Issues: Whether, after arguments and exchange of written submissions are concluded and in absence of any application by the parties, the Tribunal could on its own appoint an IT expert and direct access to the petitioner's personal mails and printouts without affording the affected party an opportunity to be heard.

Analysis: The matter arises under the proceedings instituted under Section 241 and Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, where the interlocutory direction impugned was made by the Tribunal after conclusion of arguments and written synopses. Principles of natural justice and the audi alteram partem rule require that directions which affect the rights or privacy of a party be preceded by appropriate proceedings and an opportunity to oppose or be heard. The appointment of an expert and directions for access to a party's personal records constitute intrusive, case-affecting measures which ordinarily follow a specific application and consideration of objections rather than being initiated unilaterally by the Tribunal. Procedural fairness demands that the affected party be given notice and a chance to contest such measures; otherwise the Tribunal risks appearing aligned with one party and rendering a decision without adversarial testing of the proposal.

Conclusion: The impugned direction for appointment of an IT expert and for access to the petitioner's personal mails without prior opportunity to be heard is unsustainable and is quashed. The result is in favour of the Appellant. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal to permit the respondent to file an appropriate application if so advised, and for the Tribunal to decide the same on merits after offering the affected party an opportunity of hearing within a reasonable time period.

Issues: (i) Whether a company struck off the Register of Companies is relieved of liabilities imposed by an Adjudicating Authority under FEMA and whether failure to make the statutory pre-deposit under Section 19(1) of FEMA warrants dismissal of the company's appeal; (ii) Whether the penalty imposed on the individual director under Section 13(1) and Section 42 of FEMA should be reduced.

Issue (i): Whether a company struck off from the Register remains liable to pay penalties imposed under FEMA and whether failure to comply with the pre-deposit requirement under Section 19(1) of FEMA mandates dismissal of its appeal.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined Chapter XVIII of the Companies Act, 2013, including Section 248(6) and Section 250, which preserve the continuance and enforceability of liabilities of a company even after its name is struck off and require that sufficient provision be made for discharge of liabilities. Section 19(1) of FEMA prescribes a statutory pre-deposit of penalty at the time of filing an appeal, subject to the Tribunal dispensing with the deposit in cases of undue hardship on conditions to safeguard realisation. The Appellant Company did not make the required pre-deposit and did not obtain dispensation under Section 19(1).

Conclusion: In favour of Respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed on the individual director should be moderated.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed Section 13(1) of FEMA and authoritative precedents establishing that mens rea is not an essential element for imposing civil penalties for statutory contraventions; penalties attach upon establishment of contravention. The Tribunal considered the gravity and circumstances of the contraventions and the appellant's submissions seeking proportionality and reduction of penalty.

Conclusion: In favour of Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the appeal by the struck-off company for non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement and partly allowed the appeal of the individual director by reducing his penalty; thus one appeal is dismissed and the other is partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A company struck off under Sections 248 and 250 of the Companies Act, 2013 remains liable for its obligations and penalties imposed under FEMA and failure to comply with the statutory pre-deposit under Section 19(1) of FEMA warrants dismissal of the company's appeal; however, penalties on individuals may be moderated on assessment of proportionality despite absence of mens rea being immaterial for civil penalties under Section 13(1) of FEMA.

Issues: Whether the service tax paid by banks on deposit insurance premium remitted to the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) qualifies as an "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and whether CENVAT credit of such service tax is admissible to the banks.

Analysis: The question was examined in light of Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the definition of "service" in Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, and the statutory obligations under the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961. Authoritative decisions addressing identical questions include the Larger Bench decision of the CESTAT in South Indian Bank Ltd. and the subsequent affirmation by the Kerala High Court; the Bombay High Court has followed the same view. The statutory mandate requiring banks to obtain deposit insurance and pay the prescribed premium was treated as integral to the business of banking, such that the insurance service is used in providing the banks' taxable banking and financial services. The availability of CENVAT credit was assessed by reference to the requirement of a nexus between the service availed and the taxable output services of the banks and the settled precedents holding that deposit insurance satisfies that requirement.

Conclusion: The service tax paid on DICGC deposit insurance premium constitutes an "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and CENVAT credit of such service tax is admissible to the banks. The substantial questions of law raised by the Revenue are answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee; the appeals are dismissed.

Issues: Whether the competent authority's order denying a NIL withholding tax certificate and issuing a certificate at 15% (with consequential certificate) was legally sustainable, and whether a certificate at 2% should be directed for the relevant year.

