Issues: Whether denial of exemption and consequential duty, interest, penalty and redemption fine could be sustained merely on the revocation of one certificate of origin, without scrutiny and notice in respect of the individual consignments.

Analysis: The imports were supported by certificates of origin issued by competent authorities under the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement framework. The revocation of one certificate, by itself, did not establish that the remaining consignments lacked origin eligibility or that the certificates accompanying them were unauthentic or non-compliant. The relevant rules and operational certification procedures did not permit the revocation to be treated as a substitute for the verification process contemplated under the agreement, and the authority was required to follow the prescribed notice and determination process before denying the exemption. The record did not show a proper consignments-wise verification or a legally sustainable basis for extending the adverse result from one certificate to all imports.

Conclusion: The denial of exemption and the resulting demand, penalties and confiscation-related consequences were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: An exemption under a rules-of-origin based trade agreement cannot be denied across multiple consignments merely because one certificate of origin is revoked, unless the authority independently verifies the relevant consignments and follows the prescribed statutory and treaty-based procedure.

Issues: Whether the conditions imposed by the Commissioner for provisional release of seized imported distillate marine oil under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 are proper and sustainable.

Analysis: The appeal challenges onerous conditions (including bank guarantees and end-use undertakings) imposed for provisional release despite the Commissioner finding that test reports did not definitively establish the goods as HFHSD and that the samples were most akin to DMX-type Distillate Marine Fuel. The Tribunal examined relevant judicial guidance including the Supreme Court's "most akin" principle and recent Gujarat High Court decisions which held that where expert reports do not conclusively satisfy a single standard and where deviations on parameters such as cloud point are context-dependent, ambiguity operates in favour of the importer. The Tribunal noted that cloud point is not a determinative parameter for classification as Distillate Marine Fuel and its relevance depends on end-use, vessel and climatic conditions. The Commissioner had already leaned in favour of the importer on tested parameters; nevertheless, additional onerous release conditions were imposed. The Tribunal also observed that similarly placed importers had been released without such guarantees following the Gujarat High Court decisions.

Conclusion: The conditions imposed for provisional release are not sustainable and are set aside or modified in accordance with the Gujarat High Court rulings; two bank guarantees furnished by the appellant are liable to be discharged and other onerous conditions are to be modified consistent with the cited High Court decisions. The appeal is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: For provisional release under Section 110A, where expert test reports are inconclusive or do not definitively satisfy a particular standard, the "most akin" test applies and any ambiguity in expert opinion favours the importer; cloud point is a context-dependent, non-determinative parameter for classification and end-use considerations may be used instead of imposing onerous provisional release conditions.

Issues: Whether Customs authorities could confirm demands, penalties and confiscation in respect of cars imported under EPCG licences after DGFT had issued Export Obligation Discharge Certificates (EODCs) and cancelled the bonds, without any prior adjudication or cancellation of the EODCs by DGFT.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined earlier Division Bench decisions which held that where DGFT has issued EODCs and has not cancelled them, the EODCs are determinative of fulfillment of export obligations under the EPCG scheme. The Tribunal noted the DGFT clarification that foreign exchange earnings from hotel, tourism and travel services (including use of imported vehicles) are to be considered for discharge of export obligation where no misuse or transfer is shown. The Tribunal further relied on precedent establishing that Customs cannot ignore or sit in judgment over certificates and licences issued by the licencing authority (DGFT) unless DGFT itself has adjudicated and cancelled those certificates; absence of any cancellation or adjudication by DGFT precludes Customs from confirming demands based on alleged non-fulfillment.

Conclusion: The Customs demands, penalties and confiscation confirmed by the adjudicating authority are set aside insofar as they relate to the appeals because DGFT had issued EODCs and there was no adjudication or cancellation of those EODCs by DGFT; the appeals are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the NCLT's interim directions dated 28.11.2025 prohibiting payments to certain persons and restraining creation of third-party interest in immovable property were beyond jurisdiction or unsustainable; (ii) Whether the NCLT erred in directing that certain persons (Respondents No.2 and 3 / Respondent No.4 and Petitioner) be retained on the Board despite challenges under Section 167(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Issue (i): Whether the interim directions dated 28.11.2025 (no payments to specified persons and no creation of third-party interest) exceeded the NCLT's jurisdiction or were unwarranted.

