Issues: Whether the non-speaking order-in-original confiscating the imported goods and imposing penalty was liable to be quashed and the matter remanded for fresh consideration of the petitioner's claim that no customs duty was payable under the Special Advance Authorization scheme.

Analysis: The petitioner's principal contention, namely that imports made under a Special Advance Authorization did not attract customs duty, was not considered in the impugned order. The order also did not deal with the petitioner's explanation based on the relevant DGFT notification and the customs notification relied upon before the Court. As the dispute turned on issues requiring consideration on merits, the absence of reasons in the impugned order meant that the petitioner's contentions had to be examined afresh. The Court therefore directed the authority to grant an opportunity of personal hearing and to consider the petitioner's explanation and supporting materials in accordance with law within a fixed time frame.

Conclusion: The non-speaking order was quashed and the matter was remanded to the same authority for fresh consideration, with an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the revenue can resort to coercive recovery under Section 79(1)(c) of the GST Act, 2017 to collect interest and tax alleged to be unpaid on account of misuse of input tax credit, without first completing an adjudicatory process under Sections 56/73/74 of the GST Act; and whether Section 75(12) permits such recovery in the absence of a clear admission of tax liability in returns filed under Section 39.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires that tax liabilities and the periods for payment are to be declared by the registered person and, where discrepancies or misuse of input tax credit are alleged, the authorities must initiate adjudicatory proceedings under the relevant provisions (including Sections 56, 73 and 74) and give opportunity of hearing to quantify tax, interest and penalties. Section 75(12) applies where there is an amount of self-assessed tax declared in returns under Section 39 which remains unpaid; it permits recovery under Section 79 where there is a clear admission of liability in the return. Wrong or improper utilisation of input tax credit does not constitute an admitted tax liability that authorises immediate coercive recovery under Section 79 without prior adjudication. The facts showed no prior adjudicatory order quantifying tax or interest; recovery was effected by invoking Section 79(1)(c) and amounts were collected from the petitioner's banker including alleged interest, without such adjudication.

Conclusion: The recovery proceedings initiated under Section 79(1)(c) and the collection of interest from the petitioner's banker are set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to refund the interest payments recovered from the bank. The respondents remain free to initiate appropriate adjudicatory action, if necessary, to determine any claim for interest on delayed payments.

Issues: Whether the anticipatory bail order deserved to be quashed and the matter remanded for fresh consideration on the ground that the complainant's objections were not dealt with.

Analysis: The application sought cancellation of anticipatory bail granted in a customs-smuggling prosecution. The order under challenge did not reflect consideration of the complainant's written objections, and the allegations were of a serious nature involving smuggling of gold. In these circumstances, the Court found it appropriate to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant and require the bail request to be reconsidered after hearing both sides afresh.

Conclusion: The anticipatory bail order was quashed and the matter was remanded to the learned Additional Sessions Judge for fresh decision after considering the complainant's objections and further submissions, if any.

Issues: (i) Whether the confiscation of 838 watches, confirmation of duty and imposition of penalties under Sections 111, 28(4) and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 against the appellant and co-noticees is sustainable; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) could be invoked by treating the date of search as the relevant date; (iii) Whether statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act are admissible without compliance with Section 138B; (iv) Whether penalty under Section 112 could be imposed on the co-noticee based on the impugned material.

Issue (i): Whether confiscation of the 838 watches and imposition of penalties/confirmation of duty is sustainable.

Analysis: The issue concerns whether the department proved smuggling or otherwise displaced the evidential material produced by the appellant showing import and stock entry. The adjudicating authority relied on lack or mismatch of serial/model numbers in supplier/import documents and on statements recorded during investigation. The appellant produced import documents, stock registers and explained age/entry of certain watches; many goods had been cleared by customs earlier. The adjudicator did not require or identify positive evidence of clandestine import after the appellant produced documentary material and did not independently prove smuggling.

Conclusion: The confiscation, demand of duty and penalties under Sections 111, 114A and related provisions cannot be sustained and are set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) could be invoked by treating the date of search as the relevant date.

Analysis: Section 28(4) permits extended time where duty was not paid by reason of collusion or willful mis-statement or suppression of facts and refers to the relevant date as the date of clearance. The show cause notice was issued beyond five years from the relevant date of clearance; the notice presumed the date of search as the relevant date without articulating reasons to invoke the extended period.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) is not justified; the issuance of the show cause notice after the statutory period is a valid ground to set aside the demand.