Analysis: The challenged order was examined for compliance with statutory procedure and consideration of materials placed before the competent authority. The competent authority had relied on assessing officer findings and an AAR decision without engaging with the petitioner's application, submissions, and cited judgments; the adopted AAR precedent had been overruled by a High Court decision. The pending appeals and assessments before tax authorities and appellate fora were noted, and the question of ultimate taxability was left open for those forums. Given the procedural defects and the petitioner's prior payment of equalization levy at 2%, a temporary measure was considered appropriate until appellate adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned order and certificate are set aside and a certificate under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is directed to be issued at 2% for the specified year; the direction is limited to the specified assessment year and is without prejudice to the rights of parties before adjudicatory authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: A certificate under Section 197 must be issued after the competent authority considers the applicant's submissions and relevant judicial decisions; reliance on assessment orders or AAR precedents overruled by a High Court, without application of mind to the filed application, renders the order unsustainable and warrants setting aside and appropriate interim relief.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment order passed without providing an opportunity of personal hearing and based solely on notices uploaded on the GST portal is to be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration subject to conditions proposed by the petitioner.

Analysis: The Court examined the manner of service of show cause notices uploaded on the GST common portal and the absence of personal hearing prior to passing the impugned order. The Court observed that although uploading on the portal is a recognised mode of service, when there is no response from the taxpayer the assessing officer must apply mind and explore other modes of service prescribed under Section 169(1) of the GST Act (for example by RPAD) to ensure effective service. The Court noted the admitted fact that no opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner and that the petitioner had expressed willingness to pay 25% of the disputed tax to facilitate fresh consideration.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 31.01.2024 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration on the condition that the petitioner pays 25% of the disputed tax within four weeks; the petitioner shall file reply/objections within three weeks of payment and the respondent shall issue a 14 days clear notice fixing personal hearing and thereafter decide the matter on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where notices are served by electronic portal and there is no response from the taxpayer, the assessing officer must explore alternate modes of service under Section 169(1) to secure effective service and afford personal hearing before confirming proposals in a show cause notice.

Issues: Whether the Review Petition seeking review of the judgment dated 20.03.2025 should be entertained despite a 208-day delay and whether the petition merits review on merits.

Analysis: The Review Petition was examined on two aspects: (i) delay in filing of 208 days without a satisfactory explanation, and (ii) merits of the review. On the delay aspect, the filing period was not adequately explained, and no justification was found to condone the delay. On the merits aspect, the review material was considered and found not to establish any error or ground warranting review of the earlier judgment dated 20.03.2025.

Conclusion: The Review Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and on merits; the result is adverse to the petitioner and favourable to the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in admitting the assessee's additional ground (raising that Associated Enterprises be treated as the tested party) raised for the first time before the Tribunal and remitting the issue to the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that factual material about the assessee's Associated Enterprises (names, relationships, business descriptions and TP study documents/Form 3CEB) was on the record before it and that the assessee sought admission of the additional ground based on additional evidence filed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal applied transfer pricing principles, including the arm's length principle and the OECD concept of "tested party" (least complex entity with reliable comparables), and examined precedent allowing admission of additional grounds where facts are on record and the Tribunal is the last fact-finding authority. The Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to examine the issue afresh, call for documents, make inquiries, and afford the assessee opportunity to cooperate. The High Court reviewed the ITAT's reasoning, found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's remand, observed that a fresh order pursuant to remand has been challenged by appropriate proceedings, and concluded that the Revenue's appeal did not raise a substantial question of law warranting interference.

Conclusion: The additional ground admitting the contention that the Associated Enterprises be treated as the tested party was rightly admitted by the Tribunal and remitted for fresh consideration; the Revenue's appeal challenging that order is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the delay of 202 days in preferring the appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal can be condoned and the Tribunal's order rejecting the appeal as barred by limitation set aside, thereby restoring the appeal for decision on merits.

Analysis: The delay is limited to 202 days and occurred in the immediate post-COVID-19 period when commercial activities faced widespread disruption; the appellant also alleges that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) decided without hearing the appellant on merits. The Tribunal has discretionary power to condone delay on sufficient cause being shown. Considering the short period of delay, the contextual difficulties arising from the pandemic, and the potential denial of an effective opportunity to contest the appellate order on merits, it is appropriate to allow discretionary relief subject to imposition of a cost as a condition for restoring the appeal.

