Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking quashment of the termination notice and mandamus to grant time to deposit outstanding license fee (including GST) should be entertained and relief granted, or whether the termination effected for persistent breach of contractual payment obligations should be left to contractual remedies.

Analysis: The License Agreement is a binding contractual instrument containing clear payment obligations, including liability for GST and interest on delayed payments, and providing a contractual dispute-resolution/alternative remedy mechanism. The petitioner admitted failure to comply with the stipulated payment schedule, resulting in substantial arrears. The contention of confusion regarding GST liability is unsupported where the agreement does not exclude applicability of GST and GST is a statutory levy. Given the existence of a material and persistent breach of express contractual terms and an available contractual remedy, extraordinary writ relief under Article 226 is not appropriate to substitute contractual remedies or to re-write agreed terms. The petitioner is therefore permitted to invoke the alternative remedy provided under the agreement.

Conclusion: Writ relief is refused and the petition is dismissed; the decision to terminate the license for persistent breach is sustained and the petitioner is left to pursue the contractual remedy provided in the agreement (decision in favour of the respondent).

Final Conclusion: The Court will not exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction to interfere with a lawfully terminated contract where there is clear contractual default and an alternative remedy is available under the contract.

Ratio Decidendi: Where parties have expressly agreed contractual payment obligations and an alternative contractual remedy, and where there is a material breach of those obligations including statutory dues, courts will not ordinarily exercise Article 226 writ jurisdiction to set aside a termination grounded on such breach.

Issues: Whether the appeal should be dismissed for non-prosecution/default where no appearance is made on behalf of the Official Liquidator despite prior orders directing appearance.

Analysis: The appeal record shows prior directions requiring representation for the appellant which is under liquidation, and an opportunity was given for the Official Liquidator to appear. On the subsequent hearing date no appearance was made for the Official Liquidator. Under established procedural principles, continued failure to prosecute an appeal and failure to comply with court directions justify dismissal in default to prevent prejudice to the respondent and undue delay in administration of justice. The factual matrix here - absence of appearance after express directions - meets the threshold for exercising the court's power to dismiss for non-prosecution.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed in default for non-prosecution; the procedural order for dismissal is affirmed in favour of the respondent.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to benefit under the Duty Free Credit Entitlement Scheme (DFCE Scheme) issued under the EXIM Policy 2002-2007.

Analysis: The question of entitlement was conclusively addressed by the Supreme Court in Director General of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports, where the Supreme Court examined the investigation record, found that the exporters (including the appellant) had engaged in fraudulent practices to inflate export turnover and held that no vested right had accrued to them under the Scheme. The Supreme Court also set aside relief granted by a High Court to such exporters and allowed the Government's appeals, while directing that the imposition of fee by Public Notice No.18 dated 24-07-2003 insofar as it imposed fee was set aside. The present appeal involves substantially the same issue and facts; the High Court has applied the Supreme Court's binding conclusions and noted that the appellant's review petition before the Supreme Court was dismissed. Given Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India and the Supreme Court's trenchant findings of misuse and absence of any accrued right, there is no basis for re-examination or relief in favour of the appellant.

Conclusion: The appellant is not entitled to benefits under the DFCE Scheme; the appeal is dismissed (decision against the appellant and in favour of the Revenue).

Issues: (i) Whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing Chamber Summons No.1769 of 2019 and rejecting impleadment of the Official Liquidator as defendant in a summary suit instituted prior to the liquidation order; and whether Section 33(5) and related provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 bar continuation of such pending suit or the impleadment of the Liquidator.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 33(5) which prohibits institution of fresh suits by or against the corporate debtor after a liquidation order but permits suits by the liquidator with NCLT approval. On a conjoint reading of Section 33(5) with Section 35(1) and Section 35(1)(k), the liquidator has substantive powers to institute or defend suits on behalf of the corporate debtor. The Court distinguished the moratorium under Section 14(1)(a) and held that Section 33(5) does not contain an express bar on continuance of suits already instituted prior to liquidation. The Court considered competing provisions relied upon by respondents (Sections 38-42, Section 53, Section 63, Section 231 and Section 60(5)) and held that those provisions provide mechanisms for claim lodging, adjudication and distribution priority but do not, as a matter of law, render pending suits instituted before liquidation non-maintainable or preclude impleadment of the liquidator to defend such suits. The Trial Court improperly adjudicated maintainability and merits while deciding the amendment application, contrary to the established principle that merits of the amendment should not be gone into at that stage.

