Issues: Whether the seized imported goods were liable to be provisionally released subject to conditions, while preserving the customs authorities' power to continue adjudication.

Analysis: The writ petition concerned only a seizure memo and sought interim release of the imported consignment. The Court followed the course adopted in earlier similar matters and held that release could be ordered at the admission stage itself on terms safeguarding the revenue. It directed quantification of the enhanced duty, payment of the quantified amount, furnishing of a bank guarantee, and maintenance of transaction details if the goods were sold after release. It also clarified that the customs department could continue adjudication in accordance with law and that the adjudicating authority would decide the matter independently and without being influenced by the conditional release.

Conclusion: The seized goods were ordered to be provisionally released subject to the stipulated conditions, and the petitioner succeeded.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment proceedings and consequential assessment were barred by limitation under the substituted reassessment regime. (ii) Whether the writ court should interfere with the assessment in view of disputed facts and the availability of a statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment proceedings and consequential assessment were barred by limitation under the substituted reassessment regime.

Analysis: The notice originally issued under the unamended reassessment provision was treated as a deemed notice under the substituted scheme. The limitation for issuing notice under the new regime had to be tested with reference to the substituted provisions and the time available after exclusions recognised in the governing Supreme Court directions. For the relevant assessment year, the escaped income exceeded the monetary threshold applicable to the extended ten-year period. On that footing, the reassessment notice issued in 2022 fell within the surviving period of limitation and could not be held time-barred.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were not barred by limitation and the assessee's challenge on that ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ court should interfere with the assessment in view of disputed facts and the availability of a statutory appeal.

Analysis: The dispute on computation of capital gains turned on factual questions concerning the nature of the property and the circumstances of sale. The record disclosed that these issues required examination of facts and evidence, which were better addressed in the appellate forum. In view of the alternative statutory remedy, the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction for interference with the assessment, while granting liberty to pursue appeal and seek appropriate interim protection.

Conclusion: Interference in writ jurisdiction was declined and the assessee was left to pursue the statutory appeal.

Final Conclusion: The assessment challenge was rejected, the reassessment was held to be within time, and the petitioner was directed to work out remedies before the appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice issued under the substituted regime is valid if it is within the surviving limitation computed under the new reassessment provisions read with the applicable exclusion principles, and writ interference is ordinarily unwarranted where the dispute turns on factual questions better resolved in statutory appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether liquidated damages, underwriting commission and structuring fees were entitled to exemption under section 10(23G) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by falling within the scope of "interest" under section 2(28A) of that Act. (ii) Whether the deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be granted without first reducing the deduction allowable under section 36(1)(viii) of that Act.

Issue (i): Whether liquidated damages, underwriting commission and structuring fees were entitled to exemption under section 10(23G) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by falling within the scope of "interest" under section 2(28A) of that Act.

Analysis: The expression "interest" in section 2(28A) is defined in an inclusive and expansive manner to cover interest payable in any manner in respect of borrowed money or debt, as well as service fee or other charge connected with unutilised credit facilities. On that footing, liquidated damages arising from default in a finance arrangement, underwriting commission paid for extending or enhancing credit, and structuring fees charged for modification or restructuring of credit facilities all fall within the statutory ambit of interest. Once so characterised, the receipts are eligible for the exemption under section 10(23G).

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be granted without first reducing the deduction allowable under section 36(1)(viii) of that Act.

Analysis: The deductions under section 36 are separately structured and operate independently. The deduction under section 36(1)(viii) is computed on profits derived from long-term finance, while the deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(c) is a distinct statutory allowance. The amendment to section 36(1)(viii) altered the method of computation but did not make that deduction a prior adjustment to be set off before applying section 36(1)(viia)(c). The two deductions are not dependent on each other.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substantive questions that were decided were resolved in favour of the assessee, while the remaining questions were not pressed and did not require adjudication on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory definition of "interest" under section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is wide enough to include charges such as liquidated damages, underwriting commission and restructuring fees connected with credit facilities, and the deductions under different clauses of section 36 operate independently unless the statute expressly makes one conditional upon the other.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued and assumption of jurisdiction under section 10 of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 (BMA) was valid; (ii) Whether the BMA applies to the impugned foreign bank accounts and/or their income prior to its commencement and the correct year of chargeability under section 3(1) proviso and section 59; (iii) Whether historic interest income for pre-2016 years can be taxed under the BMA.

