Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner could invoke revisional jurisdiction under section 263 on the ground that the Assessing Officer had not properly examined the taxability of interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation, and whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Analysis: The record showed that the Assessing Officer had issued specific queries and the assessee had explained that the interest under section 28 formed part of enhanced compensation and was claimed exempt under section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This was not a case of no enquiry or lack of enquiry. The revision was triggered mainly by an audit objection and by reliance on a High Court decision rendered on its own facts, whereas the binding Supreme Court position in Ghanshyam HUF and the distinction between interest under sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act continued to support the assessee's stand. The dismissal of SLP in limine did not amount to declaration of law or affirmation of the High Court's reasoning. Since the assessment view was supported by one of the possible views on a debatable issue, the preconditions for section 263 were not satisfied.

Conclusion: The invocation of section 263 was invalid and the revision order could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The assessment was left undisturbed and the assessee obtained full relief against the revisional order.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisional power under section 263 cannot be exercised where the Assessing Officer has made enquiry and adopted one of two possible legal views on a debatable issue, and a mere audit objection or non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not supply the requisite legal basis for revision.

Issues: (i) Whether denial of opportunity for cross-examination under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 violated principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether liability could be fastened on Mr. Chander Kumar Gupta / appellant despite resignation and death of the former director; (iii) Whether liability of other directors/persons (including post-resignation director Mr. Habibullah) was overlooked by the authorities.

Issue (i): Whether denial of opportunity for cross-examination under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 violated principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The Court examined whether statements relied upon were retracted, the existence of independent corroborative material (seizures, documentary evidence, energy consumption data, rental and employment records), and the relationship/financial interest of witnesses with the appellant. Authorities and precedents were considered to determine that the right to cross-examine is not absolute and depends on facts and circumstances, including whether denial causes prejudice when independent corroboration exists and statements are un-retracted.

Conclusion: The denial of opportunity for cross-examination did not violate principles of natural justice and is not a ground to favour the appellant; conclusion adverse to the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether liability could be fastened on Mr. Chander Kumar Gupta / appellant despite resignation and subsequent death of the former director.

Analysis: The Court considered documentary and circumstantial evidence tying management and operations to the appellant and the firm, including seized documents, employment lists, rental agreements, and energy consumption records. The Court held that such materials supported the adjudication of liability notwithstanding resignation or death of the former director.

Conclusion: Liability can be and was validly fastened on the concerned persons including the appellant; conclusion adverse to the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the authorities failed to consider liability of other directors/persons (including post-resignation director Mr. Habibullah) who purportedly paid alleged dues.

Analysis: The Court reviewed the adjudicating authority's treatment of payments and roles of co-noticees and employees and found the order-in-original and the CESTAT's decision address these aspects, relying on confessional statements and independent corroborative material; the factual matrix did not show omission or error warranting interference.

Conclusion: No fault is shown in the authorities' consideration of liabilities of other persons; conclusion adverse to the appellant.

Final Conclusion: On the facts and material on record, including un-retracted statements corroborated by independent documentary and physical evidence, the appellate contentions fail and there is no substantial question of law in favour of the appellant; the impugned orders are upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Denial of cross-examination under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is permissible where the relied-upon statements are un-retracted and are supported by independent corroborative evidence such that denial does not cause prejudice to the affected party.

Issues: (i) Whether the safeguards under the BNSS, 2023 and related procedural requirements with respect to arrest (arrest memos, grounds of arrest and notice to relatives) were complied with such that bail granted by the Magistrate should be set aside; (ii) Whether custodial interrogation and interim custody for investigation can be granted in respect of appellant No. 1 despite the High Court having set aside the Magistrate's bail order.

Issue (i): Compliance of BNSS, 2023 safeguards and validity of setting aside bail.

Analysis: The Court examined the factual findings of the High Court that arrest memos containing authorization to arrest and grounds of arrest were furnished and acknowledged by the arrestees, and that intimations to a relative were given and acknowledged; the Magistrate had earlier granted bail observing non-compliance but the High Court recorded service and acknowledgment of the relevant documents and videography of proceedings. The Court found no procedural lapse established to the prejudice of the appellants warranting interference with the High Court's factual conclusion.

Conclusion: Insofar as compliance of BNSS, 2023 safeguards and the High Court's reversal of the Magistrate's bail order are concerned, the Court upholds the High Court's findings (resulting in denial of bail for appellant No. 1 and maintenance of the High Court order on procedural compliance).