Conclusion: The Trial Court's order dismissing the Chamber Summons is set aside; Chamber Summons No.1769 of 2019 is made absolute permitting impleadment of the Official Liquidator and necessary amendments to the plaint within four weeks. The writ petition is allowed and disposed of.

Issues: Whether the period during which the person attended for inquiry (17.06.2025 to 20.06.2025) pursuant to summons under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act amounts to illegal detention entitling the person to compensation.

Analysis: Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act empowers a proper officer to summon any person for inquiry in the manner provided for a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure; the provision contains no express requirement of seven days' prior notice. Order XVI C.P.C. relates to trial-stage witness lists and summons procedure and is not directly applicable to administrative or pre-arrest inquiries under Section 70. Precedents establish that a person summoned under Section 70 is not per se an accused and that Courts exercising judicial review in proceedings under special tax statutes must confine review to whether statutory and constitutional safeguards (such as authorized officer status, existence of material forming belief, and informing of grounds of arrest) were complied with, rather than reappraising the sufficiency of the investigative material. The material on record showed acknowledged service of summonses, attendance on the specified dates without objection, possession and use of personal mobile phones while at the GST office, and no contemporaneous complaint of detention; arrest was recorded and produced before a Magistrate on 21.06.2025.

Conclusion: The period spent pursuant to summons under Section 70 from 17.06.2025 to 20.06.2025 did not constitute illegal detention and no compensation is warranted; the petition claiming compensation is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of Revenue for failing to examine and verify the correctness and computation of disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D (strategic investments and methodology); (ii) Whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of Revenue for failure to examine information suggesting receipt of accommodation entries (Insight Portal / Sankalp Group) and whether the revision under section 263 directing further enquiry was valid.

Issue (i): Whether the AO failed to make inquiries or verification required for determining disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue.

Analysis: The deeming provisions of Explanation 2(a) to section 263 treat an order as erroneous and prejudicial where it is passed without making inquiries or verification which should have been made. The record shows the assessee offered a suo motu disallowance backed by an expert report and the AO accepted the offered figure without further queries or independent application of the Rule 8D methodology, despite large strategic investments and substantial exempt income. Relevant judicial precedent establishes that absence of meaningful inquiry or verification attracts Explanation 2(a).

Conclusion: The AO did not conduct necessary verification of the Rule 8D computation and the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of Revenue on this issue; the revision under section 263 in respect of disallowance is justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the AO failed to examine information indicating receipt of accommodation entries and whether setting aside the assessment for further enquiry under section 263 was permissible.

Analysis: Explanation 2(a) applies where the AO omitted inquiries or verifications which should have been made. Departmental information (Insight Portal / investigation material) identifying potential accommodation entries was available in the record and was not addressed in the assessment. The revisionary direction restores the matter to the AO to examine and verify that material, affording the assessee opportunity of hearing; remand for proper inquiry is an accepted remedy where absence of inquiry precludes a conclusive finding.

Conclusion: The AO failed to make requisite inquiries regarding alleged accommodation entries; the setting aside of the assessment and direction for fresh enquiry under section 263 is valid.

Final Conclusion: Both issues involve lack of requisite inquiry or verification by the AO such that the assessment order is deemed erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue under Explanation 2(a) to section 263; the revisionary order under section 263 is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed, while the matters are remitted to the AO for fresh verification and decision after affording opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Assessing Officer accepts the assessee's claim or computation without conducting inquiries or verifications which ought to have been made-particularly regarding Rule 8D computations for strategic investments or available investigative information-Explanation 2(a) to section 263 renders the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial, authorising the Commissioner to set aside the order and direct the AO to conduct fresh enquiries.

