Issues: Whether the Section 7 application against the Corporate Debtor was maintainable when the Corporate Debtor had its NBFC registration cancelled prior to filing of the Section 7 petition.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory exclusion of "financial service provider" from the definition of "corporate person" under Section 3(7) of the IBC, 2016 and the definition of "financial service provider" under Section 3(17). The Tribunal reviewed the record, including the RBI letter showing cancellation of the Corporate Debtor's NBFC registration effective 18.09.2018, and compared the registration status with the date of filing of the Section 7 application (21.12.2019). The Court distinguished the present facts from the precedent relied upon by the Appellant, noting that in the cited case the question of the debtor's status as an NBFC had not been adjudicated below and was remanded for evidence; whereas here the cancellation certificate was on record indicating the Corporate Debtor was no longer a financial service provider when the Section 7 petition was filed. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the statutory exclusion did not apply on the date of filing.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was maintainable; the Adjudicating Authority correctly admitted the Section 7 petition. The appeal is dismissed and interim order vacated; the period of the interim order shall be excluded from the CIRP period.

Issues: Whether the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability and whether the acquittal recorded by the trial Court required interference in appeal.

Analysis: The cheque dishonour and statutory notice were not sufficient by themselves to warrant reversal where the appellant failed to disclose the prior transaction between the parties and suppressed material facts relating to the registered sale agreement, power of attorney, cancellation of power of attorney, and connected civil proceedings. The respondent produced documentary evidence showing that the cheque was issued as a security instrument in the course of the sale transaction, and that defence was found to be probable. In proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 operates, but it remains open to the accused to rebut it on a preponderance of probabilities. On the evidence, the trial Court's view that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and that the complainant had not come with clean hands was a plausible view.

Conclusion: The cheque was not proved to have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and the acquittal did not call for interference.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the statutory presumption may be rebutted by a probable defence showing that the cheque was issued as security and not towards an enforceable debt, and an appellate court will not disturb an acquittal based on a plausible appreciation of evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the GST demand orders was maintainable despite the availability of a statutory appeal, in the backdrop of the alleged denial of hearing and the claim that the petitioner's Chartered Accountant had misappropriated tax payments; (ii) Whether rejection of the rectification request was liable to be interfered with.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition challenging the GST demand orders was maintainable despite the availability of a statutory appeal, in the backdrop of the alleged denial of hearing and the claim that the petitioner's Chartered Accountant had misappropriated tax payments.

Analysis: The impugned orders had been passed under the GST assessment framework after issuance of notices and opportunities of hearing. The petitioner had an efficacious appellate remedy under the statute, but chose not to pursue it. The Court also noted that the Chartered Accountant was acting on behalf of the petitioner, so service upon him could not be disregarded by the petitioner. The plea of fraud and misappropriation raised a disputed question of fact, which was not fit for adjudication in writ proceedings and did not justify bypassing the statutory appellate mechanism.

Conclusion: The challenge to the demand orders was not maintainable in writ jurisdiction and failed.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the rectification request was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The rectification application was found to be outside the scope of correction of an apparent error on the face of the record. The Court accepted the authority's view that the requested correction could not be entertained through rectification and did not disclose any basis for interference.

Conclusion: The rejection of rectification was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition disclosed no extraordinary ground for bypassing the statutory appeal, and the challenge to the rectification rejection also did not merit interference. The petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory appeal is available, writ interference is not warranted on a disputed factual plea of fraud or misappropriation, and rectification cannot be used to reopen matters not constituting an apparent error on the face of the record.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the audit report, show cause notice and demand order under the GST regime was maintainable in view of the available statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The petitioner had participated in the audit and proceedings and a final demand order was thereafter passed under the GST law. The challenge was directed against the audit report, show cause notice and the consequential demand order, but the Court found that the grievance could be pursued before the appellate authority under the statute. In these circumstances, the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy weighed against invocation of Article 226 jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the GST demand order was left to be pursued in the statutory hierarchy, and the writ proceedings were dismissed without adjudication on the merits of the tax dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appeal is available against a GST assessment or demand order, writ jurisdiction should ordinarily not be invoked to bypass that remedy.

