Issues: Whether the assessment order dated 29th September 2023 (passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B) and the demand notice dated 29th September 2023 were vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice by failing to disclose the detailed break-up of import data received from CBEC, and whether the assessment should be quashed and remanded for fresh consideration with directions to provide particulars and an opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The impugned proceedings relied upon aggregate import figures communicated by CBEC without disclosing the breakup or underlying documents to the Petitioner. The Petitioner repeatedly sought the detailed data on which the alleged variation was computed and submitted partial reconciliations based on the limited information available. Notices issued to the Petitioner set out only aggregate figures and did not furnish the CBEC information or a detailed breakout enabling meaningful reconciliation. The assessing authority proceeded to make an addition under Sections 69/69A without providing the material relied upon, without affording a personal hearing after furnishing particulars, and without a speaking order addressing the Petitioner's submissions. Prior transfer-pricing scrutiny accepted the purchase values; yet the assessment relied on undisclosed aggregate data. Procedural safeguards in faceless assessment and the requirements of a show cause notice and adequate opportunity to rebut relied-upon material were not complied with, making it impossible for the Petitioner to effectively discharge its burden to reconcile or explain the alleged discrepancy.

Conclusion: The assessment order dated 29th September 2023 and the demand notice dated 29th September 2023 are quashed and set aside on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. The matter is remanded to the assessing authority to issue a fresh show cause notice specifying the legal provisions for any proposed addition, to provide the detailed break-up and copies of the information received from CBEC, to grant at least 15 working days to reply, to afford a personal hearing, to give not less than 7 days' notice before relying on any decision, and to pass a speaking assessment order addressing the Petitioner's submissions on or before 31st March 2026.

Issues: (i) Whether a demand for Assessment Year 2010-11 raised without producing an intimation under Section 143(1) or any independent notice of demand is enforceable; (ii) Whether foreign tax credit reflected in employer's Form-16 but not separately disclosed in the specific ITR column should be allowed and rectified under Section 154.

Issue (i): Whether a demand can be enforced against the assessee in the absence of a produced intimation under Section 143(1) or any independent notice of demand.

Analysis: Applicable provisions include the requirement of an intimation under Section 143(1) to specify sums payable or refundable and the proviso making such intimation a deemed notice of demand for purposes of Section 156. Section 156(1) mandates service of a notice of demand; where demand arises from an intimation under Section 143(1), that intimation must have been served. Departmental records did not establish production of the intimation or proof of service; retrieval of legacy physical dispatch records was not shown. The demand was recorded as arising from a mismatch in TDS reporting but the office has not produced the foundational intimation or notice of demand.

Conclusion: The demand for Assessment Year 2010-11 cannot be enforced in the absence of a produced intimation under Section 143(1) or any independent notice of demand. This conclusion is against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the foreign tax credit disclosed in the employer's Form-16 but not separately entered in the specified ITR column must be allowed and corrected via rectification under Section 154.

Analysis: The assessee claimed total TDS in the return corresponding to the employer's Form-16 which expressly mentioned taxes withheld abroad. The mismatch arose from non-entry in the specific ITR column for relief under Sections 90/91, not from suppression or misrepresentation. The rectification application under Section 154 explaining the factual matrix remained pending and the department did not dispute entitlement to the foreign tax credit on merits. Given the objective of avoiding depriving an individual taxpayer of legitimate credit due to a technical reporting approach, rectification to give effect to the credit is appropriate.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to benefit of the foreign tax credit as reflected in the employer's Form-16 and rectification under Section 154 must be effected in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed; the demand for AY 2010-11 is deleted and the foreign tax credit reflected in Form-16 shall be given effect to by completing rectification and any necessary refund adjustments within the specified time.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a demand is alleged to arise from an intimation under Section 143(1), the intimation must be produced/served as required by law and, absent such produced intimation or any independent notice of demand, the demand is not enforceable; technical mis-reporting of foreign tax credit in the ITR that corresponds to employer's Form-16 may be rectified under Section 154 to give the assessee the legitimate credit.