Issue (i): Validity of the notice and assumption of jurisdiction under section 10 of the BMA.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the facts of assignment of AO authority, timing of summons, voluntary disclosures, revised returns filed under section 139(5) and the content of the notice dated 13.04.2018. It considered whether omission to specify relevant financial year and delay went to jurisdiction and whether such defects could be cured under section 81 of the BMA (analogue to section 292B of the IT Act). The Tribunal reviewed authorities on when notice defects are jurisdictional and the statutory requirement for a notice to identify the chargeable period.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the impugned notice dated 13.04.2018 and assumption of jurisdiction under section 10 were invalid to the extent they were invoked over assets/income that were not "undisclosed" within the meaning of the BMA; accordingly the cross-objection on jurisdictional grounds is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Applicability of the BMA to pre-commencement assets/income and the correct year of chargeability under section 3(1) proviso and section 59.

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed section 3(1) (charging section commencing A.Y. 2016-17), its proviso fixing the previous year of chargeability for undisclosed assets, the definition of "undisclosed asset located outside India" in section 2(11), the components of section 4(1), and the transitional declaration mechanism in section 59. It considered the effect of valid voluntary disclosure by the assessee in revised returns under section 139(5) and voluntary letters prior to the issuance of the BMA notice, and relevant precedents distinguishing retrospective valuation of assets from prospective taxation of income.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the BMA's income charge operates prospectively from A.Y. 2016-17 and the proviso to section 3(1) grants limited retrospective valuation only for undisclosed assets acquired from income chargeable under the IT Act; where the corpus is explained (inherited capital) and income was disclosed in revised returns or via voluntary disclosure, the BMA does not apply. The Tribunal allowed the assessee on this issue.

Issue (iii): Taxability under BMA of historic interest income for pre-2016 years.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed the facts that the corpus was inherited and non-taxable as capital receipt, that historic interest for F.Y. 2009-10 to 2013-14 was voluntarily disclosed to the jurisdictional ITO with a request for re-opening under section 147, and that returns for later years were revised and processed. It examined statutory demarcation between BMA and ITA, and precedents treating pre-2016 income as assessable only under ITA machinery (including section 147/149).

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that historic interest income for pre-2016 years could not be taxed under the BMA and deleted the addition of Rs. 52,77,108 (Rs. 26,38,554 as assessee's share). The assessee succeeded on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's cross-objection on legal grounds (jurisdiction, temporal scope, and taxability of historic interest) and consequently dismissed the revenue's appeal as infructuous; the net effect is final relief to the assessee with the revenue appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: The BMA's charging section 3(1) applies prospectively from A.Y. 2016-17; its proviso permits limited retrospective valuation only of undisclosed assets that were acquired from income chargeable under the Income-tax Act, 1961; where foreign assets or income are validly disclosed (including by revised return under section 139(5) or voluntary disclosure) or the corpus is an explained capital receipt (inheritance), such assets/income do not fall within the BMA and historic pre-2016 income is assessable only under the Income-tax Act, not the BMA.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing appeals before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) should be condoned and the appeals restored for adjudication on merits; (ii) Whether the assessment and consequential penalty orders should be set aside/remanded to permit adjudication on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing appeals before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) should be condoned and the appeals restored for adjudication on merits.

Analysis: The notices of reopening were issued to an email ID recorded in the income-tax database; non-reception was attributed to the email account not being accessed by the assessee. The period when notices were issued overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic, which the Court treated as a relevant circumstance in assessing the sufficiency of the explanation for delay. The Court weighed the consequence of non-participation in assessment proceedings against the statutory requirement to file returns and identified that, while reopening of statutory time-limited opportunities was not warranted, the assessee ought to be given a fair opportunity in appellate proceedings to present its case. The Court observed that condonation of delay in filing appeals may be granted subject to safeguards to prevent undue prejudice to revenue.

