legal framework governing belated availing of Input Tax Credit and therefore the earlier adjudication on that ground requires fresh consideration under the amended provisions.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee the part of the demand attributable to belated availing of Input Tax Credit is to be re-adjudicated in accordance with the inserted Sections 16(5) and 16(6).

Issue (ii): Whether the demand confirmed on account of mismatch between details in GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B should be remitted for fresh consideration and on what conditional terms.

Analysis: The Court finds that the mismatch-related demand requires adjudication after giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard and to file supporting documents. The Court conditions remand on the petitioner making an interim compliance by way of pre-deposit of 50% of the disputed tax confirmed on account of the mismatch, filing a reply and documents treating the impugned order as an addendum to the show cause notice, and permits the authority to pass a final order thereafter.

Conclusion: Against Assessee on this issue but subject to conditional relief the mismatch-related demand is remitted to the original authority for fresh consideration after hearing; the petitioner must deposit 50% of the disputed tax (pertaining to the mismatch) from electronic cash within 30 days as a pre-condition and file a reply and documents; on compliance the bank attachment shall be vacated.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders are quashed and the matter is remitted for re-adjudication and fresh consideration: the portion relating to belated Input Tax Credit shall be reconsidered under the newly inserted Sections 16(5) and 16(6), and the portion relating to mismatch shall be reconsidered after the petitioner complies with the conditional pre-deposit and filing requirements; the authority is directed to decide the matter on merits expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory amendment (retrospective insertion of Sections 16(5) and 16(6)) alters the legal regime governing entitlement to Input Tax Credit, earlier adjudications on belated availing must be reopened and re-adjudicated under the amended provisions; demands founded on mismatches between return statements may be remitted for fresh consideration but may be subject to a pre-deposit condition and opportunity to be heard.

Issues: (i) Whether respondent no.1 had jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 29 September 2025 in view of the legal position relating to Notification No. 11/2017 dated 28 June 2017.

Issue (i): Whether respondent no.1 had jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 29 September 2025 in view of the decisions holding paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017 ultra vires and related Supreme Court precedents on pan-India applicability.

Analysis: The Court noted precedents including judgments of the Gujarat and Delhi High Courts holding paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017 vulnerable to challenge and recorded related interim orders of the Supreme Court. The Court framed the preliminary jurisdictional question for determination and directed the respondents to file a reply affidavit addressing whether respondent no.1 possessed jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice. The respondent's reply is to be filed within two weeks and furnished to the petitioner in advance of the next listing. Pending further hearing, the Court restrained any further action under the impugned show cause notice.

Conclusion: The Court did not finally decide the jurisdictional issue. The respondents are directed to file a reply on the preliminary jurisdictional issue within two weeks, and in the meantime no further action shall be taken under the impugned show cause notice.

Final Conclusion: The order grants interlocutory protection by staying further action under the impugned show cause notice and frames a preliminary question on jurisdiction for adjudication after the respondent's reply; no final fiscal determination is made.

Issues: (i) Whether the services alleged to have been rendered by the appellant (commercial training/coaching, renting of immovable property and short-term accommodation) are taxable or fall within the exemption for charitable activities under Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is sustainable in view of the appellant's asserted bona fide belief and the factual matrix.

Issue (i): Whether the alleged services rendered are exigible to service tax or are exempt as charitable activities under Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: The appellant is registered under Section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and operates under objects and byelaws showing primary charitable, religious and educational purposes. Fees and amounts received were discretionary/nominal, treated in accounts as receipts applied to charitable objects, and there is no evidence that receipts were used for private gain or that the primary purpose was profit-making. The activities of imparting training and providing accommodation were found incidental to and in furtherance of the dominant charitable purpose. Revenue has not produced cogent evidence disproving the charitable application of receipts or establishing duality of intent.

Conclusion: Services alleged to be commercial training/coaching, renting of immovable property and short-term accommodation fall within the exemption afforded to entities registered under Section 12AA by Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 and are not exigible to service tax in the present facts; this conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) can be invoked in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The record shows correspondence but no demonstrable suppression of material facts or mala fide conduct by the appellant; there existed a bona fide belief based on registration under Section 12AA and advice of auditors that the activities were exempt under Notification No.25/2012-ST. Given the Tribunal's finding on merits that the appellant's activities were charitable and exempt, the question of extended period becomes academic; moreover, invocation of extended period requires clear proof of suppression which is absent.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) is not sustainable on the facts and is unfounded; this conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The aggregate effect is that the demands of service tax, interest and penalties confirmed by the authorities are quashed and the appeal is allowed, with consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: An entity registered under Section 12AA whose primary and dominant purpose is charitable is exempt from service tax for activities undertaken in furtherance of that dominant charitable purpose under Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012; incidental or nominal receipts applied to charitable objectives do not negate charitable character, and absence of proof of suppression precludes invocation of extended limitation under Section 73(1).

