Issues: Whether bail should be granted to the accused after completion of investigation in an alleged large-scale GST fraud involving creation of bogus entities, fake invoicing and fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit.

Analysis: The matter concerns allegations of a structured and premeditated scheme of tax fraud involving multiple allegedly non-existent firms, issuance of fake invoices and fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit of approximately 75 crores. Investigation has been completed and a charge-sheet filed; material relied upon includes GSTN data analytics, e-way bill records, banking and KYC documents, electronic devices and digital communications. Jurisprudence distinguishes large-scale economic offences as requiring a cautious and guarded approach on bail, with consideration of nature of accusations, nature of evidence, possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, and the larger public interest. The prosecution's apprehension of risk to the integrity of evidence and witness testimony is supported by recovery of electronic material and corroborative statements; custodial supervision is asserted as necessary to prevent interference with the investigative record.

Conclusion: Bail is refused; decision is against the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases of large-scale, organized economic offences supported by digital trails and corroborative material, the cautious approach to bail permits refusal of bail after completion of investigation where reasonable apprehension exists of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses and where the alleged scheme indicates grave harm to public revenue.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to refund of GST paid on assignment/transfer of leasehold rights in land and whether the refund application should be considered and paid in accordance with the Court's earlier decision in Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Union of India.

Analysis: The petition challenges Deficiency Memos refusing the refund claim and relies on the High Court's prior decision holding that assignment/transfer of leasehold rights in land constitutes sale/transfer of immovable property and does not amount to supply liable to GST. The respondents have communicated that on filing an application for refund the claim will be considered and refund paid. The Court directs the petitioner to file the refund application and requires the tax authority to process and pay the refund within two weeks of receipt, thereby operationalising the legal position reflected in the earlier decision.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to have the refund application considered and the refund paid; on filing the application the refund shall be paid within two weeks. The petition is disposed accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The order implements the entitlement of the petitioner to obtain refund in line with the earlier decision that assignment/transfer of leasehold rights in land is akin to sale of immovable property and not a supply under the GST law, by directing prompt consideration and payment of the refund on filing of the application.

Ratio Decidendi: Assignment or transfer of leasehold rights in land by the lessee to a third party is a transfer of benefits of immovable property equivalent to sale and does not constitute a taxable supply under the GST framework; accordingly refund of tax paid on such transactions is allowable and must be processed under Section 54 of the GST Act.

Issues: Whether the Respondent failed to pass on the benefit of input tax credit to eligible homebuyers in the PAN Oasis project by way of commensurate reduction in price and, if so, the quantification of profiteering and consequent relief.

Analysis: The issue is examined under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the CGST Rules (including Rule 129 and Rule 133(3)(b)), having regard to Schedule III and Sections 172-173 concerning exempt supplies and reversal of ITC. The Tribunal applied the principles in the Delhi High Court judgment dated 29.01.2024 concerning real estate profiteering methodology, including rejection of the ITC-to-turnover ratio and adoption of an area-based computation with reference to units sold before the Occupancy Certificate. On re-investigation, DGAP computed a marginal increase of 0.009% in ITC ratio for the project for the investigation period (01.07.2017 to 17.01.2018), calculated total savings attributable to additional ITC, derived per square foot benefit, and arrived at a base profiteered amount of Rs. 35,800 plus GST @12% (Rs. 4,296) totaling Rs. 40,096 to be distributed among 1,865 eligible units. The Respondent unqualifiedly accepted DGAP's computation and tendered Rs. 40,096, and DGAP affirmed its report. The Tribunal accepted the DGAP report, relying on the statutory provisions and the area-based methodology mandated by the cited judicial principle, and directed refund and interest in accordance with Rule 133(3)(b).

Conclusion: The Tribunal holds that profiteering of Rs. 40,096 occurred and directs refund of Rs. 40,096 with applicable interest to the eligible homebuyers in proportion to area; decision is in favour of Revenue.

Issues: Whether the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on supplementary commission paid to travel agents and, in the circumstances of the case, whether the assessee could be fastened only with interest without further recovery of the shortfall in TDS.

