Issues: Whether rejection of the assessee's application under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme was justified when a penalty appeal was pending and the assessee and her spouse were governed by Section 5A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 5A creates a statutory fiction in respect of spouses governed by the Portuguese Civil Code in Goa, under which income is treated as community income and the assessment dispute is apportioned accordingly. The pending appeal against the penalty order constituted a pending dispute within the meaning of the Scheme, and the expression "dispute" was required to receive a broad construction consistent with the Scheme's beneficial object. The fact that no separate appeal had been filed against the assessment order did not defeat entitlement where the spouse's appeal on the same community income had already been entertained and the Scheme benefit had been extended to the spouse. The objections based on delay and lapse of the Scheme were also rejected because the application had been filed when the Scheme was in force.

Conclusion: The rejection order was unsustainable, and the assessee was entitled to consideration under the Scheme.

Issues: (i) Whether duty could be demanded on goods cleared for export but returned damaged during transit and brought back to the factory under Rule 16 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. (ii) Whether the demand for the earlier damaged consignment could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether duty could be demanded on goods cleared for export but returned damaged during transit and brought back to the factory under Rule 16 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Analysis: The goods were cleared for export, damaged in transit, returned to the factory, and re-warehoused after departmental verification. The dispute turned on the place of removal and whether the goods, having been cleared for export under bond and returned before export, could be treated as removed for purposes of duty. The settled position applied was that, in export cases of this nature, the place of removal is the port of export and not the factory gate. Goods destroyed before export are to be treated as destroyed before removal, and the demand on their full value cannot be sustained where the factual and procedural requirements were complied with.

Conclusion: Duty was not payable on the returned damaged export goods on the full value, and the assessee was entitled to relief.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand for the earlier damaged consignment could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Analysis: In the earlier instance, the damaged goods were brought back, permission for destruction was obtained, the goods were destroyed under departmental supervision, and duty on scrap value was paid and accepted by the Department. In those circumstances, reopening the matter and demanding duty on the same goods by invoking the extended period was not justified.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was not sustainable against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand and the appellate order confirming it were set aside, and the assessee succeeded in the appeal with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods cleared for export and returned damaged before export are treated as not removed beyond the port of export, and duty cannot be demanded on their full value when the export procedure and departmental verification have been complied with.

Issues: Whether interest at a higher rate than 6% (specifically 12%) is payable to the appellant on sanctioned rebate/refund amounts withheld for an abnormal delay of over 12 years, and if so, the rate and period for which such interest is payable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined applicability of Section 11BB (and related provisions) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 concerning payment of interest on delayed refunds and considered authorities recognising entitlement to higher interest where refunds are unreasonably delayed. The Tribunal noted that Section 11BB provides for interest where duty ordered to be refunded is not refunded within three months, but that judicial decisions (including Supreme Court and various High Courts) have awarded higher interest rates (commonly 12%) in cases of long and unjustified withholding of refunds. The Tribunal reviewed prior decisions of this Tribunal and the Apex Court (including Surinder Singh / subsequent Supreme Court authority, Sandvik Asia Ltd., and ITC Ltd.) and relevant government notifications fixing interest rates under different sections; it considered that in cases of abnormal delay and where the appellant suffered hardship, equitable considerations and precedent support awarding interest at 12% per annum. Having regard to the facts of extraordinary delay (over 12 years), the pattern of judicial decisions, and applicable statutory notifications, the Tribunal concluded that interest at 12% per annum is appropriate for the period for which the amount was withheld.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the sanctioned rebate/refund amount for the period specified under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether deletion of the addition for share capital and share premium as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 was justified.

Analysis: The available record contained the material furnished by the assessee concerning the identity and creditworthiness of the share subscribers and the genuineness of the transactions. Having discharged its initial burden through this evidence, the burden shifted to the Assessing Officer to scrutinise the material and undertake an independent enquiry. No deficiency in the evidence or basis to dispute the identity, creditworthiness or genuineness of the creditors was established.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under Section 68 was justified, as the assessee established the identity and creditworthiness of the share subscribers and the genuineness of the transactions. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance under Section 14A is permissible where no exempt income was earned during the relevant assessment year; (ii) Whether compensation paid to secure vacation of premises and obtain leave-and-licence use of those premises is capital or revenue expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance under Section 14A is permissible where no exempt income was earned during the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The issue was governed by binding precedent holding that, where the assessee earns no exempt income in the relevant assessment year, no disallowance under Section 14A arises. The circulars relied upon by the Revenue did not give rise to a substantial question of law in view of that settled position.