Analysis: The reliefs sought in the company petition included prayers restraining alienation of shareholding and creation of third-party rights in company assets, and an interim prayer restraining creation of third-party rights in company assets. The NCLT recorded information about withdrawals and undertakings given by parties and made prima facie directions to preserve company assets and prevent payments/transactions that could affect the company's interest pending adjudication. The appellants' contention that the NCLT corrected an earlier order on 'remuneration' did not negate the existence of interim prayers seeking restraint on disposal or encumbrance of assets.

Conclusion: In favour of Respondent. The interim directions dated 28.11.2025 were within the NCLT's jurisdiction and were not set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the NCLT erred in directing that certain persons remain on the Board and act as directors despite alleged disqualification under Section 167(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The record did not contain evidence proving service of notices of board meetings to establish continuous absence required for disqualification under Section 167(1)(b). MCA records continued to show the individuals as directors. Parties gave undertakings that no board meeting would be called pending final disposal. Given the absence of evidence of service or formalization of disqualification, continuation on the Board as an interim measure pending final adjudication was supported by the material on record.

Conclusion: In favour of Respondent. The NCLT's direction to retain the specified persons on the Board pending final disposal was justified.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are disposed of by refusing to disturb the impugned interim orders; the NCLT's interim directions concerning preservation of company assets and board composition remain in force and the NCLT is requested to pronounce its reserved judgment expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Where interim reliefs seeking preservation of company assets and status quo on board composition are pleaded and there is prima facie material (including undertakings, record of withdrawals, or absence of evidence of service of notices), the tribunal may grant provisional directions preventing payments and creation of third-party interests and retain directors on the board pending final adjudication under the Companies Act, 2013.

Issues: Whether pre-existing disputes existed between the parties regarding the goods supplied and the crystallisation/amount of the operational debt, such that the Section 9 application for initiation of CIRP was rightly rejected under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Applicable law requires that for a Section 9 application to succeed the operational debt must be due and payable and not subject to a pre-existing dispute. The Mobilox test requires the adjudicating authority to examine documentary evidence to decide (i) existence of operational debt, (ii) whether documentary evidence shows the debt is due and payable, and (iii) whether a dispute or record of a suit/arbitration existed prior to the demand notice. Communications exchanged before the demand notice showing disagreements on quality of supplied material, requests to collect/assess damaged material, and demands for reconciliation are relevant to determine a pre-existing dispute. A challenge to interest claimed (where interest was not agreed in the principal hiring orders) and a disputed claim for value of unreturned goods constitute plausible grounds of dispute which need not be finally adjudicated by the Adjudicating Authority at the Section 9 stage.

Conclusion: Issue decided in favour of the Respondent. The disputes raised prior to the Section 8 demand notice were found to be real and plausible; therefore the Section 9 application was rightly rejected on the ground of pre-existing dispute.

Issues: Whether the value of materials supplied under turnkey/composite contracts must be included in the taxable value of works contract service when the contract documents specify separate values for supply of goods and for erection/commissioning services.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the contract documents and the findings of the adjudicating authority which recorded that the work orders expressly specified the value of goods supplied and the value of erection, testing and commissioning services. The adjudicating authority also noted that the assessee was liable to pay VAT on the value of goods supplied. On this basis the Tribunal treated the separately identified supply value as not required to be added to the taxable value of the services. The Tribunal considered the legal characterisation of turnkey/composite contracts but accepted the factual segregation of values reflected in the contractual documents and accounts and the consequent tax treatment.

Conclusion: The demand to include the value of materials in the taxable value of works contract service is rejected and the impugned order dropping the demand in respect of the value of goods supplied is upheld, which is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 dated 30.07.2022 (for A.Y. 2016-17), which were issued after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, are valid when prior approval was obtained from an authority specified under Section 151(i) instead of the higher authority mandated by Section 151(ii).