Issues: (i) Whether the demand notices imposing penalty under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for failure to furnish audit reports were barred by limitation under the statutory five-year period; (ii) Whether the audit assessment and consequential demand orders for the later assessment years could be sustained when initiated after expiry of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the demand notices imposing penalty under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for failure to furnish audit reports were barred by limitation under the statutory five-year period.

Analysis: The returns for the relevant assessment years had already been completed, and the statutory scheme of Section 39 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 prohibited assessment after the expiry of five years from the end of the relevant year. The notices proceeded on the alleged non-furnishing of audit reports under Section 62(2) and imposed penalty under Section 62(3). The proviso to Section 39 was inapplicable because no prosecution-based exception arose on the facts. Once the limitation period had expired, it was not open to the authorities to reopen the matter or impose penalty on that basis.

Conclusion: The penalty-based demand notices were barred by limitation and could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the audit assessment and consequential demand orders for the later assessment years could be sustained when initiated after expiry of limitation.

Analysis: The later notices were expressly for audit assessment under Section 36 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003, read with the Central Sales Tax framework. The record showed that the limitation period for initiating audit assessment had already expired for each relevant year. As the proceedings were commenced long after the statutory cut-off, the assessment orders founded on such belated audit assessment were illegal and liable to be set aside.

Conclusion: The audit assessment orders and the consequential tax demands for the later assessment years were unsustainable and had to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, the impugned demand and assessment orders were quashed, and the petitioner's liability under the challenged proceedings did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Once the statutory limitation period for making assessment or audit assessment has expired, the revenue authorities cannot reopen or conclude the assessment by invoking unrelated penalty or audit provisions.

Issues: Whether the borrowers could challenge the Recovery Officer's order by an interim application in pending SARFAESI proceedings despite the statutory appeal remedy under section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, and whether the Tribunal could stay the Recovery Officer's sale proclamation in such proceedings.

Analysis: The appeal arose from parallel recovery steps taken under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The borrowers, instead of availing the appeal provided against an order of the Recovery Officer, invoked the pending SARFAESI securitization application to assail that order and seek restraint on sale proceedings. The governing scheme treats the two recovery mechanisms as separate and distinct, and the statutory appeal under section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 was the proper remedy against the Recovery Officer's order. Entertaining the application in SARFAESI proceedings amounted to proceeding under the wrong statutory regime and could not sustain a direction affecting the Recovery Officer's process.

Conclusion: The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the borrowers' application in the SARFAESI proceedings against the Recovery Officer's order, and the impugned order was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The order granting relief to the borrowers was set aside and the bank's challenge succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific statutory appeal lies against an order of the Recovery Officer, the aggrieved party must pursue that remedy and cannot invoke parallel SARFAESI proceedings to restrain or nullify the recovery process.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned assessment order passed without personal hearing and following service solely by uploading notices on the GST portal was vitiated for lack of effective service and opportunity of hearing; (ii) Whether issuance of notice under Section 73 of the GST Act and consequential assessment for the financial year 2024-2025 was without jurisdiction given omission of Sections 73 and 74 and applicability of Section 74A from 01.04.2024.

Issue (i): Whether service by uploading on the GST portal without exploring other modes under Section 169(1) when there was no response, and passing an ex parte order without personal hearing, rendered the assessment order invalid.

Analysis: The Court examined the facts showing notices were uploaded on the GST common portal, the petitioner did not receive personal notice and no personal hearing was granted prior to passing the assessment. The respondent conceded that opportunity of personal hearing was not provided. The Court considered Section 169(1) modes of service and observed that where a taxpayer does not respond to portal notices the officer must consider alternative modes (including RPAD) to achieve effective service rather than merely fulfilling formalities leading to ex parte orders. The Court addressed the consequences of ineffective service and absence of hearing on the validity of the assessment order.

Conclusion: The impugned order is vitiated for lack of effective service and absence of personal hearing; relief is granted in favour of the petitioner on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice and assessment issued under Section 73 for the financial year 2024-2025 was without jurisdiction because Sections 73 and 74 were omitted with effect from 01.04.2024 and Section 74A applies.