Issue (iii): Whether statements recorded under Section 108 are admissible without following Section 138B procedure.

Analysis: Statements recorded during investigation under Section 108 can be relevant in adjudication only upon compliance with the procedure in Section 138B, which requires examination of the person as a witness before the adjudicating authority, formation of an opinion on admissibility and opportunity for cross-examination. The adjudicator relied on investigative statements without following Section 138B procedure.

Conclusion: The investigative statements relied upon without compliance with Section 138B are inadmissible for proving smuggling; reliance on such statements is not sustainable.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty under Section 112 could be imposed on the co-noticee based on the impugned material.

Analysis: The imposition of penalty on the co-noticee was founded on investigative statements and inference of a common modus operandi; the linkage between the co-noticee and the 838 watches was not established independently and relied on inadmissible investigative material.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112 against the co-noticee is not sustainable and is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The collective effect of the determinations is that the adjudicator's findings of smuggling, the demand under the extended period, and penalties based on investigative statements fail; accordingly the appeals are allowed and the impugned confiscation, duty confirmation and penalties are set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a person produces sufficient documentary evidence of import/possession, the initial burden under Section 123 shifts to the department to prove smuggling; investigative statements recorded under Section 108 are admissible in adjudication only upon satisfaction of the mandatory procedure in Section 138B, and the extended limitation under Section 28(4) cannot be invoked without establishing statutory grounds and the proper relevant date.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 428 days in presenting the appeal (including the delay in filing the condonation application) should be condoned; (ii) Whether the appeal raises any substantial question of law warranting its admission.

Issue (i): Whether the 428-day delay in instituting the appeal (counting the period until the condonation application was filed) should be condoned.

Analysis: The appeal was originally filed 63 days beyond the prescribed period; a condonation application was filed subsequently after the Registry pointed out the defect, resulting in an aggregate delay of 428 days. The quality of the explanation for delay is material. The supporting affidavit explains transfers of officials and communication gaps which caused the failure to file the condonation application earlier. On cumulative consideration of these circumstances, the explanation for the delay is satisfactory.

Conclusion: The 428-day delay is condoned and the interim application for condonation of delay is allowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal involves any substantial question of law so as to admit the appeal against the CESTAT order which set aside assessment on the ground that the show-cause notice was time-barred under Section 11A(1).

Analysis: The CESTAT recorded a factual finding that no suppression of facts was established and that the proviso to Section 11A(1) could not be invoked. That finding is supported by the record and is not perverse. The question whether galvanisation amounts to manufacture under Rule 16(2) relates to merits and was not specifically challenged in the appeal memo; the core issue is the factual determination on suppression and limitation. No substantial question of law arises from the accepted factual finding that extended limitation was not justifiable.

Conclusion: The appeal does not involve any substantial question of law and therefore is not admissible on merits; the appeal is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The court condoned the delay and proceeded to consider admission, but ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of any substantial question of law.

Ratio Decidendi: A delay in filing an appeal may be condoned if sufficient cause is shown based on the quality of the explanation; however, an appeal will not be admitted where the impugned decision rests on a factual finding of no suppression supported by the record and no substantial question of law is thereby raised.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner suppressed material facts by failing to disclose an earlier writ petition challenging the same appellate order and whether such suppression warrants dismissal and imposition of exemplary costs; (ii) Whether the alternative prayer for directing decision of an application under Section 30 of the CGST Act should be granted and if so, the appropriate timeline for disposal.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner suppressed material facts by not disclosing the earlier writ petition challenging the appellate order and whether the writ petition should be dismissed with exemplary costs.

Analysis: The averments in the petition and the earlier Special Civil Application reveal that identical prayers challenging the appellate order were made previously and the earlier petition was withdrawn for the stated purpose of filing an application under Section 30 of the CGST Act. The present petition confined paragraphal averments to the Section 30 application and omitted the material fact of the earlier petition which contained the same challenge to the appellate order. The omission and presentation of facts in that manner were treated as misleading and constituting suppression of material fact, attracting disciplinary consequences in proceedings before the court.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed and exemplary costs of Rs.25,000 are imposed on the petitioner. The dismissal and costs are consequent to the suppression of material facts and misleading averments.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent authority should be directed to decide the application filed under Section 30 of the CGST Act and the timeframe for such decision.