Analysis: The issue was treated as covered by the earlier Supreme Court ruling, which held that supplementary commission paid to travel agents falls within the scope of section 194-H where the contractual arrangement discloses a principal-agent relationship under section 182 of the Contract Act. The same ruling also recognised that, where the travel agents had already paid income tax on the supplementary commission, no further recovery of the shortfall in TDS could be made from the airlines, though interest could still be levied under section 201(1-A) of the Income-tax Act. The Court also accepted that, after a long lapse of time, the assessee should not be put to the burden of proving tax payment by the agents and directed that the assessing officer confine the demand to interest on the applicable TDS amount.

Conclusion: The assessee's liability on merits under section 194-H stood maintained, but the demand was confined to interest and no fresh enquiry was to be made by the assessing officer as to whether the agents had paid tax.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tax on the underlying commission has already been paid by the recipient, the defaulting deductor remains liable for interest for failure to deduct tax at source, but further recovery of the TDS shortfall is not warranted.

Issues: Whether depreciation under section 32(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable on goodwill recognised on acquisition of a going concern by slump sale and whether the fifth proviso to section 32(1) applies to such acquisition.

Analysis: The assessee acquired a manufacturing unit as a going concern for a lump-sum consideration and allocated part of the consideration to identifiable tangible assets with the residue accounted as goodwill. The legal question turns on whether such goodwill qualifies as an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under section 32(1)(ii) and whether the statutory restriction in the fifth proviso to section 32(1) applies. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Smifs Securities Ltd. has held that goodwill falls within "any other business or commercial rights of similar nature" under Explanation 3(b) to section 32(1) and is therefore an asset eligible for depreciation. The jurisdictional High Court in Grindwell Norton Ltd. has reaffirmed that position. The fifth proviso to section 32(1), relied upon by the Revenue and applied in United Breweries Ltd., operates as a statutory restriction in cases of amalgamation/succession to limit aggregate depreciation; it is factually and legally inapplicable to a slump sale between unrelated parties. In the present facts various licences, approvals and commercial rights transferred with the business support that the residual consideration represents business/intangible rights and not merely a book entry.

Conclusion: Depreciation on the goodwill arising on acquisition of the going concern by slump sale is allowable under section 32(1)(ii); the fifth proviso to section 32(1) is not attracted to the present slump sale. The disallowance of depreciation is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee is an assessee in default under section 201(1) and liable to interest under section 201(1A) in respect of payments to two payees where Form 26A certificates have since been filed and verified; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer's determination in respect of two other payees should be sustained subject to a 30% disallowance already made and recomputation of liability; (iii) Whether fee under section 234E is leviable where the assessee contends that the TDS return was filed within prescribed time.

Issue (i): Whether filing and departmental verification of Form 26A negates liability under section 201(1) and corresponding interest under section 201(1A) for specified payments.

Analysis: Form 26A certificates in respect of the two specified payees were filed by the assessee and have been verified by the department; additional evidence admitting these documents was allowed under Rule 29; the factual effect of verified Form 26A is to establish deduction/credit for the payees and remove the basis for treating the assessee as an assessee in default for those payments.

Conclusion: The demand under section 201(1) and interest under section 201(1A) in respect of the two specified payees is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Assessing Officer's action in respect of payments to the two other payees should be confirmed subject to the assessee's 30% disallowance and recomputation.

Analysis: The assessee has already recorded a 30% disallowance of the relevant expenditure in the computation of income; no objection was raised to admission of evidence relating to these payments; any remaining liability requires calculation after giving effect to the disallowance.

Conclusion: The Assessing Officer's action in respect of these two payments is confirmed to the extent indicated; the Assessing Officer is directed to recompute the liability in accordance with law after giving effect to the 30% disallowance.

Issue (iii): Whether fee under section 234E is leviable where the assessee asserts that the TDS return was filed within time.

Analysis: The factual question of timely filing of the TDS return was directed to be verified by the Assessing Officer; deletion of the fee under section 234E was made contingent on verification establishing timely filing.

Conclusion: If the Assessing Officer finds that the TDS return was filed within the prescribed time, the fee under section 234E shall be deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by deleting the demand and interest for two payees, confirming liability for the other two payees subject to recomputation after giving effect to a 30% disallowance, and directing verification of timely filing of the TDS return for consideration of deletion of section 234E fee.