Issue (ii): Grant of custodial interrogation and interim custody for appellant No. 1.

Analysis: The Court noted that the investigation remains incomplete and that the Union sought custodial interrogation of appellant No. 1 for investigational necessity; limited custodial interrogation was ordered for specified consecutive days with interim custody until a specified date and time, after which release and trial court conditions were mandated. The Court distinguished the position of appellant No. 2 (a student) and the custodial interrogation already undertaken in West Bengal.

Conclusion: Custodial interrogation and interim custody of appellant No. 1 are permitted for the specified short period; appellant No. 2 is restored to the bail order of the Magistrate and released.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: appellant No. 2 is granted relief (bail restored) while appellant No. 1 is denied continued bail and limited custodial interrogation and interim custody is permitted for investigative purposes; both appellants are directed to cooperate with the investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the prosecution establishes factual compliance with arrest-related procedural safeguards and investigation necessitates limited custodial interrogation, courts may deny or set aside bail for the concerned accused and permit narrowly tailored interim custody while preserving the procedural protections required by law.

Issues: (i) Whether consideration received by a UAE resident for conversion and construction services performed in the UAE was taxable in India as fees for technical services; (ii) Whether the final assessment for the relevant assessment year was valid when it was completed before issuance of directions by the Dispute Resolution Panel.

Issue (i): Whether consideration received by a UAE resident for conversion and construction services performed in the UAE was taxable in India as fees for technical services.

Analysis: The services for conversion of the oil rig into a mobile offshore production unit were rendered wholly in the UAE. The India-UAE DTAA contains no separate article for fees for technical services. Such receipts were accordingly characterised as business income, and the absence of a permanent establishment in India precluded their taxation in India.

Conclusion: The receipts were not taxable in India as fees for technical services. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the final assessment for the relevant assessment year was valid when it was completed before issuance of directions by the Dispute Resolution Panel.

Analysis: The final assessment was completed on 11.11.2022, whereas the Dispute Resolution Panel issued its directions only on 01.06.2023. Finalisation on the assumption that no objections had been filed, before the directions were issued, was legally untenable.

Conclusion: The assessment completed before the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions was quashed. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned offshore service receipts are outside Indian taxability in the absence of an Indian permanent establishment, and the assessment made prematurely under the dispute-resolution procedure cannot stand.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the India-UAE DTAA contains no fees-for-technical-services article, income from services constitutes business income and is not taxable in India absent a permanent establishment; a final assessment made before Dispute Resolution Panel directions is invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether an addition for alleged low profit could be sustained merely by comparing the current profit ratio with that of the preceding year when the audited books were not rejected. (ii) Whether the disallowance of dealer scheme expenses was sustainable for want of substantiation of the outstanding liability.

Issue (i): Whether an addition for alleged low profit could be sustained merely by comparing the current profit ratio with that of the preceding year when the audited books were not rejected.

Analysis: The sales, purchases, and opening and closing stock recorded in the regularly maintained and audited books were accepted, and no specific defect or unreliability was identified. Section 145(3) was not invoked. The reduced profitability was supported by material concerning the seasonal agrochemical business, adverse crop conditions, increased sales returns, and the exceptional margins of the preceding year. No contrary material was produced to displace these findings.

Conclusion: The estimated low-profit addition was rightly deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance of dealer scheme expenses was sustainable for want of substantiation of the outstanding liability.

Analysis: The record contained scheme details, dealer and transaction-wise workings, credit notes, invoices, ledger material, confirmations, and evidence of subsequent discharge or reversal of the liability. These materials established a direct nexus between the dealer benefits and sales during the relevant year. The Revenue identified no discrepancy, defect, or perversity in the factual findings accepting the liability and its accounting treatment.

Conclusion: The dealer scheme expense disallowance was rightly deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions sustained because the Revenue failed to rebut the factual findings and supporting material establishing the correctness of the declared results and dealer-scheme liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Income cannot be estimated solely from a decline in profit ratio without rejection of reliable books, and a business liability supported by contemporaneous records and evidence of crystallisation cannot be disallowed merely on unsubstantiated doubts.