Analysis: The Court noted the legislative change omitting Sections 73 and 74 from 01.04.2024 and that only Section 74A governs assessments for the relevant period. The impugned show cause notice and assessment were issued under Section 73 despite the omission, and the Court held that such exercise lacked jurisdiction. To prevent delay and facilitate fresh adjudication, the Court directed that the impugned order be treated as a notice under Section 74A and afforded opportunity to file objections.

Conclusion: The assessment issued under Section 73 for 2024-2025 was without jurisdiction; the petitioner’s challenge on this ground succeeds.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment order dated 17.06.2025 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the respondent for fresh consideration under the correct statutory provision (Section 74A), with directions to effect effective service and grant personal hearing; overall relief is granted to the petitioner enabling fresh adjudication consistent with statutory requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: Where notices uploaded on the GST portal do not elicit a response, the officer must consider alternative modes of service prescribed in Section 169(1) to ensure effective service and provide opportunity of personal hearing; assessments issued under a statutory provision omitted by law for the relevant period are without jurisdiction and must be set aside and reconsidered under the applicable provision (Section 74A) after affording the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard.

Issues: Whether the impugned Show Cause Notice and consequential order which were uploaded on the portal but not physically served, and where no effective personal hearing notice was given, violated principles of natural justice requiring quashing/remand and a direction to grant opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The Court examined the factual record and found that the Show Cause Notice was not physically served on the petitioner and no effective notice for personal hearing was physically communicated, though the notice was uploaded on the portal. The Court considered relevant precedents addressing whether uploading on the portal suffices as service and whether failure to grant a personal opportunity to be heard amounts to breach of principles of natural justice. Applying those principles, the Court held that absence of effective service and absence of personal hearing notice deprived the petitioner of the chance to submit a response; accordingly the matter calls for restoration of the opportunity to be heard and a reasoned reconsideration by the authority.

Conclusion: The petition is partly allowed in favour of the assessee; the petitioner is permitted to file a reply within four weeks, the authority shall grant a personal hearing within two weeks thereafter and pass a reasoned order; the impugned orders are set aside to the extent they were passed without affording the opportunity to be heard and in violation of principles of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the competent committee was required to take a fresh decision on the petitioner's claim for further reward, after giving him an opportunity of hearing, instead of treating the interim reward as sufficient.

Analysis: The reward policy for informants provided for decision-making by a committee constituted under Clause 2.1 and contemplated assessment of interim reward and final reward under Clauses 13.1, 13.2, 15.1 and 15.2. The record did not show any final decision by the committee on the petitioner's entitlement to further reward beyond the interim amount already paid. In the absence of a reasoned committee decision, and in view of the need for consideration of the petitioner's claim in accordance with the policy, a fresh decision after hearing the petitioner was warranted.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to reconsideration of his claim by the competent committee, with a hearing, on whether any further reward was payable over and above the interim reward.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was only partly successful, and the respondents were directed to decide the petitioner's reward claim afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reward policy entrusts the decision to a competent committee, a claim for further reward cannot be finally declined without a reasoned decision taken after considering the relevant materials and hearing the claimant.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants violated Regulations 11(a), 11(d), 11(e), 11(m) and 11(n) of CBLR, 2013; (ii) Whether the revocation of the Customs Broker license, forfeiture of security deposit and imposition of penalty in the impugned order were justified.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants violated Regulations 11(a), 11(d), 11(e), 11(m) and 11(n) of CBLR, 2013.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined evidence and inquiry findings relating to each sub-regulation. For Regulation 11(a) the appellants admitted failure to obtain formal authorization from the importer and the record supported that absence of authorization. For Regulation 11(d) the Tribunal found no contemporaneous facts at the time of clearance showing failure to advise or knowledge of misuse; the misuse was discovered later by DRI. For Regulation 11(e) the findings of collusion or assistance were not supported by documentary or factual proof at the time of import. For Regulation 11(m) there was no evidence of delay or inefficiency in customs clearance processes. For Regulation 11(n) the appellants had produced requisite documents including IEC, DEEC certification, Advance Authorization and digitally verified existence of the importer; the KYC/checks met the standards reflected in CBIC guidance and prior Tribunal authority.

Conclusion: Partly in favour of Assessee. Regulation 11(a) is found breached; Regulations 11(d), 11(e), 11(m) and 11(n) are not proved and are in favour of the appellants (assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether the revocation of the Customs Broker license, forfeiture of security deposit and imposition of penalty in the impugned order were justified.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that, since only failure to obtain authorization under Regulation 11(a) was established and the other alleged breaches were not, the extreme measures of revoking the license and forfeiting the entire security lacked factual and legal basis. The Tribunal referred to precedent and proportionality principles, upheld that KYC and due diligence requirements were satisfied, and found revocation and forfeiture unsustainable. However, having regard to the admitted failure to obtain authorization and the Supreme Court authority on the broker's role, the Tribunal found limited monetary penalty appropriate.

