Issues: (i) Whether the question on refund of unutilised input tax credit arising from inverted duty structure, as raised by the applicant (a consultant on behalf of clients), relates to the supply of goods or services being or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant; (ii) Whether the question raised falls within the scope of Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 and thus is admissible for advance ruling.

Issue (i): Whether the question on refund of unutilised ITC (inverted duty structure) relates to the supply of goods or services being or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant.

Analysis: The application shows the applicant is a consultant acting on behalf of clients who are manufacturers and suppliers of cotton yarn. The provision defining "advance ruling" limits relief to matters in relation to supplies undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant. The facts indicate the applicant is not the manufacturer/supplier whose transactions give rise to the refund question.

Conclusion: The question does not relate to the supply of goods or services being or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant and is therefore not admissible for advance ruling in the applicant's name.

Issue (ii): Whether the question on refund of unutilised ITC falls within the scope of Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 97(2) enumerates specific categories of questions eligible for advance ruling. The refund query raised concerns refund of unutilised input tax credit due to inverted duty structure and does not fall squarely within the listed categories for advance ruling by the applicant. Additionally, the proviso to Section 98(2) precludes admission where the question is already pending or decided in proceedings in the case of the applicant; the applicant conceded the question was already decided in a proceeding.

Conclusion: The question does not fall under the scope of Section 97(2) and the application is not admissible for advance ruling; further, the application is barred under the proviso to Section 98(2) as the question was already decided in proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The Authority rejects the application for advance ruling on the grounds that the subject question neither pertains to supplies by the applicant nor falls within the statutory scope of matters admissible under Section 97(2), and is precluded by the proviso to Section 98(2) where the question is already decided in proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: An advance ruling application is admissible only in respect of matters relating to supplies undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant and only where the question falls within Section 97(2); an application that fails either requirement or is precluded by pending/decided proceedings under the proviso to Section 98(2) must be rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is applicable to the assessee's acquisition of agricultural land which is excluded from the definition of 'capital asset' under section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The statutory text of section 2(14) excludes specified agricultural land from the definition of 'capital asset' where the land is situated beyond the prescribed municipal/population/distance thresholds. Explanation (d) to section 56(2)(vii)(b) lists 'immovable property being land or building or both' among items captured by the deeming provision, but does not itself carve out the agricultural-land exclusion contained in section 2(14). The material facts establish that the land is agricultural in revenue records, is located more than six kilometres from the local limits of the relevant municipality, and the municipal population falls below the threshold; these facts are supported by a Tehsildar certificate and census data. On applying the statutory exclusion in section 2(14) to the facts, the asset does not qualify as a 'capital asset' for purposes of the deeming provision in section 56(2)(vii)(b).

Conclusion: Section 56(2)(vii)(b) is not applicable to the impugned transaction; the addition of Rs. 59,32,667 under section 56(2)(vii)(b) is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Agricultural land that falls within the exclusion in section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (on the basis of municipal limits, distance and population tests) is not a 'capital asset' and therefore the deeming provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) do not apply to such land.

Issues: (i) Whether addition of Rs. 1,26,730/- under section 56(2)(vii)(b) on account of difference between agreement value and stamp duty valuation is sustainable; (ii) Whether addition of Rs. 7,401/- on account of difference in savings bank interest is sustainable; (iii) Whether addition of Rs. 80,639/- for alleged omission of Long Term Capital Gain is sustainable given claim of exemption under section 10(38); (iv) Whether addition of Rs. 17,789/- for alleged omission of interest income requires adjudication or verification regarding prior-year taxation.

Issue (i): Whether addition of Rs. 1,26,730/- under section 56(2)(vii)(b) on account of difference between agreement value and stamp duty valuation is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the undisputed figures showing a difference of 4.87% between agreement value and stamp duty valuation. It considered the co-ordinate Bench decision addressing the interplay between section 56(2)(vii)(b) and section 50C and the operation of the tolerance proviso, treating the proviso as curative and applicable to avoid inequitable results. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition without distinguishing the binding co-ordinate Bench decision relied upon by the assessee.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,26,730/- under section 56(2)(vii)(b) is deleted; conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether addition of Rs. 7,401/- on account of difference in savings bank interest is sustainable.

Analysis: The assessees computation demonstrated that gross interest receipts were netted against interest expenditure, yielding net interest income offered to tax. The Assessing Officer made the addition based on gross credits without disputing the incurrence of interest expenditure or the permissibility of netting.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 7,401/- is deleted; conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether addition of Rs. 80,639/- for alleged omission of Long Term Capital Gain is sustainable given claim of exemption under section 10(38).