Analysis: Under the substituted re-assessment regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, prior approval of the specified authority is a precondition at the stage of passing an order under Section 148A(d) and issuing a notice under Section 148. Section 151(ii) prescribes a higher level of authority to grant sanction when more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. The time-limit interplay with the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) extends the period for grant of sanction only where the three-year expiry date falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021; otherwise the higher authority under Section 151(ii) is mandatorily required if notices are issued after three years. Where approval is obtained from an authority not competent under Section 151(ii) for notices issued after three years, the assessing officer lacks jurisdiction to issue the Section 148 notice, and consequent proceedings are vitiated.

Conclusion: The order under Section 148A(d) dated 30.07.2022 and the notice under Section 148 dated 30.07.2022 are invalid for non-compliance with Section 151(ii). Consequentially, the reassessment order dated 30.10.2025 under Section 147 and the penalty notice dated 07.11.2025 under Section 274 read with Section 271(1)(c) are quashed and set aside.

Issues: Whether the ICDS adjustment made in an intimation under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was made without complying with the jurisdictional requirements of the first and second proviso to Section 143(1) (i.e., without giving intimation to the assessee and considering the assessee's response), and whether that adjustment is liable to be quashed.

Analysis: Section 143(1), read with its first and second provisos, mandates that no adjustment under Section 143(1)(a) shall be made unless an intimation of the proposed adjustment is given to the assessee in writing or electronic mode and any response received from the assessee is considered before making the adjustment. On the facts found in the record, no intimation was served on the assessee in respect of the ICDS adjustment and the department has not disputed that no notice for the proposed adjustment was issued; consequently, the statutory pre-conditions for making the adjustment were not complied with. The absence of the required intimation and opportunity to respond constitutes breach of the jurisdictional requirements and of the principles of natural justice. The availability of appellate or alternate remedies does not preclude relief by writ where there is such a breach and where effective adjudication has not occurred in a timely manner.

Conclusion: The ICDS adjustment made in the intimation under Section 143(1) is quashed and set aside; the writ petition is allowed insofar as the impugned ICDS adjustment is concerned.

Issues: Whether an assessment/order passed under Section 74 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act for the year 2024-2025 is valid where Section 74 was omitted by a 2024 amendment and assessment should instead proceed under Section 74A.

Analysis: The impugned order was examined to determine the statutory basis invoked. The record shows the respondent issued the order under Section 74 despite Section 74 having been omitted by a 2024 amendment. The respondent conceded the use of the incorrect provision. Given the omission, the procedural and substantive requirements for assessment must follow the provision that remains in force, namely Section 74A, and the action taken under the omitted provision cannot stand as a valid assessment. The appropriate remedial course is to treat the impugned order as a show cause notice and permit the assessee to reply, followed by fresh consideration and personal hearing under the correct statutory provision.

Conclusion: The impugned order passed under Section 74 is set aside; the order is to be treated as a show cause notice, the petitioner permitted to file reply/objection within six weeks, and the respondent directed to issue a 14-day notice fixing personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate orders on merits under the correct provision (Section 74A).

Issues: (i) Whether delay in filing should be condoned; (ii) Whether notice should be issued and the matter listed for further consideration.

Issue (i): Whether delay in filing should be condoned.

Analysis: The Court considered the application for condonation of delay and granted relief allowing the petition to proceed despite the delay. The order records the condonation without detailed reasoning.

Conclusion: Delay condoned in favour of permitting the petition to proceed.

Issue (ii): Whether notice should be issued to the opposite party and the matter listed for further consideration.

Analysis: The Court considered submissions on the substantive question (including reference to Section 3(12) of the Customs Tariff Act and related authorities) and directed issuance of notice to the respondent, waived service on respondent No.1, and listed the matter for further consideration on a specified date. Parties were directed to complete pleadings and file a short note of submissions with case law compilation.

Conclusion: Notice issued; service waived on respondent No.1; matter listed for further consideration.