Conclusion: The delay of 202 days is condoned on payment of Rs.15,000 to the Telangana State Legal Services Authority within 15 days; upon production of the receipt, the ITA No.895 of 2025 shall stand revived and the appeal shall be decided on merits. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the deletion of the addition of Rs. 20,82,39,122/- by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) -- i.e., allowing exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 -- was justified where the receipts were contractual in nature.

Analysis: The appeal turns on whether the assessee's objects and activities amount to charitable purpose within section 2(15) and whether contractual receipts are incidental to and in furtherance of those charitable objects so as to qualify for exemption under section 11. The administrative findings show identical facts to earlier decisions in the assessee's own case by a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal, which held that environmental preservation activities are charitable, that the proviso to section 2(15) did not apply, and that contractual receipts did not convert the activities into business. The appellate authority recorded that there was no profit motive, the income was applied for charitable purposes, registration under section 12A had not been cancelled, and there was no contravention of section 13. On these bases and following the binding coordinate-bench precedent on identical facts, the appellate authority concluded that the receipts were incidental to charitable objects and eligible for section 11 exemption.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee -- the deletion of the addition is justified and exemption under section 11 is upheld by the Tribunal.

Issues: Whether the consent terms embodying the Settlement Agreement dated 24.12.2025 should be recorded and the Civil Appeal disposed of in terms of the Settlement Agreement under the Court's power including directions under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The parties completed mediation before a Court-appointed mediator and presented a comprehensive Settlement Agreement and joint application seeking recording of the settlement and directions under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Settlement Agreement sets out mutual releases, specified payment instalments, security and escrow arrangements, allocation of liabilities, reciprocal undertakings, and provision that the Settlement Agreement be filed as consent terms and be enforceable as a decree of the Court. The parties also sought that the consent terms be accepted and taken on record and that the final order be treated as a decree; the mediator's report was taken on record. The Settlement Agreement contains detailed operative obligations, timelines for payment, remedies on default, and mechanisms for registration and transfer of properties, and provides that pending proceedings be disposed of or kept in abeyance as conditioned by payment milestones.

Conclusion: Consent terms embodied in the Settlement Agreement dated 24.12.2025 are accepted and taken on record; the Settlement Agreement shall be kept with the case records and the Civil Appeal is disposed of in terms of those consent terms, with directions to draw a decree in accordance with the settlement and the settlement to operate as a decree of the Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the TPO/DRP's upward transfer pricing adjustment in respect of corporate guarantee commission is sustainable; (ii) Whether the TPO/DRP's upward adjustment in respect of interest on optionally convertible loans is sustainable; (iii) Whether the TPO/DRP's upward adjustment in respect of reimbursement of expenses to overseas AEs is sustainable; (iv) Whether the transfer pricing adjustment on sale of goods to Zydus USA (selection/rejection of comparables and application of Rule 10CA +/-3% variation) is sustainable; (v) Whether the transfer pricing adjustment on sale of finished goods to Zydus France (rejection of comparables and use of DIANE data) should be confirmed or remanded; (vi) Whether weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) can be restricted to the quantum approved by DSIR under Rule 6 and whether alternative claims under sections 35(1)(i) and 35(1)(iv) should be considered; (vii) Miscellaneous procedural grounds not pressed or dealt with.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate guarantee commission adjustment is sustainable.

Analysis: The TPO applied an average rate (2.52%) derived from prior-year benchmarking. The DRP restricted ALP to 1.5% following certain High Court decisions. The Tribunal examined earlier ITAT decisions in the assessee's own case where identical adjustments in prior years (notably AY 2014-15 and AY 2015-16) were deleted. The Revenue could not point to distinguishing facts or countervailing evidence to distinguish the prior ITAT rulings which the TPO had followed.

Conclusion: The adjustment on account of corporate guarantee commission (Rs.8,54,24,075) is deleted and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the interest adjustment on optionally convertible loans is sustainable.

Analysis: The TPO applied contractual LIBOR-based benchmarking consistent with preceding years and proposed an upward adjustment. The Tribunal considered prior ITAT orders in the assessee's own cases where identical adjustments across multiple earlier years were deleted. The Revenue did not show distinguishing facts; the impugned adjustment follows prior-year methodology that had been rejected by the ITAT.

Conclusion: The adjustment of Rs.2,65,51,520 in respect of interest on convertible loans is deleted and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the reimbursement-of-expenses adjustments are sustainable.

