Issues: Whether GST could be levied on the petition fee, ARR processing fee and licence fee received by the Commission for performing regulatory functions under the Electricity Act, 2003.

Analysis: The fee received by a Commission for regulating tariff, transmission and grant of licences is not an activity in the nature of trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation or any other similar activity, and therefore does not amount to "business" within the meaning of the CGST Act. The payment is not a consideration for supply in the course or furtherance of business, and the breadth of the definition of services cannot override the statutory scheme, including the exclusion for services rendered by a court or tribunal in Schedule III. The regulatory and adjudicatory functions of a Commission are exercised as part of a statutory, quasi-judicial framework and cannot be treated as taxable supplies merely because fees are collected in connection with those functions.

Conclusion: GST could not be levied on the amounts received by the Commission towards petition fee, ARR processing fee and licence fee, and the impugned show cause notice was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory regulatory and quasi-judicial functions performed by a Commission under the Electricity Act are not activities in the course or furtherance of business and fees collected for such functions do not constitute taxable consideration for a supply of services under the CGST Act.

Issues: Whether the Respondent contravened Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 by failing to pass on the benefit of Input Tax Credit in respect of construction services in the project that commenced wholly in the post-GST period.

Analysis: Section 171 is engaged where there is a reduction in tax rate or an increase in ITC that gives rise to a comparative benefit to be passed on, frequently in projects spanning pre-GST and post-GST periods. The project under consideration commenced entirely after implementation of GST and the Respondent validly exercised the option under Notification No. 03/2019-Central Tax to adopt earlier GST rates. The DGAP's investigation concluded that no additional ITC benefit accrued to the Respondent because there is no pre-GST period comparator for the project. The DGAP report was examined and accepted on these factual and legal bases.

Conclusion: It is held that Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 has not been contravened and the complaint of profiteering is rejected; decision is in favour of the Assessee.

Issues: Whether the petition under Section 213(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 seeking investigation into the affairs of a company is maintainable where the allegations primarily concern recovery of debts, dishonoured cheques, and statutory filing non-compliances.

Analysis: Section 213(b) permits investigation where there is prima facie opinion that a company's business is conducted with intent to defraud creditors or for fraudulent or unlawful purposes. The petition relied on alleged statutory irregularities, dishonoured cheques, professional complaints, and non-filing of statutory forms. These matters were evaluated against the threshold for a prima facie finding of systemic fraud or intent to defraud creditors. The petition's allegations were treated as contractual or recovery disputes amenable to civil or negotiable-instrument proceedings, and as regulatory lapses enforceable by the Registrar of Companies under Sections 92, 137, and 454. Prior or pending complaints before professional/statutory bodies and absence of conclusive findings were also noted. The petition was examined for misuse of Section 213(b) as a substitute forum for debt recovery and for absence of material establishing overarching fraudulent management warranting an investigation.

Conclusion: The petition is not maintainable under Section 213(b); there is no prima facie evidence of systemic fraud or intent to defraud creditors, and the relief seeking investigation is unsuitable where the grievances pertain to recovery of dues and regulatory non-compliances. The appeal against the order dismissing the petition is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a case alleging fraudulent GST registration, fake input tax credit claims and related offences.

Analysis: The allegations were treated as falling principally within the GST framework, while the Court noted the applicant's custody period, the maximum punishment applicable on the facts indicated, the availability of compounding, and the absence of a demonstrated necessity for continued detention. The Court relied on prior judicial views that GST offences are governed by a special statutory scheme and that bail can be considered on the facts of the case, including whether custodial interrogation remains necessary.

Conclusion: The applicant was found entitled to be released on regular bail.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted in a prosecution arising out of alleged wrongful availment and utilisation of input tax credit and related forged GST transactions, and whether custodial interrogation was necessary.

Analysis: The allegations were examined in the backdrop of the GST framework, including the penal provisions relating to fraudulent issuance and use of invoices, wrongful availment of input tax credit, and the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution. The Court noted that the matter involved a special statutory regime dealing with GST offences and that similar cases had recognised the relevance of the statutory safeguards, the limited sentencing exposure in the facts alleged, and the principles governing pre-arrest bail. The Court also considered the submission that a prior proceeding on connected allegations had already been initiated, and treated the possibility of repeated prosecution and the nature of the accusations as relevant while assessing the need for custodial interrogation.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was warranted and custodial interrogation was held not to be necessary.

Final Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to pre-arrest protection and was directed to be released on bail on the stated terms and conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In a case governed by the GST penal framework, anticipatory bail may be granted where the allegations do not make custodial interrogation necessary and the statutory and factual circumstances do not justify pre-trial incarceration.