Final Conclusion: The Court has granted interim procedural reliefs (condonation of delay and issuance of notice) and directed further proceedings; no substantive or final adjudication on the fiscal question has been made.

Issues: (i) Whether show cause notices/orders can be clubbed and issued for more than one financial year (bunching of notices) and (ii) Whether issuance of notice/assessment under Section 73 for financial years 2024-25 and 2025-26 is permissible after omission of Sections 73 & 74 and applicability of Section 74A.

Issue (i): Whether issuance of a single show cause notice/order covering multiple financial years is permissible.

Analysis: The statutory scheme permits issuance of show cause notices linked to the tax period; where annual returns constitute the tax period, notices must be based on that annual return, or where issued before annual returns are filed, on monthly returns. The practice of clubbing notices across distinct financial years lacks statutory basis and results in proceedings without jurisdiction where multiple years are combined in one notice/order.

Conclusion: The clubbing of show cause notices/orders for more than one financial year is impermissible and such notices/orders are liable to be quashed. The Conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether notices and assessment proceedings for FYs 2024-25 and 2025-26 under Section 73 are valid after Sections 73 and 74 were omitted with effect from 01.04.2024 and Section 74A applies.

Analysis: Sections 73 and 74 having been omitted with effect from 01.04.2024, the post-omission statutory regime requires reliance on Section 74A for the financial years 2024-25 onwards. Issuing notices or passing assessments under Section 73 for periods to which Section 74A applies reflects non-application of mind and lacks statutory foundation.

Conclusion: Issuance of notice/assessment under Section 73 for FYs 2024-25 and 2025-26 is impermissible; those parts of the proceedings are quashed. The Conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment order and consequential orders are quashed for lack of jurisdiction arising from clubbing of multiple financial years and for being founded on provisions omitted by statute; the respondents are permitted to initiate separate proceedings for each financial year in accordance with the applicable statutory provision.

Ratio Decidendi: Show cause notices and assessment orders must be issued in accordance with the tax period specified by law and cannot be clubbed across multiple financial years; where statutory amendments omit prior provisions, proceedings must be founded on the provisions in force for the relevant financial year (Section 74A for post-01.04.2024 periods).

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessment Order dated 29th September 2021 passed by the National Faceless Assessment Centre is vitiated by non-furnishing of the draft assessment order and non-consideration of the assessee's submissions, warranting quashing and remand; (ii) Whether the amount deposited as a pre-condition for stay (Rs. 2,02,21,990/-) must be refunded with interest following quashing of the assessment and revisional orders.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned faceless assessment and the revisional orders stand vitiated by failure to furnish a draft assessment order and by non-consideration of the assessee's submissions.

Analysis: The impugned final assessment was passed after an ITAT remand. It is admitted that no draft assessment order was furnished to the assessee prior to the final order. The final assessment also did not deal with documents and written submissions filed by the assessee. The revisional authority likewise failed to address those submissions. These deficiencies engage principles of fair procedure and the statutory framework governing faceless assessments and post-remand proceedings.

Conclusion: The impugned Assessment Order dated 29th September 2021 and the revisional orders dated 13th January 2023 and 9th February 2023 are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the National Faceless Assessment Centre for de-novo consideration of all submissions.

Issue (ii): Whether the pre-condition deposit of Rs. 2,02,21,990/- made for stay of demand must be refunded with interest in view of the quashing of the assessment and revisional orders.

Analysis: The deposit was made pursuant to a stay conditioned on the revisional order and assessment which have now been quashed. The quashing removes the basis for the conditioned stay and the pre-condition deposit taken under those orders.

Conclusion: The deposit of Rs. 2,02,21,990/- shall be refunded to the assessee along with interest as payable in law.

Final Conclusion: The assessment and revisional orders are set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh consideration; consequential refund with interest is directed. All other contentions are kept open for consideration on fresh proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to furnish a draft assessment order and failure to consider an assessee's submissions in faceless assessment proceedings vitiate the assessment, requiring quashing and remand for de-novo consideration.

Issues: (i) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in setting aside the Order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which had held the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue?