Analysis: The TPO/DRP treated reimbursements as not at arm's length (ALP = Nil) based on FAR analysis; the Tribunal reviewed prior ITAT decisions in the assessee's own matters (AYs 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15) which held such reimbursements at cost-to-cost and deleted similar adjustments. The Tribunal noted that the assessee produced supporting documents, segmental data and agreements demonstrating reimbursements were for the assessee's business interests and that the TPO/DRP did not challenge cost-to-cost character. Precedent and consistency warranted applying the earlier favourable findings to the impugned year.

Conclusion: The adjustment of Rs.7,61,41,741 for reimbursements is deleted and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the TP adjustment on sale of goods to Zydus USA (selection/rejection of comparables; Rule 10CA +/-3% contention) should be sustained.

Analysis: The TPO rejected three comparables relied upon by the assessee, retaining a narrow set of comparables and proposing an adjustment of Rs.72,78,05,930. The assessee argued comparability based on submitted segmental data and country concentration; the assessee also argued the adjustment fell within the 3% variation under Rule 10CA. The Tribunal obtained TPO confirmation that the correct weighted operating margin of accepted comparables was 1.60% (not 1.82% as the assessee had asserted), so the claimed Rule 10CA safe-harbour did not apply. On comparables, the Tribunal found the assessee's segmental data and evidence of predominant US operations persuasive and held the three rejected comparables to be functionally comparable; having accepted them, the Tribunal directed deletion of the adjustment.

Conclusion: Ground on Rule 10CA is dismissed; ground on rejection of comparables is allowed and the adjustment of Rs.72,78,05,930 is deleted in favour of the assessee (overall decision: partly in favour of assessee on different facets, but core result deletes the TP adjustment).

Issue (v): Whether the TP adjustment on sale to Zydus France (rejection of multiple comparables and DIANE database usage) should be upheld or remanded.

Analysis: The TPO/DRP rejected eight comparables relied upon by the assessee for various reasons: missing three-year data for four comparables and functional dissimilarity (retail vs wholesale) for four others; DRP also questioned the assessee's DIANE search (calendar years 2012-14 only) which did not satisfy Rule 10CA requirements for the impugned year. The Tribunal held that missing historical data must be furnished and, since such data may now be available, remitted the matter to TPO to consider the missing data; however, it confirmed the DRP's rejection where comparables were functionally dissimilar.

Conclusion: Grounds allowed in part for statistical purposes: the matter is restored to the TPO to consider the missing comparable data; other rejections by DRP are affirmed. Result is partly in favour of the assessee for statistical purposes.

Issue (vi): Whether weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) is to be restricted to expenditure approved by DSIR and whether alternative claims under sections 35(1)(i) and 35(1)(iv) must be considered.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined statutory amendment (Finance Act and Rule 6(7A)) effective for the relevant year, acknowledging that Rule 6(7A) provides that DSIR shall quantify expenditure eligible for weighted deduction in Form No.3CL. The assessee contended that Rules cannot transgress the parent statute; Revenue relied on recent tribunal decisions applying the amended rule. The Tribunal found that the Rules operate within the legislative scheme to make the provision workable and that DSIR's role in quantifying eligible expenditure is within the statutory scheme. The DRP had directed the AO to allow alternative claims under sections 35(1)(i) and 35(1)(iv) where appropriate; the AO was directed to consider those alternative claims.

Conclusion: The restriction of weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) to the quantum approved by DSIR (Form 3CL) is upheld; the AO is directed to consider alternative claims under sections 35(1)(i) and 35(1)(iv). Grounds are partly allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee to the extent indicated by DRP directions.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes: several major transfer-pricing adjustments (corporate guarantee commission, interest on convertible loans, reimbursement of expenses, sales to Zydus USA) are deleted in favour of the assessee, the claim under Rule 10CA is dismissed, the sale-to-France issue is remitted in part to the TPO for missing data while other rejections are affirmed, and the claim for weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) is restricted to DSIR-approved amounts with directions to consider alternative deductions under sections 35(1)(i) and 35(1)(iv).