Issues: (i) Whether the grant-in-aid received from CCRAS constituted consideration and whether the appellant's activities amounted to supply under the GST law; (ii) whether the appellant and CCRAS were distinct taxable persons and the activities were undertaken in the course or furtherance of business; (iii) whether exemption was available under Entry 3 or 3A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) or under Notification No. 8/2024-Central Tax (Rate); and (iv) whether the research activity was correctly treated as taxable research and development services.

Issue (i): Whether the grant-in-aid received from CCRAS constituted consideration and whether the appellant's activities amounted to supply under the GST law.

Analysis: The grant was linked to defined research deliverables, reporting obligations, and project performance. The statutory exclusion from consideration extends only to subsidies, not to grants-in-aid. The payments were therefore held to be in respect of identifiable supplies of goods and services.

Conclusion: The grant-in-aid constituted consideration, and the appellant's activities amounted to supply.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant and CCRAS were distinct taxable persons and the activities were undertaken in the course or furtherance of business.

Analysis: The appellant was a separate legal entity and the description as a sub-nodal agency did not merge its identity with CCRAS. The research work was a systematic, funded activity undertaken for defined deliverables and therefore satisfied the business nexus required for supply.

Conclusion: The appellant and CCRAS were distinct taxable persons, and the activities were undertaken in the course or furtherance of business.

Issue (iii): Whether exemption was available under Entry 3 or 3A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) or under Notification No. 8/2024-Central Tax (Rate).

Analysis: The exemption under Entry 3 or 3A required a direct nexus with functions entrusted to a Panchayat or Municipality under Articles 243G or 243W. The services were rendered to a Central Government research body and not in discharge of local body functions. The conditions for the later exemption notification were also not satisfied on the material before the Authority.

Conclusion: The claimed exemptions were not available.

Issue (iv): Whether the research activity was correctly treated as taxable research and development services.

Analysis: The activity consisted of research, analysis, testing, and reporting for consideration and fell within the taxable category of research and development services. The absence of transfer of ownership or intellectual property did not alter the nature of the supply.

Conclusion: The activity was correctly treated as taxable research and development services.

Final Conclusion: The advance ruling was sustained, and the appeal failed in full, leaving the impugned supplies taxable under GST.

Ratio Decidendi: A government grant linked to defined deliverables and reciprocal obligations is consideration under GST unless it is a subsidy expressly excluded by statute, and exemption entries must be strictly construed according to their express recipient and functional nexus requirements.

Issues: Whether reassessment framed under sections 144B and 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after return was filed in response to notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid.

Analysis: Once the assessee filed a return in response to the notice under section 148, the assessment could not be completed without issuing notice under section 143(2). The absence of such notice was treated as a jurisdictional defect. The fact that the Assessing Officer proceeded to complete the matter under section 144 did not cure the requirement, and the reassessment was held to be vitiated. The assessment was therefore regarded as bad in law and void ab initio.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid for want of notice under section 143(2), and the relief was granted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by a non-jurisdictional Assessing Officer and the consequential assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are void for want of pecuniary jurisdiction and failure of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer to issue the statutory notice.

Analysis: The tribunal applied Instruction No. 1/2011 [F. No. 187/12/2010-IT(A-I)] dated 31.01.2011, and provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 including Sections 119, 127, 143(2), 143(3), 147, 148 and 292BB. The instruction fixes pecuniary limits for allocation of cases between ITOs and ACs/DCs, thereby determining which Assessing Officer has jurisdiction for scrutiny where returned income falls within specified monetary limits. Prior decisions of co ordinate benches were followed holding that service of notice under Section 143(2) by the officer having jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a valid assessment under Section 143(3), and that a notice issued by an officer without pecuniary jurisdiction is null. Section 292BB was examined and construed as curing infirmities in service where a notice has emanated from the department; it does not validate complete absence of a statutory notice or a notice issued by an officer who had no jurisdiction to issue it. Reliance was placed on precedent establishing that transfer of cases under Section 127 must be by competent authority and supported by records; absent such valid transfer, actions by the non jurisdictional officer are void. The facts showed issuance of the statutory notice by an officer who lacked pecuniary jurisdiction and no valid notice by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer was on record within the statutory period.

Conclusion: The notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by a non jurisdictional Assessing Officer and the consequential assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are void for want of pecuniary jurisdiction and for failure of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer to issue the statutory notice; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the basis of an incorrect entry in the tax audit report, could be sustained after the report was revised to correct the factual mistake.