Ratio Decidendi: Filing and departmental verification of Form 26A certificates removes the basis for treating the payer as an assessee in default under section 201(1); additional evidence may be admitted under Rule 29 when it goes to the root of the matter and affects the entitlement to relief.

Issues: (i) Whether addition made under Section 56(2)(x) in assessment completed under Section 153A, by adopting an earlier order under Section 143(3) that was annulled/abated on account of search, is sustainable in absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search.

Analysis: The statutory framework includes abatement of pending assessments on initiation of search under Section 132/132A and the scope of Section 153A to assess total income only to the extent of incriminating material found during the search. Where no incriminating material is unearthed, completed or unabated assessments cannot be reworked in Section 153A proceedings except by valid exercise of reopening powers under Sections 147/148 subject to their conditions. The decision in PCIT v. Abhisar Buildwell (Hon'ble Supreme Court) holds that, in absence of incriminating material from the search, additions in Section 153A cannot be made by relying on earlier completed assessments. Applying these principles, the impugned addition under Section 56(2)(x) in the Section 153A order was made without any discussion of incriminating material and merely by adopting figures from the earlier Section 143(3) order which had been annulled/abated.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 56(2)(x) made in the assessment under Section 153A is deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the declared transaction value of the imported goods was liable to rejection under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 read with Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether re-determination of assessable value by adding the admitted under-invoiced portion under the residual method (Rule 9) is legally sustainable; (iii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 was justified; (iv) Whether the demand of differential duty with interest is sustainable; (v) Whether goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111(m); (vi) Whether penalties under Section 114A and on co-noticees under Section 112(a) are justified.

Issue (i): Whether the declared transaction value was liable to rejection under Rule 12 and Section 14.

Analysis: The declared invoice value was examined against admissions and corroborative records showing part of the consideration was paid outside banking channels and not disclosed. Statements recorded under Section 108 and documents seized in parallel enforcement proceedings were treated as corroborative evidence establishing that the invoice did not reflect the price actually paid or payable. Where part of the consideration is shown to have flowed outside declared channels and is undisclosed, the transaction value concept under Section 14 is vitiated and Rule 12 may be invoked.

Conclusion: The rejection of the declared transaction value is upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether re-determination of assessable value by the residual method (Rule 9) is legally sustainable.

Analysis: Given the declared value was vitiated by deliberate nondisclosure, sequential application of valuation methods is not to be mechanical. Where transaction value is shown unreliable by suppression of material facts and extra-commercial consideration, recourse to the residual method is required. The re-determination relied on appellant admissions and corroborative documentary evidence rather than conjecture.

Conclusion: Re-determination of assessable value under the residual method is legally sustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of the extended period under Section 28(4) was justified.

Analysis: Non-disclosure of material facts affecting assessment qualifies as suppression. Statutory obligation to make true and complete declarations encompasses disclosure of full consideration. Corroborative enforcement records established deliberate withholding of information, satisfying ingredients for invoking the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period under Section 28(4) is justified and sustained.

Issue (iv): Whether the demand of differential duty with interest is sustainable.

Analysis: Differential duty flows from re-determined assessable value. Interest on differential duty is a statutory consequence of short levy and follows from the affirmed valuation findings, which were corroborated by independent evidence.

Conclusion: The demand of differential duty along with applicable interest is sustainable.

Issue (v): Whether the goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111(m).

Analysis: Mis-declaration of value resulting in short-levy of duty falls within confiscation provisions. In the absence of physical availability of goods, redemption fine was not imposable.

Conclusion: Liability to confiscation under Section 111(m) is upheld; redemption fine not imposed due to non-availability of goods.

Issue (vi): Whether penalties under Section 114A and on co-noticees under Section 112(a) are justified.

Analysis: Section 114A prescribes mandatory penalty where duty is short-levied by reason of collusion, wilful mis-statement, or suppression. Findings of deliberate undervaluation, corroborated by admissions and enforcement records, satisfy these ingredients and permit inclusion of interest in penalty quantification.