Issues: Whether the Customs Authorities must delete the petitioner's name from the Customs Broker Licence Management System (CBLMS) profile of his former employer/respondent no. 3 following the petitioner's resignation and communications indicating no objection.

Analysis: The Court examined the petitioners resignation, the communication dated December 10, 2025 from the Assistant Commissioner calling upon respondent no. 3 to submit the CBLMS cancellation application within seven days, and the subsequent letter dated December 31, 2025 from the Kolkata Customs Authorities to the CBLMS authorities at Mumbai requesting deletion of the petitioners name. The respondent no. 3 did not appear despite service. On the basis of the recorded communications and absence of any objection from the Customs Authorities or respondent no. 3, the Court found no justification for retaining the petitioners name in the CBLMS profile of respondent no. 3 and directed the Customs Authorities to delete the name expeditiously.

Conclusion: The Customs Authorities are directed to release the petitioner from the CBLMS profile of respondent no. 3 and delete the petitioners name from that profile preferably within two weeks from the date of communication of the order; the writ petition is disposed of.

Issues: Whether the assessment order passed on 17th March 2025, before the scheduled video-conference hearing on 25th March 2025 and despite a request for personal hearing, is vitiated for breach of principles of natural justice and Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 144B(6)(vii) permits an assessee or authorised representative to request a personal hearing where variation is proposed, and Section 144B(6)(viii) requires that such hearing be allowed and conducted exclusively through video conferencing or video telephony. The facts establish that a request for a video-conference personal hearing was made by the assessee and that the hearing had been scheduled for 25th March 2025. The assessment order impugned was passed on 17th March 2025 prior to the scheduled hearing date. Given the statutory entitlement to a personal hearing on request and the pre-scheduled date for such hearing, the impugned order was issued without affording the procedure mandated by Section 144B and without providing the opportunity to make oral submissions; consequently the order and consequential notices are procedurally unsustainable. The matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer at the stage of the Show Cause Notice dated 7th February 2025 for reconsideration, including providing copies of replies under Section 133(6) and considering invocation of Section 144A, and for passing a speaking order after fully hearing the assessee through the proper video-conference mechanism.

Conclusion: The impugned Assessment Order dated 17th March 2025 and all notices issued pursuant thereto are set aside; the matter is remanded to the Assessing Officer to consider the assessee's replies and requests and to pass a speaking order after affording the requested video-conference personal hearing. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Indian subsidiary constituted a dependent agent permanent establishment of the foreign assessee in India, and whether 35% of offshore sales could be attributed as income in India; (ii) whether reimbursement of expenses by the Indian subsidiary was taxable as fees for technical services.

Issue (i): Whether the Indian subsidiary constituted a dependent agent permanent establishment of the foreign assessee in India, and whether 35% of offshore sales could be attributed as income in India.

Analysis: The sales arrangement showed that the Indian subsidiary purchased products for resale on its own account, acted as an independent contractor, and did not have authority to bind the foreign assessee. The agreement negatived any principal-agent relationship, while the subsidiary bore market, credit and inventory risks and acted in the ordinary course of its business. The conditions for an agency permanent establishment under Article 5(5) were not shown to exist, as there was no material to establish habitual conclusion of contracts, maintenance of stock on behalf of the assessee, or habitual securing of orders for the assessee. In the absence of a permanent establishment, attribution of offshore sales income did not arise.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee. No dependent agent permanent establishment was held to exist, and the attribution of 35% of offshore sales was deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether reimbursement of expenses by the Indian subsidiary was taxable as fees for technical services.

Analysis: The amounts recovered represented arrangements made by the foreign assessee for software, IT support, cloud facilities, email hosting, training-related facilities and related group services, which were held to constitute managerial services. The arrangement was not treated as a mere pass-through reimbursement on a pure cost-to-cost basis. The treaty did not require a make-available element, and the consideration was held to fall within the treaty definition of fees for technical services under Article 13 and the domestic law definition under section 9(1)(vii).

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the assessee. The reimbursement was upheld as taxable fees for technical services.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded on the permanent establishment and attribution issue, but failed on the fees for technical services issue, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A dependent agent permanent establishment is not established unless the Revenue proves that the Indian entity habitually concludes contracts, maintains stock, or secures orders on behalf of the foreign enterprise, and a payment for arranged business support services may constitute fees for technical services where it is in substance consideration for managerial services.