Conclusion: No disallowance under Section 14A is permissible in the absence of exempt income during the relevant assessment year, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether compensation paid to secure vacation of premises and obtain leave-and-licence use of those premises is capital or revenue expenditure.

Analysis: The payment enabled the assessee to have the existing occupant vacate the premises while permitting its continued use on leave-and-licence terms for a limited period. Applying the distinction between capital and revenue expenditure, the finding that the payment was revenue expenditure disclosed no legal infirmity.

Conclusion: The compensation paid for vacation and temporary use of the premises is revenue expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's determinations on the Section 14A disallowance and the revenue character of the compensation payment remain undisturbed.

Issues: Whether deduction under Section 54F is available where the capital gains are reinvested in a residential property standing in the assessee's wife's name.

Analysis: The jurisdictional High Court's interpretation of the pari materia exemption under Section 54B establishes that investment in a property acquired in the spouse's name does not satisfy the statutory requirement for the assessee's exemption claim.

Conclusion: The Section 54F claim for Rs.22 lakhs was rightly disallowed; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the dispute regarding internal roads, common areas and the effect of the agreement clause could be adjudicated in writ proceedings or required determination before the civil court; (ii) Whether the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred the Competent Authority from acting under Section 11 of the MOFA Act.

Issue (i): Whether the dispute regarding internal roads, common areas and the effect of the agreement clause could be adjudicated in writ proceedings or required determination before the civil court.

Analysis: The question whether internal roads form part of the common areas depends on sanctioned plans, development permissions and the contractual and statutory framework governing conveyance. Such issues are factual in nature and cannot be conclusively determined in writ jurisdiction. A private contractual clause cannot override statutory rights under the MOFA framework, and the promoter can rely only on agreement terms that conform to the statutory scheme. The proper forum for resolving disputes about extent of land, title and ownership is a civil court, and the findings in the deemed conveyance proceedings do not operate as res judicata in such civil proceedings.

Conclusion: The dispute on internal roads and the scope of conveyance was not fit for adjudication in writ proceedings and the parties were relegated to civil remedies.

Issue (ii): Whether the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred the Competent Authority from acting under Section 11 of the MOFA Act.

Analysis: Proceedings for deemed conveyance enforce a statutory obligation to convey title in specie and are not proceedings for recovery of money or enforcement of a debt. The Competent Authority discharges a statutory function and does not adjudicate complex title disputes. Statutory duties under the MOFA framework continue notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, and Section 14 does not disable the Authority from exercising its statutory powers.

Conclusion: The moratorium did not bar the Competent Authority from proceeding under Section 11 of the MOFA Act.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the deemed conveyance order failed, the writ petition was not entertained, and the parties were left to work out their title and ownership claims before the civil court.

Ratio Decidendi: Disputes concerning title, extent of land and ownership in deemed conveyance matters are to be tried by the civil court, and the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not prevent a statutory authority from performing a non-monetary statutory function under MOFA.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST demand and order was liable to be entertained despite the plea of non-service of notices, and whether the challenge was barred by delay and laches.