Ratio Decidendi: Where transfer-pricing adjustments replicate issues previously adjudicated and deleted by the Tribunal in the assessee's own preceding years, and no distinguishing facts are shown, the Tribunal will follow the prior favorable rulings; Rule 6(7A) empowers the competent authority (DSIR) to quantify eligible R&D expenditure for weighted deduction under section 35(2AB), and such rule-based quantification falls within the legislative scheme and may limit allowable weighted deduction.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 19,15,358/- by the Assessing Officer for rejecting income computed under the percentage/project completion method (AS 9) was justified.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessee's accounting treatment and found that the assessee had consistently followed the project/percentage completion method since inception and that this method is recognised under Accounting Standard AS 9. The Tribunal noted that advances received from buyers were shown as liabilities in the balance sheet for assessment year 2014-15 and the income was offered to tax in subsequent years upon execution of sale deeds and realization of full consideration. The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) failed to take these facts into account and that the revenue had previously accepted the accounting method.

Conclusion: The addition is not justified; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the deletion by the appellate authority of the addition made under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable; (ii) Whether the appellate authority erred in not obtaining a remand report under Rule 46A(3) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 in respect of additional evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs. 2,67,22,210/- made under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified.

Analysis: The appellate decision examined accounting records, debtor ledgers, portions of audited financial statements and reconciliations establishing that interest receipts arose from agency transactions where the assessee paid principals and recovered delayed payments from debtors, charging interest. The notional computation by applying a 10% interest rate to infer undisclosed loans was evaluated against documentary material demonstrating the agency model and separate recording of commission and interest income in the assessee's books. The appellate authority's treatment addressed the basis of the interest receipts and the absence of requirement to show principal sales and related debtors in the agent's balance sheet.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under Section 69B is affirmed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to call a remand report under Rule 46A(3) warranted interference with the appellate decision.

Analysis: The material before the assessing officer showed that the alleged additional documents and debtor details had been previously considered and referenced in the assessment record. The tribunal found that the contested material was not newly filed so as to require a remand report under the rule; the assessing officer had already dealt with the relevant chart and ledger extracts.

Conclusion: The contention that a remand report should have been called is rejected and the challenge is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The appellate findings that the interest income represented agency-related receipts and that the notional addition under Section 69B was not warranted are upheld; the revenue appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documentary evidence and accounting records establish that interest receipts arise from agency transactions and are properly recorded as commission/interest in the agent's books, a notional addition under Section 69B based solely on applying an assumed interest rate to infer undisclosed loans is not sustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the Tribunal should condone the delay of 57 days in filing the appeals to the Tribunal. (ii) Whether the appeals should be remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication with opportunity to the assessee and related directions (including imposition of costs).

Issue (i): Condonation of delay of 57 days in filing the appeals to the Tribunal.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the affidavit and application for condonation and the factual explanation for delay. The Tribunal noted the delay appeared genuine and that the assessee had not been well versed with law; the Tribunal weighed this explanation against the requirements for timely filing and the interest of justice.

Conclusion: Delay of 57 days in filing the appeals is condoned.

Issue (ii): Remand to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication with opportunity to the assessee and imposition of costs.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the conduct of proceedings before the Assessing Officer and CIT(A), including non-response by the assessee to notices and a dismissal for non-prosecution, and the assessee's limited legal understanding. The Tribunal determined that, notwithstanding previous non-responses, fairness and natural justice require that the assessee be given an opportunity to represent and file requisite details; the Tribunal therefore directed remand for proper adjudication and verification. The Tribunal also imposed a modest cost on the assessee to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund to reflect the need for cooperation and discourage unnecessary adjournments.

Conclusion: The matters are remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication with directions to provide opportunity of hearing in accordance with principles of natural justice; the assessee is directed to pay costs of Rs. 2,000 to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund within two weeks.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are partly allowed for statistical purposes by condoning the Tribunal filing delay and remanding the matters to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication with specified directions and costs; identical directions apply to all eight appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee has not adequately represented before earlier authorities but demonstrates a genuine delay or inability to engage, the Tribunal may condone delay and remand the matter for fresh adjudication to secure compliance with principles of natural justice while imposing proportional costs to ensure cooperation.

Issues: Whether Cenvat credit of service tax paid on GTA services for outward transportation of finished goods up to the customer's premises is admissible where sales are on FOR destination basis.