Issues: Whether the methodology and computation of alleged profiteering by DGAP require re-examination and whether the matter should be remitted to DGAP for re-investigation under Rule 133(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The DGAP performed a comparative exercise of pre-GST and post-GST availability of credit and derived a percentage increase in ITC availability which was applied to post-GST purchases to compute alleged savings and resultant profiteering, and additionally applied GST on the profiteered amount. The respondent contested the methodology, relying on the principle that comparisons must be between identical goods and services (a same-basket comparison) and produced item-wise post-GST purchase data and pre-GST applicable rates for verification. The respondent also challenged the addition of GST on the benefit amount. Applying the legal framework concerning Section 171 (obligation to pass on benefit) and procedural scope of Rule 133(4), the factual comparability of pre- and post-GST purchase items and the respondent's production of itemised data require verification before a final profiteering computation can be sustained.

Conclusion: Re-investigation by DGAP is directed under Rule 133(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to verify the respondent's item-wise post-GST purchase data, rework the ratio of ITC in the pre-GST period, compare it with the post-GST period on a same-basket basis, and recompute any profiteering; the respondent shall furnish additional documents or information as required by DGAP.

Issues: (i) Whether fees received for live transmission/live feed of cricket matches constitute 'royalty' under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (including Explanation 2 and Explanation 6).

Analysis: The dispute concerns characterization of payments for live telecast rights. The legal framework applicable includes Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and its Explanation 2 and Explanation 6, as well as principles distinguishing copyright from broadcasting rights under the Copyright Act, 1957. Prior authoritative decisions treat live telecast/broadcast as distinct from copyrightable 'work' and apply tests such as the minimum requirement of creativity to determine copyright protection. The distinction between broadcasting rights and copyright leads to the conclusion that a live telecast, absent recording, re-telecast or enduring rights, does not attract the royalty concept in clause (v) of Explanation 2. Explanation 6's reference to 'process' including transmission by satellite or similar technology does not, in the facts of the present licence limited to live telecast within a series and without enduring recording or re-transmission rights, convert the receipts into royalty. The primacy of applicable DTAA provisions over domestic taxing provisions was also identified as relevant to assessing taxing character.

Conclusion: The fees received for live transmission/live feed do not constitute 'royalty' under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the appeal by the revenue is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 challenging the CESTAT's order; (ii) Whether the CESTAT was correct in affirming that Fe content for determination of export duty prior to 01.05.2022 is to be calculated on Wet Metric Tonne (WMT) basis and in accepting load-port/NABL private laboratory reports (SKM) and transaction value over the CRCL (DMT) test report.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The questions advanced by the Revenue principally challenge concurrent factual findings about sampling, basis of Fe calculation and acceptance of transaction value supported by invoices and bank realisation certificates. The points relied upon were either governed by settled precedent of coordinate Benches and higher courts or raised factual disputes. The statutory test for admission under Section 130 requires a debatable question of law not settled by binding precedent and with material bearing on rights of parties.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law is involved; the appeal does not satisfy the threshold for admission under Section 130 in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether Fe content for determination of export duty (for shipments prior to 01.05.2022) is to be determined on WMT basis and whether load-port/NABL private lab reports and the contract-based transaction value prevail over CRCL DMT reports for levy of export duty.

Analysis: Authorities and prior decisions establish that assessment of exported iron ore must reflect the condition at export (including moisture) and, for the relevant period, Fe percentage was to be calculated on WMT. The commercial contract, final invoices and bank realisation certificates showing payment based on load-port test reports formed the transaction value under Section 14. The CESTAT and Appellate Authority applied these principles, considered sampling timing and representativeness, and relied on coordinated tribunal and court decisions and CBIC circulars directing comparison of load-port/discharge reports and deference to transaction value where contract terms so provide.

Conclusion: The CESTAT correctly affirmed determination of Fe on WMT basis and acceptance of the load-port/NABL private testing reports and transaction value over the CRCL DMT report for the shipments in question; this conclusion is in favour of the respondent (assessee).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed for lack of any substantial question of law and on the merits the concurrent findings affirming WMT-based determination and reliance on contractually agreed load-port test reports are upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: For export consignments prior to 01.05.2022, Fe content for levy of export duty is to be determined on Wet Metric Tonne (WMT) basis and, where the transaction value/price actually paid or payable is determined by contract and supported by load-port/discharge test reports and bank realisation, those reports and the transaction value govern assessment under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether the Look-Out Circular issued against the petitioner could be sustained when no cognizable offence under the penal law had been shown and the SFIO investigation had not culminated in the statutory investigation report; (ii) Whether the issuance and continuation of the Look-Out Circular was justified on the ground of public interest, economic interest, and pendency of investigation.