Issues: (i) Whether an assessment framed under section 143(3) relying on documents/digital data seized from third parties and material extracted from third-party devices without recording satisfaction under section 148 (Explanation 2) and without prior approval under section 148B is valid; (ii) Whether the additions made on merits(a) estimated profit on alleged bogus purchases, (b) unexplained expenditure under section 69C, and (c) gross profit on alleged out-of-books salesare sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment framed under section 143(3) is valid when it relies on third-party search material without recording requisite satisfaction under section 148 (Explanation 2) and without obtaining prior approval under section 148B.

Analysis: The assessment year falls within the three years immediately preceding the year of search and the AO relied substantially on material seized from third parties and on statements/data from ex-employees. Explanation 2 to section 148 and the post-2021 amendments bring third-party search material within the reassessment regime and require recording of satisfaction and prescribed prior approval. The statutory approval procedure and supervisory safeguards were not complied with; the approval relied upon was administrative/mechanical and did not evidence forwarding of seized material or application of mind as required by the statutory scheme and departmental procedure.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under section 143(3) is invalid and quashed for non-compliance with Explanation 2 to section 148 and for absence/vitiation of prior approval under section 148B (decision in favour of assessee on jurisdictional ground).

Issue (ii): Whether the additions on meritsestimated profit on alleged bogus purchases, unexplained expenditure u/s 69C, and gross profit on alleged out-of-books salesare sustainable.

Analysis: The contested additions were founded on incomplete/unreliable Tally/hard-disk data and third-party statements without independent corroboration. The assessee produced supplier ledgers, invoices, weighment slips, inward registers authenticated by excise officials, bank/payment evidence and other records substantiating purchases and sales. No meaningful independent enquiries of suppliers were undertaken and no opportunity for cross-examination of third-party witnesses was afforded. The Trial Balance relied upon for out-of-books sales was inconsistent and incapable of being treated as reliable evidence.

Conclusion: The additions are not sustainable on merits: estimated profit on alleged bogus purchases deleted in full; unexplained expenditure u/s 69C deleted; gross-profit addition on alleged out-of-books sales deleted (decisions in favour of assessee on merits).

Final Conclusion: The legal infirmity in framing the assessment under section 143(3) without adherence to the reassessment procedure and prior approval mandated by Explanation 2 to section 148 and section 148B renders the assessment void; additionally, the disputed additions based on unreliable third-party material and without independent corroboration cannot be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment year falls within the three years immediately preceding the year of a search, reliance on material seized from third parties mandates satisfaction and prior approval under Explanation 2 to section 148 and section 148B, and failure to comply with these jurisdictional preconditions vitiates any assessment based on such third-party material.

Issues: (i) Whether the running ledger titled "Mukesh Ratnajyot / Mukeshbhai RJ" found in third-party seized diaries represents real financial transactions of the assessee and justifies additions under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether interest entries in the seized diaries represent real income chargeable under section 56 for Assessment Year 2020-21.

Issue (i): Whether the ledger "Mukesh Ratnajyot / Mukeshbhai RJ" pertains to the assessee and supports additions under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The decision examines continuity, internal consistency and interest computation in the seized running ledger, admissions recorded under section 132(4), corroboration of specific diary entries with the assessee's disclosed investments and with banking records of related entities, the assessee's corporate linkage with group concerns, and absence of documentary rebuttal from the assessee. The authorities applied the net incremental peak method with intra-year telescoping and refused telescoping of time-barred opening years. The appellate findings in the connected proceedings were considered for consistency and for treatment of protective additions versus substantive additions.

Conclusion: The ledger is held to pertain to the assessee; additions under section 69C are sustained in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether interest entries in the seized ledger for A.Y. 2020-21 represent notional entries or actual accrual/receipt taxable under section 56 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The decision contrasts the character of purely notional accounting entries with systematic, periodic interest computations carried forward in a running account. It assesses whether the seized diaries, admissions and corroborative patterns indicate actual accrual/receipt of interest outside books of account and whether the appellate authority misapplied the principle of taxing only real income.