Analysis: The alternative prayer sought direction for adjudication of the Section 30 application. Granting such a direction is a procedural relief distinct from the merits of the tax dispute and is appropriate to prevent undue delay in statutory proceedings. A finite timeline for disposal is specified to ensure timely adjudication.

Conclusion: The respondent authority is directed to decide the application filed under Section 30 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 within twelve weeks from the date of receipt of the order.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by dismissal with costs while the statutory application under Section 30 is ordered to be decided within a specified timeframe; the procedural direction does not alter the dismissal resulting from suppression of material facts.

Ratio Decidendi: Suppression of material facts in a writ petition that misleads the court can justify dismissal of the petition and imposition of exemplary costs while a court may concurrently direct timely disposal of an associated statutory application.

Issues: Whether the order-in-original and rectification order imposing IGST under reverse charge on ocean freight for imported goods for the period July 2017 to March 2018 can be sustained in view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Mohit Minerals (P.) Ltd. and the subsequent amendment/deletion of Entry 10 in Notification No. 10/2017 effective 01-10-2023.

Analysis: The Court examined (i) the legal effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Mohit Minerals which held that Notification No. 10/2017 was clarificatory and that separate levy on the service element in a CIF contract would violate the principle of composite supply under Sections 2(30) and 8 of the CGST Act, and (ii) the effect of a later amendment deleting Entry 10 of Notification No. 10/2017 with effect from 01-10-2023. The Court applied the principle that a constitutional court's declaration of law ordinarily has retrospective effect unless expressly made prospective, whereas a statutory amendment is prospective unless expressly made retrospective. The Court held that a subsequent amendment or notification cannot override or trump the statutory framework or judicial pronouncement applicable to transactions in an earlier period. The Proper Officer's reliance on the post-facto amendment (effective 01-10-2023) to impose tax for the 2017-2018 period was found to be without basis because the Supreme Court's ruling that Notification No. 10/2017 was clarificatory meant the levy could not be imposed for the earlier period; notifications must conform to the statute and cannot create a retrospective tax liability contrary to judicially declared law.

Conclusion: The order-in-original dated 30-01-2025 and the rectification order dated 25-03-2025 imposing IGST on ocean freight for the period July 2017 to March 2018 are set aside; the writ petition is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the adjudication order confirmed demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice to show-cause in violation of Section 75(7) of the GST Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the petitioners were entitled to disclosure of relevant material from the GST back-office (GST B.O. portal) relied upon in the notice to show-cause to enable effective reply.

Issue (i): Whether the adjudicating authority and the appellate authority erred in confirming demand by proceeding on a ground different from the one specified in the notice to show-cause, thereby violating Section 75(7) of the GST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The notice to show-cause was confined to alleged under-declaration of turnover in GSTR-3B. The adjudicating authority based the adjudication on a different premisetreatment of certain supplies as made under forward charge by relying on a notification and the petitioners alleged issuance of forward-charge invoicesthereby changing the basis of demand from the ground specified in the notice. Section 75(7) expressly prohibits confirmation of demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice. The appellate authority acknowledged the deviation but treated it as a mere technicality; the Court found that the change involved a substantive legal question not amenable to being treated as mere quantification.

Conclusion: The adjudication and appellate orders confirmed demand on grounds different from those specified in the notice in violation of Section 75(7) of the GST Act, 2017; this infirmity is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners were entitled to disclosure of the GST back-office material relied upon in the notice to show-cause to enable effective response.

Analysis: The notice was based on data from the GST B.O. portal within the exclusive knowledge domain of the revenue. The petitioners may not have had access to that data and therefore could be deprived of an effective opportunity to reply. Principles of fair adjudication and effective opportunity to be heard require disclosure of material in the possession of the authority that forms the basis of the notice, subject to lawful restrictions.

Conclusion: The petitioners are entitled to be provided the relevant information from the GST back-office relied upon in the notice to show-cause to enable effective response.

Final Conclusion: The Court enforces the statutory protection that demands must not be confirmed on grounds other than those in the notice and requires disclosure of relevant back-office material where necessary; the matter is remitted for fresh consideration consistent with these directions.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 75(7) of the GST Act, 2017 prohibits confirmation of tax demand on any grounds other than those specified in the notice to show-cause, and where a notice is founded on material within the revenue's exclusive knowledge, the authority must disclose relevant material to afford an effective opportunity of reply.

Issues: Whether the order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration with retrospective effect is sustainable where the Show Cause Notice is vague and does not specify the period or quantum of tax sought to be recovered, and whether the impugned appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred can be sustained.