Analysis: The disputed amount had been reflected wrongly in the original tax audit report, and the revised report corrected the mistake. The addition sustained by the lower authorities was founded on the erroneous original reporting, without giving effect to the corrected factual position.

Conclusion: The addition could not be sustained and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition resting solely on an inadvertent factual error in the tax audit report cannot survive once the error is duly corrected and the revised factual position is brought on record.

Issues: Whether notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued by ITO, Ward 7(1), Kolkata in the present case was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction prescribed by Instruction No.1/2011, and whether the consequent assessment framed under Section 143(3) is invalid.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the filing details showing the return of income for AY 2015-16 declared at Rs. 49,24,210 and considered the CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 [F. No. 187/12/2010-IT(A-I)], dated 31-01-2011 issued under Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which prescribes monetary limits for allocation of cases between ITOs and DCs/ACs for metro and mofussil areas. The Tribunal noted that under the instruction the pecuniary jurisdictional thresholds determine which authority may issue notices under Section 143(2). The notice dated 11-04-2016 was found to have been issued by ITO, Ward 7(1), Kolkata despite the return amount falling within the threshold assigned to DC/AC under the Instruction. The Tribunal considered and followed relevant decisions of the Calcutta High Court and coordinate benches which held that issuance of notice by a non-jurisdictional AO pursuant to the Instruction renders the notice and consequent assessment invalid.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 143(2) issued by ITO, Ward 7(1), Kolkata was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction prescribed by Instruction No.1/2011 and therefore the assessment framed under Section 143(3) is invalid and is quashed; decision in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the delay of 802/803 days in instituting the appeals under section 253(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is condonable under section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The appeals were instituted beyond the statutory period prescribed by section 253(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and condonation is governed by section 253(5). The material on record includes the appeal memos (Form No. 36) confirming service/communication of the impugned first appellate orders to the appellant on the dates those orders were passed. Affidavits filed by the appellant also confirm receipt of the orders within the limitation period. The asserted causes for delay were (a) unawareness of disposal of first appeals and (b) corporate merger and centralisation of tax functions. The claimed unawareness contradicts the appellant's own verified statements confirming service, and no contemporaneous step was shown to have been taken to pursue the appeals for over two years after service. The merger/centralisation occurred well before the impugned orders were passed and no cogent evidence was furnished to demonstrate helplessness, lack of infrastructure, or inability to file appeals during the relevant period. The explanation was therefore found vague, self-contradictory, and insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence or inaction.

Conclusion: The explanation does not constitute a sufficient cause under section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for condoning the delay; the appeals are time-barred and hence not admitted for adjudication. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed in favor of the revenue.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 15,00,00,000 made by the Assessing Officer under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as unexplained share application money for AY 2014-15 was correctly deleted by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).

Analysis: The assessment relied on a trial balance seized during survey showing share application money from 23 entities and the Assessing Officer recorded additions under Section 68. The assessee produced ITR acknowledgements, bank statements, confirmations and source documents from the investor companies and the remand report showed no independent enquiries or recording of statements by the Assessing Officer in rebuttal. The appellate authority examined the documentary evidence, applied authorities on the three requirements under Section 68 (identity, creditworthiness and genuineness) and found that once the assessee discharged these requirements the onus shifted to the Assessing Officer to carry out enquiries to rebut the evidence; no such enquiries were conducted. The appellate authority's reliance on precedents addressing similar facts supported deletion of the addition.

Conclusion: Deletion of the addition of Rs. 15,00,00,000 under Section 68 is sustained in favour of the assessee; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit is allowable in respect of central excise duty paid on finished goods at the time of debonding of a 100% EOU and thereafter availed as credit by the DTA unit; (ii) Whether the demand raised by invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable where debonding and payment of duty were in the knowledge of the Department and acknowledged by a No Dues Certificate.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit is allowable on duty paid on finished goods at the time of debonding of a 100% EOU.

Analysis: The unit, upon debonding, paid appropriate excise duty on finished goods and thereafter became a DTA unit that used or held those goods as inputs for further manufacture or clearance. The Revenue did not point to any specific provision in the CENVAT Credit Rules that mandates denial of credit in such circumstances. Prior tribunal and Supreme Court authorities on the issue have recognized the availment of credit where duty was paid at debonding and the goods subsequently become inputs in the DTA unit.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit availed on finished goods in respect of duty properly paid at the time of debonding is allowable. Conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand confirmed by invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable when debonding and duty payment were within departmental knowledge and acknowledged by a No Dues Certificate.