Conclusion: The interest entries for A.Y. 2020-21 are held to represent actual accrual/receipt and the deletion by the appellate authority is set aside; the Department's appeal on this point is allowed in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The impugned additions under section 69C are upheld and the consequential application of section 115BBE is sustained; the appeals by the assessee for the years under consideration are dismissed while the Department's appeal in respect of interest for A.Y. 2020-21 is allowed, resulting in an overall outcome favourable to Revenue.

Ratio Decidendi: Corroborated third-party seized running ledgers, supported by admissions under section 132(4) and independent matching with disclosed transactions and bank records, can constitute reliable evidence to attribute unexplained outflows to a person and sustain additions under section 69C; systematic periodic interest entries in such ledgers indicating recurring computation and corresponding liabilities constitute real income chargeable under section 56.

Issues: Whether the writ petition under Article 226 should be entertained to bypass the statutory appellate remedy against an Order-in-Original demanding service tax, or whether the petitioner must be relegated to the statutory appeal; and whether exceptions to exhausting the alternate remedy (such as absence of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or impracticability due to pre-deposit) apply.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provides an alternate appellate remedy which is ordinarily to be exhausted before invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Questions whether the impugned order suffers from want of jurisdiction or is barred by limitation, and whether the services are exempt, raise mixed questions of fact and law that are suited for determination by the specialised adjudicatory authorities under the statute. The availability of a pre-deposit requirement and the quantum of demand are factors to be considered but do not, by themselves, render the statutory remedy ineffectual. Exceptional circumstances that would justify bypassing the statutory remedysuch as orders passed without jurisdiction or breaches of natural justicehave not been established on the record.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not entertained and the petitioner is directed to pursue the statutory appeal; the petitioner is granted liberty to file the appeal within six weeks and, upon instituting the appeal after complying with prescribed pre-conditions including pre-deposit, the appellate authority must decide the appeal on merits without taking a preliminary view on limitation. This outcome is in favour of Revenue.

Issues: Whether the deletion by the CIT(A) of the addition of Rs. 15,09,90,967 made by the Assessing Officer under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (on account of alleged bogus purchases) was legally justified.

Analysis: The assessee, engaged in trading, presented comprehensive primary documentary evidence for purchases including audited books, GST invoices, e-way bills, transport documents, ledger extracts and bank payments. Verification by the Assessing Officer was limited, transactional scrutiny was not conducted, and verification-unit enquiries covered only a few suppliers with reports not confronted to the assessee. The Assessing Officer based addition on broad assumptions drawn from third-party compliance history without specific, transaction-level contradictions or giving the assessee an opportunity to meet precise allegations. Established legal principle requires that once an assessee furnishes primary evidence substantiating purchases, the Revenue must rebut with cogent counter-evidence and afford a fair opportunity to the assessee; mere reliance on third-party information or non-filing does not automatically render buyer's purchases bogus.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under Section 69C is upheld and the result is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether DGFT Policy Circular No.42 (RE-2010)/2009-14 dated 21 October 2011, which restricted eligibility for Focus Product Scheme (FPS) benefits to a list of 33 items and made that restriction effective from 1 April 2011, was legally valid; and whether DGFT could, by way of a clarificatory circular, curtail the scope of products entitled to FPS benefits under Serial No.33, Table 4, Appendix 37D to the HBP and make such curtailment retrospective.

Analysis: The Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) and Handbook of Procedures (HBP) together determine eligibility for export incentives such as the FPS. Para 3.15.2 of the FTP refers to products notified in Appendix 37D to the HBP as entitled to FPS benefits; para 2.3 and para 2.4 of the FTP and the HBP empower DGFT to specify procedures and clarify doubts but do not permit DGFT to amend or curtail substantive eligibility created by the FTP/HBP. The impugned Policy Circular proceeded not merely to clarify but to narrow the scope of Serial No.33 by excising the express description "woven fabrics of synthetics filament yarn" and limiting benefits to 33 enumerated items. Such a restriction constitutes a substantive change in eligibility and, if to have effect, must be made by amendment to the HBP/FTP by competent authority, not by a clarificatory circular. Further, retrospective application of a change affecting vested or accrued expectations is impermissible in the absence of clear statutory power to make such changes retrospective, as reflected in authorities addressing prospective operation of trade policy changes.