Issues: Whether the company respondent No.3 was fraudulently incorporated under a name too nearly resembling the petitioner company and whether its registration should be cancelled and the balance funds in respondent No.3's bank account remitted to the petitioner's liquidation account.

Analysis: The Court examined the application of Section 4(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 8 of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 concerning names which resemble too nearly the name of an existing company. The Court compared the names and noted that the only material difference was deletion of the terminal 's' in 'services', rendering the names strikingly similar when disregarding matters set out in Rule 8(2). The Court considered documentary evidence including identical registered addresses, use of a common domain in e-mail IDs, replication of company letterhead, vendor submissions bearing the suspended director's signature, and bank transaction records showing payments receivable by the petitioner being diverted into respondent No.3's account. The Court also evaluated respondent No.1's reliance on its automated SPICe+ system and an erroneously quoted version of Rule 8 in its affidavit, finding the quoted Rule to be incorrect and the registrar's explanation inadequate. On this factual and legal matrix, the Court found that respondent No.3 was registered in a manner inconsistent with Section 4(2)(a) and Rule 8 and that the fraudulent registration facilitated diversion of funds from the petitioner.

Conclusion: The Court concludes that respondent No.3 was fraudulently incorporated with a name too nearly resembling the petitioner's name; respondent No.3's registration is cancelled and respondent No.4 (bank) is directed to remit the balance standing in respondent No.3's account to the petitioner's liquidation account.

Ratio Decidendi: A company shall not be registered with a name that resembles too nearly an existing company's name; where Section 4(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 8 of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 shows striking similarity in names and documentary evidence establishes misuse of the similar name to divert the existing company's receivables, registration is impermissible and cancellation with remedial remittance to the aggrieved company's liquidation account is appropriate.

Issues: Whether the Rectification of Mistake Application disclosed any mistake apparent from the record warranting amendment of the final order, including the challenge to penalty under Section 78 and the findings on the RCC bridge and ash bund claims.

Analysis: The application was examined under the limited scope of rectification under Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable by Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 31A of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982. Relief in rectification is available only for a patent and obvious error apparent from the record, and not for re-appreciation of evidence, reconsideration of factual findings, or correction of a debatable point of law. The objection regarding penalty under Section 78 failed because the order had already clarified that penalty would be re-determined with reference to the demand upheld in remand proceedings, and no error apparent was shown. The objections relating to the RCC bridge and ash bund findings also sought a fresh evaluation of the work orders, clauses, photographs, and factual conclusions, which lay outside the scope of rectification.

Conclusion: No mistake apparent from the record was established, and the rectification request was not maintainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the services rendered by the appellant in undertaking fabrication/job work on materials supplied by the principal constitute job work exempt from service tax under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 read with Section 66D/Section 66B of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether the invoking of the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax is justified in absence of intent to evade.

Issue (i): Whether the services rendered by the appellant are classifiable as job work and exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: The appellant performed fabrication/job work on materials supplied by the principal manufacturer at the principal's premises, with labour engaged directly in the manufacturing process and consideration fixed on per-piece basis. The Tribunal examined the nature of the activity against Sl. No. 30(c) of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 and the Negative List concept under Section 66D and the exemption provision under Section 66B of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The services are held to be job work falling within Sl. No. 30(c) of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 and are exempt from service tax. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation can be invoked where there is no evidence of suppression or intent to evade payment of service tax.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the appellant regularly filed ST-3 returns and the demand arose from differences between ITR and ST-3 figures. There was no evidence establishing suppression of facts or intent to evade payment of service tax, facts necessary to invoke the extended period of limitation under the relevant law.

Conclusion: The invocation of the extended period of limitation is not justified in the absence of evidence of intent to evade; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable both on merits (services are exempt as job work under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 read with Section 66D/66B of the Finance Act, 1994) and on limitation (extended period not invocable for lack of intent to evade); consequential demands of interest and penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 also do not arise. The appeal is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Services consisting of fabrication/job work performed on materials supplied by the principal, directly contributing to manufacture at the principal's premises with consideration on per-piece basis, fall within Sl. No. 30(c) of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 and are exempt from service tax; further, the extended period of limitation for service tax recovery requires proof of suppression or intent to evade which was not established.