Analysis: Section 29 of the GST statute empowers cancellation of registration, including retrospective cancellation. On the facts, the Show Cause Notice did not specify the period for which tax was alleged to be unpaid nor state whether cancellation would be retrospective; the petitioner therefore lacked sufficient particulars to mount an effective reply, impairing the opportunity of hearing guaranteed by principles of natural justice. Although the appeal was time-barred, the absence of adequate particulars in the Show Cause Notice rendered the substantive cancellation vulnerable to challenge. The Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction to test whether the statutory power was exercised consistent with the requirements of fair hearing and adequate notice, and considered remedial directions short of outright affirmation of the impugned orders.

Conclusion: The order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration with retrospective effect is quashed and set aside and the appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred is set aside; the matter is remitted for issuance of a modified Show Cause Notice and fresh adjudication allowing the petitioner an opportunity to reply.

Ratio Decidendi: A Show Cause Notice which fails to specify the period or quantum of alleged tax and whether cancellation is to operate retrospectively deprives the affected party of a meaningful opportunity of hearing and will vitiate a retrospective cancellation under Section 29 of the GST law.

Outcome: Special leave petition dismissed on the ground of delay as the explanation for the delay was found insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs.47,74,681 under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) / Section 69A (deemed income) can be sustained against the assessee where the assessee's non-contribution and the husband's payment of consideration are asserted and bank evidence is produced; (ii) Whether the reopening/issue of notice under Section 148 (and related order under Section 148A(d)) was validly sanctioned by the appropriate authority under Section 151.

Issue (i): Whether the addition treating 50% of the difference between stamp duty value and agreement value as deemed income of the assessee is justified where evidence of payments by the spouse was furnished.

Analysis: Reconciliation of bank payments made by the spouse to the developer was submitted, showing advances and subsequent payments aggregating the agreement consideration. The husbands assessment proceedings on identical facts resulted in dropping the reopening after verification. A comparable judicial decision on similar facts was considered. The factual material on record (bank statements and reconciliation) addresses the source of funds issue and the proviso to Section 56(2)(vii)(b) regarding dated consideration and registration was relevant to the assessment of whether unexplained income arose in the assessee's hands.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) / Section 69A is not sustainable and is deleted; the finding in favour of the assessee on this issue is upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the reopening/notice under Section 148 (and order under Section 148A(d)) was validly sanctioned by the appropriate authority as required by Section 151.

Analysis: The additional ground challenged the competency of the sanctioning authority under Section 151 given the monetary limits and the procedural timeline. Authorities and precedents dealing with the correctness of sanction under Section 151 and related quashing of reopening in comparable circumstances were considered. The admitted legal issue did not require new facts and was held suitable for admission and adjudication.

Conclusion: The reopening/notice was found to be invalid on the legal ground raised; the additional ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both the substantive challenge to the deemed income addition and the challenge to the validity of reopening/sanction are allowed, resulting in deletion of the addition and allowing the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where verifiable documentary evidence explains the source of funds for payment of consideration and the reassessment/sanction under Section 151 is procedurally defective, an addition under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) (or similar provisions) cannot be sustained and the reassessment must be quashed.

Issues: Whether the transactions in share purchase and sale were non-genuine accommodation entries attracting addition under section 68; and if so, whether the entire transaction value can be taxed or only the embedded commission, and the appropriate basis/quantum for such taxation.

Analysis: The record shows that the assessee participated in pre-arranged, layered transactions and acted as a conduit for accommodation entries, with corresponding non-genuine short-term capital loss and gain disclosed. The principal amounts passing through a conduit do not constitute the conduit's income; only the marginal commission or profit retained is taxable. Considering the nature of the transactions, the role of the assessee, and the absence of complete reliable evidence of actual commission, a conservative estimation method is appropriate. A 2% rate on the aggregate value of the non-genuine share transactions is adopted as a reasonable estimate of the commission element to be taxed.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 treating the entire value of the non-genuine share transactions as income is not sustained; instead, taxable income is to be estimated at 2% of the aggregate value of the impugned purchase and sale transactions, in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144C(13) r/w Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2020-21 is barred by limitation under Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act.