Conclusion: Delay in filing the appeals before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is condoned and the appeals are restored for adjudication on merits, subject to the assessee depositing twenty percent of the demand before the Assessing Officer; the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) shall consider the appeals on merits only upon such deposit being made.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment orders and consequential penalty orders should be set aside or remanded to permit adjudication on merits before the appropriate authority.

Analysis: In view of the restoration of appeals to the appellate forum and the need to afford the assessee an opportunity to be heard on merits, the appellate and penalty proceedings were treated as continuations of the assessment process that ought to be considered afresh by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Court declined to reopen the statutory window for filing returns but held that remand of the appeals and consequential penalty orders was necessary to enable adjudication on merits once the conditional deposit is made.

Conclusion: The assessment orders and the consequential penalty orders for the relevant assessment years are set aside and remanded to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) for fresh adjudication on merits; the appeals are restored to the appellate forum subject to the twenty percent deposit condition.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed to the limited extent of condoning delay and restoring the appeals for merits adjudication before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upon fulfillment of the deposit condition; assessment and penalty orders are set aside and remanded for fresh consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where non-receipt of notices recorded in the tax database coincides with exceptional circumstances (such as the COVID-19 period), a condonation of delay may be granted to restore appeals for merits adjudication, subject to protective conditions (including a deposit of a portion of the demand) to balance the assessee's right to be heard and the revenue's interest.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings were validly initiated on the basis of approval recorded under section 151 and the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The approval was challenged as mechanical, but the record showed that the sanctioning authority had recorded satisfaction on the reasons placed before it. The Tribunal noted that later judicial authorities had accepted similar forms of approval as sufficient where the authority had applied its mind to the reasons recorded. On the formation of belief, the Tribunal also found that the Assessing Officer had misread the nature of the receipt arising from compulsory acquisition, because interest under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is treated as part of enhanced compensation and not as ordinary interest for delay. In that background, the material did not justify reopening.

Conclusion: The reassessment was held invalid and the objection to reopening was decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the observation in the impugned order that a single show-cause notice was issued in respect of three financial years (and was therefore erroneous) should be sustained, and whether interference with the writ appeal is warranted.

Analysis: The impugned order relegated the respondent to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. While doing so, an observation was recorded that issuance of a single show-cause notice covering three financial years was erroneous. The appellate relegation rendered the observation unnecessary because it touched upon the correctness and jurisdiction concerning issuance of the notice rather than affecting the availability of the statutory remedy. In that context, limited interference was considered appropriate to remove an unnecessary comment addressing jurisdiction and correctness of the common notice, while leaving the remainder of the impugned order intact.

Conclusion: The observation that a single show-cause notice was erroneous (in respect of three financial years) is set aside; otherwise the writ appeal is not entertained. This limited interference is in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the delay of 297 days in filing appeals should be condoned and the appeals admitted for adjudication on merits, or whether the appeals are barred by limitation.

Analysis: The delay is admitted and the reasons advanced relate to seasonal engagement of staff, change of Secretary, and alleged non-receipt of appellate orders until a recovery notice. The record shows electronic notices were issued and the assessee responded to the first notice but remained non-responsive thereafter. The asserted administrative and operational difficulties were unsupported by corroborative evidence and routine internal changes and staff engagements do not demonstrate absence of due diligence. Established principles require examination of conduct, bona fides, and whether delay could have been avoided by exercising normal care; the facts show casual and negligent prosecution of the matter and distinguish the authority relied upon by the appellant.

Conclusion: The delay is not a sufficient cause for condonation; the appeals are barred by limitation and are dismissed.

Issues: Whether the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of long-term capital gains where amounts were invested towards purchase of plot, architect fees and advances for construction and construction was commenced but not completed within three years from date of transfer.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the condition in section 54 requiring purchase or construction within the prescribed periods precludes exemption where the assessee has invested capital gains by paying for purchase of plot, architect fees and advances for construction and has commenced construction but could not complete it within three years due to delay in sanction of building plans. The Tribunal considered the statutory scheme of section 54 and section 54(2) which treats amounts utilised and deposited in the specified account as cost of the new asset for the purpose of exemption, and relied on precedent interpreting identically worded provisions (including decisions on section 54G and authorities applying section 54/54F) holding that payment of advances and commencement of construction within the window period amounts to utilisation of capital gains. The Tribunal noted factual material showing provisional allotment, payments for land and architect fees, and evidence of construction activity commenced within three years, and distinguished the requirement of completion in all respects within three years from the requirement of utilisation/deposit of capital gains within the statutory window.