Analysis: The record showed demat statements and holding period details establishing that shares were held for more than twelve months and that conditions for exemption under section 10(38) for the relevant year were satisfied. Neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A) recorded findings negating those conditions.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 80,639/- is deleted; conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether addition of Rs. 17,789/- for alleged omission of interest income requires adjudication or verification regarding prior-year taxation.

Analysis: The assessee contended that portions of the interest receipts related to an earlier year and were already offered to tax, supported by Form 26AS and prior year records. The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) did not verify the assessees factual claim of prior-year taxation and proceeded to make the addition based solely on bank credits. The Tribunal found that the question of double taxation requires limited factual verification of the earlier years return, computation and Form 26AS.

Conclusion: The issue is restored to the Assessing Officer for limited verification and fresh decision in accordance with law; the ground is allowed for statistical purposes, resulting in a procedural remand in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Three substantive additions (under section 56(2)(vii)(b), savings bank interest difference, and alleged LTCG) are deleted in favour of the assessee, while one addition (interest Rs. 17,789/-) is remitted to the Assessing Officer for limited factual verification; overall the appeal is partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a difference between agreement value and stamp duty valuation falls within the recognized tolerance and a binding co-ordinate bench decision applies, no addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) is warranted; additions based on gross bank credits without accounting for permissible netting or prior-year taxation cannot be sustained without factual verification.

Issues: Whether the appeal should be disposed with directions to the National Company Law Tribunal to proceed with and decide Company Petition No. 47 of 2016 on merits within a specified time and whether the Tribunal should be directed not to be influenced by observations of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal; and how interim applications for amendment should be treated.

Analysis: The Court recorded that parties attempted but failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the relations between the parties, the Court directed that the appeal be disposed by remitting the matter to the NCLT to hear and decide Company Petition No. 47 of 2016 on its own merits within three months. The Court expressly clarified that the NCLT must decide the petition without being influenced by any observations made by the NCLAT in the impugned order. The Court also noted that any interim applications seeking amendment, if filed, are to be considered and decided by the NCLT in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The appeal is disposed by directing the NCLT to proceed with and decide Company Petition No. 47 of 2016 on merits within three months from the date of the order; the NCLT shall not be influenced by observations of the NCLAT; and any interim applications for amendment shall be decided by the NCLT in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 16.03.2022 passed under Section 74 (and penalty under Section 73(10)) can be set aside on the ground that the authority did not consider the petitioners reply and did not grant a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing, and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The petitioner filed a reply to the show-cause notice prior to the impugned order. The impugned order was passed without affording the petitioner a sufficient opportunity to produce documents or to be heard in person. The absence of a reasonable opportunity to present relevant submissions and documents engages principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. In light of the procedural defect, a remedy that permits fresh consideration by the authority after affording the petitioner a proper opportunity to be heard is appropriate. The remedial directions include setting aside the impugned order, permitting submission of the reply and documents on a specified date, affording a sufficient hearing, and directing final decision within a limited time frame.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 16.03.2022 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the authority for fresh consideration after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing; the petition is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings under Sections 148A(3) and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be initiated on the very same WhatsApp material that had already formed the basis of earlier assessment proceedings under Section 153C of the Act and had been dealt with in appeal.

Analysis: The reassessment notice was founded on the same seized digital material that had earlier been used for making an addition in the section 153C assessment. That addition had already been deleted in appeal. The material forming the basis of the impugned reopening thus stood examined and adjudicated upon in prior proceedings. In such a situation, reopening on the same foundation was not permissible, particularly when the amounts referred to in the reopening notice emanated from the same WhatsApp image already considered earlier. The digital material, without further corroboration, could not justify another round of reassessment on identical facts.

Conclusion: Reopening on the same material was impermissible and the impugned order and notice were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be initiated on the same material that has already been the subject of prior assessment and appellate adjudication, unless there is a fresh and independent basis for reopening.