Issues: Whether the applicant is entitled to grant of regular bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in respect of offences punishable under Section 132(1)(a)-(d) and Section 69 of the CGST Act, 2017, pending trial.

Analysis: The applicant was arrested on 14.10.2025 and has remained in custody since that date; investigation is complete and a charge-sheet has been filed. The alleged offences attract a maximum sentence of five years. The Supreme Court's decisions in Ratnambar Kaushik and Vineet Jain were relied upon regarding bail where investigation is complete, evidence is essentially documentary/electronic, and the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial incarceration. The prosecution emphasised the economic nature of the offence and comprehensive investigation. The Court balanced the factors of completed investigation, documentary nature of evidence reducing risk of tampering, absence of criminal antecedents, limited statutory maximum sentence, and the period of incarceration already undergone by the applicant. Conditions appropriate to secure attendance and prevent interference were imposed, including personal bond with solvent sureties, surrender of passport, operational mobile number, location PIN, prohibition on inducement/intimidation, and committing no offence while on bail, together with adherence to Section 480(3) BNSS conditions.

Conclusion: The application for regular bail is allowed and the applicant is released on bail on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 5,00,000 with two solvent sureties of the like amount and subject to the specified conditions; the M.Cr.C. is allowed and disposed of.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of GST paid (GST neutralization) notwithstanding that the final bill has been passed and a no-claim certificate has been submitted by the contractor.

Analysis: The petitioner was awarded a works contract which was completed and for which a completion certificate and final bill were issued. It is undisputed and verified by the GST office that the petitioner actually deposited the GST. The respondents denied reimbursement solely on the ground that Clause 11 of the Joint Procedural Order (JPO) bars claims after passing of the final bill and submission of a no-claim certificate, and that the supplementary agreement was not executed by the respondents. The record shows the petitioner submitted the supplementary agreement duly signed by it and documentary evidence of tax payment; the supplementary agreement was not executed by the respondents despite being presented. The Accounts Department's denial was based on procedural technicality without disputing the fact of payment or pointing to a legal bar that precludes reimbursement where the tax payment is verified. Comparable claims in identical factual circumstances were accepted by other railway divisions, demonstrating that acceptance after completion and issuance of certificate is permissible where payment is established and supporting documents are furnished.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of the GST amount paid; the respondents must accept the GST neutralization claim and reimburse the petitioner as per entitlement.

Issues: (i) whether reassessment beyond four years was barred for want of any allegation that income escaped assessment because of the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts; (ii) whether notice under section 148 was invalid as being issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of through faceless allocation; (iii) whether the addition under section 69A based solely on an unsigned third-party excel sheet was sustainable; and (iv) whether the notice under section 143(2) was invalid for not specifying the scrutiny category.

Issue (i): whether reassessment beyond four years was barred for want of any allegation that income escaped assessment because of the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts.

Analysis: The original assessment had already been completed under section 143(3), and the reassessment was initiated after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The recorded reasons and the order under section 148A(d) did not allege any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. That omission went to the root of jurisdiction under the proviso to section 147.

Conclusion: The reopening was barred by the proviso to section 147 and was invalid.

Issue (ii): whether notice under section 148 was invalid as being issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of through faceless allocation.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and not through the National Faceless Assessment Centre in the manner contemplated by section 151A and the applicable faceless scheme. The reassessment, therefore, was initiated by an authority lacking the prescribed jurisdiction under that framework.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid and the reassessment was void ab initio.

Issue (iii): whether the addition under section 69A based solely on an unsigned third-party excel sheet was sustainable.

Analysis: The addition rested only on an unsigned excel sheet recovered from a third party. No independent verification, cash trail, corroborative evidence, or statement linking the assessee to the alleged transactions was brought on record. The assessee was not supplied the full material and was denied cross-examination despite request. The electronic material also lacked the required evidentiary certification. In addition, the assessee had produced books, stock records, invoices, agreements, bank records, VAT material, and import-related documents, while the books were not rejected and the corresponding trading results and sales were accepted.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was unsustainable in law and on facts.

Issue (iv): whether the notice under section 143(2) was invalid for not specifying the scrutiny category.