Issues: (i) Whether, for computation of capital gains under section 50C, the sale consideration had to be taken as the stamp valuation finally determined by the Collector of Stamps instead of the higher value initially adopted by the stamp authority. (ii) Whether the deeming fiction under section 50C could be imported into section 54F so as to deny full exemption when the entire actual sale consideration was reinvested in the eligible residential house.

Issue (i): Whether, for computation of capital gains under section 50C, the sale consideration had to be taken as the stamp valuation finally determined by the Collector of Stamps instead of the higher value initially adopted by the stamp authority.

Analysis: Section 50C creates a deeming fiction only for substituting the consideration for the purpose of section 48 where the declared consideration is lower than the value adopted or assessable by the stamp valuation authority. The valuation in the present case had ultimately attained finality at the lower figure fixed by the Collector of Stamps pursuant to the judicial order, and that assessable value had to govern the computation. The fiction under section 50C was therefore required to operate on the final stamp value and not on the earlier provisional valuation.

Conclusion: The lower final stamp valuation had to be adopted for computing capital gains under section 50C, and the assessee was entitled to consequential relief.

Issue (ii): Whether the deeming fiction under section 50C could be imported into section 54F so as to deny full exemption when the entire actual sale consideration was reinvested in the eligible residential house.

Analysis: Section 54F grants exemption with reference to the net consideration actually received and reinvested in the new residential house. The legal fiction created by section 50C is confined to computation of capital gains and cannot be extended beyond its limited purpose. A deeming value cannot be treated as the actual net consideration for the separate exemption provision, because that would require the assessee to do something impossible, namely reinvest more than what was actually received. The exemption had therefore to be examined on the basis of the real consideration and actual reinvestment.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to full exemption under section 54F on the basis of the actual net consideration reinvested.

Final Conclusion: The additions sustained in assessment were deleted, the capital gains computation was required to be redone on the basis of the finally determined stamp value, and the assessee was held entitled to complete relief under the exemption provision.

Ratio Decidendi: A deeming fiction under section 50C is limited to capital gains computation and cannot be extended to restrict exemption under section 54F, which must be applied on the basis of the actual net consideration received and reinvested.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority erred in setting aside the adjudicating authority's refund sanction without considering the documentary evidence placed before the adjudicating authority and without rendering a reasoned order, thereby necessitating setting aside of the appellate order and remand for fresh hearing.

Analysis: The appellate order shows that the petitioner did not appear at the appellate hearing despite service of notices; however, the appellate order did not consider the documentary evidence which had been produced before the adjudicating authority that granted the refund. The requirement to consider material documentary evidence placed before the adjudicating authority is distinct from the procedural question of the petitioner's non-appearance, and an appellate authority passing final orders must examine and record findings on such documents. The appropriate remedy where an appellate order fails to consider relevant documentary evidence and does not record reasoned findings is to set aside that order and remand the matter for fresh hearing where documents may be considered and a speaking order rendered.

Conclusion: The appellate order setting aside the refund sanction is set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority for fresh hearing and decision after consideration of the documentary evidence and on a date where the petitioner may appear; petitioner to deposit costs of Rs.10,000/-; appellate authority to pass a reasoned speaking order within 12 weeks from the hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the order passed by the Principal Commissioner under section 263 of the Incometax Act, 1961 setting aside the reassessment order dated 25.03.2023 is valid; (ii) Whether the safe harbour/tolerance provisions (third proviso to Section 50C(1) and subsequent enhancement) apply retrospectively to exclude marginal differences between stamp duty valuation and declared consideration.

Issue (i): Validity of the section 263 order setting aside the reassessment order dated 25.03.2023.

Analysis: The reassessment order recorded a conscious decision, approved by the supervisory officer, not to tax a marginal difference of Rs.94,339 arising from Stamp Valuation Authority valuation versus declared consideration. The question is whether that decision amounted to an order which is "erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue" within the meaning of section 263 or only a change of opinion between officers.

Conclusion: The section 263 order is quashed; the revisional power under section 263 cannot be invoked to substitute a possible and legally permissible view taken by the Assessing Officer with supervisory concurrence. The result is in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Issue (ii): Retrospective applicability of the safe harbour/tolerance band under the third proviso to Section 50C(1) and its enhancement.