Analysis: The issue concerns the applicable time limit for completion of assessment where proceedings involve the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) under Section 144C. The statutory scheme includes time prescriptions in Section 153 for completion of assessments and a multi-stage mechanism in Section 144C providing for draft order, filing of objections, DRP directions and final order. The Madras High Court's ratio in CIT v. Roca Bathroom Products held that Sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive and that the outer time limit prescribed by Section 153 applies to final assessment orders under Section 144C(13); the non-obstante clause in Section 144C(13) does not wholly exclude Section 153. Coordinate decisions of the Hyderabad Bench applied that ratio to quash final orders beyond the Section 153 outer limit, while the Revenue urged deferral pending the Larger Bench/Supreme Court proceedings and relied on principles of institutional restraint and Section 158AB procedure. The Tribunal applied the binding effect of the Madras High Court decision, noted absence of any stay on that judgment, considered the factual timeline (draft order 27.09.2023; objections filed 27.10.2023; DRP directions 28.06.2024; final order 26.07.2024; outer limit under Section 153(1) r/w Section 153(4) expired 30.09.2023), and followed coordinate Hyderabad decisions while preserving parties' rights to revive other issues if the Supreme Court's Larger Bench decision requires modification.

Conclusion: The final assessment order dated 26/07/2024 is barred by limitation under Section 153 read with Section 144C and is quashed; decision is in favour of the Assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether section 50 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is invocable where depreciation has not been actually allowed in earlier years and whether Explanation 6 to section 43(6) permits retrospective recomputation of depreciation and WDV for concluded assessment years to attract section 50; (ii) Whether short-term capital loss on sale of motor cars can be set off against long-term capital gains on sale of immovable property in the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether section 50 applies and whether Explanation 6 to section 43(6) authorises retrospective recomputation of depreciation and WDV for concluded years to invoke section 50.

Analysis: Section 50 applies only to assets forming part of a block of assets in respect of which depreciation has been allowed. It is an explicit statutory condition requiring actual allowance of depreciation. Explanation 6 to section 43(6) is a machinery provision for computing WDV where depreciation has been allowed or ought to have been allowed under the Act. Explanation 6 cannot be used to rewrite concluded assessments by forcing depreciation into years where neither claimed nor allowed, particularly where no corresponding lease/hire income was disclosed in earlier returns. Binding authority from the High Court (Swetha Realmart LLP) supports non-invocation of section 50 in absence of any instance of depreciation actually allowed.

Conclusion: Section 50 is not invocable because depreciation was not actually allowed in earlier years; Explanation 6 to section 43(6) does not permit retrospective imposition of depreciation into finalized assessments to trigger section 50. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the short-term capital loss on sale of motor cars is allowable to be set off against long-term capital gains on sale of immovable property.

Analysis: Given that section 50 cannot be invoked and the sales of motor cars do not fall within a block attracting section 50 consequences, the characterisation and treatment of the losses remain as capital losses allowable under the normal capital gains set-off rules. The factual record shows no depreciation allowed and no lease/hire income declared in earlier years, supporting allowance of the claimed set-off.

Conclusion: The short-term capital loss on sale of motor cars is allowable to be set off against the long-term capital gains arising from sale of immovable properties. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed by deleting the addition made under section 50 and by holding that Explanation 6 to section 43(6) cannot be employed to retrospectively force depreciation into concluded years; consequentially the claimed set-off of capital loss is permitted.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 50 applies only where depreciation has been actually allowed in respect of the asset; Explanation 6 to section 43(6) cannot be used to retrospectively alter finalized assessments to create a deemed allowance of depreciation and thereby trigger section 50.

Issues: (i) Whether GST receipts collected by the assessee are includible in gross receipts for computing deemed income under Section 44B of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether provisions of Section 115JB apply to the assessee in view of Explanation 4A to Section 115JB(1); (iii) Whether the assessee is entitled to credit of short TDS and short advance tax and interest under Section 244A; (iv) Whether initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 270A is maintainable at this stage.

Issue (i): Whether GST receipts collected by the assessee are includible in gross receipts for computing deemed income under Section 44B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The issue concerned whether amounts collected as GST constitute 'amounts paid or payable' or 'amounts received or deemed to be received' under Section 44B(2). Coordinate-bench decisions in the assessee's own case on identical facts held that GST is a statutory levy collected as agent of the government and not a charge for carriage; Section 44B is a special deeming provision with a non-obstante clause, and Section 145A does not expand the specified amounts under Section 44B. The recurring nature of the issue and absence of change in law or facts were noted.

Conclusion: GST receipts are not includible in gross receipts for computing deemed income under Section 44B. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether provisions of Section 115JB apply to the assessee in view of Explanation 4A to Section 115JB(1).