Analysis: The CBDT instruction relied upon for this objection was treated as an administrative guideline and not a statutory mandate having the force of law. On that basis, the notice under section 143(2) could not be invalidated on the ground urged.

Conclusion: The challenge to the notice under section 143(2) failed.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment stood annulled, and the impugned addition did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment beyond four years requires a recorded allegation of the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, and a reopening founded only on unverified third-party material without independent inquiry, corroboration, or compliance with natural justice and admissibility requirements cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in declaring the interest at 24% per annum compounded monthly as extortionate and disallowing the entire interest component from the admitted claims of the Financial Creditors in liquidation proceedings.

Analysis: The interest component arose from term sheets recording loans advanced in 2014 to a corporate debtor that had ceased operations earlier; there was absence of board resolutions, absence of stamped/registered documentation for charges with the Registrar of Companies, and non-provision of interest in the corporate debtor's financial statements. The Adjudicating Authority applied the Code's framework including the concepts of financial debt and the jurisdiction to examine claims and transactions under Sections 50 and 60(5), and relied on prior precedent treating exorbitant interest as extortionate. On the facts, the compounding of interest converted a principal of Rs.4.66 crores into Rs.15.70 crores; material indicia (lack of documentation, failure to register charge, no evidence of need for loans) supported characterization of the charged rates as extortionate.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the entire interest component at 24% per annum is sustained; the appeal challenging that disallowance is dismissed and the Adjudicating Authority's finding that the interest is extortionate is upheld (against the appellants).

Issues: Whether the appeal is barred by limitation and therefore beyond the condoning power of the Commissioner (Appeals), where the delay exceeds the maximum statutory period of 30 days.

Analysis: The appeal challenges an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) which disallowed condonation of delay on the ground that the delay exceeded the maximum statutory period permitted for condonation. The Tribunal notes that statutory limits on condonation are binding and that no authority may exercise condoning power beyond what the statute permits. The decision in Singh Enterprises v. CCE (as relied upon by the respondent) is treated as authoritative for the proposition that condoning power cannot exceed the statutory provision, and this principle has been followed by this Bench in prior decisions.

Conclusion: The appeal is barred by limitation and is beyond the condoning power of the Commissioner (Appeals); the appeal is therefore dismissed.

Issues: Whether service tax was leviable on water charges paid for permission to draw water from a natural source, and whether the penalty imposed under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Analysis: The agreement was examined on its substance and was found to be for supply of water on a quantified, rate-based consideration, with the appellant making its own arrangements for drawal and consumption. The Tribunal followed its earlier view that such an arrangement is not a mere assignment of a right to use natural resources and that no service is provided where the consideration is linked to the volume of water drawn. The reasoning also supported the conclusion that the transaction did not fall within the taxable category relied upon by the department.

Conclusion: Service tax was not leviable on the water charges, and the penalty could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of Service Tax of Rs.9,08,617/- on import of service under Reverse Charge Mechanism for 2011-12, raised by invoking extended period of limitation, is sustainable; (ii) Whether the demand of Service Tax of Rs.73,63,722/- on advances received is sustainable where advances were claimed to be short-term refundable loans; (iii) Whether disallowance of CENVAT credit of Rs.86,69,562/- under the third proviso to Rule 4(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (Notification No.21/2014-CE(NT) dated 11.07.2014) is permissible for credits availed prior to 01.09.2014; (iv) Whether penalties under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 15(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 are imposable in the facts of this case.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of Rs.9,08,617/- under Reverse Charge Mechanism raised by invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable.

Analysis: The demand was raised after invoking the extended period of limitation. The appellant filed regular returns and paid taxes during the relevant period. No evidence of suppression, fraud, or willful misstatement was produced to justify extended limitation. The demand arises under Reverse Charge Mechanism where the assessee would be entitled to take CENVAT credit immediately, creating a revenue-neutral position. The Tribunal relied on the principle that extended limitation is not invokable in revenue-neutral situations.

Conclusion: The demand of Rs.9,08,617/- is barred by limitation and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand of Rs.73,63,722/- on advances is sustainable where advances were proven to be short-term refundable loans.