Conclusion: The DGFT Policy Circular No.42 (RE-2010)/2009-14 dated 21 October 2011 is invalid to the extent it restricts FPS entitlement under Serial No.33, Table 4, Appendix 37D to the HBP to the 33 items listed in its annexure and to the extent it seeks retrospective application from 1 April 2011. Products falling within the description "woven fabrics of synthetics filament yarn" under ITC (HS) 5407 remain entitled to FPS benefits under Serial No.33 of Table 4, Appendix 37D to the HBP.

Issues: Whether a writ petition challenging an adjudication order passed under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is maintainable where (i) notices and opportunities for personal hearing were issued and (ii) an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the Act exists, and whether the impugned order suffers from violation of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The record includes a notice issued under Section 74 of the Act and multiple hearing notices referenced in the adjudication order. Opportunities for personal hearing were afforded by the adjudicating authority through several notices and the petitioner did not appear. The statutory framework provides a specific appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Act to challenge final adjudication orders. Where a final order has been passed and a statutory appeal is available, invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction is examined in light of availability of the alternative remedy, the compliance with principles of natural justice, and any compelling reason to bypass the appeal forum. The petitioner delayed filing the writ and did not pursue the appellate remedy provided by statute after the adjudication order was passed.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable and is dismissed; conclusion is in favour of Revenue.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adjudication order under the CGST Act has been passed after issuance of notice and opportunities for personal hearing, and a statutory appeal under Section 107 is available, extraordinary writ jurisdiction will not ordinarily be exercised to set aside the order in the absence of a demonstrated breach of natural justice or other exceptional circumstances.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation is sustainable when there is no proof that notifications (SMS/e-mail) were sent and the orders were uploaded under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab; (ii) Whether the adjudication order passed without affording a personal hearing and without recording reasons is valid.

Issue (i): Whether dismissal of the appeal for delay is justified in the absence of evidence of service/notification beyond upload on the GST e-portal "Additional Notices and Orders" tab.

Analysis: The appellate order relied on the possibility that SMS and e-mail notifications must have been sent but does not record any factual finding that such notifications were actually dispatched or received. There is no independent proof on record demonstrating service by SMS or e-mail; the mere upload under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab, without proof of notification, is insufficient to establish effective service for limitation purposes.

Conclusion: The appellate order dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation is not sustainable in the absence of proof of notification and is set aside in so far as it rests on the unproven assumption of service.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication order is valid when passed without affording a personal hearing and without recording reasons.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates that an opportunity of hearing be granted where an adverse order is contemplated. The adjudication order on record is adverse, was passed without personal hearing, and lacks reasons explaining the basis for the conclusion reached. Similar precedent has set aside such orders and remanded for fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity to respond to the show cause notice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order is vitiated for failure to afford personal hearing and for lack of reasons; it is set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh adjudication after permitting the respondent to file a reply and be afforded personal hearing.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order and the adjudication order are set aside and the matter is remitted to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication after the person affected is permitted to file a reply within the specified time and is afforded a personal hearing; the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adverse adjudication order is uploaded on an electronic portal without verifiable proof of notification by SMS or e-mail and is passed without affording the statutory opportunity of personal hearing or recording reasons, the appropriate remedy is to set aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh adjudication after granting the opportunity to reply and be heard.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority's finding of excess availment of Input Tax Credit (ITC) on import of goods is sustainable in view of non-reflection of IGST in the GST portal arising from manual processing of Bills of Entry; (ii) Whether the petitioners can be held liable to reverse ITC solely because their suppliers failed to file returns.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority's observation on excess availment of ITC on import goods remains valid given evidence regarding manual Bills of Entry and subsequent post-facto entry of "Out of Charge" in ICES resulting in non-reflection of IGST in the GST portal.