Analysis: The statutory framework includes Section 10(23FB) and Section 115U (pass-through treatment of VCF income), and Section 263 (revisional jurisdiction requiring the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to revenue). The VCF Regulations, 1996 and the amended Third Schedule (negative list) determine whether investments in entities engaged in real estate are excluded from the definition of venture capital undertakings. The assessment proceedings recorded requests for detailed information and the Assessing Officer obtained and considered statements, SEBI registration, fund-wise and investment-wise details, Form No.64 filings and other materials before completing assessment allowing exemption under Section 10(23FB). SEBI amendments removed real estate from the negative list w.e.f. 05-04-2004 and SEBI clarification permits temporary investments in mutual funds. The revisional authority substituted its view without demonstrating that the AO had not applied his mind or that both conditions for exercise of Section 263 jurisdiction were satisfied; the disputed income was subject to tax in the hands of unit-holders under Section 115U and no adverse action was shown by SEBI.

Conclusion: The Tribunal correctly quashed the revisional Order under Section 263 because the jurisdictional requirements for revision were not satisfied and the assessment order represented a possible view of the Assessing Officer who had applied his mind; consequently, the appeal by Revenue is without merit.

Ratio Decidendi: Exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 requires satisfaction of both that the assessment order is erroneous and that it is prejudicial to the interest of revenue; a revisional order that merely substitutes the revisional authority's view for that of an Assessing Officer who has applied his mind and made detailed enquiries is impermissible.

Issues: (i) whether recovery proceedings and freezing of the bank account could be sustained for tax dues assessed in the name of a company that had already amalgamated and ceased to exist; (ii) whether Section 44(6) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 could be invoked to fasten liability on a former director in such circumstances.

Issue (i): Whether recovery proceedings and freezing of the bank account could be sustained for tax dues assessed in the name of a company that had already amalgamated and ceased to exist.

Analysis: The assessment order and the consequential recovery action were directed against an entity that had ceased to exist upon amalgamation. Once the amalgamation took effect, the tax liability, if any, had to be pursued against the amalgamated entity and not against the defunct company. Recovery by attachment or freezing of the petitioner's bank account on the basis of an order passed against a non-existent entity was therefore legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The action of freezing the bank account and the underlying recovery proceedings were invalid and could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 44(6) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 could be invoked to fasten liability on a former director in such circumstances.

Analysis: Section 44(6) contemplates liability of directors of a private company where tax dues of that company cannot be recovered, subject to the statutory conditions. The provision was held inapplicable to a case where the company had already amalgamated with another entity and the authorities were required to proceed against the successor company. On that footing, no liability could be fastened on the petitioner as a former director for the dues of the erstwhile company.

Conclusion: Section 44(6) could not be used to recover the dues from the petitioner, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded and the impugned recovery action was quashed, leaving the authorities free only to proceed in law against the legally liable successor entity, if otherwise permissible.

Ratio Decidendi: A recovery or assessment action initiated against a non-existent amalgamating company is a jurisdictional nullity, and director-liability provisions cannot be used to recover such dues from a former director where the statute requires pursuit of the successor amalgamated entity.

Issues: Whether the refund sanction order dated 30th June 2022 which short-sanctioned refund of Rs. 1,85,63,835/- (along with interest) should be quashed to the extent of non-granting of that amount because the order was non-speaking, failed to consider the petitioners challans and related material and did not afford a personal hearing in accordance with principles of natural justice, and whether the petitioner should be permitted to seek a fresh refund representation with a direction for a reasoned decision and personal hearing.