Analysis: Where the sale is on FOR destination basis and contractual terms, invoices and related documents show freight borne by the seller and assessable value inclusive of freight, ownership and risk in the goods remain with the seller until delivery at buyer's premises. Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 defines 'input service' and requires assessment of the 'place of removal' to determine admissibility of credit up to that place. Relevant authority and administrative guidance, including tribunal and High Court decisions applying the Supreme Court's guidance in Ultratech Cement Ltd. and subsequent CBEC circulars, direct that in FOR destination contracts the buyer's premises can constitute the place of removal. On these facts, GTA services used to transport goods up to the buyer's premises fall within 'input service' under Rule 2(l) and qualify for Cenvat credit.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of service tax paid on GTA services for outward transportation up to the customer's premises is admissible where sales are on FOR destination basis and freight is borne by the seller; the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders setting aside such credit are set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee society is eligible for registration under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, having regard to the nature, genuineness and volume of activities undertaken and compliance with professional conduct regulations; (ii) Whether the assessee is entitled to approval under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in absence of registration under section 12AB.

Issue (i): Whether the society's activities qualify as charitable purpose under section 2(15) and merit registration under section 12AB.

Analysis: The tribunal examined the society's receipts and expenditures for FY 2021-22 to 2023-24 and noted receipts of approximately Rs. 40 lakhs from pharmaceutical companies, with only Rs. 2.51 lakhs expended on free medicines for Type1 diabetic children. The bulk of expenditures related to conferences, seminars, hospitality at luxury hotels, entertainment, travel and professional fees. The tribunal also considered applicable regulatory standards including the Medical Council of India (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 and the Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices 2024, and assessed whether activities constituted genuine charitable work (including CME events that meet recognised criteria) or amounted to impermissible benefits/quid pro quo to medical practitioners.

Conclusion: Registration under section 12AB is refused. The tribunal held that the activities are not predominantly charitable within the meaning of section 2(15), substantial funds were utilised for noncharitable purposes and in breach of professional conduct norms, and therefore the application for registration under section 12AB is rightly rejected (decision in favour of the Revenue).

Issue (ii): Whether the society is entitled to approval under section 80G where registration under section 12AB has been refused.

Analysis: Section 80G(5) requires registration under section 12AB as a precondition for grant of approval under section 80G. The tribunal applied the finding on issue (i) that registration under section 12AB is not available to the society because its activities are not charitable as per section 2(15).

Conclusion: Approval under section 80G is declined. Given the refusal of registration under section 12AB, the tribunal concurred with the denial of section 80G approval (decision in favour of the Revenue).

Final Conclusion: The tribunal dismissed both appeals of the assessee, upholding the refusal of registration under section 12AB and consequentially refusing approval under section 80G; the society's activities were held not to satisfy the statutory test of charitable purpose and were tainted by expenditures inconsistent with professional conduct regulations.

Ratio Decidendi: Excessive utilisation of donated funds for conferences, hospitality and related noncharitable expenditures, coupled with violation of applicable medical professional conduct standards, establishes that an organisation does not fulfil the statutory requirement of carrying out charitable activities under section 2(15), and therefore registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G cannot be granted.

Issues: (i) Whether the officers of the Directorate of Enforcement were competent to adjudicate contraventions under FEMA; (ii) whether FEMA could be applied to activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone; (iii) whether the movement of fishing vessels and fish catch from the Exclusive Economic Zone to destinations abroad constituted export under FEMA and its Regulations.

Issue (i): Whether the officers of the Directorate of Enforcement were competent to adjudicate contraventions under FEMA.

Analysis: Section 16 of FEMA empowers the Central Government to appoint as many officers as it thinks fit as adjudicating authorities and to specify their jurisdictions. The notification appointing Customs and Central Excise officers did not exclude Enforcement Directorate officers, and the later notification expressly appointed officers of the Enforcement Directorate as adjudicating authorities under Section 13 of FEMA. The existence of multiple appointing notifications did not create any jurisdictional bar.

Conclusion: The officers of the Directorate of Enforcement were competent to adjudicate the matter.

Issue (ii): Whether FEMA could be applied to activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Analysis: The Exclusive Economic Zone Act permits extension of enactments by notification, but the Tribunal held that FEMA operates on its own scheme and that its foreign exchange consequences extend beyond territorial India under Section 1(3). In the facts of the case, the fishing operations, import of vessels, and subsequent foreign exchange transactions had sufficient nexus with India, and a separate notification extending FEMA to the Exclusive Economic Zone was held unnecessary for invoking FEMA.

Conclusion: FEMA was held applicable to the transactions arising from the Exclusive Economic Zone operations.