Issues: (i) Whether the NCLT was justified in restricting the AGM on 27.12.2025 essentially to adoption of financial statements and deferring other agenda items; (ii) Whether Mr. Brij Mohan Khanna, as Principal Trustee, could exercise voting rights of the Trust and preside as Chairperson of the AGM notwithstanding interim directions in a separate civil suit; (iii) Whether the appointment of the Chairperson for the AGM must conform to Section 104 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Issue (i): Whether the NCLT was justified in directing that the AGM on 27.12.2025 be conducted mainly on adoption of financial statements and deferring remaining agenda items.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the impugned order which limited the AGM to adoption of financial statements and deferred other agenda items pending further disposal on 27.01.2026. The appellate bench noted that the deferred agendas were not permanently stayed by the applications before NCLT and that those issues remain pending for consideration by the Tribunal on the scheduled date.

Conclusion: The NCLT's direction to hold the AGM principally for adoption of financial statements and defer other agendas is upheld and the matter concerning the remaining agendas is to be taken up by the NCLT on 27.01.2026.

Issue (ii): Whether Mr. Brij Mohan Khanna may exercise the voting rights of the Trust and preside as Chairperson of the AGM despite an interim order in CS No. 1017 of 2025 restraining interference in management/affairs of the Trust.

Analysis: The bench considered the impugned order permitting Mr. Brij Mohan Khanna to exercise voting rights of 51.84% on behalf of the Trust and to preside, while noting an existing interim order in a separate civil suit restricting interference in trust affairs. The appellate bench observed that enforcement of the civil suit interim order remains available to the affected party and that any violation can be pursued by appropriate proceedings, including contempt, rather than by imposing additional directions in this appeal.

Conclusion: The directions permitting Mr. Brij Mohan Khanna to exercise voting rights and to preside are not altered by this appeal; any contravention of the separate civil suit interim order must be addressed through appropriate proceedings in that suit.

Issue (iii): Whether the appointment of the Chairperson of the AGM must comply with the provisions of Section 104 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The bench found no serious counter to the contention that appointment of the Chairperson must follow the statutory procedure. It directed that the provisions of Section 104 be followed for appointment of the Chairperson in the meeting.

Conclusion: The appointment of the Chairperson for the AGM shall be made in conformity with Section 104 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is disposed of without upsetting the core directions of the NCLT; the NCLT is requested to take up and dispose of the remaining agenda-related issues expeditiously on the listed date.

Ratio Decidendi: Where interim orders in separate proceedings regulate trust management, enforcement of those orders is a matter for the forum of that proceeding; an appellate body may direct compliance with statutory provisions governing conduct of company meetings (Section 104, Companies Act, 2013) while leaving enforcement of separate interim injunctions to appropriate remedies in the originating proceedings.

Issues: Whether the notice dated 28th March, 2021 issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequent assessment order dated 26th March, 2022 are invalid for want of sanction by the competent authority under Section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (having regard to the time-extension under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020).

Analysis: The impugned notice is dated 28th March, 2021 for A.Y. 2015-16. Under the pre-1 April 2021 regime, Section 151(2) prescribes the Joint Commissioner as the authority to grant sanction where the relevant time-limit of four years falls within 20th March, 2020 to 31st March, 2021. Section 3(1) of TOLA extended time-limits to 31st March, 2021; Rajeev Bansal (supra) confirms that TOLA operates to extend the period so that the old-regime four-year test falls within that interval and the Joint Commissioner remains the sanctioning authority. The notice itself records that satisfaction/approval was obtained from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), Pune and does not record sanction by the Joint Commissioner. Where the statute prescribes satisfaction by a specified authority, sanction by any other officer is ineffective. The factual record shows the final approval was that of the CIT (Exemption) and not the Joint Commissioner, and alternate arguments that the Joint Commissioner was in substance satisfied are contradicted by the express form of sanction recorded on the notice and supporting documents.

Conclusion: The notice dated 28th March, 2021 under Section 148 and the assessment order dated 26th March, 2022 are quashed for want of sanction by the competent authority under Section 151; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory sanction for issuance of a notice under Section 148 is a jurisdictional pre-condition and the statute specifies a particular authority (Section 151(2)) to grant approval within a time-extended period under TOLA, approval given by any other authority is invalid and renders the notice and consequent assessment void ab initio.

Outcome: Delay condonation was refused and the appeal was dismissed as barred by time.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court's directions (paragraphs 10 and 11) requiring changes to the Central Board of Direct Taxes' software so that no demand is raised in future in similar cases are permissible and can be sustained.