Analysis: The petitioner asserted violation of natural justice on the ground that the notices and order were uploaded on the portal and were not physically served. The Court found the pleadings self-contradictory, since the petitioner also admitted that it had not filed a reply, had not sought personal hearing, had become aware of the proceedings in 2024, and still approached the Court only in November 2025 without any satisfactory explanation for the delay. The availability of an unavailed statutory appeal was also noted. Applying the settled principle that writ jurisdiction must be invoked within a reasonable time and that delay, laches, and acquiescence can defeat discretionary relief, the Court declined interference.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be barred by delay and laches, and the challenge to the impugned GST proceedings was rejected.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 for assessment year 2015-16 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to section 149(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the consequent reassessment order was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The reassessment notice was issued on 09.04.2022 for assessment year 2015-16. The relevant limitation under the unamended reassessment regime had expired on 31.03.2022. The first proviso to section 149(1)(b) protects years for which the old time limit had already run out, and the enlarged ten-year period under the amended regime cannot revive a notice that had become time-barred under the earlier law. On that basis, the notice could not validly be issued after 01.04.2022.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was time-barred, and the reassessment order based on it was invalid and liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the reassessment was annulled on the ground of limitation, leaving the additions unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: For assessment years governed by the pre-amendment limitation regime, a reassessment notice under section 148 cannot be issued under the amended law once the earlier limitation period has already expired; the first proviso to section 149(1)(b) prevents revival of such time-barred cases.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty under section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for alleged acceptance of cash loan in violation of section 269SS survived after the quantum addition based on the same transaction had been deleted. (ii) Whether the penalty could be sustained in the absence of clear satisfaction recorded in the assessment order for initiation of penalty proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty under section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for alleged acceptance of cash loan in violation of section 269SS survived after the quantum addition based on the same transaction had been deleted.

Analysis: The penalty was founded on the alleged cash loan of Rs. 64,25,000/- said to have been received from M/s. Evergreen Enterprises. The quantum addition on the same footing had already been deleted by the coordinate bench on the ground that the assessment was based only on statements and no other corroborative evidence had been brought on record. Once the underlying addition and the factual foundation for the alleged cash loan did not survive, the penalty based on that very foundation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271D could not survive and was liable to be deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty could be sustained in the absence of clear satisfaction recorded in the assessment order for initiation of penalty proceedings.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not record a clear and specific satisfaction for initiation of penalty under section 271D. It applied the principle that penalty proceedings must rest on a valid and surviving foundation and relied on the rule that where the basis for penalty initiation is absent or rendered unsustainable, the penalty cannot stand. In the facts of the case, the requirement of a proper foundation for penalty initiation was not fulfilled.

Conclusion: The penalty was not sustainable on this ground as well.

Final Conclusion: The impugned penalty order could not be sustained on the facts and in law, and the assessee succeeded in the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under section 271D cannot survive where the assessment foundation giving rise to the alleged contravention is deleted or otherwise does not survive, and penalty initiation must rest on a valid and clearly recorded satisfaction.

Issues: Whether registration fees collected from students and remitted to IATA were includible in the taxable value of commercial training and coaching services.

Analysis: Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 could not enlarge the scope of Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 to include reimbursable expenditure in the value of taxable services for the relevant period. The subsequent amendment to Section 67 with effect from 14.05.2015, expressly including reimbursable expenditure or cost, was substantive and operated prospectively.

Conclusion: Registration fees collected and remitted to IATA were not includible in the taxable value for the disputed period; the demand, interest and penalties could not survive, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an assessment order passed without affording an effective opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and without personal hearing could be sustained.

Analysis: Although uploading a notice on the GST portal is a valid mode of service, where the taxpayer does not respond to repeated portal communications, the officer must explore other prescribed modes under Section 169(1), preferably registered post, to ensure effective service. Passing an ex parte assessment merely on portal service, without personal hearing, in those circumstances results in inadequate opportunity and defeats the purpose of fair adjudication.

Conclusion: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after receipt of objections and grant of a clear personal-hearing notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether assignment by a lessee of GIDC leasehold rights in land and building to a third-party assignee for consideration constitutes a taxable supply of services under the GST law.

Analysis: A long-term leasehold assignment that divests the assignor of its entire interest and transfers the rights and benefits in the land and building to the assignee is a transfer of immovable property. Such assignment is distinct from GIDC's original grant of a lease, which constitutes supply of service. The assignment is outside the scope of supply under Section 7(1)(a), read with Clause 5(b) of Schedule II and Clause 5 of Schedule III, and is not chargeable to GST under Section 9.