Analysis: Coordinate-bench decisions on the same factual matrix concluded that where income is offered under the deeming provisions of Section 44B read with Section 90(2) and relevant tax treaty, Explanation 4A to Section 115JB(1) excludes such income from applicability of Section 115JB. No change in facts or law was shown to warrant a different conclusion.

Conclusion: Section 115JB does not apply to the assessee in view of Explanation 4A to Section 115JB(1). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the assessee is entitled to credit of short TDS and short advance tax and interest under Section 244A.

Analysis: The appellate authority below (CIT(A)) had directed verification and grant of credited TDS and advance tax and computation of interest under Section 244A. The matter remains pending with the AO and a rectification application has been filed; therefore verification and compliance by the AO was directed.

Conclusion: The AO is directed to verify and grant the short TDS and short advance tax credits and compute interest under Section 244A as per law. Grounds on these points are allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 270A is maintainable at this stage.

Analysis: The penalty initiation was premature on the material before the Tribunal and no substantive adjudication on underreporting was warranted at this stage.

Conclusion: Penalty proceedings under Section 270A are dismissed. This issue is decided against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: substantive relief granted to the assessee on the inclusion of GST under Section 44B and applicability of Section 115JB, directions given to the assessing officer to give effect to credits and interest after verification, and penalty initiation dismissed; jurisdictional/time-bar issues were kept open and some consequential matters were left for compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: For computation under Section 44B, only the specified amounts in Section 44B(2) are to be included; statutory levies collected as agent (such as GST) are not part of those specified amounts and therefore are not includible in deemed income under Section 44B.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 169 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 10,22,92,928/- made under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged bogus purchases is sustainable or requires modification.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 169 days in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The assessee filed a sworn affidavit explaining delay due to seeking legal advice and serious ill health of a director's son; the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate; no mala fide intent or benefit from delay shown; Revenue raised no objection.

Conclusion: Delay of 169 days is condoned and the appeal is admitted for adjudication on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs. 10,22,92,928/- under section 69C on account of alleged bogus purchases is sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee produced purchase invoices, consignment notes, purchase and sales registers, ledger entries, bank statements showing payments, audited accounts, one-to-one reconciliation and GST Form 2A which were not controverted by independent enquiry. The sole basis for treating purchases as bogus was a statement of the Director recorded under section 131 by another authority; that statement, read in entirety, indicated sale-in-transit (a recognised commercial practice) and did not record admission of receipt of cash, accommodation entries, or circular movement of funds. The Tribunal examined the binding precedent relied upon by Revenue (Kanak Impex) and held that its full-rigor application depends on presence of foundational incriminating material (e.g., sales-tax investigations, VAT fraud findings, hawala operator linkage, cash trails), which are absent here. The factual matrix warranted a calibrated approach between complete disallowance and full deletion.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69C cannot be sustained to the extent of the entire purchase amount. The addition is restricted to an estimated 6% of the impugned purchases to account for gross profit and possible suppression; the remainder (94%) of the addition is deleted. The Assessing Officer is directed to recompute accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed; delay in filing is condoned and the section 69C addition is reduced to 6% of the impugned purchases, with directions for recomputation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documentary evidence of purchases is complete and remains uncontroverted and there is no independent corroborative incriminating material (such as investigation reports, cash-trail or findings of VAT fraud), section 69C cannot be applied to disallow the entire purchase amount merely on the basis of a statement; in such factual matrices the addition may be restricted to a reasonable estimation of the profit/suppression element.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 2,92,12,400/- treated as bogus long-term capital gains and the consequential addition of Rs. 78,931/- (commission) could be sustained where SEBI, after investigation, revoked interim restraints and found no prima facie violation and a co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal on identical facts for the preceding year had deleted similar additions.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the Assessment Officer's reliance on investigation reports alleging organised bogus LTCG in penny stocks and examined the materials placed by the assessee, including SEBI interim orders and the SEBI order dated 06/09/2017 which revoked earlier restraints and found no prima facie violation against the assessee. The Tribunal also considered the co-ordinate Bench's decision in the assessee's own case for the immediately preceding assessment year, where identical transactions were held genuine and additions were deleted. The subsequent SEBI order relied upon by Revenue (dated 30/09/2022) did not implicate the assessee and did not introduce fresh facts to distinguish the present case from the earlier Tribunal decision and SEBI's revocation. In view of these regulatory findings and the precedent in the assessee's favour, the Tribunal found no reason to sustain the additions made by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting the addition of Rs. 2,92,12,400/- and the consequential deletion of Rs. 78,931/-. The revenue's grounds of appeal are dismissed and the appeal filed by the revenue stands dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a regulatory authority after investigation revokes interim restraints and finds no prima facie violation against a taxpayer, and a co-ordinate Tribunal decision on identical facts has deleted additions, additions treating LTCG as bogus on the basis of the same investigative material cannot be sustained in the absence of new distinguishing evidence.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the appellants' declared classification of imported Lauric Acid (claimed under CTH 29157090 with exemption under Notification No.12/2012-Cus, Sl. No.230A) and consequent denial of the exemption and confirmation of differential duty under proceedings initiated under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 is tenable.