Analysis: The Department failed to produce corroborative evidence that the receipts were advances for provision of taxable services. The appellant produced loan agreements, bank statements showing repayment with interest, and CA certificates demonstrating the amounts were short-term refundable loans recorded as current liabilities. The Tribunal applied precedent where similar factual and documentary evidence led to holding such receipts as loans rather than taxable advances.

Conclusion: The demand of Rs.73,63,722/- on advances is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether disallowance of CENVAT credit of Rs.86,69,562/- under the third proviso to Rule 4(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is permissible for credits availed prior to 01.09.2014.

Analysis: The third proviso to Rule 4(1) (restricting availment within one year of invoice) was inserted w.e.f. 01.09.2014. The credits in question were availed during 2011-12 to 2013-14 and recorded in books; there is no dispute on receipt or use of input services. The proviso operates prospectively; therefore it cannot be applied retrospectively to disallow credits legitimately taken before its insertion. Part of the credit was already allowed by the adjudicating authority; the remainder is similarly covered by prospective operation principles and precedents relied upon by the appellant.

Conclusion: The disallowance of CENVAT credit of Rs.86,69,562/- is not justified; the credit is allowed in favour of the assessee and the disallowance is set aside.

Issue (iv): Whether penalties under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 15(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 are imposable.

Analysis: Penalties were predicated on findings of suppression, fraud, or willful misstatement. The record shows regular filing and payment of taxes, absence of allegations of suppression in the show cause notice, and no evidence establishing suppression. Given that the substantive demands were not sustained on merits, and no material supports penal invocation, the statutory penal provisions are inapplicable.

Conclusion: Penalties imposed under the impugned order are not imposable and are set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned order in entirety, and grants consequential reliefs to the assessee, resulting in removal of the contested tax demands, disallowance and recovery, and penalties.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation cannot be invoked in revenue-neutral reverse-charge cases where immediate availment of credit is possible; statutory provisos inserted later operate prospectively and cannot be applied retrospectively to disallow CENVAT credits legitimately availed before their insertion.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to avail Cenvat credit on capital goods procured and received in its factory premises and handed over to the works contractor for erection and commissioning, and whether the demand based on extended period of limitation is invocable.

Analysis: The issue was examined under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, including the definition of capital goods (Rule 2(a)) and entitlement to credit of duty paid on capital goods received in the factory (Rule 3(1)). The legal effect of the works contract valuation scheme and Rule 2A(i) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 was considered to determine whether restriction on credit for the works contractor prevents the recipient-manufacturer from availing credit on capital goods. The factual matrix establishes that capital goods were purchased by the appellant under duty-paid invoices, received at the appellant's factory, and remained the appellant's property while being handed to the contractor for installation; certain goods used by the contractor as inputs were not credited by the contractor. Prior decisions treating capital goods received and used in manufacture as admissible for credit were applied to the facts. On limitation, authorities showing that extended period cannot be invoked in absence of fraud, suppression or willful misstatement and where the dispute arises from an interpretation of law were relied upon; periodic audits and statutory returns filed by the appellant were noted.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on the capital goods so procured and used is admissible to the appellant and the demand raised by invoking extended period is not sustainable; penalty imposed on the appellant is set aside (decision in favour of the assessee).

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to avail and utilize Cenvat credit on input services received for setting up, modernization, renovation of an additional/expanded plant and for services used in relation to manufacture of final products, and whether extended period of limitation is invokable.

Analysis: The dispute turns on the scope of "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and the rules of utilization of Cenvat credit. The Tribunal reviews authorities holding that services used in relation to setting up, modernization, renovation or pre-feasibility activity may qualify as input services where they have nexus with the manufacturing activity, and that Cenvat credit is maintained in a common pool permitting cross-utilization without one-to-one correlation between specific inputs/services and specific final products. The Tribunal also considers authorities on invocation of the extended period of limitation where availment was disclosed in statutory returns and audited during assessment activity. Applying these principles to the facts, the Tribunal finds that the services for setting up/modernisation/renovation of the plant fall within the ambit of input services and that disclosed availment precludes invocation of extended limitation.

Conclusion: The impugned denial of Cenvat credit is set aside and the appeal is allowed; the appellant is entitled to avail and utilize the Cenvat credit on the input services in question and the extended period of limitation is not invokable.