Analysis: The impugned order rejected or short-sanctioned the claimed refund on the basis that department records did not permit differentiation between self-assessed payments and payments made during investigation. The order does not contain discussion or reasoning showing that the petitioners documentary material (challans) was considered or that contrary material existed to displace the petitioners claim of payment of Rs. 13,13,75,917/-. The impugned order therefore lacks a reasoned, speaking determination on the factual point central to the refund claim and did not provide the petitioner a personal hearing before denial of part of the refund. Given the absence of departmental findings rebutting the petitioners evidence and the absence of a reasoned decision, procedural fairness and the requirement for a speaking order and opportunity of personal hearing are implicated. Remedial measures confined to quashing the non-reasoned portion of the order and directing fresh consideration after hearing are appropriate to secure compliance with the earlier court direction for refund with interest.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 30th June 2022 is quashed and set aside to the extent of non-granting of refund of Rs. 1,85,63,835/- along with applicable interest @12% per annum; the petitioner is permitted to file a fresh representation with supporting challans within two weeks and, on receipt, respondent shall provide a personal hearing and pass a reasoned order on the refund claim within six weeks.

Issues: Whether writ relief is appropriate against the Order-in-Original dated 22.04.2024 raising demand under the MGST and CGST Acts, or whether the petitioner should be directed to pursue statutory appeal remedies before the appellate authority.

Analysis: The Court considered the factual position that customs authorities had assessed and certified payment of customs duty, SWS and IGST on de-bonding and issued an NOC; the petitioner contested certain components of the demand before the Court but the Commissioner of Customs filed an affidavit confirming the assessment and payment. The petitioner expressly relented to not contest a portion of the demand but sought leave to challenge specified disputed amounts by statutory appeal. Respondents did not oppose the petitioner pursuing the appellate remedy. In these circumstances the Court found that directing the petitioner to pursue the available statutory appeal would appropriately address the disputed tax components and permit consideration of condonation of delay for the period the writ petition remained pending.

Conclusion: The petitioner is directed to file an appeal before the Joint Commissioner (Appeals)I under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017 within six weeks from the date this order is made available on the Court website; the writ petition is disposed of in the above terms with liberty to avail benefit of the period during which the petition was pending for condonation of delay. No costs.

Issues: Whether the notice dated 30.03.2025 issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 reopening the assessment for AY 2022-23 is valid where the revenue's case rests on a seized broker's register and statements without independent corroborative material linking the assessee to the alleged on-money transaction.

Analysis: The Court examined the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer: a register seized from a broker during a search and statements of the searched person which record an entry dated 11.08.2017 referring to Survey No. 465 and unit rates. The register does not name the petitioner and the statement of the searched person disclaims knowledge of current sale status, indicating client documents may be present but not ownership or transaction details tied to the petitioner. The authorities supplied satisfaction and approval notes and disposed of objections, but no independent corroborative evidence was placed on record to establish a live link between the petitioner and the alleged clandestine cash/on-money receipt. The Court noted the subsequent factual sequence conversion of land, gifting of 70% share in 2021, and petitioners sale of 30% in 2021 which does not align with the 2017 register entry asserted to show an intention to sell the entire plot at the recorded unit price. In absence of material connecting the petitioner to the purported higher valuation or on-money payment, the statutory requirement for reopening under Section 148 was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The impugned notice dated 30.03.2025 under Section 148 is quashed and set aside; the writ petition is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Reopening under Section 148 requires independent material establishing a live link between the assessee and alleged undisclosed income; reliance solely on a seized register and searched person's statements, without corroborative evidence naming or connecting the assessee, is insufficient to sustain a notice for reassessment.

Issues: Whether the petitioner may be permitted to file its return electronically (after filing a paper return under an interim order), be deemed to have filed the return within time, and whether directions should be given for opening the Income Tax Portal and for timelines for filing and assessment.

Analysis: The petition arises from an interim permission to file a paper return within a prescribed period. The petitioner's paper return was filed within that period. The respondents will facilitate electronic filing by opening the Income Tax Portal within a specified period and notifying the petitioner. The petitioner will thereafter upload the return electronically within a further specified period. The respondents will process or assess the electronically filed return within a specified assessment timeline. No observations are recorded on the merits of the return, which are to be considered by the Department in accordance with law.

Conclusion: Permission granted for electronic filing with the following directions: (i) the Income Tax Portal shall be opened within six weeks; (ii) the petitioner shall upload the return electronically within four weeks of notification; (iii) the return so filed shall be deemed to have been filed within time; and (iv) the Revenue shall process/assess the return within 12 months of electronic upload.