Analysis: The Court examined whether administrative changes to software can substitute for adjudicatory functions performed by the Assessing Officer, and whether such a direction would obviate the need for factual verification by the Assessing Officer regarding TDS and related records. The Court noted that credit for TDS and waiver of liability depend on verification of facts, including whether TDS was actually deducted and, where necessary, whether the person responsible deposited the tax with the Department. The Court observed that technological tools and software are instruments for assistance and data processing and cannot replace the requirement of manual examination and adjudication, including issuance of show cause notices where factual issues arise. It concluded that blanket software changes directing non-raising of demands could overlook genuine cases requiring adjudication and therefore intrude upon the Assessing Officer's statutory role.

Conclusion: The direction issued by the High Court in paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of the impugned order directing changes to the CBIT software is set aside; the High Court's administrative direction to alter the software is not sustained and is removed.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice under section 148 dated March 31, 2021 is valid where sanction was granted by an authority other than the specified authority under section 151, having regard to the time-extension under TOLA; (ii) Whether the reasons recorded for initiating reassessment disclose failure by the assessee to "disclose fully and truly" material facts so as to permit reopening beyond four years under the proviso to section 147.

Issue (i): Validity of section 148 notice where sanction was granted by a Principal Commissioner instead of the Joint Commissioner, having regard to TOLA-based extension.

Analysis: The period when the notice was issued falls between March 20, 2020 and March 31, 2021 and is therefore governed by the time-extension granted by TOLA for sanction under section 151. Under the applicable (old) regime, the specified authority for sanction within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year is the Joint Commissioner. Where the statute prescribes a particular functionary to be satisfied before exercise of power, that satisfaction must be of the statutory functionary alone. The facts show sanction was recorded as given by a superior authority not identified as the specified authority under section 151(2).

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 is invalid for lack of sanction by the specified authority. Conclusion in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (ii): Sufficiency of reasons recorded to demonstrate failure to disclose fully and truly material facts permitting reopening beyond four years under proviso to section 147.

Analysis: When reopening is sought beyond four years, the reasons recorded must specifically indicate failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons provided do not specify what material facts were withheld or how the assessee failed to disclose them; they are general/allegational and do not identify tangible material relied upon. Reasons must be read as recorded and cannot be supplemented subsequently.

Conclusion: The reasons recorded are insufficient to justify reopening beyond four years. Conclusion in favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned notice under section 148 dated March 31, 2021, the order disposing objections dated January 31, 2022, and the assessment order dated March 30, 2022 are quashed and set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory sanction for issuance of a reassessment notice must be given by a specified authority, sanction by any other authority renders the notice invalid; additionally, reopening beyond four years requires recorded reasons showing failure to disclose fully and truly relevant material facts, and time-extensions under TOLA apply to the sanctioning timelines under section 151.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable when no connection was established between the appellant and the smuggled foreign-origin cigarettes.

Analysis: The appellant had placed an order for phool jhadu supported by invoice and e-way bill, and the goods actually found were only short in quantity compared with the invoice. The foreign-origin cigarettes were found concealed in the same vehicle, but there was no material showing that the appellant was the transporter, owner, or person in charge of the vehicle, or that he had loaded, handled, or otherwise connected himself with the cigarettes. Penalty under Section 112 requires a proved involvement or abetment in the act rendering goods liable to confiscation, and mere presence of the appellant's consignment in the vehicle was insufficient to establish such involvement.

Conclusion: The penalty on the appellant was not sustainable and was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be sustained unless the person proceeded against is shown by cogent evidence to have a direct nexus with, or to have abetted, the act rendering the goods liable to confiscation.

Issues: Whether the appellants are liable to pay service tax and associated interest and penalties in respect of alleged suppression of rental income from renting of immovable property for Financial Years 2014-2015 to 2017-2018 (upto June 2017), or whether the demands and penalties confirmed by the authorities below should be set aside.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the SCN, the original adjudication order and the impugned appellate order, and analysed the financial records, ST-3 returns, ledger particulars and the CERA audit findings. The authorities below had initially treated large portions of rental receipts as taxable, allowing a revaluation by the original authority which reduced the demand to Rs.91,605. The Tribunal found that substantial amounts of the differential rental income were receipts from residential quarters recovered from staff at the Sikkim project and therefore fall within the negative-list exemption for "services by way of renting of residential dwelling for use as residence" under clause (m) of Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994 and Notification No.12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). The Tribunal further found that the department did not establish deliberate suppression: the appellants had produced detailed ledger entries and financial records accounting for the rental receipts, and the CERA auditors had access to those records when raising objections. The notional figure used for FY 2017-18 was unsupported and the alleged suppression was not substantiated by the authorities below. On these bases the Tribunal concluded that the impugned appellate order erred in upholding confirmation of the adjudged demands and penalties without proper substantiation.