Conclusion: The exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available to the assessee because the capital gains were invested (by payment for purchase of plot, architect fees and advances and commencement of construction) within the statutory window; accordingly the addition of Rs. 2,86,42,500 made by the assessing officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) is deleted and the assessee's appeal is allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether issuance of notice under section 148 and consequent reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid. (ii) Whether deduction claimed under section 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 based on a notional/stamp duty valuation in A.Y.2006-07 was allowable or whether the notional entry amounted to taxable income; and whether the addition should be deleted to avoid double taxation.

Issue (i): Validity of issuance of notice under section 148 and reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the factual basis for reopening, including information available to the Assessing Officer indicating that substantial project activities had not commenced in the year under consideration and that the assessee had claimed deduction under section 80IB(10) contrary to eligibility. The notice under section 148 was considered in light of the material and the formation of reason to believe that income had escaped assessment.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 and the reassessment proceedings under section 147 were valid. (Decision against the assessee on this issue.)

Issue (ii): Allowability of deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the return reflected a notional/stamp duty valuation and no substantive project activity had occurred in the relevant year; and whether deletion of the addition is warranted to prevent double taxation.

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed the timing of the Joint Development Agreement (21/03/2006), the commencement of project activities (March 2007), the accounting treatment showing a notional/stamp duty value credited in A.Y.2006-07, and subsequent realisation and assessment of actual project income in later assessment years (A.Y.2009-10 and A.Y.2010-11) where section 80IB(10) benefits were allowed on actual profits. The Tribunal found that the notional entry was an erroneous accounting entry, not representing real income accrued in the relevant year, and that taxing the same notional amount in A.Y.2006-07 alongside taxation of actual proceeds in later years would produce double taxation. The Tribunal also considered that the undertaking entitled to deduction was the entity that actually carried out development and fulfilled statutory conditions; however, on the facts the notional entry did not represent real income in the assessment year.

Conclusion: The impugned addition/disallowance under section 80IB(10) in respect of the notional/stamp duty valuation for A.Y.2006-07 is deleted. Grounds relating to the merits of the disallowance are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the validity of reassessment (notice under section 148) but allowed the substantive challenge to the section 80IB(10) disallowance by holding that the notional accounting entry did not constitute real income for A.Y.2006-07 and deleting the addition to avoid double taxation; accordingly the appeal is partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A notional or stamp-duty based accounting entry that does not reflect real accrued income in the relevant year cannot be taxed as income for that year where the same economic proceeds are subsequently offered and assessed in the correct assessment years; such notional entries may be deleted to prevent double taxation.

Issues: (i) Whether the limitation for filing rebate claims under Rule 5 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is to be reckoned from the date of invoice or the date of payment of service tax; (ii) Whether the rebate claims should be adjudicated afresh in view of documentary evidence, correlation between export invoices and FIRCs and correctness of computation, or whether the appeals were rightly rejected for lack of documentary evidence and non-correlation.

Issue (i): Whether limitation for rebate claims is reckoned from date of invoice or date of payment of service tax.

Analysis: The authorities below computed limitation from the date of invoice. The decision relied upon in this matter establishes that the relevant date for filing rebate claims under the Export of Service Rules, 2005 is the date of payment of service tax. The judgment applies that precedent to the legal question of relevant date for limitation.

Conclusion: Limitation for filing rebate claims under Rule 5 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is to be reckoned from the date of payment of service tax. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the matters require remand for fresh adjudication due to documentary evidence, correlation issues and computation correctness.

Analysis: The record shows that additional documentary material, including a chartered accountant's certificate certifying correlation between export invoices and FIRCs, was placed before the Tribunal and was not considered by the authorities below. Verification of factual aspects such as correlation of invoices with FIRCs and correctness of computation falls within the adjudicating authority's domain and requires examination on record. Procedural or curable defects should not be allowed to defeat substantive claims without opportunity for verification.