Analysis: The third proviso to Section 50C(1) and later enhancement of the tolerance band address unintended hardships from literal application of deeming provisions and operate as curative/remedial measures. The legal principle of giving beneficial curative amendments retrospective effect where necessary to mitigate undue hardship supports treating the safe harbour as applicable to prior assessment years for small, bonafide variations.

Conclusion: The safe harbour/tolerance band is held to have retrospective effect such that marginal differences below the relevant tolerance (here below 10%) need not be taxed; conclusion runs in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned revisional order under section 263 is quashed and the appeal is allowed, with the effect that the marginal valuation difference is not subjected to tax in the reassessment; the overall outcome favours the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A curative amendment creating a tolerance band for differences between stamp duty valuation and declared consideration is to be given retrospective effect where necessary to avert unintended hardship, and a revisional order under section 263 cannot be used to overturn a possible and legally permissible assessment view taken by the Assessing Officer with supervisory approval.

Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted in a case involving alleged possession and transportation of commercial quantity of contraband under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 read with the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The appellant was facing prosecution for offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the Customs Act, 1962. Although the alleged seizure was above the commercial quantity threshold, the appellant had remained in custody for more than four years. The order also took note that a similarly situated accused, travelling on the same flight, had already been granted bail. On these facts, the prolonged incarceration and parity with the co-accused justified release on bail at that stage. The order expressly confined all observations to the question of bail and clarified that the merits of the case were left open.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the appellant and the impugned refusal of bail was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appropriate case, prolonged pre-trial incarceration coupled with parity with a similarly placed co-accused can warrant grant of bail even where commercial quantity offences are alleged.

Issues: Whether, in the facts of the case, the adjudicating authority was justified in imposing a bank guarantee of Rs. 60,00,000/- as a condition for provisional release of seized imported goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962, or whether the goods should be provisionally released on furnishing a bond only.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory provision permitting provisional release under Section 110A, which confers discretionary power on the adjudicating authority to impose security and conditions in view of facts of each case. The factual matrix was considered: the Bills of Entry had been assessed and full customs duty paid; no search or incriminating material specific to the petitioner was produced; the seizure and provisional release orders relied on broad/general findings relating to other importers and investigative activity in another jurisdiction. The Court held that imposition of coercive conditions such as a bank guarantee requires tangible material establishing the necessity to secure the revenue; a blanket application of conditions based on unrelated investigations into other importers was not justified. The Court noted authority and alternate remedies but proceeded under Article 226 because constitutional rights (Article 14 and Article 300-A) and absence of material on record warranted exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The Court concluded that the bank guarantee of Rs. 60,00,000/- was not justified by the material on record and the petitioner was entitled to provisional release of the goods on furnishing the bond directed in the provisional release order; the respondents were directed to release the goods within three days and to issue a certificate waiving demurrage.

Issues: Whether the decision on the additional issue under Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was confined to that issue and would not prejudice adjudication of the remaining issues in the suit.

Analysis: The appeal arose from a suit in which four original issues remained pending, while an additional issue on the statutory bar under Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 had already been decided. Since the additional issue overlapped only to a limited extent with one of the original issues, there was a real apprehension that the earlier finding might be treated as having wider consequences. To avoid any prejudice, the decision was expressly confined to the additional issue alone and the remaining issues, including the enforceability and validity of the agreement and other statutory objections, were kept open for determination at trial.

Conclusion: The decision on the additional issue was held to be issue-specific and not to operate as a bar or prejudice the adjudication of the remaining issues in the suit.