Conclusion: Appeal allowed; the impugned order dated 27.06.2024 is set aside and the appellants' challenge to the service tax demand, interest and penalties is upheld in their favour.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of the properties was liable to be confirmed on the basis of the material relied upon by the Department, and whether the ingredients of a benami transaction under the Act were established.

Analysis: The appeals arose from common findings that the Department had not produced direct, reliable, or independent evidence to show that the consideration for the share subscriptions originated from the alleged beneficial owner and was routed through the alleged shell entities for the benefit of another person. The material relied upon consisted largely of statements recorded in income-tax proceedings, without adequate independent inquiry under the benami law and without corroboration from the documentary record. The record also showed that the respondent companies had business activity, profits, assessed returns, and financial capacity to justify the share issue at premium, and the investments were found to have been made for their own benefit. The Tribunal further accepted that the Department had not discharged the burden of proving the essential ingredients of benami ownership, and the invocation of the alternative statutory limb was also found untenable on the facts.

Conclusion: The Department failed to establish a benami transaction or justify confirmation of the provisional attachment, and the denial of confirmation was upheld.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority violated principles of natural justice by not providing a hearing before confirming the provisional attachment; (ii) Whether immovable property acquired prior to commission of the predicate offence can be attached as "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (iii) Whether the undisputed retention by the appellants of Rs. 10,50,75,000 out of funds received amounts to proceeds of crime attracting provisional attachment.

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority's confirmation of the provisional attachment without providing the appellants an opportunity of hearing violated principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The statutory timeline for finalizing the Adjudicating Authority's order and availability of virtual hearing were considered; correspondence requesting physical hearing was weighed against the availability of virtual hearing and the requirement that the authority conclude within statutory period. The record shows opportunities for participation were provided and not availed; change of venue within the authority's nationwide jurisdiction was examined in the context of procedural adequacy.

Conclusion: The non-attendance of the appellants did not amount to denial of hearing and there was no infringement of principles of natural justice in confirming the provisional attachment.

Issue (ii): Whether property acquired prior to the commission of the predicate offence can be attached under the definition of "proceeds of crime" in Section 2(1)(u).

Analysis: The definition of "proceeds of crime" was interpreted as comprising three limbs, including a limb permitting attachment of property equivalent in value where directly traceable proceeds are not available. Precedents explaining the concept of deemed tainted property and safeguards for bona fide third-party interests and the need to prevent evasion by siphoning off proceeds were applied to the statutory text and legislative purpose.

Conclusion: Property acquired prior to the predicate offence can be attached as property of equivalent value under Section 2(1)(u) when traceable proceeds are not available, subject to the statutory safeguards for bona fide third-party interests.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellants' retention of Rs. 10,50,75,000 out of receipts linked to the predicate offence constitutes proceeds of crime justifying attachment.

Analysis: Evidence regarding receipt, partial repayment, absence of demonstrable legitimate utilization of the retained sum, and witness statements indicating non-return were considered; the applicability of the second limb of Section 2(1)(u) to attach equivalent value where proceeds are retained was applied.

Conclusion: The retained amount of Rs. 10,50,75,000 was held to be proceeds of crime in the hands of the appellants and sustained the provisional attachment.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed and the confirmed provisional attachment stands, reflecting that (i) procedural opportunity to be heard was not denied, (ii) the second limb of Section 2(1)(u) permits attachment of property acquired prior to the predicate offence as property of equivalent value when proceeds are not otherwise available, and (iii) the retained sum was properly treated as proceeds of crime under the statute.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 encompasses (a) property directly or indirectly derived from the scheduled offence, (b) property of equivalent value where such proceeds are not traceable, and (c) property equivalent in value to proceeds taken or held outside the country; accordingly, attachment of property acquired prior to the offence is permissible under the second limb where traceable proceeds are unavailable, subject to statutory safeguards for bona fide third-party interests.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee (a section 8 company owning a solar power plant) is entitled to registration under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that its activity of generating solar power amounts to 'preservation of environment' or 'advancement of any other object of general public utility'. (ii) Whether the assessee is entitled to recognition under section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee deserves registration under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee is a section 8 company created to take over CSR capital assets (a 40 MW solar power project) from its 100% shareholder and supplies power pursuant to a power supply agreement predominantly benefitting that shareholder. Section 2(15) recognises 'preservation of environment' as a charitable purpose but the dominant object test requires the benefit to inure to the public or a sufficiently defined section of the public rather than to a single private entity. CSR rules and General Circular No.14/2021 require CSR activities to be for public benefit and not for exclusive benefit of a companys employees or related single beneficiary. The material shows continuous captive consumption/crediting of the plant's generation to the holding company, contractual allocation of green benefits to the off-taker, and tariff and operational arrangements that result in predominant benefit to the holding company. Precedents establish that incidental private benefit does not defeat charity but where the dominant object is private benefit to a particular entity, registration under section 12AB is not permissible. The onus to prove dominant public benefit lies on the assessee and the contractual and factual matrix here does not establish such dominant public benefit.