Issue (iii): Whether the movement of fishing vessels and fish catch from the Exclusive Economic Zone to destinations abroad constituted export under FEMA and its Regulations.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that once the vessels had been imported into India and later taken out and handed over to a foreign entity, the transaction amounted to export for FEMA purposes. No declaration under Regulation 3 of the Export Regulations was filed. As to the netting off of export receivables against amounts spent on diesel, bait, crew salaries, and related services, the Tribunal held that Regulation 14C required prior RBI approval for such adjustment and that a loan registration number was not a substitute for such approval. The plea based on absence of mens rea was rejected in view of the civil nature of the penalty regime under Section 13 of FEMA.

Conclusion: The contravention under Section 7(1) read with Regulation 3 and the contravention of Regulation 14C were upheld, but the penalties were reduced.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the extent of reduction of penalty, while the findings of contravention under FEMA and its Regulations were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where foreign exchange transactions arising from operations in the Exclusive Economic Zone have a direct nexus with India, FEMA can be applied without a separate extension notification; export formalities and prior RBI approval for netting-off of export receivables remain mandatory, and penalty under FEMA is attracted upon proof of contravention without proof of mens rea.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court correctly interpreted the expression "where it is possible to do so" in Section 73(4B)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 and thereby relegated the petitioner to the appellate remedy; (ii) Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file the statutory appeal and whether the Appellate Authority may decide the appeal on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court's interpretation of the phrase "where it is possible to do so" in Section 73(4B)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 is correct and supports relegation to the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The impugned order construed the statutory phrase in the context of available alternative remedies and applied that construction in paras 4 and 5 of the impugned order. The approach involved assessing the availability and appropriateness of the statutory appellate mechanism under the Finance Act, 1994 and holding that the statutory route ought to be pursued where feasible.

Conclusion: The High Court's interpretation is upheld and the petitioner is relegated to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file the statutory appeal and whether the Appellate Authority is entitled to decide the appeal on merits.

Analysis: Permission was granted to file the statutory appeal within a limited period in view of the facts and to remove any procedural impediment. The Appellate Authority was clarified to have the power to entertain and decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law notwithstanding a coordinate bench order in a different matter.

Conclusion: The petitioner is permitted to file the statutory appeal within four weeks and the Appellate Authority shall entertain and decide the appeal on merits.

Final Conclusion: The special leave petition is dismissed, with the petitioner relegated to the statutory appellate remedy and granted limited time to file the appeal, and the Appellate Authority authorised to decide the appeal on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appellate remedy is available and can be invoked, courts will refrain from granting extraordinary relief and will require exhaustion of the statutory remedy; an appellate authority may be permitted to decide such appeal on merits when procedural accommodation is directed by the Court.

Issues: Whether a tax determination and demand under the GST Act can be validly made against a deceased person when the show cause notice and determination were issued after the proprietor's death without issuing notice to the legal representative.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 93 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which addresses liability to pay tax, interest or penalty where a person liable dies and provides for liability of the legal representative when the business is continued or discontinued. The provision addresses the liability of the legal representative and recovery from the estate but does not itself authorize making the determination against a person who is already deceased. Where liability is to be enforced against a legal representative, procedural steps require that the legal representative be given notice and an opportunity to respond before determination and recovery proceedings are concluded.

Conclusion: The determination and demand issued and passed in the name of the deceased without issuing notice to the legal representative are unsustainable; the impugned order is quashed and set aside and the respondents may proceed in accordance with law by issuing appropriate notice to the legal representative.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer/CPC was competent to disallow contributions towards PF/ESI by issuing an intimation under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and thereby disallow amount under section 36(1)(va) when the question of liability was a debatable issue.

Analysis: The question involves the scope and jurisdictional limits of intimation proceedings under section 143(1) vis-à-vis disallowance under section 36(1)(va) where the liability for delayed deposit of employees' share of PF/ESI was contested and subject to divergent judicial decisions. Judicial precedents addressing identical facts and issues, including coordinate Tribunal orders and a High Court decision, treat such additions made by AO/CPC under section 143(1) as not sustainable where the issue was highly debatable and required adjudication under section 143(3) or appropriate assessment proceedings. The factual record indicated that the disallowance arose from audit qualifications and delayed deposit entries, and the body of precedents squarely covered the present circumstances, leading to the conclusion that summary adjustment under section 143(1) was beyond its proper scope in these circumstances.

Conclusion: The intimation under section 143(1) effecting disallowance under section 36(1)(va) is not legally sustainable in the present facts; the disallowance and the impugned order are set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.