Conclusion: Penalties under Section 114A and on co-noticees under Section 112(a) are justified and sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate orders are upheld in all material respects; valuation rejection, re-determination, demand of duty with interest, invocation of extended limitation, confiscation findings, and penalties are sustained and the appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the declared transaction value is shown to be vitiated by deliberate suppression of material facts and payment of part consideration through unauthorized channels, the declared invoice cannot be treated as the price actually paid or payable, permitting rejection under Rule 12 and re-determination under the residual method, with consequent duty, interest, mandatory penalty under Section 114A, and confiscation under Section 111(m).

Issues: (i) Whether the cost of barrels used for packing bitumen at the depots was deductible while valuing barreled bitumen cleared from the depots for duty purposes; (ii) Whether the extended period and penalty were invocable; (iii) Whether Cenvat credit on duty-paid barrels used at the depots was admissible.

Issue (i): Whether the cost of barrels used for packing bitumen at the depots was deductible while valuing barreled bitumen cleared from the depots for duty purposes.

Analysis: The valuation turned on Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000. Since the goods cleared from the refinery were bulk bitumen and the goods sold from the depots were barreled bitumen, the goods under assessment were not sold at the factory gate in that condition. The depots constituted the place of removal, and for goods sold from such depots the normal transaction value of the goods sold from the depot was relevant. Rule 7 applied, and the cost of packing was not to be deducted merely because the bitumen was transferred in bulk from the refinery before barrelling.

Conclusion: The deduction of barrel cost was not permissible, and the valuation was to proceed on the depot sale basis under Rule 7.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period and penalty were invocable.

Analysis: The assessee had informed the department of the change in assessment practice, and the department did not dispute that disclosure. In the absence of suppression of facts with intent to evade duty, the extended period could not be invoked. For the same reason, the mandatory penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not sustainable.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the penalty under Section 11AC was set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether Cenvat credit on duty-paid barrels used at the depots was admissible.

Analysis: Where packing material is used at a depot that functions as the place from which the final goods are cleared, credit cannot be denied merely because the packing material was not received in the factory. The barrels were used for making the goods marketable before clearance from the depots, and the credit entitlement was recognised.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on duty-paid barrels was admissible.

Final Conclusion: The duty issue was sustained only to the extent of normal period liability, while limitation and penalty were decided for the assessee and credit on packing material was allowed, resulting in a partial remand for recomputation of the dues and consequential reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Where excisable goods are cleared from a depot that is the place of removal, the depot sale value governs valuation and packing cost is includible, but extended limitation requires suppression with intent to evade, and credit on packing material used at the depot cannot be denied merely because the material did not enter the factory.

Issues: Whether the impugned administrative order imposing interest and penalty for delayed filing of GSTR-3B (April 2018 to March 2019) is liable to be quashed on the ground that a second order for the same period by a different authority results in duplication of proceedings and double taxation.

Analysis: The Court considered the fact that two distinct orders were issued by different authorities for the identical period and the identical default, resulting in two quantified interest demands for the same delay. The availability of an earlier quantified demand which was paid, and the subsequent issuance of a second demand for the same period and same default, demonstrates duplication of proceedings leading to double liability. The Court treated such duplication as legally untenable because it produces double taxation for the same taxable event and period.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 22.03.2024 imposing interest and penalty for the specified period is quashed and the petition is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 426 days in filing the Special Leave Petition is liable to be condoned; (ii) Whether the High Court's judgment quashing the reassessment notice dated 31.03.2021 and the order rejecting objections is sustainable on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the inordinate delay of 426 days in filing the Special Leave Petition should be condoned.

Analysis: The delay of 426 days is attributed broadly to departmental and administrative procedure without specific or adequate explanation. The explanation provided is vague and insufficient to justify condonation under established principles permitting extension of time only on acceptable and particularised grounds.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The delay is not condoned and the petition is dismissed on the ground of delay.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court's quashing of the reassessment notice dated 31.03.2021 and the order rejecting objections is liable to interference on merits.

Analysis: The High Court's decision on the merits was examined and found to be supportable on its reasoning and factual and legal analysis. There is no persuasive basis in the Special Leave Petition to interfere with the High Court's view on merits.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The High Court's quashing of the reassessment notice and related order is upheld.

Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition is dismissed both for failure to justify the delay and on the merits, leaving the High Court's decision quashing the reassessment notice intact.

Ratio Decidendi: An inordinate and unexplained delay in filing a Special Leave Petition is a ground for dismissal; where a High Court's merits-based quashing of a reassessment notice is supportable, the Supreme Court will not interfere.

Issues: Whether import clearances obtained by transferee importers using DFRC/DFIA licences, which were later cancelled ab initio by DGFT on grounds of fraud by the original licence holder, render the transferee liable to pay customs duty, interest and penalties where the licences were valid and not cancelled at the time of import.

Analysis: Applicable legal principles distinguish between licences that are forged and licences obtained by misrepresentation or fraud by the original holder. Authorities establish that a licence obtained by misrepresentation is voidable at the instance of the licensing authority and remains valid until the licensing authority cancels or voids it. Where the licences/scrips were legitimately issued and remained uncancelled at the time of import, transferee importers who acquired and used such licences in good faith are entitled to rely on them for duty exemption. Forged or fabricated licences that were never issued by the licensing authority are outside this principle and do not confer validity. The limitation provisions under Section 28 of the Customs Act are relevant to time-bar issues, but absent allegations of suppression or wrongdoing by the transferee, extended periods for reassessment are not invoked.

Conclusion: The appeals are allowed; where DFRC/DFIA licences were valid and not cancelled at the time of import, the demand for duty, interest and penalties on transferee importers does not survive and the transferees are entitled to consequential relief in their favour.

Issues: (i) Whether Squid Powder / Squid Liver Powder is classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 2301 or under Heading 2309; (ii) Whether re-classification and confirmation of demand are sustainable when the Show Cause Notices do not clearly and specifically propose re-classification with cogent reasons; (iii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act is legally permissible on the facts of the case; (iv) Whether penalties under Section 114A and confiscation under Section 111(m) are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether Squid Powder / Squid Liver Powder is classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 2301 or under Heading 2309?

Analysis: The imported product consists of squid liver paste mixed with substantial quantities (approximately 4050%) of soyabean meal. Heading 2301 covers flours, meals and pellets obtained by processing animal materials without admixture of other substantive ingredients. Heading 2309 covers preparations of a kind used in animal feeding, including mixtures of animal and vegetable materials and preparations for use in making complete or supplementary feeds, as explained in the HSN Explanatory Notes and Chapter Notes. Precedent decisions of the Tribunal treating marine-origin materials blended with substantial vegetable-origin nutrients as falling under Heading 2309 were applied to materially identical composition, manufacture and end-use facts. The composition shows the vegetable-origin ingredient is formative and determinative of the product's character, and the product functions as a feed ingredient/preparation used in animal feeding.

Conclusion: The product is classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 2309 and not under Heading 2301.

Issue (ii): Whether re-classification and confirmation of demand are sustainable when the Show Cause Notices do not clearly and specifically propose re-classification with cogent reasons?

Analysis: The Show Cause Notices specifically alleged mis-classification under Heading 2301, proposed classification under Heading 2309, and stated factual and legal bases including composition, manufacturing process, intended use, and relevant Chapter Notes and HSN Explanatory Notes. The appellants responded substantively and availed hearings and opportunities to rebut. Authorities require that a notice convey the substance of allegations and grounds; hypertechnical drafting deficiencies do not invalidate a notice where the notice places the importer on adequate notice and affords opportunity to respond.

Conclusion: The re-classification and consequential demands are sustainable; the Show Cause Notices were adequate.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act is legally permissible in the facts of the present cases?

Analysis: The presence of substantial soyabean meal (4050%) is a material fact central to tariff classification and duty liability. The Bills of Entry did not disclose this composition detail and described the goods merely as squid powder/liver powder. Clearance under RMS does not absolve the importer of statutory disclosure obligations. Established authorities permit invocation of the extended period where suppression of material facts affecting classification is shown; bona fide belief is not a defence where primary facts are withheld.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period under Section 28(4) is legally valid and sustainable.

Issue (iv): Whether penalties under Section 114A and confiscation under Section 111(m) are sustainable?