Conclusion: Registration under section 12AB is refused and the assessee's appeal on this issue is dismissed. This conclusion is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee deserves recognition under section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Recognition under section 80G(5) depends on the assessee being established for charitable purposes as defined in section 2(15). Given the dismissal of the claim for registration under section 12AB on the ground that the dominant object benefits a single private entity, the requirement for section 80G recognition is not satisfied. The factual and contractual allocation of benefits to the holding company precludes concluding that the activity is predominantly for public benefit.

Conclusion: Recognition under section 80G(5) is refused and the assessee's appeal on this issue is dismissed. This conclusion is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed because the dominant object of the assessee's activities is to confer benefit on a single related private entity rather than to a public or a sufficiently defined section of the public, and therefore the statutory conditions for charitable status and associated tax recognitions are not met.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the dominant object of an institution's activity is to confer benefit on a single private entity (even if the activity involves preservation of environment), the activity does not qualify as a charitable purpose under section 2(15) and registration under section 12AB and recognition under section 80G cannot be granted.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs.27,00,000 made under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of cash deposits during the demonetisation period was justified.

Analysis: Evidence shows cash deposits during the demonetisation period and the assessee asserted the source as earlier bank withdrawals recorded in audited books and cash book. The Assessing Officer doubted the explanation due to a departure from the assessee's normal pattern of immediate cash utilization and absence of denomination reconciliation; no adverse material disproving bank withdrawals was produced by the Revenue. The cash-availability statement demonstrates substantial monthly withdrawals and closing balances, making neither party's position wholly acceptable. Considering the factual matrix and the need for a reasonable estimate given the anomaly in pattern and lack of detailed denomination reconciliation, a partial adjustment was deemed appropriate.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 69A is sustained in part and restricted to Rs.13,50,000 (50% of Rs.27,00,000); the appeal is partly allowed, which is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the interim bail condition confining the petitioner to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in Kolkata can be modified to permit the petitioner to reside at his permanent residence in New Delhi.

Analysis: The petition sought modification of an existing interim bail condition that restricted the petitioner to the trial-court jurisdiction. The petition was considered and a modification was permitted subject to conditions designed to protect the progress of trial proceedings and ensure the petitioners availability for future appearances. The order also leaves the modified arrangement subject to the final decision on the main bail application pending before the High Court and urges the High Court to decide that application expeditiously.

Conclusion: Modification of the interim bail condition is allowed; the petitioner is permitted to reside at his permanent residence in New Delhi on the condition that he cooperates with further proceedings before the Trial Court and appears as and when required. The order is made subject to the final order in the bail application pending before the High Court and the Special Leave Petition is disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether execution of a decree passed exclusively against a company can be proceeded with against its directors/promoters who were not parties to the underlying adjudication and against whom no notice, pleadings, evidence or findings were recorded.

Analysis: The adjudicatory process required for fastening personal liability includes service of notice, pleadings, opportunity to contest, leading of evidence and recorded findings; a decree binds only those against whom it is pronounced. Execution proceedings must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability or bind persons who were neither parties nor adjudicated as liable. Where a moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 operates against the corporate judgment-debtor, modes of execution under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 are interdicted against the corporate debtor; however, the moratorium does not, by itself, create personal liability of directors/promoters. Piercing the corporate veil is an exceptional remedy requiring specific pleadings and a reasoned determination of abuse, fraud or misuse of corporate personality; absent such pleadings or findings, execution cannot impose personal liability on directors/promoters. The prior confinement of the lis to the company by omission to issue notice to directors/promoters attained finality and cannot be enlarged by execution.

Conclusion: Execution cannot be proceeded with against persons who were not parties to and against whom no adjudication was made in the original proceedings; therefore, the execution applications against the directors/promoters must be declined.