Issue (i): Whether the Look-Out Circular issued against the petitioner could be sustained when no cognizable offence under the penal law had been shown and the SFIO investigation had not culminated in the statutory investigation report.

Analysis: The guidelines governing Look-Out Circulars contemplate recourse to such a measure in cognizable offences under the penal law, while also recognising exceptional cases where departure may be restricted only on specified grounds. The material before the Court showed that the SFIO investigation was still in progress, no interim report or investigation report had been submitted, and the respondents were proceeding on the basis that the matter only prima facie appeared to involve fraud under the Companies Act. The statutory scheme under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 distinguishes between an interim report during investigation and an investigation report after completion of investigation, and prosecution under that provision is contemplated only after examination of the completed investigation report. In that background, the basis for sustaining the restriction was not established.

Conclusion: The Look-Out Circular was not sustainable on the stated footing.

Issue (ii): Whether the issuance and continuation of the Look-Out Circular was justified on the ground of public interest, economic interest, and pendency of investigation.

Analysis: The Court held that curtailment of travel must rest on legally sustainable grounds and not merely on the magnitude of the alleged dues or on a general assertion that investigation may be affected. The respondents did not place material showing that the petitioner's departure would jeopardise the sovereignty, security, integrity, or economic interests of India, or that he was likely to evade the process or not return. The right to travel is part of personal liberty and cannot be curtailed without satisfying the governing conditions for such an exceptional restraint. The cited decisions on the facts were found distinguishable.

Conclusion: The justification based on public interest and pendency of investigation was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The impugned Look-Out Circular was quashed and the petitioner was permitted to proceed without the travel restriction remaining in force.

Ratio Decidendi: A Look-Out Circular cannot be sustained in the absence of the statutory and guideline-based preconditions for restricting departure, and a mere pending investigation or alleged financial exposure does not by itself justify curtailment of personal liberty and the right to travel.

Issues: (i) Whether the fresh prosecution was barred by Article 20(2) of the Constitution on the ground of double jeopardy. (ii) Whether the petitioners were entitled to regular bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the allegations, their conduct, and the stage of the trial.

Issue (i): Whether the fresh prosecution was barred by Article 20(2) of the Constitution on the ground of double jeopardy.

Analysis: The protection against double jeopardy operates only after a prior prosecution has culminated in conviction or acquittal. The earlier proceeding was still pending. The alleged laundering activity was also treated as a continuing offence, and the present case was held to concern fresh acts and layering of proceeds of crime during the subsistence of the earlier investigation.

Conclusion: The plea under Article 20(2) was rejected and the prosecution was held not to be barred.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners were entitled to regular bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the allegations, their conduct, and the stage of the trial.

Analysis: The statutory twin conditions for bail under Section 45 were held to apply with full force. In view of the large quantum of alleged siphoning, the untraced proceeds of crime, the petitioners' status as proclaimed offenders, and the risk of flight and interference with the process, the Court found that the jurisdictional satisfaction required for bail could not be recorded. The age and health plea was not treated as determinative.

Conclusion: Regular bail was refused.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners failed on both the constitutional objection and the bail claim, and the request for release was declined while the trial court was directed to proceed expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Double jeopardy does not arise unless the earlier prosecution has ended in conviction or acquittal, and in a PMLA bail matter the twin conditions under Section 45 must be satisfied before release can be granted.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of service tax of Rs.7,03,884/- confirmed on the differential between ITR and Form 26AS (financial year 2016-17) is sustainable; and (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation (proviso to the relevant provision) was rightly invoked by the revenue.

Analysis: The appeal challenges a demand raised on the differential amount between ITR and Form 26AS where the larger portion of receipts was treated by revenue as subject to reverse charge. The adjudicatory record lacked documentary verification as to the nature of the discrepant receipts and no enquiry was made to determine whether those receipts represented taxable services or were covered by reverse charge. The show cause notice did not contain specific averments identifying fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts required to invoke the proviso extending limitation, and there was evidence that the appellant entertained a bona fide belief that service tax was payable by the recipient. Established precedent requires that the revenue plead and prove mala fide conduct to justify extended limitation and that the burden of proving such mala fide lies on the revenue. In the absence of specific allegations in the show cause notice and supporting material establishing deliberate suppression, the extended period could not be invoked and the demand could not be sustained on the record before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the demand is held to be time-barred and the impugned order is set aside, resulting in a decision in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of CENVAT credit attributable to electricity sold to the State Electricity Board is sustainable where the appellant had reversed such credit; (ii) Whether penalty under rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 can be imposed where credit was reversed; (iii) Whether interest under section 11AA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is recoverable where credit reversal amounts to non-availment.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of CENVAT credit attributable to electricity sold to the State Electricity Board is sustainable where the appellant had reversed such credit.