Analysis: Once suppression of material facts within the meaning of Section 28(4) is established, statutory penalty under Section 114A follows and mis-declaration of composition rendering classification and duty liability incorrect attracts confiscation under Section 111(m). No adequate mitigating circumstances for waiver or reduction of penalty were demonstrated.

Conclusion: Penalties under Section 114A and confiscation under Section 111(m) are sustainable.

Final Conclusion: On the facts and law considered, the classification, invocation of the extended period, penalties and confiscation as adjudicated are upheld and the appeals are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an imported product is a formulated mixture containing substantial vegetable-origin components that are formative of its character and intended as a preparation for animal feeding, it falls under Heading 2309 rather than Heading 2301; nondisclosure of such material composition amounts to suppression permitting invocation of Section 28(4) and consequent penalties and confiscation.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition under Article 226 challenging the SEBI final order dated 24.09.2018 and consequential attachment notices dated 13.04.2023 is maintainable, or whether the petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory remedy under the SEBI Act, 1992.

Analysis: The impugned regulatory orders record findings against the company and its directors for alleged illegal issuance of Redeemable Preference Shares and consequent recovery proceedings under Section 28A of the SEBI Act, 1992. The dispute involves evaluation of regulatory findings of fact and the extent of individual involvement of a director. The statutory scheme provides an appellate remedy under Section 15T of the SEBI Act, 1992. Judicial interference under Article 226 is confined to cases of perversity, manifest arbitrariness, absence of reasons, or breach of principles of natural justice. Where reasoned regulatory orders exist and disputed factual questions and evidence appreciation arise, writ jurisdiction is ordinarily declined in favour of the statutory appellate process.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable; the petitioner is directed to pursue the alternative statutory remedy under the SEBI Act, 1992. The petition is dismissed and interim orders, if any, are vacated.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeals under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 beyond the statutory period of thirty days and the further condonable period of fifteen days could be condoned for the appellants.

Analysis: The impugned orders were dated 03.02.2025 and the appellants were informed on 04.02.2025. The statutory 30-day period for filing under Section 61(2) expired on 05.03.2025 and the outer 15-day extension under the proviso expired on 20.03.2025. The applications for certified copies were made after expiry of the 30-day period; therefore the appellants could not claim benefit under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Tribunal's jurisdiction to condone delay is strictly limited by statute and cannot extend beyond the 15-day outer limit provided in Section 61(2).

Conclusion: The applications for condonation of delay are dismissed and the appeals are rejected; the Tribunal declined to condone the delay and the result is against the appellants.

Issues: (i) Whether the Appellate Tribunal should expunge observations recorded in paragraphs 25 and 28 of the impugned NCLT order which held that certain IL&FS-related companies were group companies of IL&FS Financial Services Ltd. and therefore could not be members of the Committee of Creditors due to alleged initiation of Enforcement Directorate proceedings.

Analysis: The issue requires examination of whether the impugned observations were supported by material on the record and whether appropriate procedure (including opportunity to be heard) was followed before recording a finding that a member must be excluded from the Committee of Creditors. Relevant legal framework includes section 30(6) and section 30(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 concerning approval of resolution plans and voting thresholds, the effect of an Enforcement Directorate money-laundering investigation on a creditor's membership of the CoC, and the necessity of evidential basis for adverse findings. The analysis considers (a) whether material on record established that the companies were group companies of the financial services entity alleged to be under ED investigation, (b) whether any ECIR or ED proceeding specifically against the companies was placed before the adjudicating authority, and (c) the procedural requirement that exclusion of a CoC member is a serious step necessitating opportunity of hearing and evidential support. Documentary material (including an annual report showing the organisational structure) demonstrated that the companies were subsidiaries of a different IL&FS holding structure and that no ED investigation material against those companies was on record; no supporting evidence was produced by the party relying on ED proceedings; and the adjudicating authority did not record reasons or consider the reply and documents filed by the affected companies before making the adverse observations.

Conclusion: The observations in paragraphs 25 and 28 of the impugned order are expunged for lack of evidence and for failure to afford appropriate opportunity and reasoned consideration before recording findings that would exclude members from the Committee of Creditors.

Final Conclusion: The appellate outcome removes the adverse observations from the impugned order and preserves that exclusion of any CoC member requires factual material and a fair opportunity to be heard; the appellate relief expunges the specific paragraphs complained of and closes pending incidental applications.