Conclusion: The appeals are remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh adjudication of rebate claims, including verification of documentary evidence, correlation between export invoices and FIRCs, and computation, after granting a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant. This conclusion affords relief to the assessee on the factual issues by directing fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The legal ruling that limitation is to be reckoned from the date of payment of service tax is affirmed; factual aspects concerning documentary evidence, correlation and computation are remitted for fresh adjudication by the Adjudicating Authority with opportunity to the appellant to place and verify relevant materials on record.

Ratio Decidendi: For rebate claims under the Export of Service Rules, 2005 read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the limitation period is computed from the date of payment of service tax rather than the date of invoice.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned Order-in-Original dated 19 April 2024 and the rectification order dated 9/10 July 2024 are non-speaking, mechanically passed orders in violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The impugned orders were examined on the limited question of whether they contain reasoned findings addressing the submissions and documents placed on record. The orders record only bald statements that the office has gone through the taxpayer's submission and that relevant documents were not produced, confirm liability and direct recovery under the relevant provisions of the GST laws, without dealing with individual contentions or explaining the basis for rejecting the submissions. The rectification order merely upheld the earlier order without independent reasoning. The applicable legal framework requires reasoned, speaking orders and opportunity for hearing before raising tax demands. Mechanical confirmation of liability without specific, intelligible findings causes prejudice and hardship and impairs the right to be heard.

Conclusion: The impugned Order-in-Original dated 19 April 2024 and the rectification order dated 9/10 July 2024 are quashed for being non-speaking and in violation of principles of natural justice; the respondents are directed to issue a fresh show cause notice, grant personal hearing and pass detailed speaking orders; coercive action is stayed until fresh orders are passed.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,96,94,712/- made by the Assessing Officer by disallowing 10% of total expenses of Rs. 39,69,47,124/- for alleged non application/substantiation of income by the trust.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the material on record and the order of the CIT(A). It noted that the assessee is a registered trust engaged in educational activities and had filed consolidated return and consolidated expenditure for 35 institutions. The CIT(A) recorded that out of total expenditure of Rs. 39,69,47,124/-, capital expenditure of Rs. 9,20,02,482/- was not adversely treated by the AO and the balance included salary payments of Rs. 23,59,03,194/-, for which the assessee produced unit wise breakups, salary registers, ledgers, cash book, bank book and audited income and expenditure accounts. The CIT(A) found that the assessee had discharged the initial onus of substantiating application of income and that the AO had not pointed to any specific defect in the evidences before making a blanket 10% disallowance. The Revenue did not controvert the factual findings of production of documents before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 3,96,94,712/- made by the CIT(A) is upheld and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the deletion by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) of an addition of Rs. 88,16,120/- made under section 69C read with section 115BBE (treating 20% of purchases from a non-filer as bogus purchases) was justified; (ii) Whether the deletion by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) of an addition of Rs. 6,893/- made by the Assessing Officer by treating interest on late deposit of TDS as disallowable under Explanation 1 to sub-section (1) of section 37 was justified.

Issue (i): Deletion of addition of Rs. 88,16,120/- treating purchases from a party who did not reply to notices and was a non-filer as bogus purchases under section 69C read with section 115BBE.

Analysis: The assessee produced purchase registers, inventory ledgers, tax audit details, GST records showing supplier registration and GST returns, and evidence of input tax credit and corresponding sales entries. The Assessing Officer recorded non-receipt of response from one supplier and relied on non-filing of income-tax return to treat 20% of purchases as bogus without addressing the explanations and documentary material furnished. The material on record included corroborative GST-based entries and inventory movement accounting for every gram of metal/jewellery.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 88,16,120/- is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Deletion of addition of Rs. 6,893/- being interest on late deposit of TDS held disallowable under Explanation 1 to sub-section (1) of section 37.

Analysis: Precedent establishes that interest on arrears of tax or late payment in similar contexts is compensatory in nature and not penal. The assessee characterized the payment as compensatory; relevant judicial authority treating such interest as compensatory was applied to the facts.

Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowance of Rs. 6,893/- is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed and the appellate authority's deletions of the impugned additions are affirmed, resulting in no addition being sustained against the assessee on the decided issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documentary evidence including GST registration and returns, input tax credit records and detailed inventory ledgers establish the genuineness of transactions, purchases cannot be treated as bogus solely due to the supplier's non-filing of income-tax returns; and interest on late payment of tax obligations that is compensatory in nature is not disallowable under Explanation 1 to sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the impugned adjudication orders passed in absence of petitioners' replies to show-cause notices should be set aside and petitioners granted opportunity to file replies and participate in proceedings; whether the challenge to the vires of Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 should be adjudicated at this stage.

Analysis: The Court examined the factual position that many petitioners did not file replies or participate in adjudication because they were advised that participation would amount to waiver of their challenge to the vires of Rule 26(2). The Court refrained from deciding the merits of the impugned orders or the constitutional challenge to Rule 26(2). Instead, it balanced the interests of justice by allowing petitioners an opportunity to file responses and be heard by the Adjudicating Authorities, subject to payment of specified costs, and directed adherence to principles of natural justice in any fresh adjudication. The Court expressly kept the question of the vires of Rule 26(2) and all parties' contentions on merits open for future determination.

Conclusion: Impugned orders set aside and petitioners granted four weeks to file responses to show-cause notices; petitioners must pay specified costs to obtain benefit of this order; issue of vires of Rule 26(2) left open.

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon in adjudication without following the procedure in Section 138B of the Customs Act; (ii) Whether printouts of emails/computer printouts could be relied upon without compliance with Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 are relevant and admissible in adjudication proceedings absent compliance with Section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 108 enables recording of statements by Gazetted Officers during inquiries. Section 138B(1)(b) makes such statements relevant in proceedings only after the person who made the statement is examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority forms the opinion that the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice; thereafter an opportunity for cross-examination must be afforded to the affected person. Tribunal and High Court authorities cited in the judgment establish that the procedure under Section 138B(1)(b) is mandatory and failure to follow it renders the recorded statements not relevant and inadmissible for proving the truth of their contents.

Conclusion: The statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could not be relied upon by the Principal Commissioner without compliance with the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether printouts of emails/computer printouts can be relied upon in adjudication proceedings without compliance with Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 138C deems computer printouts admissible as documents if the conditions in subsection (2) are satisfied and, for admissibility, a certificate under subsection (4) identifying the document and describing its production and related matters is required (or compliant equivalents as recognized by precedent). The Principal Commissioner recorded valuation findings based on email printouts without any certificate or record demonstrating compliance with Section 138C(4). In addition, the statements relied upon were retracted, undermining any suggestion of due compliance.

Conclusion: The printouts of emails were not admissible in the absence of compliance with Section 138C(4) of the Customs Act, 1962. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Because neither the mandatory procedure for admitting Section 108 statements under Section 138B(1)(b) nor the certification/conditions required by Section 138C(4) were satisfied, the findings rejecting declared transaction value under Rule 12 and re-determining value under Rule 3 of the 2007 Valuation Rules and the penalties imposed could not be sustained; the impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 acquire relevance in adjudication only after the maker is examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority and the authority forms a written opinion under Section 138B(1)(b) permitting admission (with opportunity for cross-examination), and computer printouts/email printouts are admissible only upon satisfying the conditions of Section 138C and the certification requirement of Section 138C(4).

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon in adjudication proceedings without compliance with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether printouts of emails/computer printouts could be relied upon without compliance with Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 are relevant and admissible in adjudication proceedings absent compliance with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 138B(1)(b) requires that, unless clause (a) applies, a person who made a statement during inquiry must be examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority must form an opinion that the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice; only thereafter must an opportunity for cross-examination be given. Prior decisions of tribunals and High Courts applying analogous provisions (including section 9D of the Central Excise Act) have held this procedure to be mandatory and that failure to comply renders such statements irrelevant and inadmissible for proving their contents. The impugned order relied on Section 108 statements that were retracted and were not admitted in evidence by following the Section 138B(1)(b) procedure.