Conclusion: Assignment by sale and transfer of the leasehold rights was not taxable as a supply of services; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether exemption under section 54 is available where the capital gain was not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under section 139(1), but was invested in a new residential property within the statutory period.

Analysis: Section 54(2) was applied in light of the interpretation that the time available under section 139 includes the extended period under section 139(4). Investment in the new residential property within the prescribed period constitutes sufficient compliance with section 54; non-deposit in the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the section 139(1) due date does not defeat the exemption where the capital gains have been so utilised. The appellate order was consistent with binding and coordinate precedent on materially identical facts.

Conclusion: Exemption under section 54 is allowable to the assessee despite non-deposit of the capital gains in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under section 139(1).

Issues: (i) Whether comparables could be excluded or included in the transfer pricing set on grounds of functional dissimilarity, diversified operations, lack of segmental data, different accounting year ending, and whether the Dispute Resolution Panel could suo motu exclude companies accepted by both parties; (ii) whether the existence of a tax holiday under section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 negated application of transfer pricing provisions or the need to determine arm's length price; (iii) whether telecommunication expenses excluded from export turnover were also required to be excluded from total turnover while computing deduction under section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iv) whether the claims for credit of advance tax, self-assessment tax, TDS and MAT credit required verification and allowance.

Issue (i): Whether comparables could be excluded or included in the transfer pricing set on grounds of functional dissimilarity, diversified operations, lack of segmental data, different accounting year ending, and whether the Dispute Resolution Panel could suo motu exclude companies accepted by both parties.

Analysis: Companies engaged in diversified services, product engineering, proprietary software development, or activities involving significant intangibles were treated as functionally dissimilar to a captive software development service provider. Companies lacking reliable segmental data were also held to be unsuitable comparables. However, mere difference in accounting year ending was held not to justify rejection where quarterly financial data was available to compute relevant margins. The panel was also held not justified in excluding, on its own, companies that had been accepted by both sides without compelling reasons.

Conclusion: The exclusions of functionally dissimilar companies were upheld, the rejection based only on different accounting year ending was set aside, and the suo motu exclusion of companies accepted by both parties was not sustained. The transfer pricing set was directed to be reconstituted accordingly, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the existence of a tax holiday under section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 negated application of transfer pricing provisions or the need to determine arm's length price.

Analysis: Chapter X was held to operate mandatorily whenever an international transaction exists, and the determination of arm's length price was treated as a statutory requirement independent of any alleged motive to shift profits. The proviso to section 92C(4) was relied upon to show that transfer pricing adjustments remain applicable even where the assessee claims deduction under section 10A.

Conclusion: The contention that tax-holiday status excluded transfer pricing adjustment was rejected, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether telecommunication expenses excluded from export turnover were also required to be excluded from total turnover while computing deduction under section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The computation formula under section 10A was held to require parity between export turnover and total turnover. Expenses excluded from export turnover cannot remain embedded in total turnover, as that would distort the statutory formula. The binding view of the Supreme Court in HCL Technologies and the jurisdictional High Court in Tata Elxsi was followed.

Conclusion: Telecommunication expenses were directed to be excluded from total turnover as well, against the Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether the claims for credit of advance tax, self-assessment tax, TDS and MAT credit required verification and allowance.

Analysis: These claims were treated as factual matters requiring verification of challans, certificates, return data and MAT credit records before appropriate credit could be granted.

Conclusion: The matter was restored for verification and corresponding credit, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the principal transfer pricing issues and on verification-based tax credit claims, while the Revenue failed on its challenge to the section 10A computation. The appeal was therefore only partly allowed for statistical purposes and the Revenue's appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In transfer pricing, functional comparability and reliable segmental data are essential, but different accounting years alone do not warrant exclusion where quarterly financial data permits proper computation; companies accepted by both parties cannot be excluded suo motu without cogent reasons, and deductions under section 10A must be computed by excluding the same items from both export turnover and total turnover.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was payable on free services and warranty services rendered by the authorised dealer out of dealer's margin. (ii) Whether service tax was payable on the insurance commission received by the dealer and whether the extended period could be invoked.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was payable on free services and warranty services rendered by the authorised dealer out of dealer's margin.