Analysis: Affidavit and supplementary report from customs explain that non-reflection of IGST on the GST portal arose from manual processing and lack of contemporaneous electronic "Out of Charge" entries in ICES, not from non-payment of IGST. Customs coordinated with the petitioners; post-facto documents were verified and "Out of Charge" entries were recorded in ICES for five Bills of Entry and subsequently for all eight Bills of Entry with corresponding reflection on the GST portal.

Conclusion: The appellate authority's observation on excess availment of ITC on import goods is set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to reconsider the issue in light of the customs reports and the documents to be produced by the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether reversal of ITC is warranted solely because the petitioners' suppliers failed to file returns.

Analysis: The petitioners missed the opportunity to represent their case before the appellate authority and have not satisfactorily explained that failure. The appellate authority's conclusion on reversal of ITC for supplier non-filing may be re-examined but the petitioners' right to agitate the point before the appellate authority is made conditional on payment of costs.

Conclusion: The appellate authority's conclusion regarding reversal of ITC due to suppliers' non-filing is permitted to be reconsidered, but the petitioners may present their response before the appellate authority only upon payment of costs of Rs.15,000 to the High Court Legal Services Committee and furnishing proof within two weeks.

Final Conclusion: The matter is partly allowed by setting aside the appellate observation on excess availment of ITC on import goods and remanding that issue for fresh consideration in light of customs reports; the challenge to reversal of ITC for supplier non-filing is permitted to be reconsidered subject to payment of costs by the petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: Where non-reflection of IGST on the GST portal is attributable to manual processing and absence of system-recorded "Out of Charge" rather than non-payment of IGST, an appellate authority must re-examine ITC availment claims in light of authenticated customs records and post-facto entries before sustaining any disallowance of ITC.

Issues: (i) Whether, where the demand for an earlier assessment year is under appeal before the CIT (Appeals) and no reference has been made to the Administrative Principal Commissioner/Commissioner as per CBDT Office Memoranda, the Revenue could adjust the entire refund of a subsequent assessment year against the disputed demand or only retain 20% of the disputed demand.

Analysis: The assessment for the earlier year was under challenge before the CIT (Appeals) and the entirety of the later-year refund was adjusted against that disputed demand. The CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29th February 2016 and Office Memorandum dated 31st July 2017 set out the normal practice that, for obtaining a stay of a demand, 20% of the disputed demand is to be deposited; any requirement for a lump sum payment higher than 20% must be referred to and determined by the Administrative Principal Commissioner/Commissioner of Income Tax. In the present facts there was no reference made to the Administrative Principal Commissioner/Commissioner seeking a higher proportion to be retained. The factual dispute as to service of notices under Section 245 was not examined and the petition for refund of the entire adjusted amount was rejected on that basis. On the substantive issue of quantum of adjustment, in the absence of any referral to the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner as required by the Office Memoranda, only 20% of the disputed demand could lawfully be retained from the refund and the balance must be refunded subject to the outcome of the pending appeal.

Conclusion: Only 20% of the disputed demand (Rs. 1,03,46,296/-) may be retained by the Revenue; the balance of the refund for A.Y. 2023-24 shall be refunded to the Petitioner with interest in accordance with law within 30 days from the date of uploading of the order.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening of assessment under section 147/148 is valid where the Assessing Officer recorded only cryptic reasons reproducing investigation report (borrowed satisfaction) without independent application of mind; (ii) Whether the assessment order dated 31.03.2022 is barred by limitation where it left the control of the Assessing Officer after the limitation period and was dispatched/served beyond the statutory date.

Issue (i): Whether the reopening of assessment was vitiated by borrowed satisfaction and absence of independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer consist of brief reproduction of information received from the investigation wing alleging receipt of amounts from non-existent entities and conclude that reopening is required. The recorded reasons do not demonstrate a live link between the tangible material relied upon and formation of a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. The reasons are cryptic, vague and amount to repetition of the investigation report without independent assessment or objective criteria applied by the Assessing Officer. Authorities establishing that reasons must show the link between material and belief and that borrowed satisfaction is impermissible were applied to the facts.