Conclusion: The statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could not be relied upon in the adjudication absent compliance with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether email printouts and computer-generated material could be relied upon in the absence of compliance with Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 138C deems microfilms, facsimile copies and computer printouts to be documents and admissible if conditions in subsection (2) are satisfied and where a certificate under subsection (4) or equivalent compliance is produced to show how the document was generated and that the computer operated properly. The record did not demonstrate compliance with Section 138C(4) nor production of a certificate or Panchnama to support the authenticity of the email printouts; the Section 108 statements relating to those printouts were retracted, further undermining reliance on them.

Conclusion: The email printouts/computer printouts could not be relied upon in the absence of compliance with Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Commissioner (Appeals) erred in rejecting the declared transaction value under Rule 12 and re-determining it under Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 by relying on Section 108 statements and email printouts without complying with Sections 138B and 138C of the Customs Act, 1962; the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Statements recorded under inquiry (Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962) become relevant in adjudication only after the person is examined before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority forms an opinion under Section 138B(1)(b) that the statement should be admitted in evidence, and computer printouts/email reproductions are admissible only upon satisfying the conditions of Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962 (including requisite certification or equivalent proof of authenticity and proper operation of the computer).

Issues: (i) Whether an attachment order against immovable property vested in a resulting company under a court-sanctioned scheme of demerger can be sustained to recover the wealth tax liability of the demerged company.

Analysis: The property under challenge stood vested in a resulting company pursuant to a scheme of demerger sanctioned by the Court under Sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. A sanctioned scheme effects vesting of specific assets in the resulting companies, which thereafter have independent corporate identity and independent tax liabilities. The Wealth Tax Act, 1957 governs assessment and recovery of wealth tax for the relevant assessment years; attachment of property may be resorted to for recovery of tax due from the person legally liable. Where assets have been vested in a resulting company by a court-sanctioned demerger, those vested assets are not liable to satisfy the tax liability of the demerged company absent separate liability of the resulting company itself. The availability of departmental remedies (including attachment for the resulting company's own liability and cases where appeals are stayed subject to deposits) remains open in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The impugned attachment of property vested in the resulting company to recover the wealth tax liability of the demerged company is not sustainable; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee. The Revenue remains entitled to proceed, in accordance with law, against the property vested with the resulting company for any independent wealth tax liability of that resulting company.

Issues: Whether the impugned cancellation order in Form GST REG-13 dated 03.02.2024 is liable to be quashed and the petitioner's GST registration restored, and whether restoration should be subject to conditions relating to discharge of tax liability as per the precedent cited.

Analysis: The cancellation in Form GST REG-13 dated 03.02.2024 was examined in light of the factual course that the petitioner had delayed filing returns and had earlier obtained interim protection by not disclosing the cancellation order. The Court considered the applicability of the principle that restoration of registration may be permitted if statutory or judicially prescribed conditions are met, including discharge of tax arrears and compliance with directions in the cited precedent. The Court noted competing positions on whether delayed filing that is subsequently reflected in annual returns and belated GSTR-3B filings removes revenue implication, and observed the respondent's entitlement to consider notices under the relevant provisions dealing with recovery or demand (Sections 73, 74, 74A) and the proviso under Section 62(2).

Conclusion: The impugned cancellation order dated 03.02.2024 in Form GST REG-13 is quashed and the petitioner's GST registration is restored, subject to the petitioner complying with the conditions prescribed by the cited precedent, including discharge of outstanding tax liability.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order dated 01.12.2025 passed under Section 74 of HGST/CGST/IGST Act, 2017 should be entertained on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, or whether the petitioner must be relegated to the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107.

Analysis: The Court examined the timeline of notices, adjournments sought, and absence of substantive response by the petitioner, noting that the petitioner did not respond to ASMT-10 nor to show cause notice DRC-01 and sought an adjournment only shortly before the impugned order. The Court applied established principles that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is to be exercised sparingly where an efficacious statutory remedy exists, and intervention is justified only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. The Court found no such exceptional circumstances or substantiated breach of natural justice on the record that would warrant overriding the availability of the statutory appeal under Section 107.

Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed; petitioner relegated to statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 and no interference is warranted on merits at this stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy exists, courts will decline to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 except in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances; mere procedural grievances or requests for adjournment do not displace the availability of the statutory appeal absent shown violation of natural justice.