Issues: Whether a proper officer, having blocked an electronic credit ledger under Rule 86A, can refuse to initiate and conclude adjudication proceedings on the ground that the alleged violation is not suitable for adjudication.

Analysis: Rule 86A of the CGST/WBGST Rules permits temporary restriction on utilisation of input tax credit where the officer has reasons to believe that the credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible for the reasons specified in the rule. The restriction is an interim safeguard to secure the revenue and operates pending adjudication. Once the ledger is blocked on that basis, the officer cannot deny the very adjudicatory process that must follow. A continued blockage without initiation of adjudication would defeat the scheme of the 2017 tax enactments. The Court therefore directed issuance of a show cause notice within a fixed time, filing of reply by the petitioners, and completion of adjudication within a further stipulated period, with a clear consequence that failure to conclude the proceedings would require unblocking of the ledger.

Conclusion: The refusal to adjudicate could not be sustained, and the proper officer was directed to commence and complete adjudication within the timelines fixed by the Court, failing which the electronic credit ledger would have to be unblocked.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction claimed under section 54B (and alternatively section 54F) in respect of capital gains arising from the sale of flats; (ii) Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the assessee's alternate/new claim and whether the matter should be restored to the Assessing Officer for recomputation of capital gain.

Issue (i): Entitlement to deduction under section 54B (and alternatively section 54F) on the capital gains in the assessment year 2017-18.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the facts that a registered joint venture agreement dated 20.01.2011 effected transfer/conversion of land (date of transfer), that the assessee had earlier availed deductions under section 54B in earlier assessment years, and that the agricultural land purchases relied upon for claiming section 54B exemption were made beyond the two-year period prescribed by section 54B. The Tribunal also considered the claim for section 54F as an alternate plea and the authorities' findings regarding conversion/transfer dates, allotment/possession (occupancy certificate) and earlier assessments.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Jurisdiction of the appellate authority/Tribunal to entertain a revised computation or new/alternate claim raised during appellate proceedings and the appropriate remedy.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered precedents on the appellate authority's power under section 254 to admit and entertain new legal claims or alternative pleas and the discretion to admit such claims. Applying those principles to the facts including the finding that transfer occurred by JV in 2011 and that flats were allotted/handed over with an occupancy certificate in 2014 the Tribunal found that the correct taxable capital gain for AY 2017-18 should be recomputed by the Assessing Officer by treating the assessee's share in the flats as the cost of acquisition for the relevant earlier year, and that the assessee is entitled to have the revised computation examined.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that although the assessee was not entitled to the claimed exemption under section 54B (or section 54F) as presented, the appellate forum has jurisdiction to entertain the alternate claim and directed restoration of the matter to the Assessing Officer for verification and recomputation of long term capital gain in accordance with law; the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: The appellate authority/Tribunal has jurisdiction under section 254 to entertain new or alternate claims raised on appeal and, where appropriate on the facts, may remit the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh determination of tax liability including recomputation of capital gains consistent with findings on date of transfer and cost of acquisition.

Issues: Whether the final assessment orders passed under section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) are barred by limitation and must be determined with reference to section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the interplay between section 144C and section 153, considering the Madras High Court decision in Roca Bathroom Products P. Ltd. and subsequent authorities addressing whether the timelines under section 153 subsume or apply to final assessment orders under section 144C(13). The analysis focused on the statutory scheme of section 144C (including its staged timelines for draft order, DRP objections, DRP directions and finalization) and on section 153's outer time limits for completing assessment proceedings, including extensions. The Tribunal compared the statutory timelines with the factual date charts for the relevant assessment years and applied the principle that DRP proceedings are part of assessment proceedings and that the provisions are inter-dependent rather than mutually exclusive. The Tribunal found that, on the facts and dates before it, the final orders were passed after the time limits as determined by reading section 144C with section 153.