Analysis: The Court examined the scope of review under Section 28(1) in light of the amended Section 17 and authoritative precedent holding that review under Section 28 may follow self-assessment and includes verification of classification. The legal framework requires strict interpretation of exemption notifications and places the burden on the claimant to establish that the imported goods fall within the claimed tariff sub-heading. The Court considered the General Rules of Interpretation (GRI 1) for tariff classification and noted that chapter and subheading notes govern classification. The Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Authority found that the appellant failed to produce cogent documentary or test evidence (such as analysis/composition certificates or test reports) to substantiate that the imported Lauric Acid falls under the claimed sub-heading, and that the product is not covered within the specified sub-headings of Chapter 29. The Tribunal placed weight on coordinate authority and Supreme Court decisions applying GRI and requiring strict proof for exemption claims, and found the appellant's reliance on third-party import classifications and general encyclopedia extracts insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof.

Conclusion: The rejection of the declared classification and denial of the exemption is upheld; the appeal is dismissed (decision is adverse to the assessee and in favour of Revenue).

Issues: Whether the conditionalities imposed by the Adjudicating Authority in para 33 of the impugned order permitting the bankrupt Appellant to travel abroadspecifically (a) deposit of Rs. 40 Crore as security and (b) execution of bonds by two solvent sureties of Rs. 50 Crore each (along with other conditions (c) to (l))are sustainable and require interference.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the impugned order and the factual matrix including the Appellant's declared bankrupt status, appointment of a Bankruptcy Trustee, pending proceedings/LOCs, and the need to safeguard financial creditors from risk of asset dissipation. The Adjudicating Authority's reasons for granting travel were accepted as sound. However, the Tribunal analysed whether requiring the bankrupt Appellant to arrange a Rs. 40 Crore security deposit was practicable or justified given that a bankrupt person ordinarily lacks available assets to raise such a sum and no convincing material was placed on record showing the Appellant's capacity to provide that amount. The Tribunal further considered the necessity and proportionality of other conditions: it found the requirement of execution of bonds by two solvent sureties of Rs. 50 Crore each to be a reasonable protective measure for creditors given the circumstances, and noted that conditions (c) to (l) were not challenged and serve to protect creditor interests and ensure cooperation with the bankruptcy process.

Conclusion: The direction in para 33(a) requiring deposit of Rs. 40 Crore is set aside; the remaining conditionalities in para 33(b) to (l) are upheld and shall remain in force. The permission to travel remains subject to other permissions from competent authorities as required by law.

Issues: Whether the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is ineligible as a "related party" of the Corporate Debtor within the meaning of Section 5(24)(h) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and therefore barred from submitting a Resolution Plan.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the non-binding term sheet dated 09.06.2022 and the surrounding facts. The term sheet was expressly subject to contract and contained condition precedents; no definitive investment agreement was executed, no shares were allotted, and the Rs. 10,00,000 deposited by the investor was refunded to the State Bank of India before the Section 7 petition. The Adjudicating Authority in IA No.5201 of 2024 had earlier considered the same material and held that, in absence of a definitive agreement and given refund of the deposit, the ingredients of Section 5(24)(h) (advice, directions or instructions by the investor to the company's directors/managers) were not established. That earlier finding was not challenged and has attained finality. The Tribunal found no error in the Adjudicating Authority's subsequent approval of the Resolution Plan in IA No.30 of 2024.

Conclusion: The SRA is not a "related party" within the meaning of Section 5(24)(h) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; the appeal is dismissed and the Adjudicating Authority's approval of the Resolution Plan is upheld (decision in favour of Respondent).