Conclusion: The reopening under section 147/notice under section 148 is invalid on account of borrowed satisfaction and lack of independent application of mind; conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order dated 31.03.2022 is barred by limitation because it did not leave the control of the Assessing Officer within the limitation period.

Analysis: The assessment order, though dated 31.03.2022, was dispatched by the Assessing Officer only on 02.04.2022 and served thereafter, thereby remaining within the control of the Assessing Officer beyond the last date of limitation (31.03.2022). Established principles require that an order must leave the control of the authority within the limitation period to be valid and effective; dispatch/service after the limitation period renders the assessment time-barred.

Conclusion: The assessment order is barred by limitation and is quashed; conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The cross-objection is allowed on the grounds of invalid reopening (borrowed satisfaction) and assessment being time-barred; the Revenue's appeal against the CIT(A)'s order is rendered infructuous and is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Reopening under section 147/notice under section 148 is invalid where the Assessing Officer records only reproduction of investigation material without demonstrating an independent application of mind linking tangible material to a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment; additionally, an assessment order is time-barred if it does not leave the control of the Assessing Officer within the statutory limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether advertisement, marketing and promotion (AMP) expenditure can be treated as a separate international transaction and subject to transfer pricing adjustment; (ii) Whether interest on overdue receivable from associated enterprises is a separate international transaction and what benchmark rate applies; (iii) Whether seminar and convention expenses are disallowable under section 37(1) as violative of applicable professional regulations; (iv) Whether purported disallowance under section 43B results in double disallowance; (v) Whether interest under sections 234A, 234B, 234C and 234F and initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether AMP expenditure is a separate international transaction warranting a transfer pricing adjustment.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined prior coordinate-bench decisions in the assessee's own cases which found no agreement or arrangement making AMP expenditure a distinct international transaction and held that AMP should be treated as part of the bundle of transactions on which TNMM is applied; the coordinate bench reasoning was followed for consistency.

Conclusion: AMP expenditure adjustment deleted; issue decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on overdue receivable from associated enterprises is a separate international transaction and the appropriate arm's-length interest rate.

Analysis: The Tribunal found outstanding dues were not received in time and the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proof; held that such overdue receivables fall within the scope of financing transactions under Explanation 1(c) to section 92B and must be benchmarked separately; factual credit period and agreement terms (30 days) were applied; authorities cited supported reduction of the ad hoc spread.

Conclusion: Interest on overdue receivable treated as a separate international transaction; ALP accepted with modification LIBOR + 200 basis points (reduction from LIBOR + 400); ground partly allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether seminar and convention expenses are hit by the Explanation to section 37(1) and disallowable.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted the DRP confirmed disallowance without awaiting remand report; prior years' treatment and factual verifications were relevant; directed reopening to the assessing officer to verify each expense in accordance with the Supreme Court authority and to allow items not actually in violation.

Conclusion: Matter remitted to the assessing officer for verification; disallowance not sustained without verification direction in favour of the assessee (ground allowed with remand).

Issue (iv): Whether the alleged disallowance under section 43B constitutes double disallowance.

Analysis: The Tribunal found possibility of double disallowance raised by the assessee and directed AO to examine records and delete the disallowance if it is duplicative of amounts already disallowed in return computation.

Conclusion: Ground allowed; issue remitted to AO for deletion if double disallowance is established (in favour of the assessee to that extent).

Issue (v): Whether interest under sections 234A, 234B, 234C and 234F and initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A are sustainable.

Analysis: These grounds were consequential to other adjustments or premature; no substantive merit found to overturn the lower authorities on those points.

Conclusion: Grounds on interest dismissed; penalty initiation under section 270A dismissed as premature (against the assessee on interest grounds; in favour of the assessee on penalty ground being premature).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed AMP adjustment deleted; interest on overdue receivables sustained but with ALP reduced to LIBOR + 200 basis points; seminar/convention expenses and alleged double disallowance under section 43B remitted to the assessing officer for fresh verification and appropriate action; interest heads largely dismissed as consequential; penalty proceedings dismissed as premature.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a clear agreement or arrangement making AMP expenditure an international transaction, AMP cannot be treated as a separate transaction for transfer pricing and must be considered within the bundle of transactions on which TNMM is applied; overdue receivables that remain unpaid beyond contractual credit terms constitute financing transactions under Explanation 1(c) to section 92B and require separate benchmarking at an appropriate market rate.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 148, following notice under section 148A(b), were valid in law; (ii) Whether the disallowance of deduction under section 80GGC for the alleged political donation was sustainable on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 148, following notice under section 148A(b), were valid in law.