Analysis: The issue was examined on the record of monthly reversals and ER-1 returns showing reversal of input and input service credit attributable to electricity sold to the State Electricity Board. Prior authoritative decisions establishing that reversal of credit on a monthly basis amounts to non-availment were applied. The Commissioners finding that reversal details were not furnished was held to be contrary to the documentary record and earlier Tribunal/High Court decisions relied upon in the proceedings.

Conclusion: The demand of CENVAT credit in respect of electricity sold to the State Electricity Board is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 can be imposed where credit was reversed.

Analysis: Rule 15(1) applies where the assessee has taken or utilised CENVAT credit wrongly. Given that the credit attributable to electricity sold was reversed and treated as non-availment, the precondition for imposing penalty under rule 15(1) did not exist. Relevant precedents and the record of reversal were considered in this context.

Conclusion: The imposition of penalty under rule 15(1) read with section 11AC is not justified and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest under section 11AA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is recoverable where credit reversal amounts to non-availment.

Analysis: Interest under section 11AA and rule 14 is founded on recovery of wrongly availed credit. Where reversal of credit effectively amounts to non-availment, recovery of interest is not sustainable. The tribunals earlier conclusion in the appellants own case on identical facts was applied.

Conclusion: Recovery of interest under section 11AA read with rule 14 cannot be sustained and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming demand, interest and penalty is set aside and the appeals are allowed, resulting in the extinguishment of the assessed liability arising from the credits reversed on electricity sold to the State Electricity Board.

Ratio Decidendi: Reversal of CENVAT credit on a monthly basis, corroborated in statutory returns, amounts to non-availment of such credit and precludes recovery of duty, interest under section 11AA and penalty under rule 15(1) where reversal is duly recorded.

Issues: Whether complaint proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could continue against erstwhile directors when, before the expiry of the statutory notice period, insolvency proceedings had commenced against the company, the moratorium had come into force, and the interim resolution professional had taken over the management and bank accounts of the corporate debtor.

Analysis: The demand notices were served after initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process and during the statutory notice period the management of the corporate debtor had vested in the interim resolution professional under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Once the moratorium operated and the board stood suspended, the petitioners, as erstwhile directors, had no control over the affairs of the company or its bank accounts and could not ensure payment of the cheque amount. The complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 therefore could not be sustained against them on the facts presented. The contrary reliance placed on a case not involving such insolvency-triggered incapacitation was found inapposite.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were not maintainable against the petitioners, and the summoning order as well as the connected complaint proceedings were quashed.

Issues: Whether the petitioner (assessee) is entitled to waiver of interest under Sections 12, 12A and 12B of the Interest Tax Act, 1974 for the Assessment Years 1996-97 and 1997-98 in view of prior CBDT circulars and resultant confusion regarding liability of interest on hire purchase charges.

Analysis: The issue arises from sequential CBDT communications: initial circular clarifying hire charges as interest, a subsequent communication directing assessing officers not to initiate proceedings pending reconsideration, and a later circular finally clarifying the position. These administrative clarifications created bona fide doubt about liability of interest on hire purchase charges. The petitioner voluntarily filed returns and paid tax and penal interest after final clarification without departmental detection. The respondent had earlier waived interest for preceding assessment years, demonstrating jurisdiction to grant waiver. Established principles afford the assessee the benefit of doubt where legal position was unclear and delay resulted from prevailing confusion; administrative circulars and press notes permitting waiver on voluntary filings support relief in such circumstances.

Conclusion: The impugned order is modified by allowing waiver of interest under Sections 12, 12A and 12B of the Interest Tax Act, 1974 for the Assessment Years 1996-97 and 1997-98 in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: Special Leave Petitions dismissed and pending applications disposed of.

Issues: Whether notices purportedly issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment years 2012-13 to 2016-17, which were issued manually without a computer-generated Document Identification Number (DIN) and without compliance with CBDT Circular No.19/2019, are valid; and whether, in the absence of valid notices under section 143(2), the assumption of jurisdiction under section 148 and consequential reassessment orders are vitiated.