Final Conclusion: The clarification protected the pending trial from any unintended preclusive effect and preserved the parties' rights on all issues other than the additional issue already decided.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 18.12.2025 passed under Section 74 of the Act is non-speaking and violative of the principles of natural justice, warranting setting aside and remittal to the adjudicating authority.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order and the record of proceedings including the show-cause notice, the reply dated 19.08.2025 and the chronology of purported personal hearing dates. The adjudicating authority's order largely reproduces the show-cause notice and the noticee's reply and contains only a brief, generic statement that the noticee's submissions are "not appropriate" and that supporting documents were not furnished. The order contains inconsistent or incomplete narration regarding fixation of personal hearing dates and does not record whether any hearing was afforded after the reply was filed. The adjudicating authority did not address specific factual contentions in the reply nor record reasons for rejecting them; the conclusion was reached without discernible application of mind to the explanations and evidence placed on record.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The impugned order dated 18.12.2025 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the adjudicating authority to pass a fresh order after affording due opportunity of personal hearing and recording cogent reasons if the explanation is rejected.

Issues: Whether the delay of 15 days in filing the appeal against order dated 17.01.2025, after excluding the period spent by the petitioner in writ proceedings, is liable to be condoned under Section 107(4) of the J&K SGST/CGST Act and whether the appellate authority's order dismissing the appeal as time-barred should be set aside and the matter remitted for adjudication on merits.

Analysis: The limitation period originally expired on 16.04.2025 but, on exclusion of 26 days spent pursuing a writ petition before this Court, the last date for filing the appeal extended to 12.05.2025. The appeal was filed on 28.05.2025, resulting in a 15-day delay. Section 107(4) permits the Appellate Authority to condone delay and allow an appeal to be presented within a further period of one month if satisfied that the appellant was prevented from presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. The reasons advanced by the petitioner for the short delay were neither imaginary nor fanciful, and the appellate authority's reliance on an earlier date (07.05.2025) to deny condonation improperly curtailed the statutory extended window available under Section 107(4). Given the marginal nature of the delay and the explanation furnished, dismissing the appeal on a hyper-technical basis was contrary to the statutory provision permitting condonation.

Conclusion: The delay of 15 days in filing the appeal is condoned under Section 107(4) of the Act; the order dismissing the appeal as time-barred is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Appellate Authority for adjudication of the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the adhoc disallowance of Rs. 15,77,52,570 made by the Assessing Officer by disallowing 10% of certain expense heads was sustainable; (ii) Whether disallowance of Rs. 5,77,79,000 claimed to have been paid to a lender out of interest received in the year was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the adhoc 10% disallowance of specified expense heads could be sustained where no deficiency in supporting evidence was recorded and comparative year analysis showed increases and decreases across different expense heads.

Analysis: The assessment record does not disclose any adverse finding on the sufficiency or genuineness of the supporting evidences for the expenses disallowed. The comparative figures for the relevant assessment years show that while certain expense heads were higher in the impugned year, several other heads (including salary and wages, coordination charges, artiste fees, venue charges) were substantially higher in the subsequent year. The Assessing Officer selected only those heads where expenses were higher and applied a blanket 10% adhoc disallowance without establishing that the expenses were non-genuine or not incurred for business. Reliance on additional materials before the first appellate forum that were not before the Assessing Officer raises issues under Rule 46A but does not justify sustaining an adhoc disallowance in the absence of recorded deficiencies.

Conclusion: The adhoc disallowance of Rs. 15,77,52,570 is not sustainable; decision of the first appellate authority deleting the disallowance is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance of Rs. 5,77,79,000 paid to a lender was sustainable when corresponding interest income was offered in the impugned assessment year.

Analysis: The interest amount was received and offered to tax in the impugned assessment year pursuant to a court order. The payment of Rs. 5,77,79,000 to the lender, who had advanced the original loan, is established on the record and is factually not disputed by the revenue. The corresponding expenditure is thus connected to the income offered in the same year and is allowable.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 5,77,79,000 is not sustainable; decision of the first appellate authority deleting the disallowance is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both substantive issues decided by the Tribunal favour the assessee; the departmental appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed, leaving the first appellate authority's deletions intact.

Ratio Decidendi: An adhoc percentage disallowance of expenses cannot be sustained in the absence of any recorded deficiency in supporting evidence or affirmative finding that expenses were not incurred for business; expenditures corresponding to income offered in the same assessment year are allowable when payment and receipt are established on record.

Issues: Whether, upon approval of a resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the present appeals/proceedings raising demands can be continued or must be abated.