Conclusion: Partly in favour of Assessee. The revocation of license and forfeiture of security deposit are set aside in favour of the appellants; a reduced penalty of Rs.10,000 is imposed against the appellants (against the assessee on that point).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed by modifying the impugned order: findings of violations under Regulations 11(d), 11(e), 11(m) and 11(n) are set aside, the revocation of the CB license and forfeiture of security deposit are quashed, and a reduced penalty of Rs.10,000 is imposed for failure under Regulation 11(a).

Ratio Decidendi: A Customs Broker's failure to obtain the required authorization is a breach warranting penalty, but revocation of license and forfeiture of security require clear, concurrent proof of multiple or serious regulatory breaches; absent such proof the sanction must be proportionate.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax demand under the category of Banking and Other Financial Services on amounts received by the cooperative society from its members is sustainable by applying the doctrine of mutuality; (ii) Whether the remaining demands including reverse charge liabilities and other receipts are sustainable, having regard to applicability of Notification No.30/2012-ST and the threshold exemption.

Issue (i): Whether amounts charged by the cooperative society for services provided to its members attract service tax under Banking and Other Financial Services despite being services within a members' cooperative.

Analysis: The mutuality doctrine as applied to members' clubs and incorporated/cooperative bodies excludes services provided to members from being a taxable service for consideration between distinct persons. Explanation to Section 65 was considered and the scope of "service" under Section 65B(44) was examined with reference to authorities establishing that services rendered exclusively to members of an incorporated cooperative society are not taxable. Precedent applying mutuality to cooperative societies and banks was relied upon to determine absence of taxable supply to non-members.

Conclusion: Demand under the category of Banking and Other Financial Services is unsustainable and ruled in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether demands under reverse charge (legal services) and other receipts (sales officer costs, miscellaneous receipts) are maintainable and whether taxable turnover exceeds threshold exemption.

Analysis: Notification No.30/2012-ST sets out reverse charge liability for legal services where the recipient is a business entity; the statutory definition of "support services" under Section 65B(49) and the requirement that the service be rendered by Government/local authority for support services under the notification were examined. The sales officer activity was characterised as a statutory, mandatory function under the Co-operative Societies Act rather than a support service rendered by government/local authority. The taxable turnover figures for relevant years were compared with the threshold exemption to assess levy viability.

Conclusion: Reverse charge demand for legal services and demand on sales officer costs are not sustainable; other contested receipts are below the threshold and therefore not taxable. The conclusions are in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed and all contested service tax demands (under Banking and Other Financial Services, reverse charge and other charges assessed below threshold) are set aside, producing a net decision favourable to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Services provided by an incorporated/cooperative society exclusively to its members fall outside the taxable "service" under Section 65B where the doctrine of mutuality applies; reverse charge under Notification No.30/2012-ST applies only where the recipient is a business entity and where the service qualifies as a government/local authority support service; amounts below the statutory threshold exemption are not leviable as service tax.

Issues: (i) whether the Superintendent of Taxes had jurisdiction, under delegated power, to compound the offence under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003; (ii) whether the amount deposited by the petitioner was a composition amount or a security deposit.

Issue (i): whether the Superintendent of Taxes had jurisdiction, under delegated power, to compound the offence under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Analysis: Rule 3 of the Assam Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 permits the Commissioner, by notification, to delegate powers to officers under the Act. The record disclosed notifications delegating the power under Section 89 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 to the Superintendent of Taxes. The petitioner had also submitted a written admission that it had committed the offence and requested compounding in lieu of prosecution. Section 89 requires such written admission before compounding. On these materials, the exercise of power by the Superintendent of Taxes was within jurisdiction and in conformity with the statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The Superintendent of Taxes had jurisdiction to compound the offence, and the compounding order was valid.

Issue (ii): whether the amount deposited by the petitioner was a composition amount or a security deposit

Analysis: The challan and contemporaneous record described the amount as composition money. The petitioner's later assertion that it was only a security deposit for transit permit issuance was inconsistent with the written request seeking compounding and acceptance of the same amount in lieu of prosecution. No reservation or protest accompanied the deposit.