Analysis: The debonding and duty payment were officially recorded and acknowledged by issuance of a No Dues Certificate; there is no finding of suppression of facts by the assessee. Invocation of the extended period requires concealment or suppression; absent such concealment, the extended period cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: The demand raised by invoking the extended period of limitation is not sustainable. Conclusion in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate authority allowed the appeal, set aside the adjudicating order denying CENVAT credit, quashed consequential interest and penalty, and granted consequential reliefs to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a 100% EOU duly pays appropriate excise duty on goods at debonding and those goods thereafter become inputs for the DTA unit, the CENVAT Credit Rules do not permit denial of credit absent a specific rule or concealment justifying invocation of the extended period of limitation.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 for assessment year 2017-18 is valid where it was issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year and the prior approval/sanction was obtained from the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified in section 151(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued beyond the three-year period from the end of the relevant assessment year. Section 151(ii) prescribes that where more than three years have lapsed, prior approval for issuing a notice must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or Principal Director General or, where no such authority exists, from the Chief Commissioner or Director General. In the present case, prior approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner, who is not the authority specified by section 151(ii). Prior judicial decisions applying the amended reassessment regime and section 151(ii) have been followed in assessing the competence of the sanctioning authority and the consequence of its absence or defect on the validity of reassessment proceedings. Given the defect in the sanctioning authority when notice was issued after three years, the legal defect in sanction renders the reassessment proceedings invalid and any additions made in the reassessment become unsustainable. Consequential or factual grounds dependent on the validity of reassessment are rendered academic once the reopening is held invalid.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice issued under section 148 is invalid for want of competent prior approval under section 151(ii); therefore the reassessment and consequential additions are set aside and the appeal of the revenue is dismissed while the cross-objection of the assessee is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a notice under section 148 is issued after the three-year period, prior approval must be obtained from the authorities specified in section 151(ii); absence of such competent sanction invalidates the reassessment proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether, where an assessee files a valuation report from a registered valuer, the Assessing Officer is required to refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for determination of fair market value as on the relevant date; (ii) Whether stamp duty/DSR based valuation can be substituted for fair market value without reference to the DVO and without affording the assessee opportunity to be heard.

Issue (i): Whether, where an assessee files a valuation report from a registered valuer, the Assessing Officer is required to refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for determination of fair market value as on the relevant date.

Analysis: The facts show the assessee produced a registered valuer's report contending a FMV substantially higher than the value adopted by stamp duty authorities and co-owners. Precedents cited establish that the statutory machinery contemplates valuation by the DVO to avoid miscarriage of justice and that an Assessing Officer has a duty to give the assessee the option of referral to the DVO even where no specific request is made by the assessee.

Conclusion: The Assessing Officer was required to refer the valuation issue to the DVO for determination of FMV as on the relevant date; failure to do so warrants restoration for fresh consideration.

Issue (ii): Whether stamp duty/DSR based valuation can be substituted for fair market value without reference to the DVO and without affording the assessee opportunity to be heard.

Analysis: The record shows substitution of DSR/stamp duty derived value for FMV without DVO reference and without providing the assessee adequate opportunity to rebut third-party data. Authorities indicate that stamp valuation is an administrative instrument for revenue collection and is not automatically equivalent to FMV under the Income-tax Act; hence substitution without invoking statutory valuation procedure and hearing is improper.

Conclusion: Stamp duty/DSR based valuation cannot be substituted for FMV in the assessment without following the statutory valuation procedure (reference to DVO) and affording the assessee an opportunity to be heard; the matters must be remitted for fresh determination.

Final Conclusion: The valuation issue is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to refer the matter to the DVO for determination of fair market value as on the relevant date, to afford the assessee opportunity of being heard, and thereafter to determine long term capital gain in accordance with fact and law; the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee files a valuation report by a registered valuer disputing stamp duty/DSR valuations, the Assessing Officer must, in order to ensure fair treatment, refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer for determination of fair market value and afford the assessee an opportunity to be heard before substituting stamp duty valuation for FMV.