Analysis: The decision applies Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the ruling in Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. (Supreme Court) which holds that once a resolution plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority, claims not included in the resolution plan stand frozen or extinguished and no proceedings in respect of such claims may be initiated or continued. The 2019 amendment to Section 31 is treated as clarificatory and declaratory, and the principle that statutory dues not part of an approved resolution plan cannot be pursued is applied to the present appeals.

Conclusion: The appeals cannot be continued after the approval of the resolution plan and therefore stand abated/closed; the appeals are disposed of accordingly.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax under Reverse Charge Mechanism is payable on foreign currency expenses for overseas film shooting and allied activities; (ii) Whether Rs.30,58,083/- requires reversal for short reversal of cenvat credit on common input services; (iii) Whether Rs.26,16,650/- requires reversal for cenvat credit on input services from RIMT Pvt. Ltd.; (iv) Whether Rs.15,53,293/- requires reversal for cenvat credit on projectors and related maintenance claimed to be used exclusively for exempt services; (v) Whether Rs.21,76,552/- requires reversal for excess availment of cenvat credit in ST-3 returns vis-a-vis cenvat register; (vi) Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 can be imposed.

Issue (i): Whether service tax under Reverse Charge Mechanism is payable on foreign currency expenses for overseas film shooting and allied activities.

Analysis: The Show Cause Notice and adjudication relied solely on balance-sheet figures labelled "expenditure in foreign currency" without identifying the specific taxable service or sub-clause under Section 65(105) for pre-01.07.2012 periods; for post-01.07.2012 periods, Place of Provision of Services Rules apply and Rule 6 (services relating to events and ancillary services) makes the place of provision the location where the event is held. The facts show shooting and related services were performed outside India and many payments related to immovable-property/location services abroad. Precedent and statutory rules require identification of the service and place of provision analysis before invoking RCM.

Conclusion: The demand under RCM on foreign currency expenses is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Rs.30,58,083/- requires reversal for short reversal of cenvat credit on common input services.

Analysis: Rule 6(3A) CCR requires computation based on value of services provided during the financial year; advances and point-of-taxation rules affect inclusion. The appellant applied entity-level proportionate reversal; Revenue computed division-wise excluding advances and included permanent copyright sales wrongly as exempt services.

Conclusion: The alleged short reversal of Rs.30,58,083/- is not sustained and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Rs.26,16,650/- requires reversal for cenvat credit on input services from RIMT Pvt. Ltd.

Analysis: Invoices and corresponding output invoices demonstrate that services from RIMT were content/digital mastering used for taxable output (video tape production); Revenue produced no evidence of use for exempt services; tax was discharged on such services.

Conclusion: The reversal demand of Rs.26,16,650/- is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether Rs.15,53,293/- requires reversal for cenvat credit on projectors and related maintenance.

Analysis: Capital goods (projectors) and maintenance were used for both taxable and exempt supplies; Rule 6(4) restricts denial only when used exclusively for exempt supplies. Evidence shows mixed use and taxable receipts (distributor per-show fees) on which tax was paid.

Conclusion: Denial of cenvat credit of Rs.15,53,293/- is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether Rs.21,76,552/- requires reversal for excess availment of cenvat credit in ST-3 Returns vis-a-vis cenvat register.

Analysis: Records show the appellant reversed the amount in ST-3 returns for Oct 2013-Mar 2014; Revenue's demand duplicates amounts already reversed in statutory returns.

Conclusion: The demand of Rs.21,76,552/- is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 can be imposed.

Analysis: Section 78 penalties require fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression or intent to evade tax. There is no evidence of suppression or fraudulent intent; taxes were paid in several instances and demands were based on accounting differences and unidentifed service classification.

Conclusion: Penalties under Section 78 are not imposable and are set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned demands and penalties addressed in the issues above, and directs consequential reliefs as applicable.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand of service tax founded solely on differences between balance-sheet figures and ST-3 returns, without identification and classification of the specific taxable service or proper place-of-provision analysis, is unsustainable; services performed wholly outside India fall outside Indian RCM liability, and Rule 6 CCR and Point of Taxation Rules govern correct cenvat reversal computation.