Conclusion: The final assessment orders passed beyond the time limit determined by reading section 144C with section 153 are barred by limitation and are quashed; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive for computing the limitation for final assessment orders under section 144C(13); where the final order is passed beyond the time-limit so determined, the order is time-barred and liable to be quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 49,00,000/- under Section 68 (share capital and share premium) is sustainable; (ii) Whether the protective addition of Rs. 26,39,050/- under Section 56(2)(viib) based on Rule 11UA valuation can be sustained where the assessee furnished a DCF valuation by a prescribed valuer; (iii) Whether enhancement of income by the appellate authority without issuing mandatory notice under Section 250(1) is valid; (iv) Whether disallowance of business expenses of Rs. 5,76,679/- is justified; (v) Whether addition of Rs. 1,15,842/- on account of difference between ITR and Form 26AS is justified.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs. 49,00,000/- under Section 68 is sustainable.

Analysis: Materials establishing incorporation details, PAN, ROC entries, audit reports, bank statements, share application forms and confirmations were placed on record for the subscribing companies; once the assessee discharged the initial onus under Section 68 by proving identity, genuineness and creditworthiness, the burden shifted to revenue to bring contrary material. Reliance was placed on binding precedents recognising commercial decision on share premium and prohibiting substitution of commercial judgment by tax authorities.

Conclusion: Addition under Section 68 of Rs. 49,00,000/- is deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the protective addition of Rs. 26,39,050/- under Section 56(2)(viib) can be sustained where the assessee opted for valuation under Rule 11UA(2) using DCF prepared by a prescribed valuer.

Analysis: Rule 11UA(2) permits the assessee to determine FMV by prescribed methods including DCF carried out by a merchant banker or accountant. Valuation by DCF is projection-based and not susceptible to strict hindsight comparison with later actuals; where the assessee obtains valuation from a prescribed expert using a prescribed method, revenue lacks authority under the statute or rules to arbitrarily reject and substitute its own valuation without contrary material or enabling provision.

Conclusion: Protective addition under Section 56(2)(viib) of Rs. 26,39,050/- is deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether enhancement of income by the appellate authority without issuing mandatory notice under Section 250(1) is valid.

Analysis: Section 250(1) requires issuance of notice before enhancing assessment in appeal; absence of such notice renders enhancement procedurally infirm.

Conclusion: Enhancement without issuing the mandatory notice is set aside and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether disallowance of business expenses of Rs. 5,76,679/- is justified.

Analysis: Expenditure incurred in the ordinary course of an established business, including fixed and inevitable expenses incurred during a period of reduced activity, falls within allowable business expenditure; commencement or temporary downturn does not automatically render such expenses disallowable.

Conclusion: Disallowance of Rs. 5,76,679/- is deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether addition of Rs. 1,15,842/- for mismatch between ITR and Form 26AS is justified.

Analysis: The assessment proceeded on an incorrect figure taken from the return; correct amount shown in the ITR was established on record and the appellate authority had not separately adjudicated the ground; assessment adjustment based on wrong figure cannot stand.

Conclusion: Addition of Rs. 1,15,842/- is deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The aggregate effect of the decision is that all contested additions and enhancements challenged in the appeal are set aside and the assessee succeeds on the substantive issues decided, resulting in allowance of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an assessee discharges the initial burden under Section 68 by proving identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of share subscribers, revenue must produce contrary material to sustain additions; where Rule 11UA(2) prescribes valuation methods and the assessee obtains valuation from a prescribed valuer (including DCF), the valuation cannot be arbitrarily rejected or substituted by revenue in absence of statutory power or contrary material.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned assessment order should be set aside and the matter remanded because no opportunity of personal hearing was afforded as required under Section 75(4) of the GST law and whether the alternative remedy under Section 107 is efficacious.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates that an opportunity of hearing shall be granted where a request is received in writing from the person chargeable with tax or penalty, or where any adverse decision is contemplated. The question whether the appellate remedy is efficacious requires examining the relative positions of the authority passing the order and the Appellate Authority; where the authority that refused the advance ruling is superior to the Appellate Authority, the alternative remedy may not be effective in the circumstances. The record shows no personal hearing was afforded and the availability of statutory appeal did not render that defect harmless given the comparative hierarchy and the advance-ruling context.

Conclusion: The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority to reconsider the case afresh after affording an opportunity of personal hearing under Section 75(4) of the GST law. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The appeals and special leave petitions were dismissed as not pressed on withdrawal by the appellant following settlement.

Outcome: The appeal was dismissed as having become infructuous after the offence was compounded.