Issues: (i) Whether the additions to the assessee's income were based on seized/incriminating material and thus sustainable; (ii) Whether the block periods for assessment under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are to be computed from the date of receipt of seized books/documents by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person (and the effect of the monetary threshold in the proviso to section 153A on assessments beyond the six-year period).

Issue (i): Whether the additions were based on seized/incriminating material and therefore sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessment additions and the connection claimed by the AO to seized material. The assessment recorded escaped income of Rs. 8,84,540/-, and the CIT(A) analyzed whether those additions were supported by incriminating seized documents sufficient to sustain assessment beyond the regular period. The Tribunal considered the threshold requirement under the relevant proviso to section 153A and the factual finding of the AO regarding the amount of escaped income.

Conclusion: The additions were not sustained for the purpose of extending the assessment period; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether block periods under section 153C are to be computed from the date of receipt of seized books/documents by the jurisdictional AO and whether the monetary threshold in the proviso to section 153A precludes issuance of notice beyond six years where escaped income is below Rs. 50 lakhs.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the jurisdictional High Court decision relied upon by the assessee regarding computation of block period from date of receipt by the non-searched person's AO and the applicability of the proviso to section 153A limiting issuance for years beyond six years unless escaped income in the later years meets the monetary threshold. The facts show seized documents were handed over to the assessee's AO on 22.06.2022 making AY 2015-16 fall within the 7th10th year block, but the AO quantified escaped income at Rs. 8,84,540/-, which is below the Rs. 50,00,000 threshold in the proviso. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s conclusion that the proviso's threshold requirement was not met and that the extended period could not be validly invoked.

Conclusion: The interpretation and application of the proviso operate against sustaining assessments beyond the six-year period on the facts; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds the CIT(A)'s order allowing the assessee's appeal on the jurisdictional ground that the monetary threshold for extending the assessment period was not met, and accordingly the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where escaped income quantified by the AO for the relevant later assessment years is below the monetary threshold specified in the proviso to section 153A, notices/assessments for years beyond the six-year block cannot be sustained under the extended provisions; block-period computation from receipt of seized material by the jurisdictional AO is relevant but cannot overcome the proviso's monetary threshold requirement.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of Rs. 39,80,263 claimed as indexed cost of acquisition of land is sustainable; (ii) Whether the disallowance of Rs. 1,44,55,200 claimed as indexed cost of acquisition/cost of construction of rights in constructed area is sustainable.

Issue (i): Disallowance of Rs. 39,80,263 claimed as indexed cost of acquisition of land.

Analysis: The assessee purchased the land in 1981 and subsequently entered into a development agreement under which a portion of land was transferred to the developer in exchange for constructed area. Ready reckoner value for 01.04.2002 was initially used to estimate value as on 01.04.2001; later the assessee furnished a report from the Joint Sub Registrar asserting value as on 01.04.2001. The departmental authorities rejected the claim for lack of documentary proof and questioned the methodology. The fresh evidence submitted was not earlier before the authorities and requires verification of authenticity and factual correctness.

Conclusion: The issue is restored to the Assessing Officer for factual verification of the fresh evidence and allowance of the indexed cost of acquisition if found correct; in principle the assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (ii): Disallowance of Rs. 1,44,55,200 claimed as indexed cost of acquisition/cost of construction of rights in constructed area.

Analysis: The assessee received 55% of constructed area in exchange for 45% undivided share of land under the development agreement. The departmental position that no cost is attributable because the developer funded construction ignores that the constructed area was acquired in exchange for the land value; the value of land given to the developer constitutes the cost for the constructed area received by the assessee and is relevant for computation under Section 48.

Conclusion: In principle the assessee is entitled to claim indexed cost of acquisition/cost of construction in respect of the rights in the constructed area; the matter is restored to the Assessing Officer for factual verification and determination of the quantum of deduction.

Final Conclusion: Both substantive contentions on entitlement to indexed cost (land and constructed-area rights) are accepted in principle in favour of the assessee, and both issues are remitted to the Assessing Officer for factual verification and quantification of the allowable deductions, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard.

Ratio Decidendi: For capital gains computation under Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, consideration received by way of constructed area acquired in exchange for land includes the value of the land transferred and that value constitutes the cost of acquisition/improvement for the constructed area; fresh documentary evidence not previously filed may be verified by the Assessing Officer for allowing indexed cost.