Analysis: The dispute on free services and warranty services had already been decided in the appellant's own case. The value of such services was found to be embedded in the dealer's margin and was not shown to be separately reimbursed. The earlier decision, relied upon in the present order, held that no service tax could be levied on amounts representing the dealer's margin or any part of it which had already suffered sales tax, and that the demand under Rule 6(3)(i) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was unsustainable.

Conclusion: Service tax was not payable on free services and warranty services, and the demand on that count was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax was payable on the insurance commission received by the dealer and whether the extended period could be invoked.

Analysis: The issue of insurance commission had already been settled in the appellant's own case, where the Tribunal had held that the dealer merely incidentally assisted the provision of the underlying insurance and finance services and did not render an independent taxable service. The order also records that the department was aware of the issue earlier, so the element of suppression necessary for extended limitation was absent. On the merits, the commission had already suffered service tax at the level of the principal arrangement, and the demand on the dealer was treated as unsustainable.

Conclusion: Service tax was not payable on the insurance commission, and invocation of the extended period was unjustified, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned service tax demands on both free services and insurance commission were unsustainable, and the appeals succeeded with the underlying demands set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the consideration for dealer-linked free services is already embedded in the sale transaction and a commission-based service has already suffered tax in the principal arrangement, no separate service tax liability can be fastened on the dealer for the same economic value.

Outcome: The appeal was allowed by way of remand to the original authority for fresh adjudication in accordance with the observations made in the impugned order.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of with a direction to the revisional proceedings to be concluded within four weeks, while keeping all contentions open and reserving liberty to seek appropriate redressal in respect of the other impugned order.

Issues: Whether the impugned notifications and the consequential show cause notice relating to levy of IGST on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism were liable to be set aside in view of the law declared in Mohit Minerals.

Analysis: The dispute concerned levy of tax on the service element in a CIF import transaction through Notifications Nos. 8/2017 and 10/2017. The governing principle applied was that where the supply of service is already included within a composite supply of goods, a separate levy on that service component is impermissible. The Court also noted that the later pronouncement in Mohit Minerals had upheld this position and that, to that extent, the earlier levy could not survive. Consequently, the consequential proceedings based on the impugned notifications could not continue.

Conclusion: The challenge succeeded and the show cause notice was set aside.

Issues: (i) whether Notifications No. 15/2017-ST and 16/2017-ST dated 13.04.2017, insofar as they fastened service tax liability on CIF imports, were valid in law; (ii) whether the consequential demand notice could survive; and (iii) whether refund was available, subject to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): whether Notifications No. 15/2017-ST and 16/2017-ST dated 13.04.2017, insofar as they fastened service tax liability on CIF imports, were valid in law.

Analysis: The Court accepted the admitted factual position that in CIF contracts the foreign supplier engages the transporter and pays the ocean freight, while the Indian importer is neither the recipient of the transportation service nor a contracting party to that service. Relying on the reasoning that taxation cannot be levied on services rendered and consumed beyond India and that the Finance Act, 1994 does not authorise the rule-making power to fasten liability on a third party in such circumstances, the impugned notifications were held to be beyond legislative and delegated competence.

Conclusion: The notifications were declared illegal and set aside.

Issue (ii): whether the consequential demand notice could survive.

Analysis: Once the notifications constituting the foundation of the demand were invalidated, the consequential demand had no independent footing.

Conclusion: The demand notice was set aside.

Issue (iii): whether refund was available, subject to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The Court held that the petitioner would be entitled to refund of the amount collected pursuant to the impugned proceedings, but only upon making an appropriate refund application to be decided in accordance with law, including the principles governing unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: Refund was left open for consideration in accordance with law subject to unjust enrichment.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the impugned notifications succeeded, the consequential demand fell with them, and the petitioner obtained the substantive relief sought, with refund to be worked out through the statutory refund process.

Ratio Decidendi: In a CIF import, where the foreign supplier alone contracts for and pays the ocean freight, delegated taxing power cannot be used to impose service tax on the Indian importer as a third party for an extraterritorial service beyond the statutory territorial and charging framework.