Ratio Decidendi: Absent admissible material demonstrating that a creditor is subject to enforcement proceedings, and without affording a fair opportunity to contest exclusion, adverse observations leading to removal from the Committee of Creditors cannot be sustained and must be expunged.

Issues: Whether the service tax demand confirmed by clubbing the value of food sold with mandap keeper charges (despite separate billing and VAT payment) is tenable, and whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Analysis: The appellant's records show separate invoices and separate charges for mandap keeper services and for sale of food, with VAT discharged on the food component. Notification No. 12/2003-ST provides exemption to the extent of value of goods supplied with a service where evidence of the value of goods supplied exists. Coordinate bench decisions cited in the appeal hold that where catering charges are shown separately and VAT is paid, the requirements of Notification No. 12/2003-ST are satisfied and the food component cannot be clubbed with mandap keeper service for service tax. Those decisions further treat the question as one of interpretation of law, precluding invocation of the extended period of limitation arising from audit adjustments in similar circumstances.

Conclusion: The service tax demand confirmed by clubbing the value of food with mandap keeper charges is not tenable; the extended period of limitation is not invokable on these facts. The appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of Cenvat credit of Rs. 3,38,796/-, interest and equal penalty could be sustained where Rs. 2,87,502/- had already been reversed prior to issuance of show-cause notice and the remaining disputed amount of Rs. 51,294/- arose from a composite contract containing an erection component for which credit is inadmissible.

Analysis: The appeal examines the scope of recovery where part of the allegedly inadmissible credit was reversed before issuance of the show-cause notice, the applicability of Section 11A(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in confining recovery to the balance amount, and whether an erroneous interpretation of the Cenvat Credit Rules regarding a composite contract can be equated with an intention to evade duty so as to invoke extended period and penal provisions under Rule 14 and Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. The admitted facts show that Rs. 2,87,502/- was reversed prior to notice; the balance demand relates to Rs. 51,294/- attributable to service tax on the erection component identified in the invoice; and the invoice represented a composite contract covering design, supply, installation, commissioning and erection. The legal position in Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 excludes credit for erection services, yet a composite contract can give rise to an erroneous interpretation about admissibility of credit. Where reversal has already been made before initiation of proceedings, recovery should be confined to the un-reversed balance and imposition of interest and equal penalty contrary to Section 11A(2) requires scrutiny. An honest or arguable interpretation of the statutory provisions in relation to a composite contract does not amount to mala fide or intent to evade duty sufficient to justify invocation of extended period or confirmation of equal penal consequences.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) confirming recovery, interest and equal penalty is set aside. The assessee may remit the admitted inadmissible credit of Rs. 51,294/- with interest voluntarily; penal confirmation and extended-period consequences are not sustained.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), in adjudicating an application under Section 60(5) of the IBC filed by Gloster Cables Ltd., could on the facts of this case declare that the trademark "Gloster" was an asset of the Corporate Debtor and hence vest title in the Successful Resolution Applicant (Gloster Limited).

Analysis: The Court examined the scope of Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC (residuary jurisdiction of NCLT to hear questions of law or fact "arising out of or in relation to" insolvency proceedings) in the light of the statutory scheme including Sections 14 and 31, and the duty of the Resolution Professional under Sections 18 and 25. Authorities were applied that limit NCLT's jurisdiction to disputes that have a real nexus with the insolvency resolution and to situations where the dispute's resolution is necessary for preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern. The approved resolution plan is binding under Section 31 and its finality cannot be subverted by conferring rights in excess of what the CoC approved. The Court emphasized that avoidance claims under Sections 43, 45, 46 and related provisions require specific pleading, rigorous forensic scrutiny and that natural justice requires that the party against whom avoidance is sought be put on notice. On the facts the approved plan itself recorded rival claims to the trademark and the Resolution Applicant did not pursue avoidance remedies; no RP application under avoidance provisions was filed and the NCLT's declaration of title amounted to altering the approved plan and exceeded the jurisdiction conferred by Section 60(5)(c).