Analysis: The notice under section 148A(b) proceeded on a mistaken factual premise by repeatedly alleging that the assessee had made a donation to an entity different from the one actually involved. The mistake was later admitted in the order under section 148A(d). The material relied upon for the reopening, including third-party statements recorded during search proceedings, was not furnished to the assessee despite a request. A meaningful opportunity under section 148A requires disclosure of the material on which reassessment is proposed. The absence of the relied-upon material and the defective factual foundation vitiated the jurisdictional notice and the consequential reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance of deduction under section 80GGC for the alleged political donation was sustainable on merits.

Analysis: The assessee produced the donation receipt, bank statement, and evidence showing that the recipient political party was registered under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Revenue did not bring direct corroborative evidence to show that the donation amount was returned or that the transaction was bogus. Mere reliance on general investigation inputs, third-party statements, and human probabilities was insufficient to deny the statutory deduction in the absence of tangible material connecting the assessee to any accommodation entry arrangement.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 80GGC was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment was held to be contrary to the mandatory reopening procedure, and the deduction claim was accepted on merits as well.

Ratio Decidendi: For reassessment under section 148A, the assessee must be supplied the material relied upon so that an effective reply can be filed, and a statutory deduction cannot be denied merely on suspicion or generalized allegations without corroborative evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether RVI Elements and aluminium doors/frames/shutters/lockers installed by the appellant at customer sites are liable to central excise duty; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation for demand is justified.

Issue (i): Whether the goods cleared from the appellant's factoryparts of Retail Visual Identity (RVI) Elements and fabricated aluminium doors/windows/framesamount to excisable manufactured goods liable to central excise duty.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the items cleared from factory were marketable goods or parts which only attained identity and permanence upon assembly and fixation at site. It was found that the parts were made to customer specifications, cleared in CKD condition, not resold or marketed by the purchaser, and not capable of use for other purposes in the cleared form. The Tribunal also examined permanence of fixation and the consequent character of the installed unit as immovable property, and noted absence of proof that classification under tariff headings other than 9405 had been ruled out before invoking sub-heading 9405 60 90.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked to confirm the demand for the period 20062009.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the existence of wilful suppression, fraud or misstatement necessary to invoke extended limitation. It noted that the appellant regularly filed returns, disclosed manufactured goods and paid duty under relevant headings, that similar prior demands were previously dropped by the department, and that the appellant held a bona fide view based on legal interpretation that installed items became immovable and not exigible to excise duty.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming differential duty, interest and penalties and imposing a personal penalty under Rule 26 is set aside on merits and on limitation; both appeals are allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods cleared in parts that are not marketable in the cleared form and which attain permanence and become immovable upon installation are not excisable manufactured goods; extended limitation cannot be invoked absent evidence of wilful suppression, fraud or misstatement.

Issues: Whether the Look Out Circular opened against the petitioners was liable to be quashed in the absence of any showing that they were evading investigation or likely to flee the country.

Analysis: The petitioners had been cooperating with the investigating agencies, had joined the investigation whenever required, and had furnished the documents and information sought. No non-bailable warrants or other coercive process had been issued against them. The circumstances noted for issuance of a Look Out Circular, as recognised in the governing principles, were therefore not established. Past foreign travel by the petitioners on court permission, without breach of conditions, also negatived the apprehension that they would not return or would evade the process of law.

Conclusion: The Look Out Circular could not be sustained and was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, and the petitioners were relieved from the travel restriction, subject to informing the Trial Court about their residence and travel itinerary.

Ratio Decidendi: A Look Out Circular is a coercive restraint justified only where the person is evading arrest or investigation, or there is a concrete likelihood of flight from justice; mere pendency of investigation, without such circumstances, is insufficient.