Analysis: The CBDT Circular No.19/2019 made it mandatory from 01.10.2019 that communications by the income-tax authorities must quote a computer-generated DIN, and permitted manual issuance only in specified exceptional circumstances subject to reasons recorded in writing and prior written approval of the Chief Commissioner/Director General of Income-tax, with further obligations for regularisation. The material on record (ITBA timeline and RTI responses) shows absence of evidence that the notices under section 143(2) were issued with DIN or were validly regularised as manual communications in terms of the Circular. The Department failed to demonstrate recorded reasons and prior written approval for manual issuance or subsequent regularisation within the framework of the Circular. Where compliance with the Circular is mandatory and absent, the communications fall within para 4 of the Circular and are to be treated as invalid and deemed never issued. The invalidity of notices under section 143(2) removes the essential precondition for valid reassessment proceedings under section 148.

Conclusion: Notices under section 143(2) for the years under consideration are invalid for non-compliance with CBDT Circular No.19/2019 and are deemed never to have been issued; accordingly the assumption of jurisdiction under section 148 and the reassessment orders are quashed as void ab initio, and the additional ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition made on account of unexplained cash deposits and the application of a higher special rate of tax on such addition are sustainable, and if so to what extent/quantum.

Analysis: The assessee, a senior citizen, had substantial cash deposits during the demonetisation period; substantial explanations were accepted except for certain opening cash balance and receipts from acquaintances, leading to an addition by the revenue. Considering the assessee's background and partial acceptability of declared sources, a lump-sum adjustment was estimated. Reliance was placed on a recent High Court decision holding that the legislative amendment imposing a higher special rate for undisclosed income takes effect from 01-04-2017; transactions prior to that date are not subject to the higher rate and are to be taxed at normal rates.

Conclusion: The sustained addition is reduced to a lump sum of Rs.3,00,000 which shall be taxed at normal rates; appeal is partly allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: The amendment introducing a higher special rate for undisclosed income operates prospectively from 01-04-2017, and transactions prior to that cut-off are taxable at normal rates.

Issues: Whether commission paid to non-resident foreign agents for procuring export orders outside India was chargeable to tax in India so as to require deduction of tax at source, and whether disallowance could be sustained in the absence of such deduction.

Analysis: The payment was made to non-resident agents for services rendered outside India in connection with export procurement. The agents had no permanent establishment in India and the relevant income was not chargeable to tax in India. In such a situation, the obligation to deduct tax at source does not arise. The decision also applied the principle that the treaty provisions prevail to the extent they are more beneficial to the assessee, and that a disallowance linked to non-deduction of tax cannot survive where the underlying payment itself is not taxable in India.

Conclusion: The disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source on commission paid to the foreign agents was not sustainable, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the commission to the overseas agents was held to be outside Indian taxability, making tax deduction at source unnecessary.

Ratio Decidendi: No tax deduction at source is required on payments to non-resident agents for services rendered outside India where the income is not chargeable to tax in India, and the treaty position is more beneficial to the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest under section 234A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is leviable where the original return was filed after the due date but a regular assessment was made for the first time pursuant to notice under section 153C (deemed to be under section 153A).

Analysis: Section 234A(1) levies interest for delay in filing the original return computed on the tax on total income as determined under section 143(1) or, where a regular assessment is made, on the tax determined under regular assessment. Explanation 3 to section 234A treats an assessment made for the first time under section 147 or section 153A as a regular assessment for the purposes of section 234A. Under section 153C the assessing officer, after recording satisfaction, assesses the income of the other person in accordance with section 153A; thus an assessment completed pursuant to notice under section 153C for the first time is to be regarded as an assessment under section 153A and hence a regular assessment for section 234A purposes. In the present case the original return was filed after the due date and the assessment was completed for the first time pursuant to notice under section 153C; the assessing officer computed interest under section 234A on the tax as determined in that regular assessment, reduced by TDS/advance tax/self-assessment tax.

Conclusion: Interest under section 234A is leviable and the interest of Rs. 92,153 charged by the assessing officer is upheld.

Issues: Whether the penalty levied under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained where the Assessing Officer made additions on an estimated basis and the assessment order and section 274 notice did not specify the specific limb of section 270A under which penalty proceedings were initiated.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the addition was made on an estimated basis and whether such estimated additions fall within "under-reporting of income" for the purposes of section 270A, having regard to the exclusion in section 270A(6)(b), and whether the penalty proceedings were valid when both the assessment order and the notice under section 274 read with section 270A failed to specify the precise limb of section 270A(2) or section 270A(9) under which penalty was initiated. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not disturb contract receipts but applied an estimated net profit rate to arrive at the addition, and that identical factual circumstances in coordinate-bench decisions resulted in deletion of penalty where the specific limb was not indicated.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 270A is unsustainable and is deleted; the assessee's appeal is allowed.