Conclusion: The amount was deposited as composition money and not as a security deposit.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the compounding order failed, and no interference was warranted with the order accepting composition money and declining the petitioner's refund claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Commissioner has validly delegated the power under Section 89 and the accused person has admitted the offence in writing and sought compounding, the delegated officer may lawfully compound the offence and the resulting composition payment cannot later be recharacterised as a security deposit.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice dated 19.09.2025 issued by the Central Tax Authorities should be kept in abeyance pending disposal of the appeal against penalty proceedings concluded by the State Tax Authority; (ii) Whether the Appellate Authority of the State Tax should be directed to conclude the appeal within a specified timeframe.

Issue (i): Whether the Central Tax Authorities' show cause notice dated 19.09.2025 should be kept in abeyance until the State Tax appellate proceedings are concluded.

Analysis: The Court examined that penalty proceedings under Section 121(1)/Section 122 of the TGST/CGST Act have concluded at the State level and an appeal is pending before the State appellate authority, while proceedings by the Central Tax Authorities on the show cause notice are yet to be decided. Having regard to potential overlap between the matters and to avoid conflicting determinations, the Court balanced the parties' submissions and afforded interim protection by maintaining abeyance of the Central show cause notice until the State appeal is decided. The Court further required the Central Authorities to take into account the findings of the State appellate authority when proceeding.

Conclusion: The show cause notice dated 19.09.2025 shall remain in abeyance and the Central Tax Authorities may proceed on the show cause notice only after the Appellate Authority of the State Tax concludes the pending appeal. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellate Authority of the State Tax should be directed to conclude the petitioner's appeal within a specified period.

Analysis: The Court noted delay in the State appellate proceedings and observed that final resolution of the State appeal is necessary before the Central Authorities proceed. To ensure timely disposal and to give effect to the protective abeyance, the Court directed the State Appellate Authority to conclude the appeal within a short specified period and permitted the petitioner to cooperate and file necessary replies.

Conclusion: The Appellate Authority of the State Tax is directed to conclude the appeal within three weeks from the date of the order (subject to receipt of the copy), and this direction is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by directing that the Central Tax Authorities shall not proceed on the show cause notice until the State Tax appellate proceedings are concluded, and the State Appellate Authority is directed to conclude the pending appeal within the timeframe ordered; the petitioner retains the right to file replies and to challenge any subsequent orders by appropriate proceedings.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the revisional authority, while deciding an application under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, could refuse to follow a jurisdictional Special Bench decision of the Tribunal on the ground that the decision is "not acceptable" to the Revenue, is dissented from, or is under challenge before the High Court.

(ii) What relief and directions should follow where the revisional authority has ignored binding Tribunal precedent, including whether the matter should be remanded with a mandate to decide afresh by following the Tribunal decision, and whether the revisional authority can revisit condonation of delay already granted.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Refusal to follow jurisdictional Tribunal/Special Bench precedent by the revisional authority

Legal framework: The Court treated adherence to decisions of higher appellate authorities within the hierarchy as a requirement of judicial discipline in tax administration, and applied the principle that a binding precedent must be followed unless its operation is suspended by a competent court.

Interpretation and reasoning: The revisional authority gave reasons for not following the Special Bench decision, including that the Revenue had not accepted it and was contesting it before the High Court, that there were conflicting views and the Special Bench was not a "Full Bench", and that the Special Bench (in the authority's view) incorrectly interpreted the statute and required reconsideration. The Court held this approach to be a misdirection: it was not for the revisional authority to sit in judgment over the correctness of a binding Tribunal decision. The Court emphasized that permitting lower authorities to disregard binding decisions on personal views of incorrectness would cause chaos in tax administration and undermine judicial discipline. The Court also rejected the premise that pendency of an appeal or departmental non-acceptance provides a ground to disregard binding precedent, absent any suspension/stay of its operation.

Conclusions: The impugned revisional order was unsustainable because it refused to follow a binding jurisdictional Tribunal decision on grounds that were impermissible (departmental challenge/non-acceptance, dissent, or perceived incorrectness). The Court clarified that it was not deciding the substantive correctness of the Special Bench view on tax rate; it decided only that the decision had to be followed as binding precedent.

Issue (ii): Appropriate relief; remand directions; bar on revisiting condonation of delay

Interpretation and reasoning: Since the revisional order was vitiated by failure to maintain judicial discipline, the Court found it appropriate to quash it and remand the matter for a fresh decision on merits with a direction to follow the Special Bench decision. The Court further noted that condonation of delay had already been decided in favour of the assessee and was not challenged before the Court; therefore, the revisional authority was directed not to reopen that question on remand.

Conclusions: The Court quashed the impugned order and remanded the matter to the revisional authority to pass a fresh order on merits by following the Tribunal Special Bench decision, without revisiting condonation of delay, and within a stipulated time frame of 30 days from uploading of the order.