Issues: (i) Whether the order dated 26.09.2025 and certificate dated 11.09.2025 requiring deduction of tax at 10% under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are liable to be quashed; (ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a certificate of nil rate for AY 2026-27 and subsequent years under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Validity of the impugned order dated 26.09.2025 and certificate dated 11.09.2025 requiring 10% tax deduction under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The impugned order does not record any concrete factual or legal finding explaining how the petitioners receipts for the relevant year are exigible to tax or how the petitioners residential status or PE in India has changed. Earlier High Court orders in the petitioners own matters granting nil-rate certificates for preceding years and related reasoning including consideration of relevant statutory provisions and Rule 28AA were not meaningfully distinguished by the competent officer. The officers stated justification that the certificate is interlocutory and subject to final assessment does not substitute for a reasoned finding required under Section 197 before issuing a non-nil certificate.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 26.09.2025 and the certificate dated 11.09.2025 requiring deduction of tax at 10% are quashed and set aside.

Issue (ii): Entitlement of the petitioner to a certificate of nil rate for AY 2026-27 and subsequent years under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The petitioners nature of transactions and lack of presence/PE in India were not shown to have changed for the year under consideration. Absent any recorded change of facts or a specific finding that the petitioner is resident in India or has a PE, the competent authority lacks a basis to refuse nil-rate relief. However, the competent authority may, for future years, record findings to the contrary after issuing notice and on disclosure of material facts by the petitioner.

Conclusion: A certificate of nil rate shall be issued in favour of the petitioner for AY 2026-27 and subsequent years, subject to the competent authority being free to record and communicate any contrary finding after notice if it concludes that the petitioner has a PE in India or receipts are taxable.

Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed, the impugned order and certificate are set aside, and directions are given for issuance of nil-rate certificates for the relevant and subsequent years while preserving the authority's power to re-open the question on demonstrable change of facts after notice.

Ratio Decidendi: Where prior reasoned High Court determinations on the taxability and residential/PE status of a foreign company exist, a competent officer issuing a non-nil certificate under Section 197 must record concrete, reasoned findings demonstrating change in facts or law justifying departure; absent such findings a non-nil certificate is arbitrary and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether the adjudication orders passed under Section 62 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the periods March 2023, April 2023, June 2023 and July 2023 should be set aside and the belatedly filed returns taken on record, with liberty to the authorities to proceed to adjudicate in accordance with law.

Analysis: The adjudication orders impugned were passed under Section 62 of the GST Act on the premise that returns were not filed, and contained liberty to file returns within a specified period. Section 62 provides that where a registered person furnishes a valid return within the period specified after service of an assessment order, the assessment order shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, subject to payment of interest or late fee as applicable; further provisos allow extended filing on payment of additional late fee. The petitioner produced evidence of belated filing for the specified periods after the orders were passed. In view of the statutory scheme under Section 62 and the fact that the adjudication orders were not founded on returns, it is appropriate in the circumstances to permit the belated returns to be taken on record and permit the authorities to adjudicate afresh under the appropriate provisions (Sections 73 or 74, as applicable), preserving the statutory consequences for late filing. The court exercised discretion to afford the petitioner another opportunity while imposing costs for the delay.

Conclusion: The adjudication orders passed under Section 62 for the periods March 2023, April 2023, June 2023 and July 2023 are set aside; the belated returns filed by the petitioner shall be taken on record and the respondent authorities are directed to proceed to adjudicate the matters in accordance with law (including Sections 73 or 74 of the GST Act, as applicable). Costs of Rs.25,000/- awarded to the High Court Legal Services Authority against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether transponder service fees paid to a UK resident for satellite transponder services constituted royalty under the India-UK DTAA so as to attract withholding tax under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The payment was for availing transponder services through satellite facilities owned and operated by the non-resident provider, without any transfer of control, possession, or right to use the satellite or transponder. The treaty definition of royalty in Article 13 required the payment to be for use of, or right to use, a secret process, and the amended domestic-law explanation inserted in section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could not be read into the treaty merely by reason of Article 3(3). The payment therefore did not answer the treaty description of royalty, and the recipient's absence of a permanent establishment in India reinforced the non-taxability of the receipt in India.

Conclusion: The payment was not taxable as royalty under the India-UK DTAA and no obligation to deduct tax at source under section 195 arose.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax treaty defines royalty by reference to a secret process, a domestic-law amendment enlarging the meaning of process does not alter the treaty meaning unless the treaty itself is correspondingly amended.