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority could not have declared title in the trademark "Gloster" in favour of the Successful Resolution Applicant on the facts of this case; the NCLT's finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor is set aside. This outcome is in favour of the Respondent.

Issues: (i) Whether penal interest collected by the Banks for delayed/defaulted EMIs is taxable as a declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether liquidated damages/notice period pay recovered from employees is taxable under Section 66E(e); (iii) Whether CSR expenditure is taxable as "sponsorship service" under Section 65(99a) of the Finance Act, 1994 and subject to reverse charge; (iv) Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is invocable in the facts; (v) Whether interest under Section 75 and penalties under Sections 77 and 78 are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether penal interest collected by the Appellant Banks for delayed/defaulted EMIs is taxable as a declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994?

Analysis: The Tribunal examined statutory definitions and binding clarifications (CBIC Circulars) and applied the Supreme Court authority in Clix Capital Services Pvt. Ltd., which holds that penal charges/liquidated damages arising from breach of contract are compensatory and do not constitute consideration for tolerating an act. The bench also followed coordinate Bench precedents of this Tribunal and considered that penal interest is a contractual consequence intended as deterrent/compensation and not a pre-agreed conscious agreement to tolerate default.

Conclusion: Penal interest collected by the Banks is not liable to service tax. Decision in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether liquidated damages / notice period pay recovered from employees are taxable under Section 66E(e)?

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the employeremployee exclusion in Section 65B(44), relevant case law including the Madras High Court decision in GE T&D India Ltd. and Tribunal precedents, and CBIC clarifications. It found that notice pay/liquidated damages arise from employment contracts, are compensatory in nature, and do not reflect a service provided by the employer to the employee for consideration.

Conclusion: Liquidated damages / notice period pay recovered by Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. are not liable to service tax. Decision in favour of the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether CSR expenditure incurred by the Banks is liable to service tax as "sponsorship service" under Section 65(99a) and subject to reverse charge?

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed Section 65(99a), TRU guidance and Notification No. 30/2012-ST, distinguishing pure donations (excluded) from sponsorships involving reciprocity/branding. On the facts, the adjudicating authority recorded event-wise findings, internal policies and instances of logo/brand visibility. The appellants failed to furnish documentary evidence to prove pure donations; the Tribunal held that where contributions are linked to promotional visibility or branded exposure the activity falls within "sponsorship service" and is taxable under reverse charge.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax on sponsorship services is upheld. Decision in favour of the respondent/Department.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) is validly invoked?

Analysis: The Tribunal applied settled Supreme Court principles (Nizam Sugar Factory; Uniflex Cables) that nondisclosure in statutory returns and failure to bring the matter to the Department's notice constitutes suppression for limitation purposes. It found that sponsorship transactions were not declared in ST-3 returns nor was tax discharged under reverse charge, and that mere accounting in books does not amount to disclosure to the Department.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation is upheld in respect of the sponsorship service demands. Decision in favour of the respondent on this issue (limited to sponsorship counts).

Issue (v): Whether interest under Section 75 and penalties under Sections 77 and 78 are sustainable?

Analysis: The Tribunal held that interest under Section 75 is statutory and follows from confirmation of tax liability on sponsorship services. Having upheld invocation of the extended period for sponsorship services and found suppression of facts, the Tribunal applied settled principles that penalties under Sections 77 and 78 are attracted where conditions for suppression/intent to evade are satisfied and are civil liabilities not requiring mens rea.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 75 and penalties under Sections 77 and 78 are sustained insofar as they relate to confirmed sponsorship service demands. Decision in favour of the respondent on those counts.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are partly allowed and partly dismissed demands in respect of penal interest and liquidated damages/notice pay are set aside in favour of the appellants, while demands, interest and penalties relating to sponsorship services are upheld in favour of the Department; the invocation of extended limitation and penalties are sustained only for sponsorship counts.

Ratio Decidendi: Penal charges and liquidated damages arising from breach of contract are compensatory and not consideration for a declared service under Section 66E(e); by contrast, sponsorship under Section 65(99a) is taxable where the factual matrix shows reciprocity or promotional/branding benefit, and nondisclosure of such sponsorship transactions in statutory returns justifies invocation of the proviso to Section 73(1) and consequential interest and penalties.